


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
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HISTORY
OF
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
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BY
HENRY C. SHELDON
PROFESSOR IN BOSTON UNIVERSITY

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I. — FROM A.D. 90 TO 1517

FOURTH EDITION



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PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

AMONG the responses which were called forth by the first edition of this work not a few contained gratifying references to its impartiality. In one or two instances, however, the regret was expressed that the author had not blended more of his own personality — in other words, more of his own theological convictions — with his account of doctrinal developments. We have not been able to sympathize with this regret. It is still our opinion that there is ample room for a history of doctrine as objective in tone as the present treatise. A contrary character would interfere, we believe, with its proper serviceableness in theological instruction, and would not on the whole increase its utility for private reading.

In the original preparation of the work there was an attempt to bring the history as nearly to date as possible. For the more important developments which have occurred meanwhile, notice has been secured by the revisions which have been made. In preparing the last edition, the author has derived benefit from the suggestions of Dr. Charles H. Paisley.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY,
November, 1905.



CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1

First Period (A. D. 90-320).

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

Section 1.	Philosophy	11
" 2.	Heathen Criticism and Heresies	23
" 3.	Authors and their Works	32
" 4.	Scripture and Tradition	37

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

Section 1.	Existence, Essence, and Attributes of God	53
" 2.	The Logos, or Son of God	63
" 3.	The Holy Spirit	89

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

Section 1.	Creation of the World	93
" 2.	Angels and Demons	95
" 3.	Man	98

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

Section 1.	The Person of Christ	111
" 2.	The Redemptive Work of Christ	115
" 3.	Appropriation of the Benefits of Christ's Work	125

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

	PAGE
Section 1. The Church	133
“ 2. The Sacraments	136

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. Chiliasm	145
2. Condition between Death and the Resurrection	147
3. The Resurrection	150
4. Final Awards	152

**Second Period (A. D. 320-726).**

INTRODUCTION	159
------------------------	-----

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

Section 1. Philosophy	163
“ 2. Monasticism	171
“ 3. The Alliance of Church and State	173
“ 4. Authors and their Chief Works of Dogmatic Import	175
“ 5. Scripture and Tradition	178

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

Section 1. Existence, Essence, and Attributes of God	187
“ 2. The Trinity	194

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

Section 1. Creation of the World	216
“ 2. Angels and Demons	218
“ 3. Man	222

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

	PAGE
Section 1. The Person of Christ	244
“ 2. The Redemptive Work of Christ	251
“ 3. Appropriation of the Benefits of Christ's Work	258

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

Section 1. The Church	268
“ 2. The Sacraments	270

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. Chiliasm	282
2. Condition between Death and the Resurrection	282
3. The Resurrection	285
4. Final Awards	286

Third Period (A. D. 726-1517).

INTRODUCTION	293
------------------------	-----

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

Section 1. Philosophy	301
“ 2. Authors, Schools, and Systems	311
“ 3. Scripture and Tradition	323

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

Section 1. Existence, Essence, and Attributes of God	328
“ 2. The Trinity	337

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

	Page
Section 1. Creation of the World	340
“ 2. Angels	342
“ 3. Man	343

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

Section 1. The Person of Christ	357
“ 2. The Redemptive Work of Christ	361
“ 3. Appropriation of the Benefits of Christ's Work	370

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

Section 1. The Church	384
“ 2. The Sacraments	388

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. Chiliasm	405
2. Condition between Death and the Resurrection	405
3. The Resurrection	407
4. Final Awards	407

APPENDIX.

1. Historical Items respecting the Apostles' Creed	413
2. Augustine's Evolutionary Hypothesis	414
3. Amalrich of Bena and David of Dinanto	415
4. Eckhart	416
5. Tauler and Suso	417
6. Theologia Germanica	418
7. The Waldenses	419
8. Wycliffe and Huss	420
9. John Wessel	422
10. Savonarola	423

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Scripture record, like the stars, is the same from age to age; the words of prophets, the sayings and the deeds of Christ, and the teachings of apostles, are constant luminaries in the moral firmament. As the stars address all men, as they kindle the hearts of all by the spectacle of their glory, as they guide the uncultured sailor as well as the master scientist, so the divine oracles address all men, and speak a language from which all may receive spiritual quickening and guidance.

A still further analogy may be predicated. The starry heavens challenge study and interpretation, in the course of which difficult questions are likely to be raised, and upon these conflicting answers may be, and indeed often have been elicited. In like manner the Scriptures challenge study and interpretation. In many instances they suggest much more than they expressly state. What they give in the shape of historical facts is often fitted to serve as a basis for a whole train of inferences respecting the divine kingdom. So the mind is sent off upon far-reaching paths. What it finds in the pursuit of one topic it naturally wishes to compare with the results of its inquiry upon other topics. Hence theological disquisition, definition, and ultimately the theological system. As the subject is

complex and touches upon the profoundest mysteries, one interpreter is naturally found disagreeing with another. The importance of the subject, as lying within the realm of sacred things and of immortal interests, tends to magnify the import of the disagreement in the eyes of the parties concerned. The result is earnest controversy,—controversy quenched at one point only to break out at another,—controversy threatening to be endless. To save from this calamity, as they regard it, some would say, Cease to dogmatize; cease to trouble yourself and the world with theological definitions and systems; deal with the Scriptures practically, and use them simply for stimulus and direction in righteous living. This advice has the semblance of practical sagacity, and no doubt within certain limits may be healthfully applied; but when designed for a sweeping application it becomes utopian and false. It is to be granted that the one who uses the stellar luminaries simply to enkindle the fires of poetic sentiment, or to guide his voyage, may be profited by them more than the one who becomes absorbed in the mathematics of the skies. It is to be granted that he who uses the Scriptures simply to warm his heart and to enliven his imagination by glimpses of spiritual beauty and majesty, or to guide his conduct by maxims of practical wisdom, may be more benefited by the sacred Word than the one who is occupied with constructing the exact definition and the comprehensive theological system. In either sphere a purely intellectual absorption may stand in the way of acquiring the best riches. But no one on this account thinks of putting a veto on astronomical science; no more should one think of putting a veto upon theological science, or, in other words, upon exact definition and systematic arrangement in connection with the topics of theology. Such a veto would be useless. The scientific impulse of the human mind cannot be held in fetters in any sphere, and must assert itself in the region of religious thought as well as in

any other. Indeed, there is a sacred obligation that it should be so asserted; for while an abnormal engrossment in the intellectual tends to rob the heart and to impoverish the spiritual nature, that nature is enriched by all consecrated use of the intellect. Clear and comprehensive views, searching and subtile thoughts, when not perverted into a mere instrument of mental gymnastics, are an abundant spring of holy emotion and endeavor.

It has been, therefore, in obedience to a natural and normal impulse that the Church in all ages has attempted a construction of Christian doctrine. Its work, however, in this direction, while in part normal, has often been carried on in a wrong temper and by illegitimate methods. Force has often invaded the domain of reason, and free thought has been crushed before an arrogant assumption of infallibility. Factors alien to the essence of Christianity have crept into the Church. False dogmas have sometimes been invented to give countenance to false customs, or to minister to hierarchical pride. Tradition has usurped in no small degree the place of revelation, and theologians have comported themselves like the astronomer who should judge the stars by the theories of some ancient star-gazer, rather than the theories by the facts which may be gained from the stars themselves. Reaction against such perversions has not always stopped at the right limit. Extreme dogmas have been opposed by extreme dogmas. Radicalism has sometimes been as indiscriminate in tearing down as conservatism has been in retaining. In consideration of the alternation between doing and undoing, the reviewer may be reminded of the weaving of Penelope, and be led to question the reality of any progress toward the perfect fabric of Christian doctrine. Upon a deeper scrutiny of the subject, however, he will be likely to adopt a more hopeful verdict; he will remind himself that it is wellnigh inevitable, in a sphere so deep and complex as is that of Christian thought, that progress should be made

through an alternation of advances and retreats, or at the expense of many false and abnormal movements.

The course of doctrinal development, whether it has been normal or abnormal, is replete with interest and instruction. The investigator who is ready to scrutinize it with due care and energy will derive at least two great advantages. In the first place, he will find illustrations of the natural tendencies, theoretical and practical, of different doctrinal positions. In the second place, he will gain a needful preparation for a proper understanding and appreciation of the different doctrinal systems of the present. A thing is completely known only as its antecedents are known. To understand well the theological world of the present, one must go back and consult the process of its formation.

The history of Christian doctrine, as a branch or discipline receiving distinct and general recognition, is of quite recent date. Most of the works upon the subject, in which an historical rather than a polemical spirit is dominant, have appeared within the present century.

The place which the history of doctrine occupies is easily defined. The importance and extent of its subject matter make it worthy of a special treatment apart from general church history. At the same time the dogmatic writer has repeated occasion to refer to the facts of doctrinal history. To do this without being cumbrous, he must take ascertained results, instead of indulging in lengthy investigations. His work presupposes a treatise in which exact historical criticism has already been accomplished. The history of doctrine, therefore, holds an intermediate place between general church history and systematic theology. It supplements the former and prepares for the latter.

In conducting this branch, it is an obvious rule that the chief attention should be bestowed upon the main current of doctrinal thought in each successive era. The subordinate and less characteristic developments must receive only

a subordinate place. Mere curiosities of individual opinion or speculation, if noticed at all, must be touched very lightly. Space is to be given to a consideration of philosophy, of heresies, and of the secular power, in proportion to the breadth and permanence of the influence which they have exerted upon the cardinal movements of the theological world.

Several cautions need to be kept in mind by the investigator. As Gieseler remarks, care must be taken not to credit an age with more definite ideas than those really entertained. Dogmas have sometimes had their starting-point in the indeterminate. Now, to take advantage of this primeval mist, and to say that it covers the complete dogma of after times, is a great sin against the truth. It is an unwarranted leap, for example, to conclude that the doctrine of transubstantiation was entertained in the early centuries, simply because we find here the idea that a special sanctity, or perchance even an ineffable presence, pertains to the elements of the eucharistic service. Again, it is to be remembered that identity of phraseology is far from being a sure proof of identity of doctrinal belief in different ages. The rhetoric of one era may become the dogmatic teaching of another.

Historians are not fully agreed as to the proper division into periods. As it seems to us, the first period ought to extend to the reign of Constantine. Whatever transitions there may have been previously, that which the Church experienced under the first Christian Emperor was far more marked. We meet here, not merely a new order of external circumstances, but a new order of theologians and of theological discussions. The exact year that shall be fixed upon as the limit of the period is a matter of subordinate concern. In general church history there are good reasons for fixing upon the year 313, when the Milan edict of toleration was issued, since this marks the relative close of the heathen persecutions, and supplies an opportunity to take a

connected view of the whole administration of Constantine as a patron of Christianity; but in the history of doctrine the person of the Emperor claims less consideration; and the dividing line may well be drawn at the beginning of the Arian controversy, about the year 320. This division will enable us to locate Lactantius in the first period, where in truth he belongs, since his writings contain nothing which specially reminds us of the Arian era. The second period is appropriately made to include the whole chain of related controversies which agitated the Christian Empire at large. Having this scope, it could not end before the year 680, and there are reasons for extending it on to about the year 726. This date brings us to John of Damascus, the great dogmatic authority of the mediæval Greek Church. It brings us also to the iconoclastic controversy which alienated the Papacy from the Eastern Empire, stimulated its endeavors to build up an independent Western Empire, and so helped toward the unrestricted development of the Latin type of Christianity. The limit of the third period is of course the opening of the Reformation. A precise historical turning-point, which may serve as a limit of a fourth period, is not easily found. There are quite substantial reasons, however, for drawing a dividing line about the year 1720. This brings us to the neighborhood of Moravianism under Zinzendorf, and of Methodism under the Wesleys. It is also a date which is favorably related to a consideration of the great rationalistic movement of modern times. To be sure, it does not place us at the very beginning of English Deism, for Lord Herbert, Shaftesbury, and Toland came upon the stage before 1720; but it does place us before the deistical writers of England whose works were most influential upon the Continent; before the principal work of Collins, his "Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion," published in 1724; before Woolston, whose "Discourses on the Miracles" appeared in 1727-29; before Tindal, whose "Christianity as Old as

Creation" was published in 1730, and translated into German in 1741; before Morgan also, and Chubb, and Bolingbroke. As respects France, this date brings us to the eve of scepticism as led by Voltaire. In Germany it marks the rise of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy, which served actually, if not designedly, among the factors contributing to the initiation and spread of German rationalism. A fifth period is properly extended to the present. We have then these five periods:—

- I. From the close of the Apostolic Age to 320.
- II. From 320 to 726.
- III. From 726 to 1517.
- IV. From 1517 to 1720.
- V. From 1720 to the present.

Each of these periods has its distinguishing characteristic, though this is not to be asserted in any case in a too exclusive sense. In the first period it was necessary to defend Christianity as a whole against heathenism, and also against heresies so radical as to assail the very essence of the Christian faith. It may therefore be called the Age of Apology. The second, as the period of sharp controversy over individual points of the Christian system, may be termed the Age of Polemics. The third, or the mediæval period, was characterized by the endeavor to systematize and to defend the existing faith of the Church, and is known as the Age of Scholasticism. In the fourth period Protestantism was called upon to define and to vindicate its position against Romanism; on the other hand, Romanism was stimulated to make an elaborate and authoritative restatement of its faith; Protestantism, moreover, became divided into a number of communions, each ardently bent upon vindicating its own special tenets; controversies and creeds abounded; the period is fitly termed, especially as regards Protestantism, the Age of Confessions. In the fifth period the doctrinal movement has

been exceedingly complex, and it is difficult to give a brief statement of its leading characteristics. Perhaps we describe as amply as is possible in a single sentence, when we say that the period has been distinguished by an assertion of the claims of reason against those of revelation, or of the natural against those of the supernatural, together with attempts to reconcile the opposing claims. It appears pre-eminently as the Age of Strife and of Attempted Reconciliation.

First Period.

FROM THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO 320.

First Period.

FROM THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO 320.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I.—PHILOSOPHY.

It was a just discrimination which led early Christianity to seek, especially in the great middle era of Greek culture, for a congenial philosophy. The philosophical developments beginning with Socrates and ending with Aristotle have at the same time the greatest intrinsic worth and the highest interest from the Christian standpoint. In the pre-Socratic philosophies there was little that was suited to engage the appreciation of a Christian writer of the first centuries. Their spirit and content were in general remote from a truly theological vein. The drift of their investigation was neither toward God as a moral sovereign, nor toward man as the subject of a moral dominion. The great problem with them was to find out the element or principle underlying the phenomenal world. In some instances the attempt was made to explain the universe by physical analogies, and first principles of a material nature were assumed. This was the case with the Ionian school. In other instances speculation tended to idealism, and first principles of a metaphysical nature were adopted. This was the case with the Pythagoreans and the Eleatic school.

In individual instances a recognition was given to both orders of principles. This was especially the case with Anaxagoras (an important forerunner of Socrates), who made a clear distinction between the world of mind and the world of matter. An occasional reference, of a worthy character, to a Supreme Being, may no doubt be found in these early philosophies; but in the main they paid little tribute to that which is of the highest concern in Christian thought,—to God as the centre of moral excellence and dominion, to man's relations with God, and to the far-reaching import of moral conduct.

The post-Aristotelian philosophy, as represented by the Epicureans and the Stoics, had at least one point of connection with Christianity. Both of these schools assumed to be practical. In contrast with the speculative cast of the pre-Socratic philosophies, they were mainly concerned with the life, and sought an ideal standard for the regulation of individual conduct. The leading problem with them was how to master and to utilize the conditions of this present world. The age naturally fostered such an inquiry. It was an age of political decline, of uncertainty, of turmoil and disruption. Outward circumstances could not be trusted. Hence there was an occasion to think upon life, and to lay hold of some definite rule for its conduct, some standard by which its experiences might be estimated.

Neither of these two schools, however, presented a rule or measure in true harmony with Christianity. Epicureanism made pleasure the standard. It taught that every pleasure is in itself a good, and that it becomes an evil only as it stands in the way of a greater pleasure. It pointed the individual to no immutable standard of right, to no God who requites conduct. To such phantom-like gods as it chose to recognize, it assigned no interest whatever in the affairs of this world. Its panacea against all fear of death and the future was the dogma that there is nothing after death. In fine, the best principle of Epicureanism was

nothing higher than a certain prudence in the choice of pleasures. "With coarse and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus would inevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whose temperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it would develop a refined selfishness, a perfect egoism, which Epicurus has adorned with the name 'tranquillity of mind.'" (B. F. Cocker, *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*.)

Stoicism was much more healthful in tone. It made virtue, or a life conformed to reason, the supreme good, taught the doctrine of the brotherhood of the race, and laid great stress upon resignation to one's lot in life. Many of its maxims were agreeable to Christian ethics, and it was not without an approach to a leading theological tenet in its stress upon an all-ruling Reason or Logos. Nevertheless, Stoicism had but a limited kinship with Christianity. Its view of God and the world was pantheistic rather than theistic, and it was only by an inconsistency that it could give any place to divine providence or to human freedom in the proper sense. Whatever scope it may have allowed to a life after death, it denied the immortality of the soul. Its doctrine of a universal brotherhood was accompanied by little of heart-impelling force. The resignation, too, of which it made so much account, was not the Christian virtue of the same name; the resignation of the Stoic was a determined will repressing murmurings, rather than the submission of a meek and lowly heart casting itself upon Eternal Love. Indeed, the marked tendency of Stoicism was to nurture the antichristian spirit of pride and self-sufficiency. Epictetus and some others may not reveal this tendency; still it was inherent in the system.

Of the two great authors who represent the crowning era of Greek philosophy, both were by no means equally qualified to receive a welcome within the circle of early Christianity. While Aristotle had his special pre-eminence, destined to a special recognition in the age of Scholasti-

cism, it was not of a character to commend itself to the theologians of the first centuries. Their interest lay not so much in the direction of analysis and system as in that of spirit and subject-matter. Naturally, therefore, they were specially attracted by the writings of Plato, with their soaring spirit and deep ethical vein.

Among the features of Platonism commending it to the appreciation of Christianity, the following held an important place:—1. It was theistic. There are, to be sure, some representations in the Platonic writings which might be thought to have an adverse bearing toward the proper theistic theory, or the theory of a supreme *personal* God. In the doctrine of Ideas, a pre-eminence is assigned to the Idea of the Good. It is ranked so high as seemingly to leave no place for anything higher. The Idea of the Good is described as that which imparts truth to the object and knowledge to the subject; as being in the intellectual world what the sun is in the visible world; as the author, not only of the knowledge in all things known, but of their being and essence; as lord of light in this world and source of truth and reason in the other; as the highest and best in the sphere of being. (Republic, Bks. VI., VII., Jowett's translation.) Such language, no doubt, favors the conclusion that Deity, if affirmed at all, is to be identified with the Idea of the Good; and the Idea of the Good is naturally suggestive of the impersonal rather than the personal. Still, the exegesis which would deny the doctrine of a personal God to Plato is utterly at fault. There are eminent interpreters who hold that Plato entertained a consistent theory as to the relation of God to the Ideas. Thus Ritter says that the Platonic Ideas denote "certain determinations of the divine reason." (History of Ancient Philosophy.) According to this, the Idea of the Good would be nothing else than the most fundamental and inclusive aspect of the divine reason. Upon this point, however, it is not necessary to pronounce. Whether Plato clearly defined to himself or

not the relation of God to the Ideas, he entertained and taught the theory of a personal God. "Plato," says Zeller, "often speaks of God as a person; and we have no right to see in this only a conscious adaptation of his language to the popular religious notions. Such a mode of representation was indispensable to him, on account of the immobility of ideas, in order to explain phenomena." (Plato and the Older Academy.) In the Platonic writings God is described as the only wise, as the author of good, but far removed from any agency in the production of evil; as unchangeable, incapable of falsehood, the fairest and best that is conceivable, absolutely perfect in all his attributes; the Father of the universe, who framed all things after an eternal and unchangeable pattern; the careful Creator and Ruler, who attends to the perfecting of the small as well as of the great; the true measure of all things. (See in particular Bk. II. of the Republic, the Timæus, and Bks. IV. and X. of the Laws.) 2. Platonism embraced elevated and spiritual views of the proper aims and acquisitions of the soul. It asserted three truths of the utmost import; namely, that there exist immeasurable and imperishable riches, that these are attainable by the human spirit, that they are not to be found in the phenomenal world. With a confidence truly sublime and quickening, Platonism from first to last affirmed that in the region of the supersensible exist realities absolutely superior to the imperfection and vanity of earth. In the Symposium, for example, we have a description of an absolute beauty, which knows no waxing or waning; which, without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things; which endows the one in true communion with itself with power to bring forth, not mere images of beauty, but realities. A like description is applied in the Republic to the absolute good, in the contemplation of which it is said that the soul is made radiant with intelligence,

and delivered from the twilight of varying opinion in which he dwells who does not rise above the seen and the temporal. (Bk. VI.) The attitude toward these invisible realities is made the test of wisdom, and to discard them in any sphere is declared to be folly. "I conceive," says the chief speaker in the Laws, "that the true lawgiver aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit, when separated from virtue." (Bk. IV.) The praise which is rendered to love in the Symposium may be regarded as a tribute to the same truth; for love, according to the Platonic conception, is deep regard for and yearning after the perfect and everlasting. The phraseology of Plato is, to be sure, contrasted to some extent with the Christian. He does not make that definite association between all this unspeakable reality and the person of God which belongs to Christian thought; yet it is so easy to supply the connecting link that the effect is almost the same as if it had been distinctly affirmed. Men of deep and mystical piety in all ages have used the Platonic representations as descriptive of divine perfections, and have been stimulated thereby in their aspirations after union with God. Moreover, Plato is not far from stating that the soul has its everlasting portion in God, and that the vision of Him is the true beatific vision. He represents God as enriching with His friendship the man who strives to be like Him, and describes the departure of such a man from this world as a journey toward the good God.

3. Platonism taught the immortality of the soul, and was characterized by an earnest and solemn tone in reference to future awards. "I am confident in the belief," Socrates is reported as saying, "that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil." Among the philosophical grounds of this confidence, the uncompounded nature of the soul and its power

of self-motion are adduced. "The soul," he says, "is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable." (Phædo.) "If the soul be truly affirmed to be self-moving, then must she also be without beginning and immortal." (Phædrus.) In proportion to this stretch of being before the soul is the import of her moral conduct here. "O my friends," exclaims Socrates, "if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not merely in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful." (Phædo.) "No man but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below, having a soul which is like a vessel full of injustice, is the last and worst of evils." (Gorgias.) Future punishment, according to Plato, is in the main corrective, continuing perchance for ages, but finding an ultimate limit. It is possible, however, for sin to become incurable and unpardonable. Men who have indulged the extreme of wickedness, especially those who, like the tyrant, have abused high and sacred trusts, pass under a hopeless doom. "Such are hurled into Tartarus, which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out." (Phædo and Gorgias.) As respects the nature of punishment, Plato gives expression to the rational view, that the greatest penalty of evil-doing "is to grow into the likeness of bad men, and, growing like them, to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad." (Laws, Bk. V.)

Other approaches to Christian ideas might be mentioned. We find the opinion that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but the gift of God. (Meno.) We are taught that "we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him." (Crito.) Very important contrasts, no doubt, may be spe-

cified between Plato's philosophy and Christianity. Even those representations which most remind us of the Gospel, when interpreted in connection with his general system, are sometimes found to differ quite materially from the Scriptural teachings. Still the points of real kinship are numerous and palpable.

Among the early fathers, Justin Martyr indicates a general preference for Platonism by his more frequent reference to this system than to any other, as also by the statement that it came the nearest to satisfying his heart prior to his acquaintance with Christianity. (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, II.) Theophilus mentions Plato as "the most respectable" among philosophers. (*Ad Autolicum*, III. 6.) Clement of Alexandria speaks of the "truth-loving Plato," and though he claims that the eclectic method, which selects the best elements from the several philosophies, is the true one, shows nevertheless quite a decided leaning to Platonism. (*Stromata*, Lib. I. cap. 7, 8.) Minucius Felix remarks: "Plato has a clearer discourse [than the other philosophers] about God, both in the matters themselves and in the names by which he expresses them; and his discourse would be altogether heavenly, if it were not occasionally fouled by a mixture of merely civil belief." (*Octavius*, XIX.) Arnobius styles Plato "that sublime head and pillar of philosophers," and also speaks of him as "the divine Plato, many of whose thoughts are worthy of God." (*Adv. Gentes*, I. 8; II. 36.) Lactantius mentions Plato as being, in the common judgment, the wisest of all philosophers, and asserts Cicero's claim to the rank of a philosopher on the ground that he was an imitator of Plato. (*Divine Institutes*, I. 5, 15.) No such ample line of favorable references as the above can be found to Aristotle in the writings of the early fathers. It is quite clear, therefore, that their preference was given to Plato. Perhaps we shall approach as near as possible to accuracy by saying that the philosophy of cultured Christians of the first three

centuries was an eclectic system, in which Platonism held a decided pre-eminence so far as factors from the heathen world are concerned.

As respects the worth of heathen philosophy as a whole, a considerable difference appears in the estimates of different church fathers. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, are examples of the most favorable estimate. Justin Martyr imputes to every race of men a share in the Word, that is, the divine reason or enlightening principle, and says of the heathen philosophers, poets, and sages, that "each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic Word." (1 Apol., XLVI.; 2 Apol., XIII.) Clement of Alexandria is still more positive and explicit in recognizing a divine factor in the heathen learning. He does not hesitate to declare that philosophy "is in a sense a work of Divine Providence," and says that it had the office of a "schoolmaster to bring the Hellenic mind to Christ. . . . As the proclamation [of the Gospel] has come now at the fit time, so also at the fit time were the law and the prophets given to the barbarians, and philosophy to the Greeks, to fit their ears for the Gospel." Not only did it train the Greeks in righteousness, but it serves still as a kind of preparatory training to those who attain to faith through demonstration, or it supplements the faith already entertained by supplying greater breadth of view and greater firmness of conviction. (Stromata, I. 1, 2, 5, 7; VI. 6, 17.) Origen in open terms paid less tribute to philosophy than Clement; but indirectly he recognized it still more, since he imported it more largely into his own system of thought.

It is not to be imagined, however, that any of the fathers in their appreciation of philosophy were inclined to assign it a co-ordinate place with the Gospel. "Philosophy," says Ackermann, "was of little value to them, as such; and their estimation of it, whether slight or high, had respect only to its agency as preparatory to Christianity and as conducive

to the development of Christian faith. Their commendation did not proceed from a heart divided between Plato and Christ; their whole ardor and enthusiasm was unalterably directed to the Lord; and when they pointed with commendation to Plato, this was only because he seemed to them to point to Christ, and because, in their opinion, if he had lived till the time of Christ, he would have fallen in homage before the Lord Jesus, and would have beheld with joy the realization of his ideals in and through Him." (The Christian Element in Plato.) The same writers who have been quoted as commending philosophy are emphatic in their declarations of its insufficiency, and indeed of its poverty, as compared with the Christian revelation. Both Justin and Clement are found qualifying the relative merit of the philosophers by the supposition that they obtained their noblest thoughts from the Jewish Scriptures. (1 Apol., XLIV.; Strom., V. 1, 5.) Both affirm the fragmentary nature of the Greek wisdom. Justin teaches that, whereas lawgivers and philosophers were permitted to gaze only upon some part of truth, and so often fell into contradiction with themselves, truth full-orbed and entire has been manifested in Christ. (2 Apol., X.) The sects of the philosophers, says Clement, have treated truth as the Bacchantes treated Pentheus when they tore his limbs asunder; they have torn off "a fragment of eternal truth, not from the mythology of Dionysus, but from the theology of the ever-living Word." Besides its failure to comprehend the whole truth, the Hellenic philosophy is destitute of strength to perform the commandments of the Lord. "Philosophers are children unless they have been made men by Christ." (Strom., I. 11, 13, 16.) "The Gospel," says Origen, "has a demonstration of its own more divine than any established by Grecian dialectics." (Contra Celsum, I. 2.)

Irenæus appears to have occupied a comparatively neutral position, neither specially opposing nor specially com-

mending heathen philosophy. In one instance he quotes Plato in favorable contrast with the Gnostic heretics. (*Contra Hæreses*, III. 25. 5.) An historical, practical interest was dominant with this eminent exponent of Christian faith and life.

On the part of some of the fathers, we find wellnigh a wholesale disparagement of philosophy. Tatian questions whether any noble thing has been produced by philosophy, and says of the philosophers that they "dogmatize one against another, though each one vents but the crude fancies of the moment." (*Oratio ad Græcos*, II., III.) Tertullian acknowledges that philosophers have sometimes entertained truths which are held by Christians. But he gives them no special credit for the possession, since, as he maintains, they have come to it by chance, as a ship might fortunately make harbor in the dense darkness, or else by virtue of that intelligence which is common to all men. He sees a strong presumption against philosophers, in the fact that they have supplied to heresy its chief arsenal, and indeed may fairly be named "patriarchs of heretics." He concludes, therefore, that all fellowship with philosophy should be disclaimed. "What," he exclaims, "has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from the porch of Solomon. Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the Gospel!" (*De Præscriptione Hæreticorum*, VII.; *De Anima*, II., III.) As if to predicate the most extreme opposition possible, he says (referring to Christ's death and resurrection), "It is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd; the fact is certain, because it is impossible." (*De Carne Christi*, V.) Such language, however, is not to be taken too seriously. Tertullian speaks here, as in many instances, in

hyperboles; and probably meant little else than the commonly accepted truth, that many things incredible to the natural man are most worthy of God, and altogether within the compass of His power. In his own range Tertullian was among the most alert of men to find reasons for his faith. With Lactantius also we find on the whole a very adverse estimate of heathen philosophy. In his view, its theoretical value is reduced wellnigh to nothing by the disagreements of its exponents, while its want of practical value is clearly proved by its failure to reform the lives of its votaries. (Div. Inst., Lib. III.)

It may justly be concluded from the above review, that the Catholic fathers in general had little inclination to consult heathen philosophy for the substance of any part of their teaching. They reveal everywhere a conviction of the superiority and adequacy of their own oracles as regards the essence of religious truth. We are warned, therefore, against assuming a too radical influence from philosophy upon their teaching. At the same time, it must be conceded that philosophy was somewhat of a factor in the doctrinal developments of the period. 1. In so far as it contributed to the rise of heresies, it supplied an occasion for a definite construction of Christian doctrines. 2. It nurtured in quite a proportion of the fathers a tendency to speculative thought, a tendency to explore Christianity upon its theoretical side, instead of being wholly occupied with its practical aspects. 3. It colored the exposition of certain points of Christian theology. Platonism, for example, directly or indirectly modified the mode of expounding the doctrine of the Logos. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the substance of this doctrine came from Platonism, or that even the form of its exposition was not under obligation to other than Platonic antecedents. 4. It supplied to the most speculative of the fathers some of their less central tenets. Origen, for instance, adopted the Platonic theory of the pre-existence of

souls, and gave it considerable importance in his system of thought.

Neo-Platonism had its origin in this period. As a developed system, however, it came after the great majority of the ante-Nicene fathers. The more conspicuous examples of its influence belong to the next period. It will be of practical advantage, therefore, to defer its consideration.

SECTION II. — HEATHEN CRITICISM AND HERESIES.

Heathen assaults upon the persons and upon the faith of Christians served as a direct occasion of doctrinal development. In order to justify themselves before the persecuting power, and to moderate its fury, it was necessary to answer the charges that were made against their conduct and their beliefs. These charges in the first instance were only brief comments expressive of contempt or abhorrence. But after the middle of the second century more ample notice began to be taken of Christianity by heathen authors, and we have the ironical portraiture by Lucian, and the serious attempts at refutation by Celsus and Porphyry. References of either sort were a challenge to Christian writers, and their replies involved an effort at the definite construction and clear statement of Christian doctrines.

Not less was the incentive which came from heresies. It was with no false sense of their responsibility that the fathers of the Church set themselves with full vigor against those alien systems which used the name of Christianity to cover dogmas contradictory to its essence. In this early formative period, when there was no record of long-established creeds to exercise a conservative influence, it was exceedingly important that all corruptions and counterfeits of Christianity should be thoroughly exposed and vanquished. The circumstances of the case warranted the zeal which was expended upon the refutation of heresies.

At the same time, this very zeal was attended with its own dangers, and it cannot be said that it was always wisely directed. Aversion to heresy tended in some instances to an abnormal emphasis upon ecclesiastical authority. In the region of pure dogma, also, ardor in opposing one extreme sometimes inclined the disputant toward the opposite extreme.

The heresies of the first three centuries may be assigned to three principal groups: (1.) The Jewish; (2.) The Gnostic and Manichæan; (3.) The Monarchian. In the estimate of the early Church, Montanism was also a heresy. No doubt the emphasis which it laid upon extraordinary spiritual gifts, especially upon prophesying in ecstatic condition, could easily serve as a door to dogmatic innovation. In fact, however, it assailed no important doctrine of the current orthodoxy. Its fault was in the line of addition rather than of rejection. An ultra supernaturalism and an ascetic morality were its distinguishing characteristics.

JEWISH HERESY.—As the writings of Paul abundantly indicate, there was a party of Judaizers in the apostolic age which troubled the Church by insisting upon the necessity of keeping the law of Moses. Persistence in this teaching could not fail to develop the party into a sect. In the second century we find a sect of Judaizers mentioned under the general name of Ebionites. So they are styled by Irenæus (I. 26. 2). Hippolytus and Origen, in the third century, employ the same designation (*Philosophumena*, VII. 22; *Cont. Cel.*, II. 1 and V. 61). Irenæus and Hippolytus specify no distinctions among the Ebionites, but Origen speaks of them as a twofold sect; and at an earlier date Justin Martyr had indicated that there were two general classes among the Judaizers. The distinction expressed by Justin lay in the fact that one class insisted that all must keep the Mosaic law; while the other kept it themselves, without, however, insisting upon its universal observance. According to Origen, one class denied and

the other accepted the supernatural conception of Christ. This latter class is probably to be associated with the more liberal party mentioned by Justin, as also with the Nazarenes, who still maintained some congregations in Syria at the end of the fourth century. Both parties held the doctrine of Christ's second coming and personal reign upon earth. The more rigid class, in harmony with their theory of the continued validity of the Mosaic law, utterly repudiated Paul's claim to the apostolic office. In the view of this faction, Christ was a mere man, conceived in the ordinary way, and distinguished only by a peculiar endowment of the Holy Spirit, which he enjoyed from the time of his baptism. In some instances the Ebionite doctrines were combined with a speculative bent, and Jewish and Gnostic elements were brought within the compass of the same system. This was the case with the teaching of Cerinthus, who figured in Asia Minor in the later years of the Apostle John. Both orders of elements appear also in the Pseudo-Clementine writings (Homilies, Recognitions, and Epitome, the first being the most original and important), which were produced after the middle of the second century.

The Ebionites, as a distinct sect, were undoubtedly of small consequence numerically. It may also confidently be affirmed, that the distinctive tenets of Ebionism never found place with any large fraction of the Christian body after the Church had reached wide limits in the Gentile world. A contrary view has indeed been asserted. Some have had the courage to maintain that the Church, even far into the second century, was largely dominated by Ebionite views, at least as respects the person of Christ. One of the main evidences quoted for this theory is found in the statements of Hegesippus, the extant fragments of whose writings are contained for the most part in the Church History of Eusebius. After giving an account of his journey to Rome, about the year 160, Hegesippus adds, "In every succession and in every city the doctrine pre-

vails according to what is declared by the law and prophets and the Lord." (Euseb., IV. 22.) In another place he speaks with enthusiastic praise of the ascetic piety of James the Just. From this it is concluded that he had a Jewish bias, that he was in fact an Ebionite, and, since the doctrines of the various churches were agreeable to his mind, it follows that they were also Ebionite. To this is added his adverse comment upon a sentence in one of Paul's Epistles, which Gobarus, a Monophysite of the sixth century, adduces. (Photius, Bibl., CCXXXII.) The comment is thought to prove a rejection of Paul's authority, and hence the acceptance of the Ebionite standpoint.

As respects this line of argument, it is to be observed that there are two distinct points to be considered: first, the doctrinal position of Hegesippus himself; and secondly, that of the churches about which he testifies. It is conceivable that Hegesippus might have been an Ebionite, and at the same time that his testimony about the churches, so far as it implies an agreement with his Ebionism, might be false, and capable of being proved false by overwhelming evidence. But it is by no means clear that Hegesippus was an Ebionite. His description of James the Just scarcely goes further toward proving him an Ebionite than it does toward proving the same of Eusebius, who not only quotes his description, but adds himself an expression of admiration for the character of James. The utmost conclusion that this passage would authorize is that Hegesippus was of Jewish antecedents, was by disposition an admirer of ascetic piety, and was specially acquainted with the history of the church at Jerusalem. As regards the comment quoted by Gobarus, we have no proper assurance that Hegesippus had at all in mind the words of Paul, or aimed his strictures against their Pauline sense. (Neander.) A single isolated statement of this kind ought surely not to be allowed to outweigh the commendation of Eusebius, who had before him the writings of Hegesippus. How could Eusebius

speak of him as a distinguished champion of the truth against heretical impieties (IV. 7, 8), if there was anything in his productions which showed him to be an Ebionite? How could the same historian who condemns the "absurdity" and "irreligion" of the Ebionites (III. 27) bestow such high praise upon an Ebionite author? "As respects his Christological views," says Dorner, "the charge that he was an Ebionite is utterly unfounded." (History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.) This makes it at least uncertain that the testimony of Hegesippus is at all in favor of assuming an Ebionite character in the churches of his day. But upon this point his testimony is not needed. The assumption that at the middle of the second century a large portion of the churches, including some holding the most representative position, professed an Ebionite type of doctrine, is abundantly disproved. It is contradicted by every argument for the genuineness of John's Gospel, of most of the Epistles also, and indeed of the greater part of the New Testament. It is contradicted by the major part of the writings of the apostolic fathers. It is contradicted by the writings of Justin Martyr and the apologists who followed him, all contemporaries of Hegesippus, who assumed to be representatives of the general Church of their time, and have always been recognized as such. It is contradicted by the statements of Irenæus, who wrote his great work at just about the same time that Hegesippus was engaged upon his production, and only about two decades after the journey of the latter to Rome (both apparently having written when Eleutherus was Bishop of Rome). Irenæus was in no wise inclined to Ebionism, and sets forth a creed which in important points contradicts Ebionism, and declares this to be the creed of the universal Church of his time. "The Church," he says, "having received this preaching and this faith, although scattered throughout the whole world, yet, as if occupying but one house, carefully preserves it. . . . The churches

which have been planted in Germany do not believe or hand down anything different, nor do those in Spain, nor those in Gaul, nor those in the East, nor those in Egypt, nor those in Libya, nor those which have been established in the central regions of the world." (I. 10.)

GNOSTICISM AND MANICHÆISM. — Gnosticism was embodied not so much in an organized sect as in a multitude of shifting schools. With few exceptions, among which Marcion is especially noteworthy, its representatives were possessed far more by a speculative than by a practical bent. The rise of Gnosticism may be referred in general to a false conservatism. As many Jews wished to import Judaism into Christianity, so many heathen, when they adopted the Christian name, wished to carry their heathenism with them, or at least some factors of it, and so mingled with the new system speculative tenets of an entirely alien cast. Among specific causes were the spirit of intellectual aristocracy, so largely dominant in the ancient world, Oriental mysticism, and a deep but misguided sense of the power of evil. The materials employed were as varied as the Gnostic sects were numerous. The different systems of Greek philosophy, Judaism, and the various religions of the Orient, were all laid under contribution. The most notable and influential factor borrowed from Christianity was the great idea of redemption. Clear indications of the existence of Gnostic heresy are found in the writings of the Apostles Paul and John; but the era of its rankest growth and widest influence was the second century.

The Gnostic systems (to use substantially the same description which we have employed elsewhere) agreed, in the main, upon the following points. God is the unfathomable abyss, exalted above all contact with the creature world. From God an unfoldment has proceeded, His attributes or powers going forth in personal form, the first emanations serving as sources for those more remote, until a chain of celestial beings, or æons, appears between the

supreme Father and the material realm. The material is the seat of evil, something essentially opposed to the divine. The fashioner of the material world, the Jehovah of the Old Testament, is a subordinate being, standing below even the æons, and representing psychical rather than spiritual existence. The Saviour is a being from the æonic world, who united himself with Jesus of Nazareth. This union, however, which was only temporary, was not of the nature of a real incarnation, and involved no subjection to bodily needs and sufferings. Men are by nature divided into different moral classes, and so fitted for different destinies. No member of a lower class can transcend the circle which fate, or an absolute predestination, has drawn about him.

Among the features distinguishing Gnostic systems from each other were the different degrees of dualism which they affirmed. The Syrian were in general more dualistic than the Alexandrian. Some, much after the fashion of the Indian pantheists, regarded the material realm as the region of emptiness and illusion, the void opposite of the *pleroma*, that is, of the æonic realm, or the world of reality and spiritual fulness; others assigned a more positive nature to the material, and regarded it as capable of an evil aggressiveness, even apart from any quickening by the incoming of life from above. Some sects were less hostile to Old Testament Judaism than others. Hence, while some represented Jehovah as a positively malicious being, others represented him as merely a limited being, unconsciously fulfilling the will of a higher power. In their use of the Scriptures, the Gnostics generally were very arbitrary; but some were disposed to sustain their views chiefly by far-fetched allegorizing, while others rejected outright large portions of the Bible, and worked over the remainder to suit their own ideas. In their moral codes there were also notable differences. Contempt of the world led some to adopt in theory and practice a strict asceticism; others pleaded the same thing as a ground of license, and ran into an extreme Antinomianism.

Manichæism, which arose in the latter part of the third century, was, like Gnosticism, a mixture of heathenism with Christianity. It differed from average Gnosticism by its smaller appropriation of Christian ideas, its more radical and undisguised naturalism, and its more thorough organization.

MONARCHIANISM. — Between the closing part of the second century and the third quarter of the next century two series of Monarchians or Anti-trinitarians appeared. One of these (not to mention the obscure sect of the Alogians) was represented by Theodotus and Artemon, who were condemned at Rome not far from the year 200, and finally culminated in Paul of Samosata, whose condemnation and deposition from the bishopric of Antioch were pronounced in 269. The other series, the so-called Patripassian, began at Rome with Praxeas, near the end of the second century, was represented also by Noetus, and probably by Beryllus of Bostra, and at last culminated in Sabellius, who was excommunicated in Alexandria in 261.

Some of this list of Monarchians had probably only a local influence as respects winning adherents, and it may be questioned whether a very extensive following was gained by any of them. The fact that Monarchianism appeared at the same time in two diverse types, and was generally condemned, indicates that, as a whole, it was no product of the traditions of the Church, but rather a speculative attempt to get over certain difficulties pertaining to the Christian system.

Paul of Samosata and Sabellius appear as the most significant representatives of their respective classes. Both held to the single personality of the Godhead, this being the common tenet of Monarchianism. But on the question whether the one divine person was incarnated, they answered differently. Paul, like the predecessors of his school, replied in the negative. Christ, as he taught, had no existence prior to His supernatural conception and birth. God was to some

extent in Christ, but not strictly as a factor of His person; He was in Christ only in the sense of giving to Him a superior endowment of wisdom and power. In virtue of this endowment and the high mission with which He was intrusted, Christ, though only a man in essence, obtained a species of divine dignity. Sabellius, on the other hand, held, with Praxeas and Noetus, that the one divine person was in Christ, not after the mode of a charism or endowment, but as the central factor of His being; that indeed the human in Christ was only a vestment assumed by the divine person. According to Sabellius, there is a trinity, but it is only a trinity of manifestations. God as the outward moving, as the creator and ruler of the universe, — in other words, God in His general revelation, — is the Logos. God, as specifically revealed in the giving of the law, in the provision of redemption, and in the sanctifying of believers, is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. These three titles are indicative, not of distinctions in the divine nature, but of stages in the divine economy; they denote the same divine person under successive forms of manifestation. The human in Christ appears in this scheme to serve only as a transient instrument of the divine, and the incarnation takes more the character of a theophany than of an incarnation, in the sense of an abiding union between God and man. The abridgment in this way of the significance of the historical Christ brings the system of Sabellius, notwithstanding it seems at its starting-point the opposite of Ebionism, into a certain affinity with the same. “The one point alone,” says Dorner, “that he reduces the revelation of Christ to the rank of a mere means, and does not also regard Him as an end in Himself, is a degradation of Him, which approximates to Ebionism.”

As the literature of the second and third centuries attests, the Catholic Church received from Gnosticism and Monarchianism profound incentives toward a more definite construction of Christian doctrine. The Judaic Ebionism,

though receiving some attention, was treated in these centuries as a matter of subordinate importance.

SECTION III. — AUTHORS AND THEIR WORKS.

	Genuine Writings.	Approximate Date.
I. APOSTOLIC FATHERS.		
Clement, Bishop of Rome,	First Epistle (under his name) to the Corinthians	A. D. 92-101
Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch,	Seven Epistles (shorter or Vossian recension) . . .	107-116
Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna,	Epistle to the Philippians	Soon after the Ignatian.
Barnabas	Epistle	A. D. 100-150
Hermas	Pastor of Hermas (an allegorical work)	100-140
Unknown Writer	Epistle to Diognetus . . .	100-140
Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia	Expositions of Oracles of the Lord (only a few fragments being extant)	120-160
II. APOLOGISTS OF THE SECOND CENTURY.		
Justin Martyr	Apology I.; Apology II.; Dialogue with Trypho	138-166
Tatian	Address to the Greeks	Near 150
Athenagoras, of Athens	Embassy (or Plea) for Christians; On the Resurrection	170-180
Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch	Three Books to Autolytus	168-188
Quadratus and Aristo	Fragments	117-138
Aristides	Apology	117-138
Melito, Claudius	Mainly Fragments	160-180
Apollinaris		
III. GREEK WRITERS OF ALEXANDRIA.		
Clement	Exhortation; Educator; Stromata, or Miscellanies; On the Rich Man	190-202
Origen	De Principiis; Against Celsus; Commentaries on the Old and New Testaments	210-254
Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria	Important Fragments . . .	248-264
IV. OTHER GREEK WRITERS.		
Gregory Thaumaturgus, Bishop of Neo-Cæsarea	Declaration of Faith; Panegyric; Canonical Epistle	244-270
Methodius, Bishop of Tyre	Banquet of Virgins, etc. .	Before 311

	Genuine Writings.	Approximate Date.
V. WRITERS OF GREEK ANTECEDENTS OR CULTURE IN THE LATIN CHURCH.		
Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons	Five Books against Heresies Philosophumena; Christ and Antichrist; Against Noetus, etc.	A. D. 180-190
Hippolytus, (reputed) Bishop of Portus Romanus		200-236
VI. LATIN WRITERS.		
Tertullian	Works against Praxeas, Hermogenes, and Mar- cion; Treatises on Re- pentance, Baptism, the Flesh of Christ, the Res- urrection of the Flesh, the Soul, etc.	190-220
Minucius Felix		Octavius
Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage	Epistles; Treatise on the Unity of the Church, etc.	245-258
Novatian		The Trinity; Jewish Meats
Arnobius	Adversus Gentes	295-305
Lactantius	Divine Institutes; Anger of God; Workmanship of God; Manner in which the Persecutors died . .	315-325

It is hardly necessary to state that these writings are commonly quoted by their Latin titles; the work of Tatian, for example, as "Oratio ad Græcos," the Plea of Athenagoras as "Legatio," the treatise of Theophilus as "Ad Autolycum," the "Exhortation" and "Educator" of Clement as "Cohortatio" and "Pædagogus."

The only writing claiming to be from Clement of Rome which is undoubtedly genuine is his Epistle (in sixty-five chapters) to the Corinthians. The second and shorter Epistle to the Corinthians which bears his name is mentioned by no writer prior to Eusebius (Hefele, "Patrum Apostolicorum Opera"), who speaks of it in these dubious terms: "We know not that this is as highly approved as the former, and we know not that it has been in use with the ancients." (III. 38.) In form and substance, too, this writing gives evidence of being a homily rather than an

epistle. There is little reason, therefore, for ascribing it to Clement. The most important of the writings forged under the name of Clement are those already mentioned, — the “Homilies” (with their “Epitome”) and the “Recognitions,” the latter being the less remote of the two from orthodoxy. Besides these productions, the Pseudo-Clementine literature embraces two epistles concerning Virginity, discovered in a Syriac version, and several decretal letters in the collection of the pseudo-Isidore. Clement is also associated (as the instrument of their transmission) with the so-called “Apostolical Constitutions.” The eight books of this work treat mainly of morals, discipline, and worship. They are believed to have been composed, for the most part, at the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century.

Of the fifteen Epistles bearing the name of Ignatius, the spurious character of eight is clearly evinced by their style and contents, and by the lack of any reference to them up to the sixth century. The remaining seven are found in a longer and a shorter recension, and three of them, in an abbreviated form, have been discovered in a Syriac version. The drift of recent criticism, as well as the balance of evidence, authorizes the preference of the shorter recension, as giving the seven epistles substantially in the form in which they were left by Ignatius.

It is commonly conceded that the author of the Epistle which bears the name of Barnabas could not have been Paul’s distinguished companion of that name.

The identity of Hermas is somewhat a matter of conjecture. By the author of the “Canon of Muratori,” written in the latter half of the second century, he is called the brother of the Roman Bishop Pius. This would place him toward the middle of the second century. It should be noticed, however, that some historians have inferred from statements of Hermas himself that he was a contemporary of Clement of Rome.

A writing entitled the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," recently brought to light and bearing marks of genuineness, appears to have claims to be associated, in point of age, with the literature of the apostolic fathers.

Besides the three writings which are unquestionably from the pen of Justin Martyr, there are several treatises bearing his name for whose genuineness some claim may be put forward. Here belong the "Address to the Greeks," the "Cohortatio," or "Hortatory Address to the Greeks," the "Sole Government of God," and fragments from the work on the Resurrection. Quite a number of critics contend for the genuineness of the "Hortatory Address," and the treatise on the "Sole Government of God."

Tatian is properly given a place among the fathers of the Church, since the single treatise which has come down from him was written before he became associated with Gnosticism.

A distinction may be drawn between the writings of Tertullian composed before and those composed after he espoused Montanism. The distinction, however, is not of great importance in the history of doctrine. In both orders of writings the same views are found upon the leading topics of theology; and where Montanism affected the teaching of Tertullian, it for the most part simply intensified characteristics and tendencies already at hand.

Hippolytus and Novatian may be reckoned among the exponents of the Catholic theology of their age, though both were in relations of hostility to the Roman see, and the latter finally became the leader of a schism. With Novatian the ground of separation was the lax discipline, as he regarded it, of the Roman bishops. Hippolytus, according to his own account, had occasion to complain, not only of loose discipline, but also of affiliation with the Patripassian heresy on the part of the bishops Zephyrinus and Callistus. He was evidently a man of broad learning,

and with Irenæus and Tertullian ranks among the writers of prime dogmatic importance in the West.

Arnobius and Lactantius remained in heathenism until mature life, and neither of them seems to have become thoroughly acquainted with the Christian system. Their writings, therefore, cannot be taken, without some qualification, as representative of the doctrinal standpoint of their time.

Among the several groups of writers, the apostolic fathers appear distinguished by their practical interest. Little of the speculative is contained in their writings. Their words bear mainly upon the Christian life of the individual and of the Church. Still they touch upon many points of doctrine, and their testimony has special value, on account of its nearness to the age of the apostles. With Justin Martyr and his co-apologists we find a more speculative bent, and a more positive endeavor to construct and to defend Christian doctrines. This was only in accordance with their antecedents as men well versed in the Hellenic philosophies. In the early Alexandrian school the intellectual interest was still more prominent. Theorizing here was no doubt pushed somewhat to an extreme, at least in case of Origen; but at the same time, some of the best products of Christian thinking in the early centuries came from this school, and some of its opinions stand in favorable contrast with those of writers less given to idealism. In the Latin Church there were theologians who showed a good degree of intellectual activity and productiveness, but on the whole the disposition to philosophize was less native to the West than to the East. Something of the characteristic bias of the Latin Church, in the direction of administration and of those departments of doctrine most plainly concerning man's practical interests, — namely, anthropology and soteriology, — may be discovered in the literature of the period. Of the ambition and faculty for administration, Cyprian appears in this period as a specially eminent representative.

SECTION IV.—SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. CANON.—To the writers immediately succeeding the apostles, the Holy Scriptures were pre-eminently the books of the Old Testament. They were conversant with more or less of the apostolic writings, and no doubt regarded them as containing unimpeachable truths of the new dispensation. But they were not yet prepared to think of a New Testament as standing over against the Old, and made up of a definite list of sacred books. Church must commune with church, one quarter of Christendom must receive ample and credible information as to what was in other quarters, before there could be any positive and wide-spread conviction as to the proper compass of the apostolic literature.

Even with respect to the proper limits of the Old Testament, there was occasion in the early Church for inquiry and investigation. At first, however, this occasion was unrecognized. Writings claiming a place in the Old Testament, or found in juxtaposition with its books, were readily quoted as inspired Scripture by Christian authors. By the time of Christ, a number of such books had appeared. These were held in minor regard by the Palestinian Jews; but by the Alexandrian Jews they were highly esteemed. Still, the latter knew how to distinguish them from the proper canonical Scriptures. Philo, who was doubtless well acquainted with them, never cites them in his references to the Jewish oracles. (Gieseler, "Dogmengeschichte.") Less discrimination was naturally shown by the Christians. Being for the most part unacquainted with the Hebrew, they were not distinctly apprised of any dividing line between the older books and the later additions. Both alike were known by them in the Greek language, and were found within the compass of the same version; namely, the Septuagint. Hence, we find about

the full list of what are currently termed the apocryphal books, such as the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, Judith, Baruch, and the Books of the Maccabees, quoted by one Christian writer or another. In some instances, writings not recognized by the Septuagint were cited. Thus, the Fourth Book, or the Apocalypse, of Ezra, (written perhaps within the Christian era,) is cited by the Epistle of Barnabas and by Clement of Alexandria; and Tertullian attempts to prove that the Jews were wrong in rejecting the inspired Book of Enoch from their canon. (*De Cultu Fem.*, I. 3.)

It is in the latter half of the second century that we first meet with a definite attempt, on the part of Christian writers, to ascertain the proper limits of the Old Testament. About the year 170, Melito, Bishop of Sardis, made inquiries upon the subject in Palestine. In a letter written to his brother Onesimus, he gives in his list of Old Testament books those which belong to the Hebrew canon proper (with the exception of Esther), and none others. (Euseb., IV. 26.) Origen, at a later date, called attention to the same list, including, however, in the Book of Jeremiah the so-called Epistle of Jeremiah. (The omission of the minor prophets in the citation of Eusebius, VI. 25, must be regarded as accidental.) Origen, to be sure, considered some of the apocryphal books worthy of a place in the canon, and attributed their non-acceptance to the false motives and prejudices of the Jews. But the distinction, after it was once made, between the proper Hebrew Testament and the later additions gained increasing force, especially in the Greek Church. In the fourth century, as also thereafter, the Greek fathers, in general, accepted only the Letter of Jeremiah and the Book of Baruch, in addition to the strict Hebrew canon.

Some of the Latin fathers who were especially conversant with Greek literature discriminated against the apocryphal books. Here belong Hilary of Poitiers, Rufinus, and

Jerome. Augustine, on the other hand, and several councils in which he took part, namely, that of Hippo in 393, and those of Carthage in 397 and 419, decided expressly for admitting into the canon the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Tobit, Judith, and the two Books of the Maccabees. Near the same time, a like judgment was rendered by the Bishop of Rome. These decisions secured the balance in the Latin Church in favor of the above-named apocryphal books, though long after this era there were here and there learned men in the Latin Church who manifested a conviction that these books were not to be accounted of full canonical worth. Even Gregory the Great quoted the first Book of the Maccabees as if its title to a place in the canon might be questioned. (Moral., XIX. 21.) See also list of others who made strictures upon the Apocrypha, as given by J. Gerhard (Loc. Theol., I. § 89).

As the interval which separated the Church from the apostolic age was increased, and the traditions of that age were more liable to be questioned, there was naturally an increased incentive to fix the exact bounds of the apostolic literature, and thus definitely to circumscribe the oracles of the new dispensation. To this incentive, necessarily involved in the conditions of the case, was added the spur which came from the arbitrary conduct of heretics, in curtailings, remodelling, or adding to the apostolic writings. Marcion, for example, remodelled Luke, and rejected the rest of the New Testament, with the exception of ten Epistles of Paul (Tertul., Adv. Marcion, IV. 2, 3). A Gospel according to the Egyptians is mentioned by Hippolytus among heretical writings (Phil., V. 2), and was probably of quite early origin. Irenæus, speaking of a Valentinian sect, the Marcosians, says, "They adduce an unspeakable number of apocryphal and spurious writings, which they themselves have forged to trouble the minds of foolish men and of such as are ignorant of the scriptures of truth." (Cont. Hær., I. 20. 1.) "The Church," says Origen, "has

four Gospels, heretics many; of which one is entitled according to the Egyptians, another according to the Twelve Apostles. Basilides also has dared to write a Gospel, and to inscribe it with his own name. I know a certain Gospel which is named according to Thomas and according to Matthias." (In Luc., Hom. I.) No doubt there is ample evidence that heretical parties gave much recognition to genuine writings, and their testimony enters into the sum total of proof for the apostolic origin of the New Testament books. But there was enough of arbitrary procedure on their part to intensify the natural demand within the Catholic Church for a fixed canon.

About the middle of the second century, at least within the limits of the third quarter of that century, there was rendered a very positive and general recognition of the Scriptural character of the great body of our present New Testament books. Even before this date there was a collection, whatever may have been its compass, which was read at the stated services of the Church; for we find Justin Martyr, in the earliest of his writings, stating that it was the custom of Christians to have the "Memoirs of the Apostles" read to the congregation on the first day of the week. (1 Apol., LXVII.) The so-called "Canon of Muratori," written probably about the year 170, indicates, notwithstanding its somewhat fragmentary character, that the Church of that date was substantially united upon the acceptance of the four Gospels, the Book of Acts, the Apocalypse, and nearly all of the Epistles. Only one uncanonical book, namely, the Apocalypse of Peter, is added to the New Testament list by this document, and concerning this it is said that it was not universally admitted. (See Westcott on the Canon.) The writings of Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, men representing sections of the Church widely separated geographically, testify to a general acknowledgment of a like collection. In fine, we may say without hesitation that the Catholic

Church (that is, the great body of Christians of that age) in the latter half of the second century unanimously assigned a canonical character to the four Gospels, the Acts, thirteen Epistles of Paul, the First Epistle of John, and the First Epistle of Peter, and did not as a whole receive any book now reckoned uncanonical.

Among the other New Testament books, the Apocalypse seems not to have been denied apostolic origin by any Catholic writer earlier than Dionysius of Alexandria, except the Roman presbyter Caius. Dionysius regarded it as "the work of some holy and inspired man," by the name of John, but not to be identified with the Apostle John. Some of the Greek fathers of the fourth century followed the opinion of Dionysius; but Athanasius and others contended for the apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse, and in the course of the fifth century their verdict became substantially universal in the Greek Church. The Epistle to the Hebrews was estimated very highly in the Greek Church, and was frequently quoted as a production of Paul. Origen often quotes it in this way, though in his more specific statement he decides that it is to be regarded as Pauline simply in substance, having been written by an immediate disciple of the Apostle. The early Latin fathers leave it unnoticed, or else decide against its apostolic authorship. Its right to a place in the canon, however, was commonly acknowledged in the Latin Church from the time of Augustine and Jerome. Some exception was taken to the Epistle of Jude and to the Second and Third Epistles of John, as appears from the testimony of Eusebius and Origen; but each of them was approved by individual writers in the first three centuries, and there was probably never in the Church at large a serious disinclination to receive them. The Epistle of James and the Second Epistle of Peter obtained little recognition from early writers, and, largely on this account, were regarded with doubt by Eusebius and some later authors. At the close of the fourth century, however, the

Church was substantially united upon affirming the canonical rank of these, as of all other books in our New Testament collection.

A few books besides those now in the canon were assigned, for a certain interval, and by a fraction of the Church, a canonical or semi-canonical character. We learn from Eusebius that the Epistle of Clement of Rome was read in many of the churches for a considerable time (III. 16, IV. 23), though this does not necessarily imply that it was placed fully on a par with the apostolic writings. Clement of Alexandria quotes the Epistle of Barnabas as the writing of the Apostle Barnabas, evidently attributing to it the character of sacred Scripture, and Origen treats it with nearly equal respect. (Strom., II. 6, 7, 20; De Prin., III. 2, 4.) Both of these writers indicate also by their quotations that they attributed a high degree of authority to the "Pastor" of Hermas. The way in which the "Canon of Muratori" mentions the Apocalypse of Peter has already been noted. According to Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria included the same among the books upon which he wrote brief comments. (VI. 14.) None of these books, however, were ever assigned a Scriptural character by any general authority, and in time they lost the partial recognition accorded them. As regards the larger and more essential portion of the New Testament canon, there was a marked unanimity in the Church from the first consideration of the subject.

2. INSPIRATION AND AUTHORITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. — The writings of Philo indicate the existence at the opening of the Christian era of a very emphatic theory of inspiration. According to this exponent of the highest Jewish culture of Alexandria, the prophets were passive instruments in the hands of the revealing God, and even the Septuagint translation was inspired word for word. The human nature, he teaches, must sink below the horizon, and be lost in trance, before the divine orb can arise. "When the divine light shines the human light sets, and

when the divine light sets this other rises and shines; and this very frequently happens to the race of prophets, for the mind that is in us is removed from its place at the arrival of the Divine Spirit, but it is again restored to its previous habitation when that Spirit departs, for it is contrary to holy law for what is mortal to dwell with what is immortal." (Heir to Divine Things, LIII.; Life of Moses, Bk. II., Chaps. V.-VII.; Rewards and Punishments, IX. Translation by C. D. Yonge.)

The earliest Christian writers who express any theory upon the subject of Scriptural inspiration approximate to the representations of Philo. Justin Martyr says that the utterances of the prophets were not their own, but the utterances of the Divine Word which moved them. (1 Apol., XXXVI.) In a writing attributed to him, the souls of the prophets are compared to a harp or lyre, upon which the Holy Spirit, as a kind of divine plectrum, descends, and from which He brings forth superhuman and accordant responses. (Cohortatio, VIII.) In like manner Athenagoras says that the Spirit from God "moved the mouths of the prophets like musical instruments," that the Spirit lifted Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the other prophets "in ecstasy" above the natural operations of their minds, and made use of them as the flute-player breathes into the flute. (Legatio, VII., IX.)

Perhaps it would be concluding too much to affirm that by such figures these writers meant to indicate absolute passivity, or the complete loss of self-consciousness in the inspired agent. Among the early Christians the distinct utterance of this theory was characteristic of the Montanists. Accordingly Tertullian, speaking as a Montanist, makes the following comment on the statement that Peter upon the Mount of Transfiguration knew not what he said: "Was his ignorance the result of simple error? Or was it on the principle which we maintain in the cause of the new prophecy, that to grace ecstasy or rapture is incident?"

For when a man is rapt in the Spirit, especially when he beholds the glory of God, or when God speaks through him, he necessarily loses sensation, because he is overshadowed by the power of God; a point concerning which there is a question between us and the carnally minded." (Adv. Marc., IV. 22.) By the carnally minded, or psychics, Tertullian denotes here the non-Montanists; and his phraseology indicates that the Catholic Church, at least after the rise of Montanism, was averse to the theory that the state of inspiration is a state of ecstasy, in which sensation and self-consciousness are wholly lost. Origen is distinguished among early writers as explicitly opposing this theory, and asserting the contrary idea, that inspiration elevates and quickens the natural faculties of the agent. He predicates, moreover, a close connection between inspiration and moral character. The fact that the Pythian priestess was beside herself in the act of prophesying, he declares to be an evidence that her mind was clouded by an evil demon. Far different the effect of a divine working. "The Jewish prophets, who were enlightened as far as was necessary for their prophetic work by the Spirit of God, were the first to enjoy the benefit of the inspiration; and by the contact, if I may so say, of the Holy Spirit, they became clearer in mind, and their souls were filled with a brighter light. . . . They were selected to receive the Divine Spirit, and to be the depositaries of His holy oracles, on the ground of their leading a life of almost unapproachable excellence." (Cont. Cel., VII. 4-7.)

But though the Montanist theory was generally repelled after the latter part of the second century, the majority of Christian writers still entertained a very positive conception of Scriptural inspiration. Irenæus says, that we may be "assured that the Scriptures are perfect, since they were spoken by the Word of God and His Spirit" (II. 28. 2); and Clement of Alexandria, though he is not very explicit, seems strongly to emphasize the instrumental posi-

tion of the sacred writers. Origen in one place speaks as though he conceived that the prophets, having received from God the substance of their revelations, were left to clothe them in their own language. (*Selecta in Deut.*) Still the whole plan of his exegesis, making so much account as it did of individual words and phrases, as well as his declarations that deep meanings are to be found in the smallest items of Scripture, virtually assumed verbal inspiration. In general, the tendency, no doubt, was to regard inspiration as extending not merely to the main subject matter, but also to the very words employed.

The earliest of the writers quoted above — namely, Justin Martyr and Athenagoras — had directly in mind the Old Testament in their references to the subject of inspiration. But whatever theory was applied to the Old Testament was naturally applied to the New, when once the apostolic writings had been collected into an acknowledged canon. We find such authors as Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen asserting the unity of the dispensations, and connecting quite as emphatic an idea of inspiration with the New as with the Old Testament. (*Cont. Hær.*, II. 28, IV. 9; *De Præscrip.*, XXXVI.; *Strom.*, VII. 16; *In Lev. Hom.*, VI. 2.)

The theory of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures involved, of course, the theory of their plenary authority and inestimable value. Irenæus calls the four Gospels the four pillars of the Church. (III. 11. 8.) Cyprian speaks of the Scriptures as “founts of divine fulness,” *divinæ plenitudinis fontes*. (*Adv. Jud.*, *Procœm.*) “The divine Scriptures and institutions of wisdom,” says Clement of Alexandria, “form the short road to salvation.” (*Cohort.*, Chap. VIII.) Origen declares it an impious sentiment, that a merely historical character is to be ascribed to the Scripture records, as though they did not have in the present a positive bearing upon our welfare and salvation. Everywhere, even under the very stones of stumbling, some

good may be found. "If we are commanded," he says, "not to utter any vain or useless word, what must be thought concerning the prophets? Must it not be concluded that every word which proceeded from their mouth is efficacious?" (In Num. Hom., XXVII. 2; In Jer. Hom., XXXIX.)

3. INTERPRETATION AND USE OF THE SCRIPTURES.— Though exegesis was in its infancy, some sound hermeneutical maxims were enunciated in this period. Clement of Alexandria, for example, lays down the principle, that Scripture must be compared with Scripture, and that interpretation preferred which agrees best with the body and texture of the sacred volume. (Strom., VII. 16.) A similar principle is involved in the protest of Irenæus against the Gnostic perversion of holy writ by excerpting passages from their connection and arbitrarily stringing them together. (I. 9. 4.) Tertullian, too, hit upon a noteworthy idea, when, in opposition to Marcion's excision from the Bible of everything deemed counter to the attribute of love in God, he asserted that analogy teaches us that *antitheses*, or contrasted features, are to be expected in written revelation, inasmuch as the revelation of God in nature abounds in such. (Adv. Marc., IV. 1.)

One of the most palpable faults in early exegesis was an almost universal tendency to excess in the direction of allegorical interpretations. Origen represents the extreme of this tendency. To remain upon the low ground of the letter, he repeatedly urges, is to fail of the true bread. The kernel, the spirit, the proper food, lies beyond the outward envelope. "As man consists of body, soul, and spirit, so in the same way does Scripture." Every part is to be credited with a spiritual meaning, but there are certain passages to which a bodily sense is not to be imputed at all. "Sometimes a few words are interpolated which are not true in their literal acceptance, and sometimes a larger number." The Evangelists in some cases varied from the

historical order of the narrative, and where it was not possible to preserve both the bodily and the spiritual sense, sacrificed the former. The passages, however, "that are true in their historical meaning, are much more numerous than those which are interspersed with a purely spiritual signification." (De Prin., Bk. IV., Chap. I. 11-20; In Joan., Tom. X. 4.)

That the reading of the Scriptures was practised generally by all classes in this period, can hardly be asserted. Lack of copies and lack of education must have excluded many from the privilege. But there was no obstacle in the theories of the times to this general reading. The Bible was an open book to laymen as well as to priests. Justin Martyr advises the heathen of their privilege to peruse the sacred writings, and urges them to make use of the same. (1 Apol., LXIII.; Cohort., XXXV.) "Examine," exhorts Tertullian, "our sacred books, which we do not keep in hiding, and which many accidents put into the hands of those who are not of us." (Apol., XXXI.) Origen justifies the simple style of the Scriptures against the objections of the polished Greek, on the ground that they were designed for every class of men. "Our prophets," he says, "and Jesus Himself and His apostles were careful to adopt a style of address which should not merely convey the truth, but which should be fitted to gain over the multitude." (Cont. Cel., VI. 1, 2.) "Many passages appear in the writings of Origen which make it evident that the general reading of the Scriptures was regarded in this age not merely as permissible but as necessary." (Gieseler.)

4. RELATION BETWEEN SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION. — The facts stated with reference to the formation of the New Testament canon cannot fail to suggest that for an interval large dependence must have been placed upon the spoken Word. The testimony of those who followed the apostles must have served as a chief certificate of the true apostolic teaching. In the lack of a generally acknowledged and

widely distributed New Testament, the channel of oral communication had, in point of availability, a certain superiority over that of written communication. Even in his day Irenæus could speak of many nations of believers in Christ as "having salvation written in their hearts by the Spirit, without paper and ink" (III. 4. 2); and at an earlier date such a description must have been capable, relatively speaking, of a still more general application.

Truth handed down in this oral way was styled tradition. As the pressure of heresy was felt, there was naturally an incentive to give connected statements of the main points embraced in the traditional teaching. Brief summaries of Christian faith, corresponding in substance to the so-called Apostles' Creed, came to be recognized very generally by the churches. A summary of this kind was called a rule of faith, *κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας*, *regula fidei*. The rule of faith differed from the fixed creeds of later times as not being formally set forth and enforced by any general authority, and consequently not being confined to an unvarying phraseology, though preserving essentially its identity of substance. The confidence felt respecting its agreement with the apostolic teaching may be judged from such preambles as the following: "The Church, though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith." "This rule of faith has come down to us from the beginning of the Gospel, even before any of the older heretics." "The rule of faith is altogether one, — alone, immovable, and irreformable." (Irenæus, I. 10; Tertul., Adv. Prax., II.; De Veland. Vir., I.) Language like this evidently assumes that the rule of faith was based on unbroken tradition, and was comparatively independent of written oracles. The rule of faith was not, of course, coextensive with tradition, but only its most important embodiment.

The relative completion of the New Testament canon in the latter half of the second century naturally affected the

position of tradition. It hastened its subordination to the written Word. The two continued, no doubt, to be regarded as the same in substance. Accordingly Irenæus speaks of the apostles as first proclaiming the Gospel in public, and afterwards handing down the same in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of the faith. (III. 1.) However, the more explicit, ample, and steadfast statements of the written oracles gave them a special advantage as a standard, and invited appeal to them rather than to tradition. Both were still appealed to; but practically, and in the main theoretically, the preference was given to the Scriptures.

Some statements, to be sure, may appear counter to this conclusion. We find Irenæus, for example, placing great stress upon the idea of a continuous transmission of the truth from the apostles through the succession of bishops, and urging accordingly the importance of consulting the apostolic churches in determining questions of doctrine. In this, however, he is not setting aside Scripture in favor of tradition, but seeking, as he had ample occasion to do in fighting the Gnostics, to guard against arbitrary interpretations of Scripture. His whole emphasis in this direction is of the nature of a practical expedient to check a capricious handling of the sacred Word, rather than a theoretical qualification of the authority of that Word. The abundant references which he makes to the Scriptures indicate clearly enough what was to him, personally considered, the chief standard. About the same may be said of Tertullian. In one place, indeed, he says, "Our appeal must not be made to the Scriptures." But here he was speaking of heretics, with whom there was a controversy as to what should be received as Holy Scripture. The appeal, therefore, he urges, must not be to this in the first instance. We must see first who have the rule of faith handed down from the apostles, for these will be likely to have both the true Scriptures and the true exposition of

them. (De Præscrip., XIX., XXII.) In another connection he intimates that tradition is something less clear and decisive than Scripture. "Of those things," he says, "which are observed on the ground of tradition, we are bound to give a more worthy reason in proportion as they lack the authority of Scripture, until, by some celestial gift, they be either confirmed or corrected." (De Jejun., X.) The mere fact of long-established custom, he declares, is no adequate evidence of validity. "Our Lord Christ has surnamed Himself Truth, not Custom. . . . Whatever savors of opposition to truth, this will be heresy, even though it be ancient custom." (De Veland. Vir., I.) It is the abounding appeals of Tertullian to the Scriptures, however, which most clearly prove that they were to him the unrivalled authority.

In the Alexandrian school there was an evident inclination to rank Scripture above tradition, though in conformity with the age they thought of the two as harmonious rather than antagonistic. "The reading of the Scriptures," says Clement, "is necessary in order to the demonstration of what is said. . . . Those who are ready to toil in the most excellent pursuits will not desist from the search after truth till they get the demonstration from the Scriptures themselves. . . . We establish the matter that is in question by the voice of the Lord, which is the surest of all demonstrations, or rather is the only demonstration." (Strom., VI. 11, VII. 16.) "We must summon," says Origen, "the Holy Scriptures to testimony. For unattested [in this way], our assertions and explanations deserve no credence." (In Jer. Hom., I.)

From Hippolytus we have this statement: "There is one God, the knowledge of whom we gain from the Holy Scriptures, and from no other source. . . . Whatever things, then, the Holy Scriptures declare, at these let us look; and whatsoever things they teach, these let us learn." (Adv. Noetum, IX.) The hierarchical spirit of Cyprian

might be expected to incline him to emphasize tradition. Nevertheless, his controversy with the Roman bishop Stephen gave him occasion to declare the superiority of the written Word, and its deciding power against everything at variance with itself. After speaking of Stephen's appeal to tradition, on the subject of the re-baptism of those who had had only heretical baptism, he proceeds as follows: "Whence is that tradition? Whether does it descend from the authority of the Lord and of the Gospel, or does it come from the commands and epistles of the Apostles? For that those things which are written must be done, God witnesses and admonishes. . . . What obstinacy is that, or what presumption, to prefer human tradition to divine ordinance, and not to observe that God is indignant and angry as often as human tradition relaxes and passes by the divine precepts! . . . Nor ought custom, which had crept in among some, to prevent the truth from prevailing and conquering; for custom without truth is the antiquity of error." (Ad Pompeium, Ep. 73 in Ante-Nicene Lib.)

It is entirely certain that in the third and fourth centuries the great controversies were waged mainly upon the field of Scriptural exegesis. Tradition held in those centuries a subordinate position. It may also be affirmed that it was below equality with Scripture in the latter part of the second century. That it should have been relatively prominent prior to that is not to be regarded as an abnormal state of things. Tradition while yet near to the fountain-head of the apostolic teaching was comparatively vital and trustworthy.

Tradition was regarded as the common property of the Church. Clement of Alexandria, indeed, gave some indulgence to the idea of a secret tradition. "Secret things," he says, "are intrusted to speech, not to writing. . . . The *gnosis* is that which has descended by transmission to a few, having been imparted unwritten by the Apostles." (Strom.,

I. 1, VI. 7.) But such a notion was characteristic rather of Gnosticism than of Catholic Christianity. The language of Clement is not easily paralleled among the writers of the first three centuries. Origen perhaps comes the nearest to it. He intimates that some doctrines were held in reserve until the pupils of Christianity should be suitably prepared for them, but emphatically rejects the imputation of Celsus that it was proper to call Christianity a secret system. "Almost the entire world," he says, "is better acquainted with what Christians preach than with the favorite opinions of philosophers. . . . In these circumstances, to speak of the Christian doctrine as a secret system is altogether absurd. But that there should be certain doctrines, not made known to the multitude, which are [revealed] after the exoteric ones have been taught, is not a peculiarity of Christianity alone, but also of philosophic systems, in which certain truths are exoteric and others esoteric." (Cont. Cel., I. 7.)

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I.—EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.—There was a feeling in the early Church that the great truths respecting the existence and nature of God scarcely need to be commended by arguments; a conviction that they are so self-evident that only condescension to human perversity urges to any attempt to make them more evident. This conviction was probably wide-spread. Certain is it, that we find several expressions of the belief that truths most worthy of acceptance lie beyond the range of demonstration, and so need rather to be stated than to be argued, at least for one occupying a normal standpoint. In conformity to this opinion, Justin Martyr says of the prophets: "They did not use demonstration in their treatises, seeing that they were witnesses to the truth above all demonstration, and worthy of belief." (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, VII.) Again he remarks: "The word of truth is free and carries its own authority, disdaining to fall under any skilful argument. . . . Nothing is either more powerful or trustworthy than the truth; so that he who requires proof of this is like one who wishes it demonstrated why the things that appear to the senses do appear." (*De Resurrect.*, I.) "First principles," says Clement of Alexandria, "are incapable of demonstration. . . . God, not being a subject for demonstration, cannot be the object of science. . . . All demonstration is traced up to indemonstrable faith. . . . The

knowledge of the first cause of the universe is of faith, but is not demonstration." (Strom. II. 4; II. 5; IV. 25; VIII. 3.)

Emphasis upon this line of thought was necessarily accompanied by much dependence, as regards the proof of the divine existence, upon the testimony of the religious consciousness of men. The unperturbed impulses and spontaneous convictions of the soul, it was urged, witness to God; the idea of God is native to the soul. Says Clement of Alexandria, "Far from destitute of a divine idea is man, who, it is written in Genesis, partook of inspiration, being endowed with a purer essence than the other animate creatures." (Strom. V. 13.) Man has, therefore, only to scrutinize the contents of his own consciousness to be apprised of the divine existence. "If one knows himself, he will know God." (Pæd., III. 1.) In another connection he speaks of this knowledge as springing from a certain divine effluence, which is instilled into the hearts of all men; as being born, in other words, of that universal light which is shed, not from the natural, but from the spiritual sun, the living Word. "For the sun could never show me the true God; but that healthful Word [does this], that is the sun of my soul, by whom alone, when He arises in the depths of the soul, the eye of the soul itself is irradiated." (Cohort., VI.) Irenæus testifies, on this wise, to an intuitive knowledge of God: "Since His invisible essence is mighty, it confers on all a profound mental intuition of His most powerful, yea, omnipotent greatness. Wherefore, although 'no one knows the Father, except the Son, nor the Son, except the Father, and those to whom the Son will reveal Him,' yet all do know this one fact, at least, because reason, implanted in their minds, moves them, and reveals to them that there is one God, the Lord of all." (II. 6.) So decisive is the inward testimony, argues Tertullian, that it cancels all excuse for neglecting the worship of the true God. "There is not a soul of man," he says, "that does

not, from the light that is in itself, proclaim the very things that we [Christians] are not permitted to speak above our breath. Most justly, then, every soul is a culprit as well as a witness: in the measure that it testifies for truth the guilt of error lies on it; and on the day of judgment it will stand before the courts of God, without a word to say. Thou proclaimedst God, O soul, but thou didst not seek to know Him." (De Test. Animæ, VI.) "The soul was before prophecy. From the beginning the knowledge of God is the dowry of the soul,—one and the same amongst the Egyptians, and the Syrians, and the tribes of Pontus." (Adv. Marc., I. 10.) Arnobius, also, notwithstanding the inferior ideal of human nature which he sets forth, emphatically maintains that there is in the soul an instinctive acknowledgment of God. (Adv. Gen., I. 33.)

The human soul being thus regarded as having a native affinity for the divine, it was naturally argued that it only needs to be delivered from the weight and the blinding power of sin to become vividly conscious of God. Accordingly, we find Theophilus responding to the heathen challenge, "Show me thy God," as follows: "If you say, 'Show me thy God,' I would reply, 'Show me your man, and I will show you my God.' Show, then, that the eyes of your soul are capable of seeing, and the ears of your heart able to hear. . . . As a burnished mirror, so ought man to have his soul pure. When there is rust on the mirror, it is not possible that a man's face be seen in the mirror; so also when there is sin in a man, such a man cannot behold God." (Ad. Autol., I. 2.) To the same effect is the exhortation of Clement of Alexandria: "If thou desirest truly to see God, take to thyself means of purification worthy of Him; not leaves of laurel fillets interwoven with wool and purple, but wreathing thy brows with righteousness, and encircling them with the leaves of temperance, set thyself earnestly to find Christ." (Cohort., I.)

A second line of evidences for the being of God was

drawn from nature. The manifold indications here of power, intelligence, and design, it was maintained, are clear indications of an all-wise and all-powerful Creator and Ruler. Many of the early writers present this order of proofs with a good degree of animation. (Theoph., I. 5-7; Minucius Felix, XVII., XVIII.; Lactant., De Ira Dei, X.; Div. Inst., I. 2; Pseudo-Clem., Hom., VI. 24, 25.) One of the most elevated descriptions is that by Dionysius of Alexandria. Criticising the theory that the world arose by the chance combination of atoms, he asks: "What phalanx ever traversed the plain in such perfect order, no trooper outmarching the others, or falling out of rank, or obstructing the course, or suffering himself to be distanced by his comrades in the array, as is the case with that steady advance in regular file, as it were, and with close-set shields, which is presented by this serried and unbroken progress of the host of the stars? Whence comes it that this mighty multitude of fellow travellers, all unmarshalled by any captain, all ungifted with any determination of will, and all unendowed with any knowledge of each other, have nevertheless held their course in perfect harmony?" (Adv. Epicur., III.)

Metaphysical proofs of the existence of God, such as those adduced by Augustine, Anselm, and Descartes, were quite foreign to the theology of the first three centuries.

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. — In approaching the subject of the divine essence, the early fathers were under the influence of two opposing interests. On the one hand, as claiming to be worshippers of the *perfect* One, they were interested to emphasize the transcendence of God, or His ineffable spirituality and greatness; on the other, they were interested to assert the completeness of the revelation of God in Christianity. Stress upon the elevation of God above all human thought could result in disparaging the revealing power of Christianity, while stress upon the latter might seem to lower the idea of God by making Him too

easily apprehended. To reconcile these two interests has been found a difficult task in all ages of Christian history; and it is not, therefore, to be expected that in the first Christian age it should have been perfectly accomplished.

Many tokens are apparent of a tendency to assert very strongly the transcendence of God. One such may be seen in the reiterated statement that God is properly nameless. "No one," says Justin Martyr, "can utter the name of the ineffable God; and if any one dare to say that there is a name, he raves with a hopeless madness." (1 Apol., LXI.) Similar expressions are used by Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and others. (Ad Autol., I. 3; Strom., V. 11; Octav., XVIII.; Div. Inst., I. 6.) The idea back of such statements, as appears from the explanations offered, was that no earthly vocabulary has a name that is adequate to describe God. The noblest name can only partially express some one function or aspect of the Divine Being. To this was added the notion that names are for the purpose of distinguishing individuals, which admit therefore of comparison, whereas God is alone and beyond all comparison.

The same tendency is more clearly and unqualifiedly evinced by emphatic statements of the exaltation of God above all proper comprehension by the human mind. "Our heart," says Minucius Felix, "is too limited to understand Him, and we are then worthily estimating Him when we say that He is beyond estimation." (Octav., XVIII.) Before the majesty of God, according to Novatian, all eloquence and reason are mute. Discourse and thought stand far below Him. "Whatever in any respect you might declare of Him, you would rather be unfolding some condition and power of His than Himself." (De Trin., II.) "There is but one thing," says Arnobius, "man can be assured of regarding God's nature: to know and perceive that nothing can be revealed in human language concerning God." (III. 19.) Clement of Alexandria also emphasizes the unmeasured

eminence of Deity above all finite thought; and indeed, he may be regarded as the most noteworthy representative in the period of the negative mode of defining God. "We may reach somehow," he says, "to the conception of the Almighty, knowing not what He is, but what He is not. . . . The First Cause is not in space, but above space and time and name and conception." (Strom., V. 11.) The various predicates applied to Him involve an accommodation to human weakness. Even His unity is something ineffable. "God is one, and beyond the one, and above the Monad itself." (Pæd., I. 8.) Origen speaks of God as incomprehensible, as a Being "whose nature cannot be grasped or seen by the power of any human understanding, even the purest and brightest." (De Prin., I. 1. 5.)

In the preceding paragraph are contained the most radical declarations indulged by the early Christian writers on the transcendence of God. These statements, therefore, cannot be taken unqualifiedly as representative of the thought of the age. Even the same writers who make the boldest assertions concerning the impossibility of knowing God, assume, or even assert, that there is a certain knowledge of Him. Thus Clement of Alexandria says, "It remains that we understand, then, the Unknown, by divine grace, and by the word alone that proceeds from Him." (Strom., V. 12.) Compared with each other, Clement's statements leave, as the ultimate result, a declaration of a real though partial knowledge of God. Deity proves to be, in his view, unknown in these two senses: (1.) He cannot be strictly demonstrated; (2.) He cannot be fully grasped or comprehended by any finite mind. "No one can rightly express Him *wholly*." (Strom., V. 12.) Origen, who was in general less inclined than Clement to push the idea of God into the region of utter abstraction, very plainly decides for a real, though incomplete knowledge of God. The following sentences illustrate his standpoint: "Whatever be the knowledge which we are able to obtain of God, either by

perception or reflection, we must of necessity believe that He is by many degrees far better than what we perceive Him to be." (De Prin., I. 1. 5.) "The statement [of Celsus] that 'He cannot be expressed by name' requires to be taken with a distinction. If he means, indeed, that there is no word or sign that can represent the attributes of God, the statement is true, since there are many qualities which cannot be indicated by words. Who, for example, could describe in words the difference betwixt the quality of sweetness in a palm and that in a fig? But if you take the phrase to mean that it is possible to represent by words something of God's attributes, in order to lead the hearer by the hand, as it were, and so to enable him to comprehend something of God, so far as is attainable by human nature, then there is no absurdity in saying that 'He *can* be described by name.'" (Cont. Cel., VI. 65.) "God is invisible, because He is not a body, while He can be seen by those who see with the heart, — that is, the understanding; not indeed with any kind of heart, but with one which is pure." (Ibid., VI. 69.) Irenæus, while he declares that it is not possible to know God "as regards His greatness," sees, nevertheless, in His very greatness, or in the vastness of His resources, a guaranty of God's ability to reveal Himself to men. "Man," he says, "does not see God by his own powers; but when He pleases He is seen by men, by whom He wills, and when He wills, and as He wills. For God is powerful in all things." (IV. 20.) In general it may be said that early Christian theology assumed something more than a "regulative knowledge" of God; it assumed a *genuine* though partial knowledge of Him.

While some expressions are found which, taken by themselves, seem to push the transcendence of God beyond the true limit, others occur which strike one as falling short of that limit. Tertullian, for example, appears to have been unable to rise to the conception of pure spirit. "Nothing,"

he says, "lacks bodily existence but that which is non-existent." (*De Carne Christi*, XI.) This idea he applies directly to God, in these terms: "Who will deny that God is a body, although 'God is a spirit'? For spirit has a bodily substance of its own kind, in its own form." (*Adv. Prax.*, VII.) It might be suggested that Tertullian used the word "body" as equivalent to substance. No doubt he conceived of the divine body as invisible to mortal eyes, and immeasurably contrasted with earthly grossness; but he seems, nevertheless, to have contemplated it under the aspect of extension, and so to have included it within the category of bodies proper. According to Origen, Tertullian had been anticipated in this positive ascription of a body to God, by Melito. (*Select. in Gen.*) Less directly he was anticipated by some others, who, notwithstanding their emphatic conviction of the spirituality of the divine nature, interpreted the omnipresence of God very much in accordance with bodily analogies. Athenagoras, for example, argued that there can be only one God, since there is no room for a second, — no room, as His words imply, in a spatial sense, as well as in respect of governing functions. (*Legat.*, VIII.) Theophilus, also, unless his language imperfectly represents his thought, indulged a similar conception of omnipresence. (*Ad. Autol.*, I. 5; II. 3.) It is to be observed, however, that a little lapse from scientific exactness of expression is so easy upon such a subject, that a verdict is not hastily to be passed upon the real theory of an author. Among those most decidedly repudiating all bodily characteristics from God, and grasping the purest conception of the divine omnipresence, were the Alexandrians. "God is not in place," says Clement, "but above both space and time." (*Strom.*, II. 2.) Origen urges that we are not to think of God as in any degree corporeal, and declares the proposition of the Stoics, that God is a spirit diffused through all things, and containing all things within Himself, to be no dogma of Christians, since the Christian

doctrine shuns to apply to God the notion of containing or being contained in the proper spatial sense. (De Prin., I. 1; Cont. Cel., VI. 71.)

Origen, however, had his own way of compromising the transcendence of God, inasmuch as he affirmed a necessary limitation upon divine power and knowledge. The limitation which he predicated had its foundation in a notion which has been ventilated not a little in modern philosophy, — the notion that the boundless or the infinite cannot be known. This notion, when applied to Deity, involves either a denial of His infinitude, or a denial of His personality. Now Origen, notwithstanding a measure of affiliation with Neo-Platonism, was decidedly averse to its obscuration of the personality of God. In this relation he was in full sympathy with the general drift of the first centuries, and had a strong interest in the perfect freedom and self-consciousness — or, in other words, in the proper personality — of the Supreme Being. Unwilling to abate aught in this direction, he was logically driven to qualify God's infinitude. Hence we find him, in connection with his proposition on the necessary limitation of the created universe, indulging the following statements: "We must say that the power of God is finite, and not, under pretence of praising Him, take away His limitation. For if the divine power be infinite, it must of necessity be unable to understand even itself, since that which is naturally illimitable is incapable of being comprehended. He made things, therefore, so great as to be able to apprehend and keep them under His power, and control them by His providence." (Epistle of Justinian to Menas. Compare version of Rufinus in De Prin., II. 9.) Again he remarks: "That which is boundless in nature cannot be comprehended, since it is the nature of knowledge to bound what is known." (In Matt. Tom., XIII. 1.) Origen seems to have been led astray here through judging the divine by the human. Knowledge within the human range implies circumscrip-

tion. Not so, however, in the divine range. God's knowledge is not to be conceived as circumscribing His being, nor His being as setting bounds to His knowledge. Circumscription and bounds are to be ruled out of all connection with either the one or the other. When this is done, there will be no obstruction to the *notion* of the co-existence in God of infinite being and infinite knowledge; though of course the human mind, as it cannot *image* the infinite at all, cannot distinctly image to itself the co-existence in question. (Nitzsch, in his *System der Christ. Lehre*, § 72, exculpates Origen, as meaning to affirm determinateness in God, or the presence of definite predicates, rather than any limitation proper; but it may be doubted whether the language of Origen allows him to be thus excused.)

Some of the passages already quoted indicate that time relations were regarded as foreign to God, and others to the same effect might be cited. That God is immutable and impassible was often asserted. (In Num. Hom., XVI. 4; Select. in Gen.; Legat., VIII.; Adv. Prax., XXIX.; Div. Inst., I. 3.)

As respects moral attributes, it naturally characterized an age rejoicing in the new-found treasure of redemption to dwell especially upon the love of God. Still, the sterner attributes were not overlooked. In opposition to Marcion's one-sided emphasis upon divine love, a place was claimed for divine justice. Tertullian in particular was zealous to assert this aspect of Deity. In proportion, he argues, as God is the lover and defender of the good, He must necessarily be the hater and punisher of the evil; such a weakling as Marcion puts in the place of God can never command the reverence needful to the conservation of moral order. There is no antagonism between goodness and justice. "God is wholly good, because in all things He is on the side of good." (Adv. Marc., I. 26, 27, II. 13.) According to Tertullian, vindication of law and essential

hatred of sin are leading motives with God in the infliction of punishment. By the Alexandrians, on the other hand, especially Origen, the corrective design of punishment was largely emphasized. We find Origen, indeed, protesting against the Marcionite disparagement of justice, and claiming, like Tertullian, that it is in perfect agreement with goodness and must have a place in any normal conception of God; but he gives a very different turn to his argument by asserting that God punishes in kindness, and for the sake of the improvement of the punished as well as for the security of moral order in general. (De Prin., II. 5.)

Among special views bearing upon God's holiness, none is perhaps more noteworthy than the idea of Origen that power to sin would involve a limitation of God. He maintains that "God is not able to commit wickedness, for the power of doing evil is contrary to His deity and its omnipotence." (Cont. Cel., III. 70.) To fall into sin implies wavering and weakness; an infinite lapse from righteous strength, an unthinkable imbecility, must ensue ere God can indulge any wickedness.

SECTION II.—THE LOGOS, OR SON OF GOD.

1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS.—In every system of thought which does not rest upon the low plane of materialism, or lose the distinction between God and the world in a pantheistic maze, there is a natural occasion to dwell upon the idea of mediation. God in His exaltation above time and space and every material characteristic, appears in unspeakable contrast with the visible world. How to soften the antithesis, or to bridge over the interval between the two, becomes a problem of foremost interest. Among the first essays at a solution, a more definite analysis of the general idea of God naturally claims a place. It is realized that, if a world-

ward side can be predicated of God, which is at the same time in harmony with His transcendence, something has been done towards spanning, in a consistent manner, the chasm between God and the world. This worldward side is found in the divine mind, as holding in itself from eternity the immaterial forms or patterns of all things in the universe of creatures. Thus an antecedent of the visible world is discovered,—an ideal world in the divine mind. Herein a kind of medium is provided between the general concept of God and the concept of the world. And this evidently may serve as a basis for a further development. The worldward side may be so far distinguished from the general notion of God as to acquire a relative independence; in other words, the sum of divine ideas forming the ideal world may obtain in figure, or even in actual belief, the position of a personal intelligence, and be represented as the *conscious* instrument of creation, the conscious instrument of the universal revelation of the hidden God. Thus, finally, there may be set forth a veritable medium between God and the world. As being, on the one hand, immanent in the Godhead, this medium may be viewed as truly divine; as holding, on the other hand, an instrumental place, it may be conceived under the aspect of subordination. The name Logos, or Word, as aptly expressing the function of revelation, is naturally included among the philosophic designations of the medium.

The preceding statements cannot fail to suggest that among the antecedents of the doctrine of the Logos a place must be given to Platonism, or at least that Platonism was essentially adapted to occupy such a place. The confirmation of this suggestion, it is to be observed, is independent of the acceptance of this or that theory as to Plato's own meaning in his teaching upon the subject of the Ideas. His general representations of the Ideas as supersensible realities, as forming the eternal pattern of the visible universe, as the unchanging source of all excellence and genuine

being in the world, as the sole medium of absolute knowledge, were in themselves fitted to assist those having a firm hold of theistic faith in developing the doctrine of a divine Mediator between God and the world, or the doctrine of the Logos. A clear illustration of this is found both in Jewish and Christian writings. Among the protean shapes, for example, which Philo gives to his theory of mediation, we have one which is openly based upon the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. God is represented as describing to Moses the invisible attendants of Himself in these terms: "You must conceive that the powers which are around me invest those things which have no distinctive qualities with such qualities, and those things which have no forms with precise forms, and that without having any portion of their own everlasting nature dismembered or weakened; and some of your race, speaking with sufficient correctness, call them Ideas, since they give a peculiar character to every existing thing, arranging what had previously no order, and limiting and defining and fashioning what was before destitute of all limitation and definition and fashion." (On Monarchy, I. 6.) The powers are here, to be sure, spoken of as a plurality; but, as Philo exemplifies, it was very easy to combine them into one, or to postulate the Logos as the Idea, inclusive of all the other Ideas. An equally indubitable reference to the Platonic teaching is found with Origen, where he says: "It is also a question for investigation, whether the 'only begotten' and 'first-born' of every creature is to be called 'substance of substances' and 'Idea of Ideas,' and the 'principle of all things.'" (Cont. Cel., VI. 64. Compare Clement, Strom., V. 3.) The representations also of Plato, that the Ideas are the essential condition of science, and indeed of true rationality, find a parallel in the teaching of a number of early Christian writers, that the Logos is in all men the principle of the higher reason.

Besides supplying in his doctrine of Ideas a general basis

for the Logos teaching, Plato indulged some scattered statements, which are indeed quite obscure, but capable nevertheless of suggesting a plurality of persons in the Godhead. In a letter to Dionysius there is an enigmatic reference to a triad of divine principles or persons, and in a letter to Hermias, Erastus, and Corsicus mention is made of a divine guide and of the father of the guide. (Quoted by Theodoret, Græc. Affect. Curat., Serm. II. Compare Eusebius, De Præp. Evang., XI. 10; Petavius, Theol. Dogmat., De Trin., I. 1.) Little account, however, is to be taken of these two letters, since eminent critics pronounce them spurious. In the Republic, Book VI., he speaks of *the good* as begetting a child in his own likeness. In the Timæus he represents the Creator as forming the world after an eternal pattern, and placing a living soul at its centre. What was Plato's own meaning in these statements may stand in question. But their bearing in the way of suggestion is obvious enough in itself, and is further indicated by the fact that the Neo-Platonists regarded them as implying their trinitarian scheme. As Theodoret represents, Plotinus and Numenius taught that Plato affirmed three eternal subsistencies, the good, mind, and the soul of the world.

Earlier than Platonism, Judaism furnished antecedents to the Christian conception of the Logos. In this category is to be reckoned the Old Testament characterization of the "word of the Lord" as the instrument of creation and revelation. Strongly re-enforcing the suggestion contained in this phraseology came the custom, initiated in the Solomonic era, of personifying wisdom. The eighth chapter of Proverbs may justly be ranked among the principal factors in shaping the doctrine of the Logos. Wisdom is here described as the primal companion of God, as His first-born son. "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His way, before His works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth." Representa-

tions like these, in the hands of a speculative Judaism, could hardly fail to be utilized in developing a theory of mediation between God and the world. Judaism of this cast was especially nurtured by the atmosphere of Alexandria, where Oriental religion came into contact with Greek culture, and eclecticism flourished as nowhere else in ancient times. Something of the philosophizing tendency naturally engendered by such surroundings appears in the so-called *Wisdom of Solomon*, a book written probably about a century before Christ. In this writing, terms are employed which directly anticipate the doctrine of the creative function, the enlightening office, and the eternal generation of the Logos. *Wisdom* is described as the "worker of all things," as "one, manifold, subtile, quick, loving, gentle, steadfast"; as "overseeing all things and containing all spirits"; as "more active than all active things"; as a "vapor of the power of God and a certain pure emanation of the glory of Almighty God"; as "the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness"; as remaining ever the same, renewing all things, and through nations conveying herself into holy souls. (Chap. VII. Compare *Ecclesiasticus*, I., XXIV.)

But the most eminent exponent by far of the speculative Judaism of Alexandria was Philo, who wrote in the early years of the Christian era. In him we find the utmost freedom in blending the stores of Greek philosophy with the tenets of his Hebrew faith. Many systems yielded him their contributions. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers was exceedingly agreeable to his mind; but it was upon the works of Plato, whom he mentions as "that sweetest of all writers," that he fed with special avidity.

As already indicated, Philo presents the Logos under a variety of aspects. We find him, for one thing, identifying the same with the divine reason, viewed as planning the world or holding in itself the plan of the world. Such, at

any rate, his representation is made to appear when statement is compared with statement. "If any one," he says, "were to use more undisguised terms, he would not call the world which is perceptible only to the intellect anything else than the reason of God already occupied in the creation of the world; for neither is a city, while only perceptible to the intellect, anything else than the reason of the architect, who is already designing to build one perceptible to the external senses." (On the Creation of the World, VI.) In the same treatise he indicates that reason viewed in this light may be called the image of God. This image, or intellectual world, he affirms, is far above all comparison with the visible world, as much more brilliant than the latter as the sun is than darkness, or day than night. In another connection he applies to this divine image the name of Logos, or Word, and declares that it is the archetype of the visible world and the instrument of its formation. "The shadow of God," he writes, "is His Word, which He used like an instrument when He was making the world. And this shadow, and as it were model, is the archetype of all things. For as God is Himself the model of that image which He has now called a shadow, so also that image is the model of other things." (Allegories of the Sacred Laws, III. 31.) God created everything out of the formless essence, "without indeed touching it Himself, for it was not lawful for the all-wise and all-blessed God to touch materials which were all misshapen and confused, but He created them by the agency of His incorporeal powers, of which the proper name is ideas." (On Those who offer Sacrifice, XIII.) In the following sentence these powers are viewed as one: "Now the image of God is the Word, by which all the world was made." (On Monarchy, III. 5.) In accordance with the office which the Logos has in fashioning the world, its dividing or distributing function is emphasized. It moves swiftly, like the flaming sword by which it is symbolized, outstrips everything, divides and

distributes everything in nature. (The Cherubim, etc., IX. ; Sacrifices of Abel and Cain, XVIII. ; Heir of Divine Things, XXVII., XLVIII.) As being the universal model, the Logos claims priority to all other things. "The Word of God is over all the world, and is the most universal of all the things that are created." (Allegories, III. 61.) The Word of God is "the first beginning of all things, the original species or the archetypal idea, the first measure of the universe." (Questions and Solutions, IV.) Holding thus the next place to the Highest, the Logos, in the view of Philo, may be styled the *second Deity*. "No mortal thing," he says, "could have been formed in the similitude of the supreme Father of the universe, but only after the pattern of the second Deity." (Ibid., LXII.) Finally, the Logos is represented as holding the place of a mediator or intercessor between God and the race. The most marked description to this effect is perhaps the following: "The Father who created the universe has given to his archangelic Word a pre-eminent gift, to stand on the confines of both, and separate that which had been created from the Creator. And this same Word is continually a suppliant to the immortal God on behalf of the mortal race, which is exposed to affliction and misery, and is also the ambassador sent by the Ruler of all to the subject race. And the Word rejoices in the gift, and boasts of it, saying, 'And I stood in the midst between the Lord and you; neither being uncreate as God, nor yet created as you, but being in the midst between these two extremities, like a hostage as it were of both parties: a hostage to the Creator, as a pledge and security that the whole race would never fly off and revolt entirely, choosing disorder rather than order; and to the creature, to lead it to entertain a confident hope that the merciful God would not overlook His own work.'" (Heir of Divine Things, XLII. Compare Life of Moses, III. 14.)

Some of Philo's representations suggest that he regarded the Logos simply as an aspect or power of God, while

others seem to assume for it a personal character. Which theory he really entertained is a question which has divided critics. Dorner decides against the distinct personality of Philo's Logos, and thinks the same may be described as follows:—(1.) A divine faculty, whether of thought or creation, or both together. (2.) A divine activity, the act of thinking or generating the ideal world. (3.) The thing thought,—namely, the ideal world. (4.) The formative principle of the sensible world. (Hist. of Doct. of Person of Christ.) Possibly Philo himself wavered between the personal and the impersonal in his conception of the Logos. He was by no means tied down to exact and methodical thinking. Speculation appears to have been regarded by him as a kind of mental luxury, and he roams through its wide ranges with but moderate regard for self-consistency.

Philo's teaching did not at all embrace the idea of an incarnation of the Logos. A divine incarnation, such as Christianity teaches, was utterly alien to his system of thought. His radical disparagement of the body as the great enemy of virtue, and his idealistic temper, excluded all sympathy with the idea of the Word becoming flesh. As might be inferred from this, Philo's doctrine of the Logos had no real connection in his mind with his Jewish faith in a Messiah. The promise of a Messiah had a minor interest for him; and the hope of His coming and work, which he entertained, consisted simply in the expectation of a kind of theophany, a supernatural manifestation visible only to the just, which should serve in bringing back the scattered Jews to Palestine.

Platonism, the Old Testament, and Philo's combination of the two, served undoubtedly as antecedents of that development of the doctrine of the Logos which we find among the Christian fathers. But there is another antecedent that must not be left out of the account; namely, the facts of the Gospel history,—that marvellous combination of natural and supernatural factors in the birth, and

life, and teaching, and death, and resurrection, and ascension, of the Redeemer. This unparalleled list of facts would have demanded the formulation of a theory of the Logos, or Son of God, had such never been suggested before. Platonic or Philonic philosophizing may have colored unduly the teaching of some of the fathers upon the subject. So may a regnant philosophy of any age color unduly the exposition given by individual authors of the deeper questions of theology. But an accessory or modifying cause is not to be taken for the principal. The fundamental and permanent occasion for a doctrine of the Logos, or, more broadly speaking, for a trinitarian theory, lies in the facts of the New Testament revelation.

2. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS. — Entire agreement with each other, or even entire consistency on the part of each with himself, could hardly be expected of the first Christian writers who took up the difficult task of developing the doctrine of the Logos. In case of ambiguity or seeming contradiction, fairness requires, of course, that the general drift of an author should be made the chief consideration. One passage is not to be set up as a standard for the interpretation of other passages without the most ample reasons. Too little attention has sometimes been paid to this obvious rule. Gieseler, as it seems to us, falls short of his usual impartiality in his treatment of this subject, and exhibits too much of an inclination, in the first period of his "*Dogmengeschichte*," to interpret everything in the light of passages most adverse to the proper divinity of the Son, or to the trinitarian theory. Petavius also inclines to the side of severity in judging the trinitarianism of the ante-Nicene fathers. On the other hand, writers might be specified who show an opposite bias, and unduly slight expressions indicative of a more or less emphatic subordination of the Son. Bishop Bull, in his celebrated "*Defence of the Nicene Faith*," erred somewhat in this direction.

Whatever the contrariety of statement on the part of the early fathers, it does not appear so radical as to preclude the propriety of embracing the import of their teachings under certain general propositions.

1. *The early Church taught with great unanimity the personal pre-existence of the Son.* The rule of faith, quoted by different writers as embracing the teaching undoubtedly handed down from the apostles, assumes such pre-existence. (Irenæus, I. 10. 1, III. 4. 2; Tertullian, *De Præscrip.*, XIII.; Origen, *De Prin.*, Præf., 4.) Clement of Rome, if his language be taken as the connection of clauses seems to require, represents Christ as speaking in the Old Testament through the Holy Ghost. (1 Epist. XXII.) His carefulness also to qualify the statement that Christ was of the seed of Jacob, by the added clause "according to the flesh," is a hint of his belief in Christ's pre-existence. Ignatius expresses himself very emphatically in reference to this tenet, speaking of Christ as one "who was with the Father before the ages, and in the end was revealed" (*Ad Mag.*, VI.); as one "who is above all time, eternal and invisible, yet who became visible for our sakes." (*Ad Polycarpum*, III.) In the Epistle of Barnabas it is argued that it was necessary that the Son of God should come *in the flesh*, since men who cannot endure to look upon the natural sun, which is the work of His hands, could not by any means endure to look upon His glory unveiled. (V.) The same epistle also makes mention of the Son as the one to whom the divine preface to man's creation was addressed. (V., VI.) Hermas describes, in his allegorical fashion, a great white rock rising out of a plain, the rock ancient in appearance, but having a new gate cut into its side. In the interpretation the rock is said to bear the semblance of age because "the Son of God is older than all His creatures, so that He was a fellow councillor with the Father in His work of creation"; and the gate is new "because He became manifest in the last days of the dispensation." (*Simil.*, IX. 2, 12.)

Hermas, to be sure, uses a rather peculiar phraseology, in that he speaks of the Son of God as a spirit (Simil., IX. 1); and some have concluded that he identified the Son with the Holy Ghost. But even if this identification be granted, it proves simply that Hermas did not acknowledge a *third* personality in the Godhead; it militates not at all against the personal pre-existence of the Son. The passages quoted above certainly imply that the Son was personally distinct from the Father before the incarnation, and that this pre-existent one was the centre of personality in the incarnate Christ. As regards the relation between Son and Holy Spirit, the symbolism of Hermas is no doubt involved in great obscurity. Dorner concludes that his total representation appears most consistent on the supposition that the Son was distinguished in his thought from the Holy Spirit. The epistle to Diognetus speaks of the advent of Christ as a coming from heaven, where He had shared the counsels of God. (VII., VIII.) In the eleventh chapter of the same epistle — which, however, is regarded by many as of later origin than the preceding portion — it is said of the Son, "This is He who was from the beginning, who appeared as if new." Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Theophilus plainly assume the personal pre-existence of the Son (or the Logos, as they usually term Him). Athenagoras has been thought by some to have acknowledged no personal distinction between the Son and the Father. It is true that he calls the Son the understanding, the reason, the intelligence, and the wisdom of the Father, and emphasizes the inseparability of the one from the other. But writers who beyond all question predicate personal distinctions in the Godhead employ similar expressions. Athenagoras, even when speaking of the Son as the divine reason, might very well have regarded this as assuming the condition of an hypostasis; and, in fact, his language is not without positive indications that such was his conception. He speaks of the *coming forth* of the Logos to serve in the work of creation, in virtue of

which coming forth He might be termed the first product of the Father, — an order of expression which certainly some writers used to describe the generation, or the issuing into personality, of the Logos. The fact, moreover, that in refuting the charge of atheism he thinks it necessary to mention the Son as well as the Father and the angels, and makes the Son the immediate superintendent of the angels, is indicative of an ascription of personality to the former. (Legat., X.) To this it is to be added, that while he mentions the unity of Father, Son, and Spirit, he speaks also of “their *distinction* in unity.” (Legat., XII.) In fine, Athenagoras, whether successful in his aim or not, seems to have had in mind the very design characteristic of Athanasian trinitarianism; namely, the assertion on the one hand of unity of essence, and on the other of personal distinctions. As respects the succeeding writers of the period, it is not necessary to multiply testimony, the fact being notorious that they explicitly taught the personal pre-existence of the Son. This was clearly, therefore, the current teaching of the age. The Ebionites and the Monarchians were exceptions; but, upon grounds already stated, they may be reckoned as having been very decidedly in the minority.

2. *The early Church showed a marked tendency to apply divine predicates to the Son, and to assert His consubstantiality, or unity in essence, with the Father.*

Heathen criticism represents the Christians as assigning a divine rank to Christ. The letter of Pliny to Trajan, written about the year 110, says that the Christians who were brought before his tribunal testified that they were accustomed to assemble on a certain day before sunrise, and to sing responsively among themselves a song of praise to Christ as God (*carmen Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem*). To the same effect are various statements of Celsus. (Cont. Cel., II. 31, II. 67, IV. 2.)

The oldest complete hymn from the early Church is filled

with the praise of Christ, and applies to him such titles as "King of Saints," and "Lord of Immortality." (In works of Clement of Alex.) A writer quoted by Eusebius confirms Pliny's statement on the custom of Christians. "As many psalms and hymns," he says, "as were written by believing brethren from the beginning celebrate Christ the Word of God in terms descriptive of divinity." (Eccl. Hist., V. 28.)

The rule of faith, as quoted by Origen in the translation by Rufinus, asserts that Christ, after serving the Father in the creation of all things, divested Himself and became man, yet remained what He was before, namely, God. (De Prin., Præf.) The version of the rule given by Irenæus speaks of Jesus Christ as "our Lord, and God, and Saviour, and King." (I. 10. 1.) One of the versions contributed by Tertullian describes the Word that was sent into the world as "both man and God, the Son of Man and the Son of God." (Adv. Prax., III.)

In writings dominated by a practical interest, as was the case with some of those from the apostolic fathers, a frequent and distinct application of the divine name to Christ is not to be expected. In a treatise not formally theological, even the most staunch trinitarian naturally uses, in the main, such titles of Christ as are descriptive rather of His office and human manifestation than of His place in the Godhead. The earliest Christian literature after the New Testament, however, will not be found destitute of significant tributes to the divinity of Christ.

Clement of Rome terms Christ "the sceptre of the majesty of God," and the brightness of the divine majesty, and portrays Him as the medium of all spiritual blessings. (1 Epist. ad Cor., XVI., XXXVI.) The second Epistle bearing Clement's name, though not from his hand, is of quite ancient date. Its opening sentence is as follows: "Brethren, it is fitting that you should think of Jesus Christ as of God,—as the judge of the living and the

dead." In the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians it is said of Christ, "To Him all things in heaven and earth are subject." (Chap. II.) The same writing represents the Son as being joint source with the Father, of every spiritual grace. (XII.) The Epistle of Barnabas names Christ the Lord of all the world, and the Judge of the living and the dead. (V., VII.) Ignatius speaks of Christ as unproduced in respect of His higher nature, as "God existing in flesh," as the "eternal Word," as "our God." (Ad Eph., VII.; Ad Mag., VIII.; Ad Tral., VII.; Ad Rom., III.) He also indulges in the expression, "the blood of God." (Ad Eph., I., both in the shorter Greek and the Syriac recensions.) "The name of the Son of God," says the Pastor of Hermas, "is great, and cannot be contained, and supports the whole world. If, then, the whole creation is supported by the Son of God, what think ye of those who are called by Him?" (Simil., IX. 14.) The Epistle to Diognetus teaches that the invisible God did not send a servant or an angel to men, "but the very Creator and Fashioner of all things. . . . As a king sends his son, who is also a king, so sent He Him; as God, *ὡς θεόν*, He sent Him." (VII.)

With Justin Martyr and the apologists immediately following, we find a more formal and definite attempt to define the place of the Son in the Godhead than characterized the apostolic fathers. The representations of this group of writers remind, to some extent, of Philo's teaching. The Son, according to their leading conception, is the Word and Wisdom of God, and, as such, the immediate antecedent of the world, and the principal medium of divine revelation. The fact that He is begotten places Him, in their view, somewhat below an exact equality with the unbegotten Father. Still they assert for Him lofty predicates and an essentially divine rank.

Justin Martyr teaches that, after God the Father, the Word is the most kingly ruler; that next to the unbegotten

God He is worshipped and loved by Christians. He is the wisdom, and power, and glory of the Father, by whom He is begotten after a peculiar and ineffable manner. As fire kindles fire without itself being diminished, so the Father begat the Son before the beginning of creation. As in origin, so in nature the Son is immeasurably distinguished from every creature. He is the great source of truth in the universe, so that a participation in truth or reason is a participation in Him. "Christ," says Justin, in one place, "is King, and Priest, and God, and Lord"; and in several instances he applies to Him the full title of Deity. He declares also that, as God, He is impassible. Such, at least, is the statement of a fragment attributed to Justin. (1 Apol., XII.; 2 Apol., X., XIII.; Dial. cum Tryph., XXXIV., XLVIII., LVI., LIX.-LXI., CXXVI., CXXVIII.; Frag. X. in Ante-Nicene Lib.) The less ample statements of Tatian indicate a belief quite similar to that of Justin, and the former uses the same figure as the latter in describing the generation of the Son. (V., VII.) The references already made to Athenagoras, in connection with the subject of pre-existence, indicate with sufficient clearness that the Word was located by him within the circle of the Godhead proper. Theophilus speaks of the Word as having always been present with the Father, as begotten before all creatures, as the agent by whom all things were made, as the Divine Person who walked in Paradise, as God from God. (II. 10, II. 22.)

Clement of Alexandria and Irenæus are distinguished in a measure from the preceding group, as also from the writers who followed them. They came late enough to see the rankest growth of Gnosticism, and to feel the need of combating its peculiar tenets; but at the same time they came too early to share in the reaction against the Patripassian or Sabellian heresy. The daring and elaborate specifications of the Gnostics about the generation of æons, of whom the Logos was reckoned as one in their scheme,

naturally inclined them to a cautious and negative attitude on the question of the generation of the Son. An incentive of this nature and from this source is decidedly apparent in Irenæus. He reproaches the Gnostics with attempting to describe the indescribable, with talking about the generation of the Word with as much assurance as if they themselves had been present at His birth. He urges that the utterance of a word by a human tongue is no suitable illustration of the divine generation. "If any one," he writes, "says to us, 'How then was the Son produced by the Father?' we reply to him that no one understands that production, or generation, or calling, or revelation, or by whatever name we may describe His generation, which is in fact altogether indescribable." (II. 28.) The divine nature is not to be judged by human standards. The parental relationship on earth is no satisfactory image of the relation between the Divine Father and Son. God has in Himself nothing more ancient or late than another. (II. 13.) Occupying this position, Irenæus had naturally no interest in the distinction, made by the preceding group of writers, between the immanent and the uttered Word, *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικός*. The same is true of Clement, who declares that "the Word of the Father of the universe is not the *λόγος προφορικός*." (Strom., V. 1.) Both emphasize the immanent Word or the union of the Son with the Father. Their total representation indicates that they recognized the personality of the Word; but they were not so much interested as those who came after them to bring out the personal aspect, since they were not called upon to contend against the Patripassian denial of distinct personality.

Clement of Alexandria styles the Word the supramundane wisdom, the image of God, the archetypal light of light, the commander-in-chief of the universe, the circle of all powers rolled and united into unity. He was and is the divine source of all things. He was in the beginning

and before the beginning. As Creator He bestowed life upon us, as Instructor He taught us when He appeared in the flesh. "Believe Him," exhorts Clement, "who is man and God. Believe, O man, the living God, who suffered and is adored." The Divine Word is truly "most manifest Deity." He is eternal, the one great High Priest. He is God in the form of God, and God in the form of man. To think of any imperfection in Him were monstrous. "For Him to make any addition to His knowledge is absurd, since He is God." His nature precludes transitions. "From His own point of view the Son of God is never displaced; not being divided, not severed, not passing from place to place; being always everywhere and contained nowhere; seeing all things, hearing all things, knowing all things." (Cohort., I., X., XII.; Pæd., I. 2, I. 6, I. 7, I. 8; Strom., IV. 25, VII. 2.) "On the part of Clement," says Baur, "an endeavor is visible throughout to carry over to the Logos all absolute predicates."

Irenæus speaks of the Word as the Founder, and Framers, and Maker of all things; as the Saviour of all, and the Ruler of heaven and earth; as the measure of the immeasurable Father; as having been always with the Father, and having glorified Him before all creation; as both God and man, since He forgave as God and suffered as man. "Vain," he says, "are the Ebionites, who do not receive by faith into their soul the union of God and man." (I. 15. 5; III. 9. 3; III. 11. 8; IV. 4. 2; IV. 14. 1; IV. 20. 3; V. 17. 3; V. 1. 3.)

Tertullian and the writers who followed him in the third century had to contend against the denial by Praxeas, Sabellius, and others, of personal distinctions in the Godhead. They were concerned, therefore, as has already been intimated, to assert clearly the distinct personality of the Son. At the same time, the criticisms of their opponents made them feel the need of securing the divine unity. It is quite conceivable that this double demand

might have given a bias, at a certain stage, toward the idea of subordination, since a second Person subordinate to the first would naturally seem less antagonistic to unity than co-ordinate Divine Persons. In some of the writers of the third century a bias of this sort is no doubt discernible. Still the same era abounds in testimony to the essential divinity of the Son.

According to Tertullian the Son is the supreme Head and Master of divine grace, the Enlightener and Trainer of mankind. In substance he is one with the Father. As a ray is of the same nature as the parent sun, as the stream is of the same substance as the fountain, so the Son is of the same substance as the Father. "He proceeds forth from God, and in that procession He is generated; so that He is the Son of God, and is called God from unity of substance with God." Divinity admits of no degrees, since it is unique. Divine persons must be distinguished by something else than difference of substance. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three, not in substance, but in form. There is only one substance in three coherent and inseparable [Persons]. The Son, though revealed by means of the flesh, is, considered in Himself, like the Father, invisible, since He is God. He is at once truly God and truly man. While He is the Son of the Almighty, He is likewise Himself Almighty. As the Father is omnipresent, so also is the Son. (Apol. XXI.; Adv. Prax. II., XII., XVII., XXIII.; Adv. Hermog., VII.; Adv. Marc., V. 20.) Tertullian, it must be granted, in his somewhat headlong polemics sometimes stumbles on unsuitable illustrations; as, for example, when he describes the relation of Father and Son by the category of whole and part. (Adv. Prax., IX.) But even this crude and materialistic representation, while it is adverse to the Son's full equality, argues a belief in His oneness of substance with the Father.

Hippolytus taught that the Son is of the substance of God, and speaks of Him as "the God above all," as "our

Lord Jesus Christ who is also God," as "God the Word [who] came down from heaven," as "the impassible Word of God," who needed to be incarnated in order to become subject to suffering. While he asserts that there is, not merely a relative, but an absolute difference between the human and the divine, between the finite and the infinite, he affirms the coexistence of both in Christ. (Phil. X. 29, X. 30; De Chr. et Antichr., VI.; Adv. Noet. XV., XVII.; Adv. Beron, Frag. I.; Comm. in Ps., II.)

Novatian characterizes the Son in terms very similar to those of Tertullian, applying to Him the divine name, styling Him both God and man, and affirming that He exercised prerogatives and powers peculiar to God, such as forgiving sins, knowing the secrets of hearts, and being everywhere present. (De Trin.)

Whatever the writings of Origen may contain that is at variance with the idea of the proper divinity of the Son, they assert His actual possession of essentially divine attributes. The statement appears repeatedly that the virtues shared in by creatures have in Christ an absolutely full and complete subsistence. Language is used which certainly implies that these virtues exist nowhere in fuller measure than they do in the Son. What else is the import of the following sentences of Origen? "He whom we regard and believe to have been from the beginning God, and the Son of God, is the very Logos, and the very Wisdom, and the very Truth." (Cont. Cel., III. 41.) "Our Saviour does not partake of righteousness, but being Himself righteousness, He is partaken of by the righteous." (Ibid., VI. 64.) "All things belonging to God are in Him. Christ is the wisdom of God. He Himself is the power of God, He Himself the righteousness of God," etc. (In Jer. Hom. VIII. 2. Compare In Ioan. Tom., VI. 3.) Referring to this order of expressions, Baur says of Origen's teaching: "Everything absolute, which can never be thought of except as an essential determination of God, is ascribed also

to the Logos." Still further, the Son is represented as the light of the intelligible universe (In Ioan. Tom., I. 24) and the brightness of divine glory. In person, as well as in substance, He is to be thought of as eternal. He was always with the Father, as brightness is always with the light, His generation being ever complete and ever continued. (In Jer. Hom., IX. 4; In Ioan. Tom., I. 32.) He is omnipresent; His coming to men in no wise compelled Him to vacate the seat previously occupied. With those who know Him, and with those who know Him not, He is everywhere present. (Cont. Cel., IV. 5, V. 12.) As in His divine nature He is above the limitations of place, so also He is above the limitations of circumstances. The assumption of a human body and soul by "the immortal God, the Word," wrought no change in Him, and put no constraint upon Him, save the constraint which holy benevolence gladly adopts for the sake of those in need. (Cont. Cel., IV. 15.) In the measure of His knowledge, also, He shows Himself to be truly divine. Those are greatly at fault who think that His divinity cannot be proved from the Gospel of Matthew, inasmuch as that Gospel ascribes to Him a power which is peculiar to God, the power of knowing men's hearts. (In Matt. Tom., XII. 6.) "Thou, O Son of God, who knowest all things, knowest what is in man." (In Ioan. Tom., X. 30.)

The preceding paragraph is based upon writings of Origen of which the Greek text is extant. In quoting from works preserved only in ancient Latin translations, there will be of course somewhat less of confidence,—unless perchance the subject matter is counter to the views held by the translator. Among writings of this order the "De Principiis," as rendered by Rufinus, is distinguished by very clear statements of the essential divinity of the Son. The following are some of its statements: "What belongs to the nature of deity is common to the Father and the Son." (I. 1. 8.) "Let him who assigns a beginning to the Word

or Wisdom of God take care that he be not guilty of impiety against the unbegotten Father Himself, seeing that he denies that He had always been a Father." (I. 2. 3.) "If all things which are the Father's are also Christ's, certainly among those things which exist is the omnipotence of the Father; and doubtless the only-begotten Son ought to be omnipotent." (I. 2. 10.)

Origen, according to Dorner, held a view which afforded a natural ground for predicating the same divinity in Father and Son. "Instead," he says, "of resorting to a quantitative division, Origen adopts a different view of the mode of existence of the divine as a whole. This is one of the most important and luminous features of Origen's system. He saw that finite things are characterized by a certain exclusiveness; he who makes something external his property, by that act withdraws it from others; and so far as another is in possession, I am not in possession. But in the sphere of the spiritual and divine the case is otherwise. The art or science of any man is not lessened by its being in the possession of others; and as it is with wisdom, so it is also with goodness, with ethical perfection. They are indivisible, it is true, in the sense that no one can truly possess any portion thereof without possessing the principle of the whole; but this does not imply that only one individual can possess them. On the contrary, their nature is to be principally indivisible and yet communicable; that is, they can be entirely possessed by more than one subject at the same time." (Hist. of the Doct. of the Person of Christ, Div. I. Vol. II.)

Dionysius of Alexandria, influenced largely by his opposition to Sabellianism, seems to have used expressions which at least could be taken in a sense very disparaging to the relative dignity of the Son. But, on the other hand, the vigorous protests which his language called forth, and his own explanations and interpretations, were of the nature of a very positive tribute to the doctrine of the Son's true

divinity. In an epistle to the Roman bishop, designed as a response to his critics, Dionysius declared his belief in the eternity of the Son, and indicated with sufficient clearness his opinion that the Son might properly be termed "consubstantial" with the Father, although this precise word was not to be found in the Scriptures.

Lactantius indulges in a rather crude description of the Son's generation. He testifies, however, very explicitly to His consubstantiality with the Father. "The Father," he says, "cannot exist without the Son, nor can the Son be separated from the Father, since the name of Father cannot be given without the Son, nor can the Son be begotten without the Father. Since, therefore, the Father makes the Son, and the Son the Father, they both have one mind, one spirit, one substance." (Div. Inst., IV. 29.)

3. *A number of the early fathers admitted into their view of the Son points of subordination not allowed by later standards of the Church.*

It is quite evident from the preceding review that the image of Christ, which hovered before the mind of the early Church, was the image of a divine Person holding by rank and nature a place within the circle of the Godhead. The central current of theology was steadfastly in the direction of acknowledging in the Godhead a dual (not to speak at present of a trinal) personality. This result of our investigation, however, leaves still a question to be considered. While there was a general belief in a plurality of divine Persons, was this belief formulated in harmony with later standards? Did all the fathers of the first three centuries come up to the Nicene standard as respects the relation of the Son to the Father, and affirm only such a subordination of the Son as is necessarily involved in holding a second place in the order of thought and of personal relations?

This question must be answered in the negative. In two points, in particular, individual writers subordinated the Son

beyond the measure of later standards. The first of these consisted in attributing the generation of the Son to an act of will, rather than to a necessity of the divine nature. No doubt, some of the Christian apologists who indulged this style of representation were not consciously drawing a contrast between a voluntary and a necessary generation. What they were interested to bring out was the contrast between the generation of the Son of God and the generation which the mythology of the heathen associated with the progeny of their gods. Hence they represented the former as belonging purely to a spiritual range, as effected by the Father without any partnership, effected by His simple will. Their representations, nevertheless, as they stand, place an act of will rather than a necessity of nature back of the generation; and the one position, it is to be observed, involves quite a significant subordination as compared with the other. The affirmation, in connection with the generation, of a necessity which extends over the Father as well as over the Son, goes very far toward eliminating the inequality which is otherwise implied. Among those who may fairly be designated as referring the generation to an act of will are Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, Tertullian, and Novatian. (Dial. cum Tryph., LXI., CXXVIII.; Orat. ad Græc., V.; Ad Autol., II. 10, II. 22; Adv. Prax., VII.; De Trin., XXXI.)

The second point consisted in a qualification of the absolute eternity of the *personal* subsistence of the Son, the absolute eternity of His essence being at the same time unquestioned. If it be assumed that the early writers uniformly regarded the generation of the Son as giving rise to His personal subsistence, then the teaching of most of the writers named in the preceding paragraph included this element of subordination. For, in that event, inasmuch as they discriminated between an unbegotten and a begotten Logos, they will be found drawing a positive distinction between the state of the Logos as being without personal

subsistence and His state as having personal subsistence, — a distinction which cannot be indulged without compromising the absolute eternity of His person, even though it be said that time first began with the creation. An unbegotten state and a begotten state of the same subject cannot be equally eternal. A distinction of this kind involves at least an obscuration, if not an intentional denial, of the feature of strict eternity. As to the assumption in question, it has been opposed by some eminent critics. It is, nevertheless, quite remote from the appearance of an arbitrary assumption, since the term “generation,” or “being born,” naturally implies the origination of personal subsistence, and not merely the sending forth of an already existing person. But whatever the case with the other writers under consideration, Tertullian and Novatian certainly indulged statements adverse to the absolute eternity of the Son’s personal subsistence. Tertullian speaks of the Father as alone older than the Son, represents that the latter had a beginning, and declares that there was a time when He did not exist with the Father. (Adv. Hermog., III., XVIII.) “It is essential,” says Novatian, “that He who knows no beginning must go before Him who has a beginning. . . . He [the Son] is before all things, but after the Father, since all things were made by Him, and He proceeded from Him of whose will all things were made.” (De Trin., XXXI.) Both of these writers, to be sure, placed the Son before time as measured by created things, and predicated the absolute eternity of His essence; but, as the statements quoted show, they obscured the notion of His eternal, personal subsistence. The language of Athenagoras also seems to involve this feature of subordination. (Legat., X.)

Origen associated the generation of the Son with the will of the Father, but at the same time seemed inclined to locate its ground in the divine essence. “This is a point,” says Baur, “upon which only wavering and uncertain expressions are found on the part of Origen. . . . He con-

tinually vacillated between placing the principle of the Son's existence in the essence of the Father, and placing it in His will." According to the interpretation of Dorner, the Son, in the view of Origen, is not so much the product of an act of will as the expressed will itself, or the eternal energy of the Father. The question concerning the eternity of the Son's person, Origen endeavored to answer decidedly in the affirmative. On the two points specified, therefore, he is less clearly exposed to the charge of subordinating the Son than are some of his predecessors. But in another respect he went much farther than any of those named above in the direction of subordination. We find him declaring that the Father alone can be termed God in the most eminent sense; that He is God with the article (*ὁ θεός*), while the Son is God without the article (*θεός*); that His knowledge and contemplation of Himself are greater than the contemplation which the Son has of Him; that there is an interval between Him and the Son like that between the latter and creatures. (In Ioan. Tom., II. 2, XXXII. 18, XIII. 25.) This seems in most palpable contradiction to the ascription by Origen of essentially divine attributes to the Son. How is the apparent discrepancy to be explained? The most probable solution lies in the consideration that Origen laid immense stress upon the fact that the Son is begotten; that while He has the divine predicates, He does not have them in the most original sense, but by virtue of a communication from the Father. This one distinction, as he conceived, involved an immeasurable superiority of the Father. Such is the explanation which Dorner offers. "He had no intention whatever," he says, "of denying to Him [the Son] the fulness of veritable divine powers, that is, divine essence; but he did not consider Him to be the primary ground. In the Son, therefore, is indeed the entire fulness of God; but He is God in a derived sense." The same exposition is given by Redepenning. "The subordination of the Son," he writes concerning Origen's theory, "con-

sists entirely in this, that He is the Son and not the Father ; the mode of His personal subsistence (*sein Personsein*) alone establishes the subordination in which He stands as secondary to the sole primal and absolute One." (Origenes, II. p. 93.)

The negative attitude of Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria toward the doctrine of the Son's generation saves them from being exposed to the charge of entertaining either of the two elements of subordination most characteristic of the theology of the age. The extent of their distinction between the relative dignity of the Father and the Son is not exactly definable. Irenæus in one connection attempts to read a lesson of humility to the Gnostics, on the ground that even the Son of God disclaimed knowledge of the very day and hour of the judgment. (II. 28. 6.) This implies a certain superiority in the Father, though by no means such a superiority as to contradict Irenæus's belief in the essential divinity of the Son. His total representation plainly assumes such divinity ; and, moreover, it is to be noted that respectable theologians have been found, in the present age, who deny that it is a prerogative even of the absolute God to foreknow every future event. Little account is to be taken of the representations of some ancient writers that Clement designated the Logos as *κτίσμα*. If he used this term he must have employed it in an uncritical way, and without reference to the contrast which was afterward so emphatically drawn between creation and generation. The ample application which he makes to the Logos of the highest predicates of divinity forbids the assumption that creaturehood proper entered at all into his idea of Him. His statement that the nature of the Son is nearest to Him who is alone the Almighty One (Strom., VII. 2) implies, it is true, a certain subordination of the former. But the extent of this remains in question, and one is evidently warned against making too much of the expression when he finds Clement styling also the Son Almighty.

(Pæd., I. 9.) On the whole, Clement of Alexandria came nearer to obliterating the distinction between the Son and the Father than he did to interposing the Arian gulf between them.

SECTION III.—THE HOLY SPIRIT.

As practical Christianity preceded the speculative, so naturally an acknowledgment of the Trinity of revelation preceded an acknowledgment of an essential Trinity, or the Trinity pertaining to the Godhead as such. The earliest references to the subject among Christian writers include little else than the Scriptural phraseology, and speak of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit simply as revealed and operative in the world. A reference of this kind, for example, is found with Ignatius, whose exhortation reminds his readers of their relations to Father, Son, and Spirit. (Ad. Mag., XIII.)

From the outset the Holy Spirit was fully recognized in the life and worship of the Church, and was conjoined with the Father and the Son in the brief and simple compendiums of the faith that found common acceptance. The Rule of Faith, in Origen's version, says: "The apostles related that the Holy Spirit was associated in honor and dignity with the Father and the Son." (De Prin., Præf. Comp. Irenæus, I. 10.) In the line of dogmatic construction, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit received far less attention than the Son. In this the natural order was followed. An approach toward a settlement of the great questions relating to the Son needed to be made before the doctrine of the Spirit could receive full and specific attention.

The rather scanty references to the nature of the Holy Spirit involve somewhat more of ambiguity than that which pertains to the references to the Son. However, the great

majority of the writers may safely be accredited with acknowledging the personality of the Spirit. Here belong Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Novatian, Origen, Methodius, and others. (1 Apol., VI., XIII.; Ad Autol., II. 15; Pæd., I. 6, II. 2, III. 12; Strom., V. 14; Cont. Hær., IV. 20; Adv. Prax., IX.; Adv. Noet., VIII., XII., XIV.; De Trin., XVI., XXIX.; In Ioan. Tom., II. 6; Sympos. Virg., X.) Justin Martyr speaks of Christians as worshipping the Spirit and holding Him in the third place. Theophilus uses this somewhat peculiar phraseology: "The three days which were before the luminaries are types of the Trinity (*Τριάδος*), of God, and His Word, and His Wisdom. And the fourth is the type of man, who needs light, that so there may be God, the Word, Wisdom, man." Confining ourselves to this passage, we might perhaps question whether Theophilus meant to denote by Wisdom the Holy Spirit. The usage of other writers, however, suggests that such was his design. Irenæus in several instances plainly identifies Wisdom with the Holy Spirit, and as plainly teaches His personality. "With Him," he says, "were always present the Word and Wisdom, the Son and Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and spontaneously, He made all things, to whom also He speaks, saying, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness.'" (IV. 20. 1.) A single expression of Hippolytus has been interpreted by some against his belief in the personality of the Spirit. "I shall not," he says, "speak of two Gods, but of one; of two persons, however, and of a third economy, namely, the grace of the Holy Ghost." This, to be sure, is somewhat ambiguous and objectionable when measured by the standard of a complete trinitarian terminology. But considering the indefinite use of terms in his day, and the factors which enter into his total representation, he cannot fairly be pronounced guilty of the charge in question. The following sentences are certainly indicative of faith in the Spirit's

personality: "A man is compelled to acknowledge God the Father Almighty, and Christ Jesus the Son of God, who, being God, became man, to whom also the Father made all things subject, Himself excepted, and the Holy Spirit [also excepted], and that these, therefore, are three. . . . We see the Word incarnate, and we know the Father by Him, and we believe in the Son, we worship the Holy Spirit. . . . It is through the Trinity that the Father is glorified; for the Father willed, the Son did, the Spirit manifested." Upon the subject of this paragraph the testimony of Kahnis, based upon full investigation, is worthy of notice. "The representation," he says, "which became wellnigh a reigning one in the era of the 'Illumination,' that the ante-Nicene fathers did not regard the Holy Spirit as a divine personality, and for the most part identified Him with the Son, we must characterize as utterly unfounded. Only in case of Lactantius, where it can plead the authority of Jerome, is it justified." (Dogmatik, Vol. II.)

The Spirit was placed third in order of thought, and in the general representation there was affirmed of Him a certain subordination to the Son. Origen in one instance carries this aspect of subordination to an extreme, even numbering the Spirit among the things made by the Son. (In Ioan. Tom., II. 6.) Still, to say, without qualification, that Origen reduced the Spirit to the rank of a creature, would convey wrong impressions, and would involve the uncritical procedure of allowing a general expression to weigh more than many specifications. The Spirit, in the view of Origen, was widely distinguished from a creature, as the term is ordinarily used. If we may trust the version of Rufinus, He is described by Origen as having immediate knowledge of the Father, as being in the unity of the Trinity, as possessing an uncreated substance. "There was nothing," it is said, "which was not made, save the nature of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit."

(De Prin., IV. 1. 35.) But, leaving these more doubtful sources, we find Origen associating the Spirit with the Son, predicating of both alike an indefinite superiority to the creature world at large, distinctly ranking the Spirit as one of the three Divine Hypostases. (In Ioan. Tom., XIII. 25, II. 6.)

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

It was the common teaching of the early Church, that the world was created out of nothing, the notion that matter existed from eternity being repudiated. Justin Martyr, it is true, says in one place that God in the beginning created all things out of unformed matter; but in another connection he sufficiently indicates his belief that the formless matter itself was the product of a creative act. (1 Apol., X.; Cohort., XXII., XXIII.) To affirm the eternity of matter seemed to the Christian writers to contradict the pure supremacy of God. Hence Tertullian accused Hermogenes of introducing two Gods, inasmuch as he ascribed to matter the divine attribute of eternity. (Adv. Hermog., IV.) "To suppose," argues Lactantius, "that it is necessary that God should be furnished with materials, is to dishonor Him by an unworthy comparison with men." (Inst., II. 9.)

Creation was viewed as an entirely free act, springing from divine goodness. "The world," says Athenagoras, "was not created because God needed it, for God is Himself everything to Himself." (Legat., XVI.) Nature was regarded as designed for the service of man. "The creation," says Irenæus, "is suited to man; for man was not made for its sake, but creation for the sake of man." (V. 29.) Man himself, according to the same writer, was made that God might have some one upon whom to confer benefits. (IV. 14.)

Theophilus, who was the first to give an extended commentary on the Mosaic days of creation, understood them literally. (Ad Autol., Lib. II.) A like view is implied in the following statement of Irenæus: "In as many days as this world was made, in so many thousand years shall it be concluded." (V. 28. 3.) Tertullian, in his refutation of Hermogenes, represents creation as taking place by successive acts, and most likely had the scheme of literal days in mind. (XXIX., XLV.) The opening words of Genesis are well described by him as being of the nature of a general introduction to the specific account which follows. "First comes," he says, "a prefatory statement, then follow the details in full; first the subject is named, then it is described." (Adv. Hermog., XXVI.) The Church at large probably concurred with these writers, and understood by the Mosaic days divisions of time, and, indeed, divisions of the length of an ordinary day. This, however, was not the unanimous teaching. Clement of Alexandria taught that creation took place in an indivisible moment before time, which it itself initiated, and that the days were used in the Mosaic account for presenting created objects in the order of their worth or in their logical connection. "Something," he says, "must needs have been named first. Wherefore those things were announced first from which came those that were second, all things being originated together from one essence by one power. For the will of God is one, in one identity. And how could creation take place in time, seeing time was born along with the things which exist?" (Strom., VI. 16.) Origen was equally averse to accepting the literal sense of the days, regarding it as derogatory to God that He should be represented as proceeding with His work after the manner of a day-laborer, and holding that all things were probably made at once by the simple fiat of Deity, the Mosaic days being used only for the sake of orderly representation. (Select. in Gen.; De Prin., IV. 1. 16.) The seventh day was understood by him to be co

extensive with the duration of the existing world. (Cont. Cel., VI. 61.)

With Origen, the exceptional view appears that the existing world has been preceded by a series of other worlds, reaching back indefinitely; each world, after fulfilling its appointed term, having given place to a new creation. He maintains that this view involves an answer to the question, What was God doing before the creation of the world? and also that it is demanded, in order to secure God's immutability. God, he argues, could not have been omnipotent, without things to govern, any more than He could have been a father without a son. To place creation at a fixed point is to affirm a change in God from a less to a more perfect state; hence the creative process must be pushed back into the depths of eternity. (De Prin., 1. 2. 10; III. 5. 3.) The immediate occasion of the material world, according to Origen, was the fall of souls, who were thus made unworthy of their celestial habitations. It may also be numbered among the tokens of Origen's speculative boldness on this subject, that he favored the supposition that the stars are living and rational beings. (De Prin., I. 7.)

SECTION II. — ANGELS AND DEMONS.

THE subject of angelology exhibits, in connection with considerable freedom of representation, an approximate unanimity upon a number of points. It was commonly taught, with respect to unfallen angels, that they are personal beings, of a lofty order, endowed like men with freedom, engaged in joyful service of God, and especially employed by Him in ministering to the welfare of men. It was also quite a common opinion, that they possess bodies of a refined, ethereal nature. Direct statements of this opinion in no wise abound, but it seems to be implied by the current view respecting the fall of angels (noticed in

the next paragraph), and also by the representations of certain writers that demons are glutted with the fumes of burning sacrifices. (Tertullian, *Apol.*, XXII.; Origen, *Cont. Cel.*, III. 29, IV. 32, VIII. 60.) Tertullian, furthermore, definitely ascribes to angels a peculiar kind of body. (*De Car. Christi*, VI.)

With respect to evil angels, it was taught that they were created good; that they fell through a misuse of their freedom; that at their head is Satan, who held originally an eminent rank, but by reason of pride and envy became an apostate. Several of the fathers (Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, and Methodius) held that the envy which incited to the apostasy was exercised toward man. (*Cont. Hær.*, IV. 40. 3; *De Patient.*, V.; *De Dono Patient.*, XIX.; *De Resurrect.*) Lactantius offered the theory that the devil originally stood next to the Divine Son in the order of being, and fell through his envy of Him. (*Inst.*, II. 9.) The fall of the other angels who lost their first estate was quite generally attributed to lust after the daughters of men. (Justin, 2 *Apol.*, V.; Athenagoras, *Legat.*, XXIV.; Clement, *Strom.*, III. 7; Tertullian, *De Cult. Fem.*, I. 2; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.*, II. 15; Methodius, *apud Epiphan. Hær.*, LXIV.) This view agreed with the current interpretation of Genesis VI. 2, according to which the "sons of God" who mingled with the daughters of the Cainites were angels. The souls of the giants sprung from this intermingling were regarded as identical with demons, — beings occupying an intermediate place between men and evil angels, and serving with the latter as patrons of heathenism, with all its lying wonders, oracles, superstitions, impurities, and delusions.

The ideas entertained of angels had a close connection with the theory of divine providence. Good angels were regarded as instruments of God in the government of the world. Several of the fathers, following hints of the Jewish Scriptures, especially of the Septuagint version of Deut.

XXXII. 8, 9, represented that each nation has its presiding angel or angels. (Strom., VI. 17; De Prin., III. 3; In Ex. Hom., VIII. 2.) Origen suggests that the "Man of Macedonia," who appeared to Paul, was probably an angelic guardian of that region. (In Luc. Hom., XII.) Angels were also associated by some with individual churches and with individual men. Hermas and Origen assume that an angel, or rather two angels, a good and an evil, are specially connected with each individual, at least with each member of the Church, the one or the other standing nearest to him according to his conduct. (Pastor, Mandat., VI. 2; Hom. in Num., XX. 3, XXIV. 3; In Ezech., VI. 8; In Luc., XXXV.) Also Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian give intimations of belief in a special angelic superintendence of the individual. (Strom., VI. 17; De An., LVII.) Already with Clement we find the idea that the gradations of the ecclesiastical hierarchy are an image of the angelic ranks. (Strom., VI. 13.)

Aside from evil influences upon the hearts of men, violent diseases, pestilences, and irruptions of nature were regarded as chief tokens of the agency of evil angels and demons in the world. A view quite exceptional was that of Cyprian, that the evils of his time were largely to be accounted for by the advancing age of the world. "The world," he says, "has now grown old, and does not abide in that strength in which it formerly stood; nor has it that vigor and force which it formerly possessed." (Adv. Demet., III.)

Meanwhile care was taken to guard against so magnifying the agency of angels as to abridge the proper province of God or of man. While Athenagoras speaks of God as exercising a general providence over the whole, the particulars being left to angels (Legat., XXIV.), there were writers, on the other hand, who made explicit statements of the doctrine of special providence. That God cares for the least things and for the parts, as well as for the great

whole, is clearly stated by Clement of Alexandria, Novatian, and Minucius Felix. (Strom., VI. 17; De Trin., VIII.; Octav., XVIII.) Quite as definitely it was taught that man, in the use of available resources, is more than a match for evil angels and demons, and is under no necessity of becoming a prey to their wiles. "Fearing the Lord," says Hermas, "you will have dominion over the devil, for there is no power in him." (Mandat., VII. Comp. Origen, De Prin., III. 2; Lact., Inst., II. 16.)

While the good offices of angels were so largely recognized, it was still not regarded proper to worship them or to address prayers to them. The single passage of Justin Martyr (1 Apol., VI.) which has an ostensible bearing in the direction of angel worship, cannot weigh aught against this verdict; so far is its apparent sense contradicted by other statements of Justin (1 Apol., XIII., XVI., LXI.), as well as by the literature of the age, that it must be reckoned as an instance of hasty, inconsiderate expression, or as a case of ambiguous grammar. Origen represented the general standpoint of the Church in his time, when, referring to Celsus, he said, "If he would have us seek the favor of others after the Most High God, let him consider that, as the motion of the shadow follows that of the body which casts it, so in like manner it follows that, when we have the favor of God, we have also the good-will of all angels and spirits who are friends of God." (Cont. Cel., VIII. 64.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — It may be questioned whether the Church of the first three centuries entertained so high a view of Adam's original endowments as came forth later in the Augustinian theology. At any rate, we find some expressions of the opinion that the primal state of Adam was that of the undeveloped,

though perfectly innocent man. Speaking of God's withholding from Adam the knowledge of good and evil, Theophilus says, "He wished man, infant as he was, to remain for some time longer simple and sincere." (Ad. Autol., II. 25.) According to Clement of Alexandria, Adam had, at the outset, capacities for acquiring high moral character, rather than such character itself. "He was not perfect in his creation, but adapted to the reception of virtue." (Strom., VI. 12.) Still it was a noble position which, in early Christian thought, was assigned to the first man. It was taught that he possessed the uncorrupted image of God, that he was blessed with dominion over nature, that he enjoyed intimate companionship with his Maker, that he was fully endowed with freedom, and was competent in the right use of his powers to acquire present and eternal blessedness. An exceptional position was occupied by Arnobius in his radical disparagement of the ideal of human nature.

The image and likeness of God, embodied in Adam, were somewhat differently understood by different writers. In the view of all, the more essential meaning of the terms was to be found in rational and moral traits, in the intellect, the will, the capacity for holiness in spirit and deed. But some included also bodily traits. Thus we find Irenæus and Tertullian drawing a distinction between the two words "image" and "likeness," applying the one to bodily characteristics and the other to the spiritual nature. In predicating this corporeal resemblance they had in mind, as their representations indicate, the Divine Person who walked in Paradise and who talked with Moses upon the mount, — the Word in the form in which He was revealed before His incarnation. (Cont. Hær., IV. 38. 4, V. 6, V. 16; De Bap., V.; De Res. Car., VI.; Adv. Prax., XIV.; Adv. Marc., II. 5-9.) Clement of Alexandria and Origen, on the other hand, rejected all bodily analogies. They however distinguished, though not steadily, between the two

words "image" and "likeness." While both words, as they taught, have reference to the inner nature, the one denotes characteristics pertaining to man as man, the other characteristics which may be cultivated or be lost. "Scriptural usage," says Origen, "conveys no other meaning than this: that man received the dignity of God's image at his first creation, but that the perfection of his likeness has been reserved for the consummation, namely, that he might acquire it for himself by the exercise of his own diligence in the imitation of God." Clement employs almost the same terms, and indicates that the distinction in question had been drawn by preceding writers. (Strom., II. 22; Cohort., IV.; De Prin., III. 6; In Gen. Hom., I. 13.) The view of Philo, that man is more directly the image of the Word, and so is the image of an image, was one which also found expression with Christian writers.

The Scriptural account of the abode of the unfallen man was generally taken in a literal sense, though writers advocating the literal meaning claimed the privilege of finding in the description some items of a mystical import. Theophilus states that Paradise was an actual place upon the earth, though in respect of beauty intermediate between earth and heaven. (Ad Autol., II. 24. Comp. Iren., III. 23, V. 5; Hippol. Hexaëm., in Joan. Damasc.) The Alexandrians, on the other hand, especially Origen, were inclined to attribute an allegorical sense to the account in Genesis. "Who is so foolish," asks Origen, "as to suppose that God, after the manner of a husbandman, planted a Paradise in Eden, and placed in it a tree of life, visible and palpable, so that one tasting of the fruit by the bodily teeth obtained life? and again that one was partaker of good and evil by masticating what was taken from the tree? And if God is said to walk in Paradise in the evening, and Adam to hide himself under a tree, I do not suppose that any one doubts that these things figuratively indicate certain mysteries, the history having taken place in appearance, and not

literally." (De Prin., IV. 1. 16.) Again, Origen cites, as a probable conjecture, the notion that by the coats of skins provided for the fallen pair are to be understood bodies. (Select. in Gen.) This implies the belief that the fall was the cause of man's advent to this world, rather than a calamity which took place upon the earth.

As respects those cardinal features of human nature which have their place in each man as well as in Adam, there was also a variety of opinion. The New Testament diversity of expression, as regards the number of components in the nature of the individual, is reflected in the literature of the early centuries. Tertullian, it is quite certain, was a dichotomist, holding that man in his proper person is composed simply of body and soul. Soul and spirit, he argues, are not two, for they cannot be separated. Spirit is only a name for an aspect or operation of the soul. (De An., X., XI.) Irenæus and the Greek fathers generally were inclined to speak of a threefold division of man's nature. Some of these, however, were not strict trichotomists, since either they did not think of the spirit as a fixed factor in the individual, or the distinction which they drew between soul and spirit did not amount to a distinction as to substance. In the former category, Tatian and Irenæus are to be reckoned. By the spirit, they understood the Holy Spirit, "so far as the same obtains in man concrete form," (Kahnis,) and the retention or loss of this, as they represented, depends upon the conduct of the individual. (Orat. ad Græc., XII., XIII; Cont. Hær., V. 6. 1, V. 9.) Justin Martyr says: "The body is the house of the soul, and the soul the house of the spirit. These three, in all who cherish a sincere hope and unquestioning faith in God, will be saved." (De Resur., X.) Justin here speaks seemingly as a trichotomist; but in a preceding chapter (VIII.) of the same work he asks the question, "What is man but the reasonable animal, composed of body and soul?" Origen uses in the main the language of trichoto-

my. He takes pains, in several instances, to specify that the soul holds an intermediate rank, and assigns to it a relative independence; but still he indulges statements which suggest that the distinction between soul and spirit concerns faculties or states rather than substance. (De Prin., III. 4; Cont. Cel., VII. 38; Hom. in Gen., I. 15; Hom. in Luc., VIII.; In Matt. Tom., XIII. 2; Ioan. Tom., XXXII. 11; Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., I. 5, VI. 1, VII. 3.)

The soul was thought of as widely distinguished in nature from the body. It was not, however, regarded by all as strictly incorporeal. Tertullian taught expressly that it is corporeal, being a subtile extended something, invisible to eyes of flesh, but capable of being seen by the spirit, as is proved by the fact that it has been seen by persons in prophetic trance. It is also, says Tertullian, an indication of its corporeal nature that it is able to sympathize with the body. (De An., V.—IX.) In this line of positive and outspoken opinions, Tertullian appears as an exception. Still, there were others who evidently assigned a species of corporeity to the soul, whether by preference or because of their inability to represent to themselves the purely incorporeal. Tatian says, "The human soul consists of many parts, and is not simple; it is composite, so as to manifest itself through the body." (XV.) Irenæus also, though he terms the soul incorporeal, assigns to it the leading corporeal characteristic of extension, and represents that it is conformed to the shape of the body, whether it be in or out of the same. (II. 19. 6; II. 34. 1; V. 7. 1.) Origen, on the other hand, declares that the soul is independent of such a condition of bodily existence and activity as space, and urges that it must be incorporeal, since otherwise it could not perceive and understand, as it does, that which is manifestly incorporeal. (De Prin., I. 1.)

As respects the natural immortality of the soul, three writers of the second century — viz. Justin Martyr, Tatian,

and Theophilus — expressed themselves adversely. Neither of them, however, definitely stated that any human beings are, as a matter of fact, to cease to be. "Some," says Justin, "which have appeared worthy of God, never die; but others are punished so long as God wills them to exist and to be punished." (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, V.) Tatian, while he says that the soul is naturally mortal, and becomes immortal only by union with the divine, speaks, nevertheless, of a painful state for the wicked in immortality. (XIII., XIV.) It may be questioned how far death was identified by these writers with extinction. Baur gives his verdict upon the subject in the following terms: "These teachers did not understand by death a complete extinction, but only a loss of consciousness, which the soul possesses just because of its union with the spirit. The soul does not fully cease to be; it is only severed from the connection in which it hitherto had existed as an integral part of an ego, a personality, and sinks to the unconscious impersonal condition, to the merely animal life which pertains to it when separated from the spirit." It will be noticed, however, that Tatian assumes for the wicked a condition of conscious suffering beyond the era of the resurrection. Meanwhile, the denial of the natural immortality of the soul was not able to hold its ground. Irenæus and the writers who followed gave their verdict in favor of natural immortality, Arnobius being the only conspicuous exception among the authors of the third century. Lactantius states that "immortality is not the consequence of nature, but the reward and recompense of virtue." (*Inst.*, VII. 5.) But his language here has no reference to a mere continuance of conscious existence, since he says a little later in the same treatise, "Death does not entirely extinguish and destroy, but visits with eternal torments; for the soul cannot entirely perish, since it received its origin from the Spirit of God, which is eternal." (VII. 12.) It should be added, that some Arabians in the third century taught that the

soul shares the fate of the body, dying with it and being raised with it, — a view finding expression also with Tatian. (XIII.) According to Eusebius, Origen converted the Arabians from their opinion. (Eccl. Hist., VI. 37.)

On the generative faculty of human nature only a few positive statements were indulged, and these indicative of different theories. Tertullian taught that body and soul are produced simultaneously, and that both are from the human parents. His theory was strict traducianism. Among the arguments for it he emphasized the frequently observed fact that children repeat the disposition of their parents. (De An., XXV.) Clement of Alexandria speaks of the *introduction* of the soul into the body; a style of expression indicative of creationism, or the theory that the soul is originated by a special act of God. (Strom., VI. 16.) Lactantius taught that the soul comes into being solely by the agency of God. (De Artif. Dei, XIX.) Origen denied that there are earthly fathers and mothers of our souls. As already stated, his theory was that of pre-existence. This, as he maintained, is commended by the explanation which it offers of God's dealings with men. If it be assumed that souls existed and sinned in a previous state, then it may be urged that their unequal conditions in this world are in harmony with the different degrees of ill-desert with which they came into their earthly estate. (De Prin., II. 9. 8, III. 3. 5; Select. in Ezech.; In Matt. Tom., XV. 35.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — Those who accepted, in general, the literal sense of the Scriptural account of Paradise, were satisfied with a literal interpretation of the story of the fall. Those, on the other hand, who made free to depart from the letter, found as much occasion to allegorize at this point as anywhere. Origen, as already indicated, was utterly disinclined to see in the trespass of Adam and Eve the literal partaking of literal fruit. Some of the Gnostics used the account of the fall as an argument against

marriage. The Catholic theologians, holding, as they did, to the actual birth of Christ and the divine institution of marriage, were compelled emphatically to repudiate such an application. Still we find Clement of Alexandria favoring the idea that the first human trespass pertained to connubial relations, not because such relations may not be holy and acceptable in the sight of God, but because the first pair prematurely, and while yet in their youthful state, assumed to make use of the connubial privilege. (Strom., III. 17.) On the part of all Catholic teachers the essence of the primal sin was located in a misuse of freedom, a disobedience to the known will of God, to which indeed the wiles of the devil tempted, but for which there was no necessity or valid excuse.

As regards the connection of Adam's posterity with the primal transgression, there was in these centuries no assertion of the stricter theory of imputation, namely, that the first sin was immediately charged by God upon every child of the race. Tertullian makes the nearest discoverable approach to such a theory, when he says that man was entrapped by Satan into breaking the divine commandment, "and being given over to death on account of his sin, the entire human race, tainted in their descent from him, were made a channel for transmitting his condemnation." (De Test. An., III.) As might be judged from this passage, and as appears more clearly in other passages, Tertullian did not look upon Adam's sin as by itself involving the condemnation of his posterity, but saw in the inherited taint or corruption the ground of that condemnation. It is because corruption is propagated (and corruption leads to transgression) that condemnation is propagated. The sequence, as understood by Tertullian, is implied in this statement of his: "Every soul, by reason of its birth, has its nature in Adam, until it is born again in Christ; moreover, it is unclean all the while that it remains without this regeneration, and because unclean it is actively sinful." (De

An., XL.) Neither by Tertullian, nor by any other writer of this period, was the doctrine of direct imputation taught. Clement of Alexandria declares that there is no imputation or record made against any one, except for voluntary transgressions. "Those are not reckoned that are not the effect of choice." (Strom., II. 15.) The same writer asks respecting the newly born child, apparently in a spirit of deprecation, "How did he fall under the curse of Adam, who had done nothing?" (Strom., III. 16.) To similar effect is the declaration of Athenagoras, that children, having done neither good nor evil, are not candidates for the judgment. (De Res., XIV.)

A second negative proposition on the subject may be put in this form. It was not thought, in this period, that the transmitted effects of the fall are such as to destroy man's moral freedom, or to eliminate all elements of good from his nature. It was the reiterated declaration of the eminent and representative men of the Church, that the individual has an element of free will, can choose good or evil, can turn toward God or turn away from Him, can use or abuse the grace which offers all assistance needful to normal moral activity. (1 Apol., XLIII. ; 2 Apol., VII. ; Dial. cum Tryph., CXLI. ; Legat., XXIV. ; Strom., IV. 13 ; Hippol., Phil., X. 29 ; De Prin., I. 8. 3, III. 1.) Arnobius appears as a stranger to the general current of Christian thought, when he says that natural infirmity rather than choice makes a man a sinner. (I. 49.) Such a statement certainly was not less alien to the prevailing sentiment of the Church than was the teaching of Origen, that freedom of choice is so characteristic of the creature that it will involve forever the possibility of falls and recoveries, though in this view Origen was no doubt occupying an exceptional position. Affirmations of the common sinfulness of men appear on the part of various writers ; but even Tertullian, who went as far in this direction as any one, took pains to assert that no man is destitute of some elements of good. "There is,"

he says, "a portion of good in the soul, of that original, divine, and genuine good which is its proper nature. For that which is derived from God is rather obscured than extinguished. . . . Just as no soul is without sin, so neither is any soul without seeds of good." (De An., XLI.) The same writer also does not hesitate to speak of childhood as "the innocent period of life." (De Bap., XVIII. Comp. Cyprian, Epist. ad Fidum, No. 58.) Origen, as his general system dictated, evidently believed that no human soul in this world is wholly alien from God and righteousness. "Without doubt," says he, "every one who walks upon the earth is a partaker of the Holy Spirit, receiving it from God." (De Prin., I. 3, 4.) In another place he speaks of the Word, who is the true light, as being in all men, increasing in some and diminishing in others. (In Jer. Hom., XIV. 10.)

A positive and exact statement of the moral consequences commonly attributed to the fall is not easily made. It is quite certain that the Church as a whole believed that the fall resulted in a sad depravation of the moral opportunities of man, or the conditions of his moral activity; that it left him without that strong support which he primarily enjoyed in his perfect communion with God; that it rendered him, through the lack of this intimate communion, very liable to become a prey to evil spirits, and to the lower powers of his own nature. How far the fall depraved or positively corrupted the moral nature itself, as well as the conditions of moral activity, is a question which very few writers of the first centuries attempted to answer definitely. Tertullian was unusually explicit for his age. As has been noted, he assumed, as a result of the fall, a positive corruption of the moral nature of all men, though not a corruption so radical as to exclude elements of good. It is very probable that his view was rather more emphatic than that of the Greek theologians of his time, and that he represents the beginning of the Latin type of anthropology, which ulti-

mately became widely distinguished from the Greek by its stronger emphasis upon the innate or inherited depravity of men. Origen indulges some very definite expressions, to the effect that from the day of birth the taint of impurity is upon every one born in this world (Hom. in Lev., VIII. 3, XII. 4) ; but statements of this kind had with him a peculiar sense, and are very little indicative of the standpoint of the Church upon the subject of original sin. The impurity which he predicates had in his thought scarcely any connection with the fall of Adam. Each newly born child is impure for two reasons : (1.) Because of personal transgression in a previous state ; (2.) On account of the mystery of generation. (In Matt. Tom., XV. 23.) Origen, holding as he did a semi-Gnostic view with regard to the body, could very easily persuade himself that the pre-existent soul, in the process of reaching its earthly nativity, contracts of necessity a certain taint.

Illustrating the general subject under consideration by comparison, we may say that the Church of the first three centuries maintained, quite as strongly as does Arminian Methodism, the actual possession of free will by the descendants of the fallen Adam, but on the whole fell somewhat below the latter in stress upon inherited corruption and dependence upon divine grace.

The death which was universally regarded as resulting from the fall seems to have been interpreted wholly in a spiritual sense by Clement of Alexandria. (Strom. III. 9 ; VII. 11.) But it may be concluded that Theophilus and Irenæus were nearer the current of Christian thought in making the death penalty attached to sin include the dissolution of the body. (Ad. Autol., II. 25 ; Cont. Hær. IV. 39, V. 19, V. 23.)

Formal definitions of the nature of sin are rare in early Christian literature. We find, however, statements bearing more or less directly upon the subject. The principle that

sin is the offspring of a free act of the soul, rather than a necessary accompaniment or inherent property of a material body, was asserted by certain writers in opposition to an heretical disparagement of the body. "In what instance," asks Justin Martyr, "can the flesh possibly sin by itself, if it have not the soul going before it and inciting it?" (De Resur., VIII.) "Although sins," says Tertullian, "are attributed to the body, yet they are preceded by the guilty concupiscence of the soul; nay, the first motion of sin must be ascribed to the soul, to which the flesh acts in the capacity of a servant." (Adv. Marc., I. 24.) There was a strong occasion for the Church to assume this position, as it ministered to the defence of the doctrine of the resurrection; but, at the same time, there were ascetic tendencies in the Church inclining in a contrary direction. If these did not go so far as to invoke a denial of the freedom of the soul over against the body, they did nurture the idea, as appears in the case of Origen, that the body is an undesirable incumbrance. It is noteworthy, also, that we have even in this early period an example of the negative conception of sin. This appears in the writings of Origen. Placing the essence of virtue in a voluntary and normal *activity* or *exertion*, he not unnaturally looked upon a relative cessation of this exertion as initiating apostasy. Moral defection, he taught, begins in lassitude of soul. Sin has, therefore, a negative rather than a positive ground. The good is the really existent; evil, being the opposite of the good, is the non-existent, τὸ οὐκ ὄν. (De Prin., I. 4, II. 9. 2; In Ioan. Tom., II. 7.) A speculative account of sin, destined to find less acceptance than the above in Christian thought, appears with Lactantius. While he represented that the attitude of God toward moral evil is one of opposition and hatred, he seemed, nevertheless, to regard evil as a necessary constituent of a moral world,—a condition of the existence of its opposite. "He permitted the evil," he says, "on this account, that the good might also shine

forth, since, as I have often taught, we understand that the one cannot exist without the other," just as "there cannot be a higher place without a lower, nor a rising without a setting, nor warmth without cold, nor softness without hardness." (De Ira Dei, XV.) It may be suggested that the idea which Lactantius had in mind was that the *possibility* of moral evil, not its *actual existence*, is the necessary counterpart of the existence of moral good; but that is not what he states. In the same connection, also, he falls into the grossly dualistic representation that the body is the seat and centre of evil; the soul, of good. Lactantius, in this whole description, was treading on dangerous ground. A more guarded statement on the relation of evil to the order of the world appears with Clement of Alexandria, who declares that, while evil is not a necessary factor, it is compelled by the overmastering wisdom of God to yield a measure of compensation. "It is the greatest achievement," he says, "of Divine Providence, not to allow the evil which has sprung from voluntary apostasy to remain useless and for no good." (Strom., I. 17.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

As repeatedly portrayed in early Christian literature, Christ appears as both divine and human, the Son of God and the Son of Man; the new head of the race, in whom the ideal of manhood flowers forth in matchless perfection and beauty; the mediator between the sinful and the holy; the perfect bond between the creature and the Creator. Some may have interpreted the description of Isaiah as bearing against the comeliness of His appearance. (Clem., Pæd., III. 1; Tertul., *De Carne Chr.*, IX.; Origen, *Cont. Cel.*, VI. 75.) But in the view of these same writers this feature was no detracting, being fully compensated by the emphasis which it put upon the purely spiritual, and by the condescension which it revealed. No shadow of doubt rested upon the doctrine of His perfect sinlessness. Origen, to be sure, felt constrained to allow that His reception of a body by human birth involved the contraction of a certain taint; but he makes it of small import, — something cancelled by the simple ceremonial cleansing. His statement is as follows: "*Omnis anima quæ humano corpore fuerit induta, habet sordes suas. Oportet ergo ut pro Domino et Salvatore nostro, qui sordidis vestimentis fuerat indutus, et terrenum corpus assumpserat, ea offerrentur quæ purgare sordes ex lege consueverant.*" (In *Luc. Hom.*, XIV.) In other connections Origen affirms the sinlessness of Christ, and from various writers we have unqualified declarations of the same truth. (In *Ioan. Tom.*, XX. 25; *Ep. ad Rom.*,

III. 3; Just., Dial., CX.; Clem., Pæd., I. 2; Tertul., De An., XLI.)

The teachings of the Ebionites and others gave occasion for a special consideration of the divine nature of Christ. A previous chapter has shown what answer was given to the denial of that nature. A strong occasion for asserting the reality of the human nature of Christ, at least so far as concerns the body, was supplied by the Gnostics, who were disposed to deny the reality of the flesh of Christ, or the reality of His union with the flesh. The vigorous protest against this denial, which meets us in the writings of the Apostle John, was renewed again and again from the days of Ignatius to those of Origen. If Christ was not truly incarnate, urges Tertullian, if He had no more than the phantom of a body, then His work was imaginary, and His salvation is a delusion. (Adv. Marc., III. 8-11.) Origen, if he did not value the body for itself, could appreciate the sublime moral purpose and use subserved by the incarnation. A truly eloquent strain is that which he indulges over the manifestation of the God-man. "Since we see in Him some things so human that they appear to differ in no respect from the common frailty of mortals, and some things so divine that they can appropriately belong to nothing else than to the primal and ineffable nature of Deity, the narrowness of human understanding can find no outlet, but, overcome with the amazement of a mighty admiration, knows not whither to withdraw, or what to take hold of, or whither to turn. If it think of a God, it sees a mortal; if it think of a man, it beholds Him returning from the grave, after overthrowing the empire of death, laden with its spoils. . . . To utter these things in human ears, and to explain them in words, far surpasses the powers either of our rank, or of our intellect and language. I think that it surpasses the power even of the holy apostles; nay, the explanation of that mystery may be beyond the grasp of the entire creation of celestial powers." (De Prin., II. 6. 1.)

While Clement of Alexandria and Origen attributed to Christ a real body, made of earthly substance, their speculative bent still led them to suppose that it was distinguished by certain remarkable properties, if not in virtue of its own constitution, at least in virtue of its union with the Logos. Clement taught that Christ was impassible, free from all bodily necessities and appetencies. "He ate not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him." (Strom., VI. 9.) According to Origen, the body of Christ had a different appearance to different persons, glorious in the eyes of the spiritual and appreciative, but uncomely to those of opposite character and disposition. His explanation of this fact is given as follows: "It is not a subject of wonder that the matter, which is by nature susceptible of being altered and changed, and of being transformed into anything which the Creator chooses, should at one time possess a quality agreeably to which it is said, 'He had no form or beauty,' and at another, one so glorious, and majestic, and marvellous, that the spectators of such surpassing loveliness should fall on their faces." (Cont. Cel., VI. 77.)

The earlier writers were satisfied with the general statement that the Word became flesh. The theological exigencies of the age led them to emphasize in particular the reality of Christ's human body. Having less occasion to speak of His possession of a human soul, they did not indulge definite statements upon this point, and stopped short with the general representation that Christ assumed human nature. Their writings are characterized neither by a formal denial nor by a formal affirmation of a rational human soul in Christ. It was about the end of the second century that writers began to be explicit upon this subject. Tertullian and Origen declared, very definitely, that one factor in the person of Christ was the rational soul. Irenæus is to be credited with the same belief, since he speaks of Christ as

giving His soul for man, as well as His body, and in his terminology soul was inclusive of the rational principle. From the time of these writers, the full manhood of Christ was accepted in the common belief of the Church.

Among the writers of the second century there are three — viz. Hermas, Justin Martyr, and Clement of Alexandria — whose statements have been thought to imply a denial of the rational soul. Hermas speaks of the holy pre-existent Spirit as dwelling in a body (Simil., V. 6), from which it has been concluded that his view of Christ embraced simply these two factors. But by body or flesh Hermas seems to have meant something more than flesh proper, since he speaks of it as walking religiously, and obtaining, on this account, the reward of being taken into full partnership with the Spirit. “How can a body,” says Dorner, “be rewarded by being exalted to the rank of the Son of God, and put on a level with the Holy Spirit? One might, with much greater reason, say that Hermas approximates to the view of the Adoptionists, who held that the humanity of Christ participated in Sonship, not so much on the ground of its connection with the Son of God as because of its own holy walk.” (Vol. I., Note PP.) The ground of the assumption against Justin Martyr is his trichotomy, together with his statement that Christ consisted of body, Logos, and soul. (2 Apol., X.) According to the trichotomist theory, soul is only the principle of animal life, and hence it is concluded that Justin must have put the Logos in place of the rational soul. But this is not decisive. As already indicated, Justin was not so strict a trichotomist but that he could have used the word “soul” in a broader sense than the one specified. Equally devoid of substantial proof is the assumption against Clement of Alexandria. He speaks, to be sure, of Christ as impassible, while yet he numbers passibility among the attributes of the human soul. (Strom., VI. 9; Pæd., III. 1.) This is proof against belief in the customary experiences of the soul, but not against a belief in the existence of a

soul in Christ. Clement may have assumed for the Logos as much of a controlling power over the soul as over the body included in His person.

The soul of Christ, according to Origen, was, like all others, pre-existent, and was the most eminent of all; a soul which had perfectly maintained its allegiance to God from the beginning. Its union with the Logos, therefore, was of the nature of a reward. (De Prin., II. 6.)

The incarnation was, no doubt, commonly regarded as involving a permanent union of the divine and the human. It was no mere theophany, no temporary assumption of a body after the type of the incarnations taught by Indian myths, but an indissoluble incorporation of the human with the divine. Some of Origen's statements, it is true, may seem to run counter to this conception of the incarnation. "Although he was man," he says of Christ, "yet now is He in no wise man." (In Jer. Hom., XV. 6.) But we are warned against attaching too much meaning to such expressions, inasmuch as we find Origen declaring that the saints, in general, are to cease to be men. (Ibid., and In Matt. Tom., XVII. 30.) An elimination of the body and a peculiarly close union between the finite soul and the Logos was probably all that Origen wished to assume, as regards the disappearance of Christ's manhood. It is to be noted, too, that Origen allowed that Christ took his risen body to heaven; but there is evidence that he regarded the incorporeal as the ideal state, and hence the state destined ultimately to be reached by the Son of Man.

SECTION II. — THE REDEPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

THE writings of the early fathers contain little upon this topic except brief and incidental references. While there was no lack of exuberant and grateful feeling over the amazing facts of redemption, there was little effort to elicit

from these facts a full and explicit theory. In no treatise was the subject taken up exclusively, and treated at length. The redemptive work was viewed in its manifold aspects; and no one aspect claimed, on the whole, a prominence which overshadowed the rest. The more current ideas may be indicated by the following propositions:—

1. *Christ was regarded as the one and the sufficient Mediator between God and men.* Clement of Rome speaks of Christ as “the High Priest of all our offerings, the defender and helper of our infirmity.” (1 Epist., XXXVI.) Christ is characterized by Ignatius as the High Priest “to whom the holy of holies has been committed, and who alone has been intrusted with the secrets of God,” as “the door of the Father, by which enter in Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, and the prophets, and the apostles, and the Church.” (Ad Philadel., IX.) Other writers speak with equal emphasis of the mediatorial work of Christ, describing Him as the medium of revealing God and of bringing about the proper union between Him and mankind. “From Him,” says Origen, “there began the union of the divine with the human nature, in order that the human, by communion with the divine, might rise to be divine, not in Jesus alone, but in all those who not only believe, but enter upon the life which Jesus taught.” (Cont. Cel., III. 28.)

2. *The death upon the cross was regarded as the crowning feature of the redemptive work.* “Let us look steadfastly at the blood of Christ,” exclaims Clement of Rome, “and see how precious that blood is to God, which, having been shed for our salvation, has set the grace of repentance before the whole world.” (1 Epist., VII.) The utmost fervor of Ignatius is called forth by the contemplation of the crucifixion. “Let my spirit,” he says, “be counted as nothing for the sake of the cross, which is a stumbling-block to those who do not believe, but to us salvation and life eternal.” (Ad Eph., XVIII.) “To me Jesus Christ is in the place of all that is ancient; His cross, and death, and res-

urrection, and the faith which is by Him, are undefiled monuments of antiquity." (Ad Philadel., VIII.) Christ, argues Justin Martyr, in that He was hanged upon a tree, bore the curse that was due to all; not that He became actually accursed in the sight of God, but as suffering for the liberation of the race from the curse resting upon it. (Dial. cum Tryph., XCIV., XCVI., CXI.) Irenæus describes the passion of Christ as the supreme manifestation of the God-man, the means of bringing to a complete measure the saving efficacy accruing from His voluntary obedience. (V. 16. 3.) Christ's death, according to Tertullian, is the basis of Christian hope and the very foundation of the Gospel. (Adv. Marc., III. 8.) If Origen, upon the one hand, seemed to depreciate the significance of Christ's death by styling the preaching of the cross an inferior stage, Christ being revealed chiefly as the eternal Wisdom among the perfect, on the other hand he endeavors to expand its significance to the widest conceivable limits. He gives it a bearing not merely upon this world, but upon all worlds, upon every rational creature. Christ, he represents, is the High Priest of angels as well as of men. He sacrifices for the celestial as well as the terrestrial, — a corporeal offering in the one case, a spiritual in the other. (In Ioan. Tom., I. 40; Hom. in Lev., I. 3, 4; Hom. in Num., XXIV. 1.) He alone is able to atone for all; the offerings of holy men may serve in a measure to cancel sins, but they cannot avail for the sins of the whole world. (In Num. Hom., XXIV. 1; In Ioan. Tom., XXVIII. 14.) And, moreover, such efficacy as they do possess, they possess in virtue of the great offering of Christ which lies back of them. (So at least Redepenning interprets Origen.) There were individual writers, it is true, who made the teaching function of Christ rather more prominent than the sacrificial function which found expression in His death. This was the case with Clement of Alexandria. But in the current representation the death of Christ was ranked as a factor

of pre-eminent significance in the redemptive work; and the writings of Clement, too, are not without tokens of a warm appreciation of its significance. (Pæd., I. 9, II. 2, II. 8.)

3. *The death of Christ was looked upon as a vicarious sacrifice for man.* The bearing of this sacrifice upon divine justice was in the main neither definitely analyzed nor stated. But the fact that it was a vicarious offering, and was designed to bring undeserved benefits, was fully acknowledged. "On account of the love He bore us," says Clement of Rome, "Jesus Christ our Lord gave His blood for us by the will of God; His flesh for our flesh, and His soul for our souls." (Chap. XLIX.) Almost the same words are repeated by Irenæus. "The Lord has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh." (V. 1. 1.) In the Epistle to Diognetus we have this beautiful tribute to Christ's vicarious sacrifice: "He Himself took on Him the burden of our iniquities. He gave His own Son a ransom for us, the holy One for transgressors, the blameless One for the wicked, the righteous One for the unrighteous, the incorruptible One for the corruptible, the immortal One for them that are mortal. For what other thing than His righteousness was capable of covering our sins? By what other One was it possible that we, the wicked and the ungodly, could be justified than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable device! O benefits surpassing all expectation! That the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors!" (Chap. IX.)

Among the more advanced views of Christ's death, a foremost place may be claimed by a conception of Irenæus already touched upon. The death of Christ, according to a cardinal representation of this writer, is to be regarded as the consummation of Christ's holy obedience; and in

this obedience, as a whole, we are to recognize an offset to man's disobedience. The essence of the atonement lay in the voluntary obedience of the God-man to the laws which belong to the human sphere. Speaking of the cross, Irenæus says: "Doing away with that disobedience of man which had taken place at the beginning by the occasion of a tree, 'He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,' rectifying that disobedience which had occurred by reason of a tree, through that obedience which was upon the tree." (V. 16. 3. Comp. III. 18. 7, V. 21.)

4. *The work of Christ was regarded as bringing redemption negatively, by limiting the power of Satan and his angels.* This was a view of no little significance in the first centuries. Heathenism appeared then as the dominant power in the world, laying its hand, when it pleased, with crushing force upon the worshippers of the true God; and heathenism was believed to be under the patronage of Satan, and the evil angels and demons leagued with him. No wonder, under such circumstances, that there was a vivid feeling respecting Satanic and demoniacal agency, and a lively rejoicing over all tokens that in Christ there was a power competent to defeat and limit such agency. According to the representations of several writers, the ministry of Christ made a positive inroad upon the kingdom of the adversary, and abridged the power and confidence of its votaries. "Christ was made man," says Justin Martyr, "for the sake of believing men, and for the destruction of the demons." (2 Apol. VI.) "We call Him Helper and Redeemer, the power of whose name even the demons do fear, and at this day, when they are exorcised in the name of Jesus Christ crucified under Pontius Pilate, they are overcome." (Dial. cum Tryph., XXX., XLIX.) Irenæus repeatedly describes Christ as the stronger than the strong man, who was, therefore, able to bind the latter. (III. 8. 2; III. 18. 6; III. 23.) He urges also that it was needful that the Son of God should become man, born of a woman, in

order that His victory over the adversary might properly accrue to the benefit of men. "Therefore," he says, "does the Lord profess Himself to be the Son of Man, comprising in Himself that original man, out of whom the woman was fashioned, in order that, as our species went down to death through a vanquished man, so we may ascend to life again through a victorious one." (V. 21. 1.) Origen dwells also at considerable length upon the bearing of Christ's work upon the dominion of the devil. The mythical tone of some of his representations upon this subject will be noticed in another part of the present section.

5. *The work of Christ was regarded as bringing redemption positively by the introduction of a divine life.* The incarnation ushered in, as was conceived, a new spring-time in the moral history of the race. Like a fountain opened in a desert, it became the source of a new vitality, bringing into the midst of the corruptible and decaying a principle of incorruption and fadeless growth. This was a view deeply permeating the mind and heart of the early Church. "Ignorance was removed," exclaims Ignatius, "and the old kingdom abolished, God himself being manifested in human form to bring newness of eternal life." (Ad Eph., XIX.) To heal man's corruption, argues Justin Martyr, it was necessary that the Word, with His incorruptible life, should come into the human sphere. (Frag.) The same idea is very emphatically expressed by Irenæus: "By no other means could we have attained to incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be joined to incorruptibility and immortality, unless first incorruptibility and immortality had become that which we also are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by incorruptibility, and the mortal by immortality, that we might receive the adoption of sons?" (III. 19. 1.) "The Word became flesh," says Hippolytus, in order that, "by mixing the incorruptible with the corruptible, and the strong with the

weak, He might save perishing man." (Chr. et Antichr., IV.) "Excellent is the medicine of immortality!" exclaims Clement of Alexandria. (Cohort., X.) "That which is predicted by the prophets," writes Origen, "is worthy of God, that He who is the brightness and express image of the divine nature should come into the world with the holy human soul, which was to animate the body of Jesus, to sow the seed of His word, which might bring all who received and cherished it into union with the Most High God, and which would lead to perfect blessedness all those who felt within them the power of God the Word, who was to be in the body and the soul of a man." (Cont. Cel., VII. 17.)

One factor in the life-giving power of Christ, as discerned by leading writers, was the moral influence or the holy persuasion emanating from His ministry. His person, words, and deeds, it was claimed, invite to a contemplation that is elevating and purifying to thought and feeling. Clement of Alexandria, for example, names Christ "the holy charmer of the sick soul," the physician who is able to adapt Himself to all varieties of spiritual maladies, who has "many tones of voice and many methods for the salvation of men." (Pæd., I. 2; Cohort., I.) "So great is the power of the cross of Christ," says Origen, "that if it be placed before the eyes and faithfully held in mind, so that the eye of the mind looks with intent gaze upon the very death of Christ, no concupiscence, no lust, no fury, no envy, can prevail." (Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., VI. 1.) A disciple of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, styles Christ "the most lovely object of all, who attracts all irresistibly toward Himself by his unutterable beauty." (Orat. Panegyry.)

The theory that the redemptive price was paid to Satan is found in this period, but it is to be questioned whether it is discoverable in the writings of more than one author, —namely, Origen. Irenæus has been charged with enter-

taining the theory, but upon insufficient grounds. He states, indeed, that the incarnate Word redeemed man from the apostasy — that is, the devil — by His own blood; that He recovered man, not by violence, but in a righteous way and by means of persuasion. (V. 1. 1; V. 2. 1.) To one having the theory in mind, it may seem to be implied by such statements; but a different interpretation is possible, as is claimed by such critics as Duncker, Gieseler, Dorner, and Kahnis. The persuasion may be regarded as applying, in the thought of Irenæus, not to the devil, but to man; and by redemption from the devil may be denoted, not the payment to him of a price, — viz. the blood of Christ, — but redemption simply in the sense of deliverance from thralldom, the blood of Christ being the means of the deliverance in a sense quite different from the commercial. Granting the possibility of such an interpretation, we are compelled by the general tone and by many specific statements of the writings of Irenæus to accept its entire probability. (1.) He nowhere allows a right in the devil over fallen men, but uniformly represents his dominion as an usurped and iniquitous dominion. (2.) He says that God did not, like the devil, resort to a stratagem for carrying out His purpose. This is quite significant. For the conditions forbade that the devil should be thought of as receiving any real gain out of the transaction; he must necessarily be regarded as being outwitted, since the end to be achieved was an abridgment of his dominion. So manifest was this, that those writers, whether in this or the succeeding period, who went farthest in acknowledging the payment of a ransom to Satan, went farthest also in confessing therein a divine stratagem. (3.) Irenæus represents that Satan's dominion over men was overthrown, not in virtue of a contract with the adversary, but by the victorious righteousness of Christ, which foiled the tempter and prepared for a similar victory on the part of men. Sin, as he states, was the bond which held man to Satan, and hence, as men through

the good offices of the Word are purified from sin, they are freed from their former bonds. (4.) The view of Irenæus, that the sayings of Christ revealed to the devil, for the first time, his everlasting doom, and stirred him up to blaspheme, does not harmonize with the supposition that the blood of the Redeemer was given to him in answer to a contract. The contract theory, as shaped by its advocates, pictures the devil as deluding himself with a false hope of victory, not as blaspheming over certain defeat. (See V. 2. 1; V. 21. 3; V. 26. 2.)

Origen undoubtedly gave expression to the theory in question, being easily betrayed into it by his verbal exegesis, taken in connection with his bold, speculative temper, which was more alert to seize upon every material of thought than to harmonize the ingathered materials. The following is, perhaps, Origen's most explicit statement of his peculiar view: "To whom did He give His soul as a redemptive price for many? Not, indeed, to God. Was it, then, to the evil one? He, in truth, had us in his power, till the soul of Jesus was given as a redemptive price to him, deceived with the idea that he could exercise mastery over it, not perceiving that he could not bear the pains involved in retaining it. Wherefore, death, which seemed to have subjected Him to its own dominion, now rules Him no more, since He was made free among the dead and stronger than the power of death; and so far stronger, that, of those whom death had conquered, whoever wished could follow Him, death possessing no more power against them, for whoever is with Jesus cannot be assailed by death. . . . The soul, indeed, of the Son of God was given as a redemptive price for us, but not His spirit, for previously He had delivered that to the Father, saying, 'Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit'; nor, indeed, His body, for we have found nothing to that effect in the Scriptures. And since He gave His soul as a redemptive price for many,—but it did not remain with him to whom it had

been given,—He says in the fifteenth Psalm, ‘Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell.’” (In Matt. Tom., XVI. 8.) It is clear, from the above, that the acknowledgment of a right in Satan, and the payment to him of a ransom, turn out, on the theory of Origen, to be a mere sham. Satan makes no new acquisition, and loses the power already possessed. So little of anything like a real exchange appears, according to the total representation of Origen, that Gieseler concludes that he did not have such in mind. “Origen does not consider,” says he, “that Christ, in the proper sense, gave His soul as a ransom to the devil, but only in a figurative and qualified sense.”

It is unnecessary to add, that this mythical transaction with the devil by no means filled up the circle of Origen’s contemplation of the saving office of Christ. He viewed His work from a great variety of standpoints. If he affirmed a certain connection between His death and Satan, he affirmed no less explicitly that His death was of the nature of a sacrifice to God and a propitiation for the sins of the world. The following are some of his sentences bearing upon this point: “He who was made in the likeness of men, and was found in fashion as a man, without doubt presented to God for the sin which He had received from us (for He bore our sins) an immaculate victim; that is, His spotless flesh.” (In Lev. Hom., III. 1.) “Thou who hast come to Christ, the true High Priest, who by His blood has made God propitious to thee, and reconciled thee to the Father,” etc. (In Lev. Hom., IX. 10.) “Purer than all living things, this man dies for the people, bearing our sins and infirmities; for He was able to blot out all the sins of the whole world received into Himself, since He did no sin, neither was deceit found in His mouth.” (In Ioan. Tom., XXVIII. 14.)

Following the intimations of Scripture (Ps. XVI. 10; Eph. IV. 9; 1 Pet. III. 19, 20), several writers taught that Christ descended into Hades to carry thither the knowl-

edge and the benefits of the Gospel. According to Clement of Alexandria, His ministry there, as well as upon earth, was for Gentiles no less than for Jews, and could be accepted or rejected with the same freedom which belongs to men of this world. (Strom., VI. 6.) Origen makes frequent mention of the descent into Hades, and brings out the idea that this advent, as well as the earthly, had its forerunners; namely, the prophets, in particular John the Baptist. (Cont. Cel., II. 43; In Lev. Hom., IX. 5; Lib. Regum, Hom., II.; In Matt. Tom., XII. 3; In Luc. Hom., IV.) Christ's coming, as he represents in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, was a signal of release for those held in Hades not so much on account of crime as on account of the mere fact that they were numbered with the dead. (V. 1.) Hippolytus also speaks of the descent into Hades, and says that John the Baptist was made a forerunner of this visitation, "that there too he might intimate that the Saviour would descend to ransom the souls of the saints from the hand of death." (Chr. et Antichr., XLV.) Clement of Alexandria represents that the apostles also engaged in the ministry to the inhabitants of Hades, and a like office is assigned them by Hermas. (Strom., VI. 6; Simil., IX. 16.) Meanwhile, this tenet concerning the preaching of Christ in Hades did not acquire sufficient importance, in the general estimate, to claim a place in the symbols of the churches till after the middle of the fourth century.

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

"It stands as an assured fact, a fact knowing no exceptions, and acknowledged by all well versed in the matter, that all of the pre-Augustinian fathers taught that in the appropriation of salvation there is a co-working of freedom

and grace." (Kahnis.) There was no favor in the Catholic Church of the first centuries for any theory of irresistible grace, or of absolute predestination to eternal life. The Gnostics may have cherished the idea that there is an elect class, a class of pneumatic persons, who from their very nature are incapable of being despoiled of an inheritance in the upper heaven; but in the Church at large neither this nor any kindred idea found sympathy, and it was emphatically taught that God is ready to welcome all, and that he saves none without their own co-operation. The maxim of Philo, that, while a good of some kind always comes from seeking God, it is not by any means certain that He will be found, was not at all congenial to the minds of the early Christians. "Seek and ye shall find," was uttered by them without doubt, or any other qualification than the Scriptural requirement of earnestness, sincerity, and humble submission to the truth so far as made known.

Predestination, accordingly, so far as it was affirmed in connection with the destiny of men, was regarded as conditioned by God's foreknowledge of the free acts of men. Origen, in particular, develops this doctrine. "That which is to be," he says, "does not take place because it is known; but it is known that it will be, because it is to take place." (Comm. in Gen.) "Many things are carried on without His will, nothing without His providence." (In Gen. Hom., III. 2.) "Not because the prophets predicted did Judas betray; but because he was to be a betrayer, they foretold those things which he was to do from the wickedness of his purpose, since, indeed, Judas had it in his power to be like Peter and John, if he had so willed." (Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., VII. 8.) In harmony with this standpoint, Origen affirmed that the Scriptural representations concerning God's hardening of the heart must be taken with some qualification. It is unworthy of God and inconsistent with human responsibility that He should, independent of man's

choice, harden the heart. In any case of hardening, as, for example, that related of Pharaoh, the result is to be imputed to the misuse of light and forbearance. As the forbearance of a benevolent master leads the perverse servant farther into corruption, as the same rain which prepares wholesome fruits on one piece of ground nurtures upon another only thorns and briers, as the same sun which melts the wax hardens the clay, so divine dealing misused by Pharaoh corrupted and hardened his heart. (De Prin., III. 1. 8-12; Comm. in Ex.; Cant. Cant., Bk. II.) But while Origen teaches with constant decision the inalienable freedom of man, he still allows that man's part in the work of personal salvation is small compared with God's part. (De Prin., III. 1. 18.)

There was a wide-spread faith in the early Church in the power of the Gospel to work sudden transformations, to bring the seeker speedily into possession of the essential prize of the Christian calling. But we find, on the other hand, declarations to the effect that time is needed properly to consummate the work of moral renovation. "It is probably impossible," says Clement of Alexandria, "all at once to eradicate inbred passions; but by God's power, and human intercession, and the help of brethren, and sincere repentance, and constant care, they are corrected." (Quis Div. salv., XL.) God frequently, argues Origen, allows a certain experience of evils, and cures by a gradual process, in order that the cure may be permanent. "For God governs souls, not with reference, let me say, to the fifty years of the present life, but with reference to an illimitable age." (De Prin., III. 1. 13.)

Faith was commonly regarded as the pre-eminent means in the appropriation of salvation, and strong affirmations that it is the sole means may be found. "We, being called," says Clement of Rome, "by His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, nor by our wisdom, or understanding, or godliness, or works which we have

wrought in holiness of heart, but by that faith through which, from the beginning, Almighty God has justified all men." (Chap. XXXII.) "Man is justified by faith," writes Origen, "the works of the law making no contribution to his justification. Where, accordingly, faith is absent, which justifies the believer, even if one have the works of the law, nevertheless, because they are not built upon the foundation of faith, however good they may seem to be, they cannot justify their doer, because faith is wanting, which is the seal of those who are justified by God." (Comm. in Epist. ad Rom., III. 9.) "Faith toward God justifies a man," is a declaration of Irenæus. (IV. 5. 5.) According to Clement of Alexandria, simplicity, knowledge, innocence, decorum, and love are all the daughters of faith. (Strom., II. 12.)

The "justification" resulting from faith was not defined with the careful discrimination which appears in later times. The fact that remission was closely associated with regeneration in the minds of many writers, indicates that there was no such decisive distinction drawn between the terms *justification* and *regeneration* as is made, in the main, by Protestantism.

A definition of faith, which may be characterized as the current one, can hardly be quoted. While in some instances the word was used merely to denote the acceptance of truth on testimony, in other instances it was employed in a deeper sense, and was made to include the self-surrender of the soul to the truth intellectually received, or the spirit of consecrated loyalty. This latter sense may be inferred from the relation which different writers affirmed between faith and works. Ignatius, for example, says, "Faith cannot do the works of unbelief, nor unbelief the works of faith" (Ad Eph., VIII.), — a statement which evidently includes in the conception of faith the inner moral disposition. To the same effect is the following from the same author: "The beginning is faith and the end is love. Now these

two, being inseparably connected together, are of God, while all other things which are requisite for a holy life follow after them. No man [truly] making a profession of faith sinneth; nor does he that possesses love hate any one. The tree is made manifest by its fruits." (Ad Eph., XIV.) Origen also very explicitly includes a right moral disposition in the idea of genuine faith. It is not the mere assent of the intellect. "Faith, properly speaking, belongs to him who receives with his *whole soul* what is believed in baptism." (In Ioan. Tom., X. 27.) "The absence of transgression is an indication of true faith, as on the contrary the presence of transgression is an indication of unbelief." (Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., IV. 1.) "Since Christ is not only the wisdom of God, but also the power of God, he who believes in Him, in so far as He is the power of God, will not be powerless for noble achievements. In like manner, regarding Him as patience and fortitude, we shall say that, if we shrink from labors, we do not believe in Him, in so far as He is patience, and if we are faint-hearted, that we do not believe in Him, in so far as He is the embodiment of strength and firmness." (In Ioan., XIX. 6.)

Attempts to define the relation of faith to knowledge were especially characteristic of the Alexandrians. Clement sometimes speaks as though faith was regarded as the initial stage, the acceptance in a general way of truth, whereas knowledge is the grasp which one has of truth when its grounds and relations have been analyzed and demonstrated. (Strom., VII. 10.) But in other instances he affirms a reciprocal relation between them, an inherent tendency of the one to pass over into the other. "Knowledge," he says, "is characterized by faith; and faith, by a kind of divine mutual and reciprocal correspondence, becomes characterized by knowledge." (Strom., II. 4.) Origen also assumed an easy and natural transition from faith to the higher spiritual knowledge, a transition, however, which, instead of eliminating faith, contributes to its per-

fection. What the apostle said of knowledge, "Now I know in part," may be applied, as Origen claims, to faith. Perfect faith, as well as perfect knowledge, lies beyond our present estate. (In Ioan., X. 27.)

Notwithstanding the clear declarations quoted above, that faith is the one condition of salvation, whose place works cannot usurp, there was an initial tendency even in this period to displace faith from this supremacy, a tendency to allow the outward to trench upon the domain of the inward. Bearing in this direction was the stress which came quite generally to be laid upon baptism, not simply as an expression of allegiance to Christ, but as a means of absolution. There was also an ascetic spirit which worked in the same direction; a disposition, more or less entertained, to attach special merit to certain forms of self-denial. Certain works crucifying to the natural desires, such as liberal alms-giving and abstinence from marriage, were thought by some to be especially praiseworthy; and there was somewhat of a tendency in the latter part of the period to view such works apart from the inner spirit, and to make them in some degree co-ordinate with faith as a means of securing the divine favor. Hermas is one of the earliest of the Christian writers who gives clear indications of this temper. He even teaches the doctrine of works of supererogation, if one expression of his is to be taken without qualification. "If you do any good," he says, "beyond what is commanded by God, you will gain for yourself more abundant glory." (Simil., V. 3.) Too much stress, however, is not to be laid upon a single sentence like this. Hermas might have had reference, not to what is absolutely beyond divine requirements, but only to what is beyond the ordinary and commonly understood requirements of God. More emphasis is to be laid upon his general representations of the efficacy of certain forms of outward works, like alms-giving, as also upon his statement that "he who repents must torture his soul, and be afflicted with many kinds of affliction." (Simil.,

VII.) Tertullian exhibits a similar vein, not merely styling repentance the price of pardon and a species of satisfaction for sins, but insisting strongly upon outward humiliating tokens of penitential sorrow, and declaring in connection with the demand for these, "The less quarter you give yourself, the more will God give you." (*De Pœnit.*, IX.) "The remedies for propitiating God," says Cyprian, "are given in the words of God Himself; the divine instructions have taught us what sinners ought to do, that by works of righteousness God is satisfied, that with the deserts of mercy sins are cleansed." (*De Op. et Eleem.*, V.) Referring to the Book of Tobit, the same writer adds: "The angel certifies that our petitions become efficacious by alms-giving, that life is redeemed from dangers by alms-giving, that souls are delivered from death by alms-giving." Like others emphasizing works of this kind, Cyprian regarded them specially needful for sins committed after baptism, the sacramental cleansing itself being supposed to do away with all sins committed before baptism. (*Ibid.*, II.) Origen affirms that in the Gospels seven remissions of sins, or seven occasions of remission, are indicated: (1.) Baptism; (2.) Martyrdom; (3.) Alms-giving; (4.) Forgiveness of our brothers; (5.) Conversion of the sinner from the error of his way; (6.) Abundant Love; (7.) The deep repentance which makes tears the bread of the sinner day and night, and inclines him to confess his guilt and to seek healing. (*In Lev. Hom.*, II.) No doubt much of this order of statements which appears in the writings of the fathers is to be taken with some qualification, inasmuch as other statements of theirs indicate a belief that outward works are of value only as they are sanctified by a right inner condition, — a condition of faith and holy purpose. Both orders of statements must be taken together. But even when we do this, we must allow that there was an initial drift toward ceremonialism, and toward a legal rather than an evangelical view of good works. A fully Protestant consciousness

did not characterize the Church of the second and third centuries upon this subject; nor ought we to expect to find such under the conditions then existing. An already developed Romanism was the natural antecedent of a clearly and sharply defined Protestantism. At the same time, the standpoint of the Church of that age cannot be described as Romish; it embraced simply certain initial tendencies toward Romanism.

Only a moderate approach was made toward the characteristic of a later age, as respects obstructing direct approach to Christ by the interposition of subordinate agents. Reverence for confessors or martyrs tended near the end of the period to a somewhat excessive valuation of their intercessions. A few items, also, favorable to the special importance of the Virgin Mary appeared. The opinion was already entertained by some, that, notwithstanding the birth of Jesus, Mary remained virgin. (Clem., Strom., VII. 16. Comp. Origen, Comm. in Matt. Series, XXV.) She continued, however, beyond the close of this period, to be assigned to the same plane essentially as the rest of the saints, and neither she nor they became so prominent before the Constantinian era as materially to obstruct the direct vision of Christ, at least so far as the great body of Christians were concerned. Tertullian in one connection strongly denounces an overvaluation of the intercessions of martyrs. Reminding the martyr that it was the purity of Christ which enabled Him to suffer effectually in behalf of others, he says to him: "If you yourself have done no sin, suffer in my stead. If, however, you are a sinner, how will the oil of your puny torch be able to suffice for you and for me?" (De Pud., XXII.)

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I.—THE CHURCH.

OWING to the manner in which they originated, the different congregations possessed at the outset a good degree of independence. Still from the first they felt the uniting power of a moral bond,—a bond which Gnostic and other perversions tended, in the main, only to strengthen. Not far from the middle of the second century, those churches which held in common the apostolic traditions began to appropriate to their communion the name of “Catholic” (Euseb., IV. 15), regarding themselves as belonging to the Universal or Catholic Church, as opposed to any local factions standing outside of their fellowship. (“Catholic” and “Roman Catholic” have different meanings in our terminology.)

An interest in preserving unity very naturally led responsible representatives of the Catholic Church to emphasize the importance or even necessity of being within its fellowship. This is especially apparent in the case of Ignatius, Irenæus, and Cyprian. The first of these, to be sure, does not directly insist upon adhesion to the Catholic Church. He had more in mind the preservation of the unity of each individual congregation through the subordination of all its members to the governing head, namely, the bishop. But he assumed, as an existing fact, the communion of the individual churches with each other, and his emphasis upon episcopal authority was no doubt connected in his

mind with a certain stress upon Catholic unity. Among his vigorous assertions of the need of unity and of subjection to constituted authority is the following: "If any one be not within the altar, he is deprived of the bread of God." (Ad. Eph., V.) Irenæus outlines quite distinctly the idea of a Catholic Church, and represents it as comprising the churches distributed throughout all lands and continuing in fellowship with the chief depositaries of pure tradition, namely, the churches founded and instructed by the apostles in person. To willingly hold a place outside of the Church, thus defined, indicated, in his view, both a lack of love and a lack of truth, both a wrong spirit and false doctrines, and hence an alien position as regards the grace of Christ. "Where the Church is," says he, "there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church, and every kind of grace; but the Spirit is truth. Those, therefore, who do not partake of Him, are neither nourished into life from the mother's breasts, nor do they enjoy that most limpid fountain which issues from the body of Christ; but they dig for themselves broken cisterns." (III. 24.) Cyprian is no less emphatic, declaring that there is one Church in the world which alone has valid sacraments, within whose bounds alone can true martyrdom find place. (Epist. ad Confessores, No. 50; De Unit. Eccl., XIV.)

Such language seems certainly to express the dogma that there is no salvation outside of the Church. But it is to be noted that these writers represent the most hierarchical side of their age; and, moreover, that they had in mind, in their strong statements, not so much the mere fact of being outside of the Church, as the fact of being placed outside by a wilful and unholy breaking of the bond of unity and peace. It may be questioned whether such a man as Irenæus, or even such a man as Cyprian, had the case been distinctly put, would have asserted that salvation under the new dispensation is absolutely dependent upon

being included within a definite outward, earthly organism. Such, certainly, was not the position of the leading Greek fathers in this period. The favorable view which Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria took of the Greek philosophers, as also certain specific statements of theirs, preclude the idea that in their view salvation was strictly bounded by the circumference of the Catholic Church, as instituted in this world. (1 Apol., XLVI.; Strom., VI. 6.) A like belief may also be affirmed of Origen. To be sure, while commenting on the conditions under which Rahab's house was spared, he declares that, outside of this house, — that is, outside of the Church, — no one is saved, and whoever goes without becomes responsible for his own death. (In Jesu Nave, Hom., III. 5.) But it is probable that, in Origen's definition, the bounds of the Church were not strictly identical with the line marked out by a connected hierarchy. His total representation, including his view of the sacraments, forbids the assumption that he believed that salvation is strictly dependent upon adherence to a definite outward organism. This holds as regards present salvation. The forfeiture of eternal salvation from lack of connection with the Church in this world was, on the theory of Origen, altogether out of the question.

Whatever the qualification made in any quarter upon the necessity of union with the Catholic Church, nowhere was the distinction clearly drawn and firmly upheld between the visible and invisible Church. In this very lack there was provided a noteworthy opportunity for the growth of that ecclesiasticism which locates the essence of the Church in its outward organism, and declares everything outside of its circle alien to the Church and to the grace of God.

The episcopate was regarded by those most given to hierarchical views as the chief means of expressing and conserving the unity of the Church. Within the episcopal

body, the Roman bishop, as was clearly dictated by the imperial and apostolic associations of Rome, enjoyed a certain pre-eminence in point of honor; but there was no general acknowledgment in this period of his possession of a constitutional supremacy or rightful governing authority over the whole Church. Cyprian gave expression to the essential points of the hierarchical theory of his age in the following sentences: "The Church which is catholic and one is not cut nor divided, but is indeed connected and bound together by the cement of priests, who cohere with one another." (Epist. ad Flor. Pupianum, No. 68.) "The episcopate is one, each part of which is held by each one for the whole." (De Unit. Eccl., V.) Among the Montanists, a portion of the importance elsewhere assigned to the bishops was awarded to the oracles of the "new prophecy." Tertullian's references to the subject of this section are divided between the standpoint of Irenæus and that of the Montanists.

SECTION II.—THE SACRAMENTS.

The Latin word *sacramentum*, and the corresponding Greek word *μυστήριον*, had a very wide application in the first centuries. They were admissible in connection with anything to which the idea of sanctity could be attached. Tertullian, accordingly, speaks of the works of the Creator as *magna sacramenta*; of the work of the incarnate Christ, as *sacramentum humanæ salutis*; and styles the death of Christ *sacramentum passionis*. (Adv. Marc., V. 18, II. 27; Adv. Jud., X.) The term "sacrament," however, was specially associated with baptism and the eucharist.

BAPTISM. — As already indicated, great significance was attached to baptism. It was looked upon as the completing act in the appropriation of Christianity,—the seal of positive adoption into the family of God. From at least

the middle of the second century, the normal execution of the rite was commonly regarded as procuring a full remission of all past sins. At the same time, we find baptism styled an instrument of regeneration and illumination, the sacrament which sets free into eternal life, the laver of regeneration, the laver of saving water, the water of new birth. (Just. Mart., 1 Apol., LXI.; Clem., Pæd., I. 6; Tertul., De Bap., I.; Iren., III. 17; Origen, Select. in Deut.; Cyprian, Epist. ad Donat., No. 1.)

In view of such expressions, it may be said that Justin Martyr and the succeeding fathers taught the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; but at the same time there are important limitations which must go with this statement. 1. It was assumed by these writers that, in case of adult candidates, baptism is made efficacious only in connection with the right inner disposition and purpose. Tertullian, to be sure, in connection probably with his materialistic idea that a cleansing power is imparted to the very water itself, seemed to think that a remission must ensue from the mere reception of the rite; but he considered that the grace received would be valueless unless the candidate had exercised due repentance, since the absence of repentance would be quite sure to involve the speedy loss of what had been unrighteously gained. (De Pœnit., VI.) Others holding less materialistic notions were not driven to any such awkward argumentation. Origen, for example, says: "Not all receive to their salvation the baptismal washing." (In Ezech. Hom., VI. 5.) "He who has ceased from his sins receives remission in baptism. But if any one comes to the font still harboring sin, he obtains no remission of his sins." (In Luc. Hom., XXI.) "When, therefore, we come to the grace of baptism, renouncing all other gods and lords, we confess only God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But while making this confession, unless we love the Lord our God with all the heart, and with all the soul, and with all the strength cleave to Him, we

receive no part in the Lord." (In Ex. Hom., VIII. 4.)

2. These writers did not regard baptism as absolutely essential to the initiation of spiritual life, or what, in an allowable use of the term, might be called regenerate life. It was viewed by them as the *completing part* of a process of moral cleansing and renovation. Even Tertullian, with all the emphasis which he laid upon the baptismal grace, clearly brings out this point. "That [baptismal] washing," he says, "is a sealing of faith, which faith is begun and is commended by the faith of repentance. We are not washed in order that we may cease sinning, but because we have ceased, since in *heart* we have been bathed already." (De Pœnit., VI.) "Not all baptized with water," says Origen, "have been forthwith baptized with the Holy Spirit, as, on the contrary, not all who are ranked among the catechumens are aliens and destitute of the Holy Spirit. For I find in the Divine Scriptures certain catechumens counted worthy of the Holy Spirit, and others who had received baptism counted unworthy of the grace of the Holy Spirit." (In Num. Hom., III. 1.)

The practice of infant baptism was, evidently, the policy of the Church in the time of Origen and Cyprian, the former of whom declares it a matter of apostolic tradition. The practice was also quite current in the time of Tertullian, who opposed it on the ground of the inexpediency of placing young and innocent children under the heavy responsibilities of the baptismal covenant. Earlier than Tertullian, there is no very certain reference to the maxims or practice of the Church as respects infant baptism.

It was not considered that valid baptism ought in any case to be repeated. But a question was raised as to whether the baptism administered by heretics, in case one should come from their ranks to the doors of the Catholic Church, ought to be acknowledged as valid. Among the leading disputants on the subject were Cyprian and the Roman Bishop Stephen, the former taking the negative

and the latter the affirmative. The Roman policy finally gained the ascendancy, and it became a general maxim that those who had once been baptized, according to the Trinitarian formula, should not be rebaptized. A considerable list, however, of exceptions was allowed in the East.

The mode of administering baptism was very rarely a matter of dogmatic specification in this period. If the literature is thought to testify in favor of the currency of immersion, there is contemporaneous, and quite as explicit, evidence that immersion was not regarded as of the essence of baptism. (See in particular the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," and Cyprian's Epistle to Magnus.)

THE EUCHARIST. — A mere repetition of the words employed at the original institution of the eucharistic service is, of course, by itself, scarcely at all indicative of dogmatic belief. Such a repetition, without further evidence, cannot fairly be quoted as favoring the doctrine of the real bodily presence. In Protestant services of the present day, the elements are named, without any hesitation, the body and blood of Christ, where there is no idea that they are such in a literal sense. A like economy of words may have found place in the usage of the primitive Church.

A convenient introduction to the faith of the early Church upon the subject of the eucharist may be found in considering the question, whether the doctrine of transubstantiation was enunciated by any writer of the first three centuries. If taught at all, it was undoubtedly taught by Justin Martyr and Irenæus; for nowhere are statements found which bear more the semblance of this doctrine than do those which appear in the writings of these two authors. The principal passage from Justin is as follows: "Not as common bread and common drink do we receive these; but in like manner as Jesus Christ our Saviour, having been made flesh by the Word of God, had both flesh and blood for our salvation, so likewise are we taught that the food which is blessed by the prayer of His word, and from which

our blood and flesh by transmutation are nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh." (1 Apol., LXVI.) Irenæus in one or two instances indulges language quite similar. "As the bread which is produced from the earth, when it receives the invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the eucharist, consisting of two realities, earthly and heavenly; so also our bodies, when they receive the eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection to eternity." (IV. 18. 4.) "When, therefore, the mingled cup and the manufactured bread receives the Word of God, and the eucharist becomes the body of Christ, from which things the substance of our flesh is increased and supported, how can they [the Docetists] affirm that the flesh is incapable of receiving the gift of God, which is life eternal, which [flesh] is nourished from the body and blood of the Lord, and is a member of Him?" (V. 2. 3.) Now, it is not to be denied that an alert fancy may find in these statements the complete doctrine of transubstantiation; in that event, however, it will find more than a critical discernment can discover. But do not Justin and Irenæus teach that, in virtue of the consecration, the elements of the eucharist become the body and blood of Christ? Yes, and any and every theory of the eucharist that was ever formed teaches the same. The only question concerns the sense in which the bread and wine were regarded as being made the body and blood of the Redeemer. Was it conceived that their essence was transformed into the actual body, the crucified and glorified body of Christ? Neither Justin nor Irenæus says any such thing. But do they not teach that bread and wine in the act of consecration cease to be common bread and wine? Yes, and so did Tertullian teach that the water consecrated to baptismal use ceases to be common water. Why no longer common? Not on account of the transformation of the essence of the water into anything else, but on account of the brooding presence of the

Spirit. Why assume anything more as respects the belief of Justin and Irenæus? Why not stop where their representations stop, and say that they taught that the bread and wine in the eucharist are conjoined with the heavenly Word, exhibit in virtue of this union an image of the primal assumption by the Word of flesh or earthly material, so that they may be styled His body and blood, and in virtue of the same union possess a peculiar efficacy which makes them food of immortality? To go beyond this is to go beyond warrant. They do not say that the change in the bread and wine is a change of essence. They do not say that it is any other change than the change to a condition of new worth and virtue by reason of the presence of a divine component. To discover here the doctrine of transubstantiation (or consubstantiation) requires imagination aided by a peculiar dogmatic impulse. What we have is simply the doctrine of a mystical presence in the eucharist. This is well expressed by Baur, who says of the teaching of Irenæus: "We have here the same idea that appears with Justin. Bread and wine become the flesh and blood of Christ, not through a real transformation into the body of Christ, but only through the relation in which, in virtue of the act of consecration, they are placed to Christ or the Logos, whereby there is transferred to them a divine something which fits the body of the recipient for the resurrection."

That the doctrine of transubstantiation was not entertained by Justin and Irenæus is indicated by the standpoint of succeeding writers. Clement of Alexandria, in his rather obscure references to the subject, suggests, beyond the symbolical use of the elements, certainly nothing more than a mystical presence of the Logos in the eucharist. Tertullian teaches unmistakably that the consecrated elements are *symbols* of Christ's body and blood. A few rhetorical expressions, or current phrases, such as are found elsewhere in his writings (De Res. Carn., VIII.; De Pud.,

IX.), have no force against the plain import of the following statement of his: "Having taken the bread and given it to His disciples, He made it His own body, by saying, 'This is my body,' that is, the figure of my body. A figure, however, there could not have been, unless there were first a veritable body." (Adv. Marc., IV. 40.) Tertullian defines in what sense the eucharistic bread is the body of Christ, and states that it is such as being the figure or symbol of His body. Dogmatism may say that it was such, in the view of Tertullian, in another unstated and more literal sense; but exegesis has nothing of this sort to offer. Cyprian also uses expressions indicative simply of a symbolical relation between the elements and Christ's body. Speaking of the necessity of using wine as well as water, he says: "Blood cannot appear to be in the cup, when in the cup there is no wine, whereby the blood of Christ is shown forth. . . . I wonder very much whence has originated this practice, that, contrary to evangelical and apostolical discipline, water is offered in some places in the Lord's cup, which water by itself cannot express the blood of Christ. . . . We see that in the water is understood the people, but in the wine is showed the blood of Christ." (Epist. ad Cæcilium, No. 62.) Origen abounds in expressions which assume the presence of Christ's flesh and blood only in a metaphorical or symbolic sense, and deny a literal partaking of them. The flesh and blood, as he teaches, which are true meat and drink, are the flesh and blood of the divine word; that is, wholesome doctrine, truth vitalized from above. (In Gen. Hom., X. 3; Ex. Hom., VII. 8; Lev. Hom., VII. 5.) "We are said to drink the blood of Christ not only in the sacramental rite, but also when we receive His words." (In Num. Hom., XVI. 9.) "Not that visible bread which He was holding in His hands did God the Word call His body, but the word in whose mystery (*in cujus mysterio*) that bread was to be broken. Nor did He call that visible drink His blood, but the word in whose

mystery that drink was to be poured out. For the body or blood of God the Word, — what else can it be than the word which nourishes and the word which rejoices the heart?" (Comm. in Matt. Series, LXXXV. Comp. Tom. in Matt., XI. 14.) In the Apostolical Constitutions we have this statement: "Instead of a bloody sacrifice, He has appointed that reasonable and unbloody mystical one of His body and blood, which is performed to represent the death of the Lord by symbols." (VI. 23.)

In the development of the doctrine of the eucharist, the idea of sacrifice was earlier asserted than was the change of substance. As compared, however, with the later teaching, very important limitations were placed in this period upon the sacrificial character of the rite. While associations with Judaism naturally suggested that the bread and wine which, with other gifts of the congregation, were brought to the altar, should be called a sacrifice, they were so termed only as being a thank-offering to God, as having a kindred significance with the prayer of thanksgiving, the *εὐχαριστία*, which gave the name to the entire rite. Such is the sacrificial character assigned to the elements by Justin Martyr. (Dial. cum Tryph., CXVII.) The representations of Irenæus are to the same effect. He styles the eucharistic sacrifice a rendering of the first fruits to the Creator, and emphasizes especially the idea that it is an expression of gratitude. It is not an offering designed to atone for sin. "Sacrifices do not sanctify a man, for God stands in no need of sacrifice; but it is the conscience of the offerer that sanctifies the sacrifice when it is pure, and thus moves God to accept as from a friend." (IV. 18. 3.) "Now, we make an offering to Him, not as though He stood in need of it, but rendering thanks for His gift, and thus sanctifying what has been created." (IV. 18. 6.) Cyprian advances a step or two beyond Irenæus, in that he puts the priest in place of the congregation, and represents him as imitating in his offering the sacrifice of Christ; that is, as offering

what can fitly symbolize the sacrifice of Christ, his argument in this connection being against the use simply of water in the eucharistic cup. (Epist. ad Cæcil., No. 62, § 14.) Meanwhile, this feature of the eucharist was by no means dwelt upon by the whole body of Christian writers. Speaking of the first three centuries, Gieseler says: "It is to be observed that Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Cyprian are the only church teachers who speak of the eucharist as a sacrifice." Origen clearly teaches that, apart from the sacrifice made by Christ, none except spiritual offerings have any place under the new dispensation; and other writers give intimations of the same order of thought. "The sacrifice of the Church," says Clement of Alexandria, "is the word breathing as incense from holy souls. . . . The righteous soul is the truly sacred altar, and incense arising from it is holy prayer." (Strom., VII. 6.)

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. CHILIASM. — The doctrine that the end of the present dispensation is to be preceded by the personal reign of Christ upon earth was entertained in the second century not only by Ebionites, and by writers who, like Cerinthus, mixed with their Gnosticism a large element of Judaism, but by many (very likely a majority) of those in the Catholic Church. There is, to be sure, no inculcation of the doctrine in the writings of Polycarp, Ignatius, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus. It was expressly advocated, however, by writers as representative of their age as Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian, as well as by Papias. "I and others," says Justin Martyr, "who are right-minded Christians on all points, are assured that there will be a resurrection of the dead and a thousand years in Jerusalem, which will then be built, adorned, and enlarged. . . . There was a certain man with us, whose name was John, one of the apostles of Christ, who prophesied, by a revelation made to him, that those who believed in our Christ would dwell a thousand years in Jerusalem; and that thereafter the general, and in short the eternal, resurrection and judgment of all men would likewise take place." (*Dial. cum Tryph.*, LXXX., LXXXI.) Irenæus reproduces some of the extravagant descriptions of Papias respecting the fruitfulness of the earth during the millennial reign, places the coming of Antichrist just before the inauguration of that reign, teaches that the just will be raised up by the descended Saviour, and dwell, with the remnant of believers still in the

world, in Jerusalem, being there disciplined for the state of incorruption which they are to enjoy in the New Jerusalem, which is from above, and of which the earthly Jerusalem is an image. (V. 33-36.) "Of the heavenly kingdom," says Tertullian, "this is the process. After its thousand years are over, within which period is completed the resurrection of the saints, who rise sooner or later, according to their deserts, there will ensue the destruction of the world and the conflagration of all things at the judgment." (Adv. Marc., III. 24.)

Near the close of the second century, a current adverse to this order of ideas was started. An initial cause of this was the great prominence which Montanism gave to the doctrines of Chiliasm. This, in connection with the general reprobation of Montanism, tended naturally to lessen enthusiasm for those doctrines. Then came the positive opposition of the Alexandrian school, which, with its bias to idealism, could hardly fail to challenge the theory of a visible personal reign of Christ upon earth. Origen devoted a chapter of his "De Principiis" to a refutation of materialistic notions of the millennial reign (II. 11), and his disciple, Dionysius of Alexandria, controverted, with great zeal, the tenets of the Egyptian Chiliasts. At the end of the third century, therefore, Chiliasm held a disputed place in the Church. In the early part of the next century, it became virtually obsolete. As late a writer as Lactantius, it is true, appears as an ardent believer in it, and pictures at length the second advent and the earthly kingdom (Div. Inst., Lib. VII.); but he in no wise represents the drift of his age, for the cessation of the persecutions and the erection of a Christian Empire gave a new direction to thought and desire. Nothing was more natural, while the storm of heathen violence was raging, than for Christians to long for the coming of their Deliverer, and for a manifest triumph of His kingdom over the kingdom of this world. The storm, however, having ceased, and the kingdom of

this world having passed under a Christian sceptre, their desire for the special and open intervention of their Divine Leader was necessarily relaxed.

2. CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION. —

The doctrine of an intermediate state was prevalent in the early Church, as appears from the writings of Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Irenæus, Hippolytus, Novatian, Origen, and Lactantius. (Dial. cum Tryph., V.; De An., LV., LVIII.; Cont. Hær., V. 31; Orat. ad Græc., I.; De Trin., I.; De Prin., II. 11. 6; Cont. Cel., VII. 5; Div. Inst., VII. 21.) By some of these writers, this doctrine was asserted, in express opposition to the Gnostic view, that *pneumatic* Christians pass at once into the *pleroma* on their departure from the body.

Much after the manner of the later Judaism, the early Christians assumed, in the main, a wide common receptacle for the souls of the dead,—the invisible region, or Hades. This was sometimes described (and probably was generally regarded) as an under-world. Though having in a sense a common abode here, the dead were not regarded as being subjected to a common lot; for Hades was described as a place of partial rewards and punishments, the righteous having foretastes of the fruition awaiting them, and the wicked, of the punishments impending over them. Also, in a local respect, the lot of the two classes was regarded as in a measure distinguished, as may be judged from references to the sixteenth chapter of Luke. Paradise seems not to have been reckoned within the bounds of Hades. Tertullian, apparently, describes it as a region in this world, but inaccessible, save to those for whom it is appointed. (Apol., XLVII.) Origen, also, assigns an earthly location to the more immediate Paradise. (De Prin., II. 11. 6.)

Tertullian expresses with much confidence the belief that all souls are detained in Hades till the resurrection, martyrs alone excepted. “No one,” he says, “on becoming absent

from the body, is at once a dweller in the presence of the Lord, except by the prerogative of martyrdom, whereby [the saint] gets at once a lodging in Paradise, not in Hades." (De Res. Carn., XLIII.) "The sole key to unlock Paradise is your own life's blood." (De An., LV.) Just how far Tertullian's view was shared by the Church at large is difficult to determine. He seems to have found those who were disposed to claim that at least the patriarchs and prophets were removed from Hades in the retinue of the Lord's resurrection. At any rate, he introduces one as urging this supposition, and replies as follows: "How is it, then, that the region of Paradise, which, as revealed to John in the spirit, lay under the altar, displays no other souls as in it besides the souls of the martyrs?" (Ibid.) It is to be noted, also, that the language of Cyprian is rather indicative of sympathy with the opinions which Tertullian controverts than otherwise. Speaking of earthly losses and calamities, he asks, "What is this to Christians? What to God's servants whom Paradise is inviting?" (Adv. Demet., XX.) "It is for him to fear death who is not willing to go to Christ. It is for him to be unwilling to go to Christ who does not believe that he is about to reign with Christ. . . . The righteous are called [at death] to their place of refreshing, the unrighteous are snatched away to punishment. . . . Let us greet the day which assigns each of us to his own home, which snatches us hence, and sets us free from the snares of the world, and restores us to Paradise and the kingdom. . . . We regard Paradise as our country. We already begin to consider the patriarchs as our parents: why do we not hasten and run that we may behold our country, that we may greet our parents? There a great number of our dear ones is awaiting us, and a dense crowd of parents, brothers, children, is longing for us, already assured of their own safety, and still solicitous for our salvation." (Tract. de Mortal.) Certainly the man who indulged this language either did not believe that death takes

the righteous soul down into Hades, or else in the intensity of Christian hope and in his rhetorical fervor he forgot, for the time being, his creed. Whatever the dogmatic belief of Cyprian may have been, Origen taught distinctly that since the death of Christ Hades no longer holds righteous souls; that Christ transported to Paradise the righteous men of former ages who had been detained in Hades; that under the Christian dispensation the good pass directly into Paradise. "I think," he says, "that all the saints who depart from this life will remain in some place situated on earth, which Holy Scripture calls Paradise, as in some place of instruction, and, so to speak, class-room or school of souls, in which they are to be instructed regarding all the things which they have seen on earth, and are to receive also some information respecting things which are to follow in the future." (De Prin., II. 11. 6. Comp. In Lib. Regum Hom., II.)

It was commonly believed that the close of the present dispensation is to be signalized by a conflagration,—a testing and destroying fire. Of a belief in a purgatorial fire between death and the resurrection, we find no distinct intimation, except with the Alexandrians. In one place Origen represents that there is a fire which confronts every one at death; that those who are free from sin pass through it without harm, as the Israelites passed through the Red Sea; that the wicked, on the other hand, are submerged in it as in a fiery river or lake. (In Psal. Hom., III. 1.) In another connection he represents that those who have only a certain admixture of dross are purged by the fire, while those whose natures are wholly composed of dross sink into the abyss. (In Ex. Hom., VI. 4. Comp. Hom. in Ezech., I. 13; Hom. in Luc., XXIV.; Cont. Cel., V. 15.) As regards the nature of the purifying fire, Origen indicates plainly enough that he understood by the term not so much a material flame as a spiritual test and discipline. (In Jer. Hom., XVI. 6; In Ezech., II. 7.) Redepinning defines Origen's

fire as "nicht ein materielles Brennen, sondern ein inneres Gericht." It is hardly necessary to add, that the ideas and the imagery of Origen were well fitted to aid in developing the doctrine of Purgatory which afterwards claimed the credence of the Church.

3. THE RESURRECTION. — While the Gnostics accepted the resurrection only in a figurative and spiritual sense, Catholic Christians were zealous advocates of an actual resurrection of the body, and many treatises were devoted by their representative writers to a specific consideration of the subject. In the common view, the resurrection assumed a very literal aspect, and was regarded as destined to restore to the soul the same body, as respects substance as well as form, with which it had been united in this life. A clear indication of such a conception of the resurrection is seen in the theory entertained of the millennial kingdom by many, as a kingdom in this world and possessing the essential marks of an earthly kingdom, while yet a principal part of its citizens were represented to be risen saints. An indication quite as decisive is the exegesis given, by various writers, of Paul's declaration that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." In their comments on this statement, Tertullian, Novatian, and Methodius teach that the exclusion from the divine kingdom has no reference to the flesh as such, but to its sinful works, its guilt, its irrational impulses. When purified from these, it is altogether fit for the divine realm. (Adv. Marc., V. 10; De Trin., X.; De Resur., as quoted by Photius.) We find also many direct statements to the effect that the substance of the present body is to be in the future body. (Just., De Resur., X.; Tatian, Chap. VI.; Athenag., De Mort. Resur., XXV.; Irenæus, V. 3; Tertul., De Res. Carn., LX.) Still, those most inclined to the literal interpretation were ready to admit some exceptions to an exact restoration of the body. All of them at least conceived that blemishes would be excluded from the bodies of the saints; and Tertullian allowed that, though

all the parts known to us are to be in the resurrection body, we may still presume upon a suspension of the grosser functions of the same. It is to be observed, also, that some of the Chiliasts relieved quite materially the grossness of their conceptions by affirming a new transformation at the end of the millennial reign, in virtue of which the saints are to enter into the angelic state. Speaking of this consummation, Tertullian says: "We shall then be changed in a moment into the substance of angels, even by the investiture of an incorruptible nature, and so be removed to that kingdom in heaven of which we have been treating." (*Adv. Marc.*, III. 24.)

Origen is distinguished among the early fathers by his steadfast endeavor to spiritualize the conception of the resurrection. As already stated, he seems to have regarded the incorporeal as the ideal state. Still he accepted the fact of a bodily resurrection. The resurrection body, as he taught, is of the angelic type from the very first, an ethereal, spiritual body. It is historically related to the body which previously had partnership with the soul; the latter supplies to the former its germ or underlying principle. "We maintain," says Origen, "that as above the grain of wheat there arises a stalk, so a certain power is implanted in the body, which is not destroyed, and from which the body is raised up in incorruption." (*Cont. Cel.*, V. 23.) "Although the bodies die and become corrupted, and are scattered abroad, yet by the word of God that very germ which is always safe in the substance of the body raises them from the earth, and restores and repairs them." (*De Prin.*, II. 10. 3.) This language seems to assume a germ of some kind as common to the bodies of the two states. That Origen was entirely unwilling to proceed any further than this, as respects assuming identity of substance, is quite clear from his comments on the first Psalm. He remarks here that our bodies are fitly compared to a river, since they are in perpetual flux, retaining the same form

indeed, but continually changing as respects substance. The resurrection body accordingly will be after the type of the present body; but we are not, Origen states, to look for a reappearance of the same substance.

In defending and establishing the doctrine of the resurrection, the following were the principal considerations urged:—(1.) The power to restore is the complement of the power to create. (2.) Though the substance of one body may in part pass into another body, the divine economy will prevent an assimilation of the same to the latter. All the material that is needful for the perfection of the body of each heir to the resurrection will be held in reserve by the Lord of all things. (3.) The transitions in the realm of nature are highly suggestive of a resurrection. (4.) The resurrection of the body will be no more of a prodigy than was its primal formation from an infinitesimal germ. (5.) As body and soul have been partners in virtue and vice in this life, so should they be partners in the rewards and punishments of the life to come. (6.) As the blight of the fall came upon both body and soul, so should the restoring power of God be manifested and glorified by the perfect redemption of both.

4. FINAL AWARDS.—Justin Martyr seems to have placed the resurrection of the wicked, as well as of the just, at the beginning of the millennial reign (1 Apol., LII.); but other Chiliasts included only the saints in the pre-millennial resurrection, and made the second resurrection the immediate antecedent of the final judgment.

That rejecters of the Gospel in this world have no probation beyond the grave was the dominant view of the early Church. The preaching of Christ or of His apostles in Hades, as assumed by several writers, can hardly be regarded as involving an exception to this belief, inasmuch as this preaching had reference to those who had died before Christ had come and offered the grace of salvation. References to the intermediate state assume, in general,

that in that state the wicked anticipate certain doom instead of progressing toward recovery. As respects the awards rendered on the great day of judgment, it was almost a universal belief that they are to seal the everlasting fortunes of souls. The great majority of writers quote the strongest terms of the New Testament in describing future punishment, add no qualification, and in many instances indicate, by specific statements or by their general system of thought, that they admitted of no qualification. (Clem., 2 Epist., VI.; Ignatius, Ad Eph., XVI.; Epist. ad Diognetum, X.; Hermas, Simil., IX. 18; Just. Mart., 1 Apol., VIII., LII.; Theoph., I. 14; Iren., I. 10. 1, IV. 39. 40; Tertul., De Præscrip., XIII.; De Res. Carn., XXXV.; Lactant., Div. Inst., VII. 10, 11, 21; Apost. Const., II. 13.) Arnobius steps aside from the current representation, by assuming that punishment will end in the annihilation of the soul. "This is man's real death," he says, "this which leaves nothing behind. For that which is seen by the eyes is [only] a separation of soul from body, not the last end,—annihilation. This, I say, is man's real death, when souls which know not God shall be consumed in long-protracted torment with raging fire." (II. 14.) Justin Martyr also speaks as though punishment might end in extinction of being (Dial. cum Tryph., V.); but he does not say positively that it will, and in view of other statements of his, it cannot be said that he entertained such a supposition. In his first "Apology," he not only applies the term "eternal," *αἰώνιον*, to the punishment of the wicked, but indicates that the term is employed in the sense of endless duration, by expressly opposing it to the period of a thousand years, which is specified by Plato. (Chap. VIII.) The position of Clement of Alexandria has been diversely interpreted. His strong emphasis upon the corrective design of punishment and upon the absence of all hatred from the bosom of God, as well as his ascription of moral freedom to Satan (Pæd., I., VIII.;

Strom., I. 17, VII. 2, 12, 16) favors the supposition that he extended probation into the future life, and assigned to it no definite limit. On the other hand, Clement speaks of an "unavailing remorse with punishment" as visiting the sinner in the world to come (Cohort., X.), of a condemnation which may be pronounced after fair trial (Strom., VI. 6), and, according to a fragment from his lost work on the "Soul," states expressly the doctrine of endless punishment. The fragment is as follows: "Immortal are all souls, even those of the wicked, for whom it had been better not to have been incorruptible; for, punished by a limitless infliction of unquenchable fire, and dying not, they obtain no end of their misery." (Apud Maximum, *Capita Theol.*, Sermo LIII.)

Origen was the only writer who distinctly advocated the doctrine of endless probation. Some of his statements, too, seem to fall in with the current teaching, and to assume a limit to probation. "A day of propitiation," he says, "remains to us until the going down of the sun; that is, until the end of the world." (In Lev. Hom., IX. 5.) The suggestion of a limit is naturally drawn from this statement, as also from his language in another connection, where, deriving his figure from the work of the potter, he says that, after we have passed through this life, if we are found as a broken vessel, there will be no longer any chance for a reconstruction. (In Jer. Hom., XVIII. 1.) Little stress, however, is to be laid upon these instances. A better index of his real belief may be found in his characterization of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as indeed a sin which is to be forgiven neither in this world nor in the world (or age) about to be, but is not necessarily excluded from pardon in the *ages to come*. (In Ioan. Tom., XIX. 3.) In numerous instances he indicates clearly enough his faith in the possible restoration of every rational creature. (De Prin., I. 6, II. 10, III. 5; Cont. Cel., VIII. 72; In Ioan. Tom., I. 37.) Origen was led to this theory both by his conception of

God and his conception of man. He believed that there is no inexorable justice in God which should move Him to punish simply for the purpose of vindicating law, without reference to the amendment of the transgressor; and that free will is an inalienable possession which makes it ever possible for the creature to gravitate toward the good. It is to be observed, however, that this freedom, as viewed by Origen, makes another fall possible. His was not the theory of a universal *irreversible* restoration, but the theory of a universal restoration which is probably to be followed by new falls and new restorations.

Quite a diversity of representation appears as respects the nature of future punishment. Lactantius teaches that the fire which preys upon the wicked is actual fire, a peculiar liquid fire unmixed with smoke. (Div. Inst., VII. 21.) Some of Tertullian's expressions indicate the like conception. (De Pœnit., XII.) By Origen, on the other hand, the essence of future punishment was located in separation from God, and in the pains of a guilty conscience; and Irenæus gives expression to a kindred view. (De Prin., II. 10; Cont. Hær. IV. 39.) The more or less spiritual temper of the writer was also a factor in determining the conception entertained of future rewards. In general, however, so strong was the consciousness in this age of obligation to the Redeemer, that the privilege of beholding Him in His glory and of being received into the more intimate companionship with Him was a large part of the felicity anticipated by all earnest Christians.

Second Period.

320-726.

INTRODUCTION.

THE reign of Constantine naturally ushered in the AGE OF POLEMICS. The preceding period had closed with unsettled problems. It had been pre-eminently a canvassing period. Not a little, it is true, had been accomplished toward building up a system of Christian doctrine. The ranker heresies, such as the Judaic Ebionism and the heathen Gnosticism, had been vanquished. The two contrasted types of anti-trinitarianism, which culminated in Paul of Samosata and Sabellius, had been condemned. In every department of doctrine, outlines destined to be retained through succeeding ages had been drawn. There had been a positive drift towards certain standards. But the drift had not yet acquired momentum enough to swallow up opposing currents. Much was still left indeterminate. Upon the most important themes there was a lack of formulas, which might give apt and accurate expression to the dominant belief of the Church. Doctrinal development had proceeded far enough to awaken a practical and a speculative interest in such themes, while yet a satisfactory and authoritative settlement was wanting. To rest under such circumstances was an impossibility. The Church was necessarily impelled to strive for a more complete and definite construction of doctrine.

At the same time the pursuit of this end was beset with great difficulty. The questions themselves were so pro-

found as easily to give occasion to divergent views. Those who aspired to their solution were biased by antecedents as wide apart as Christianity, heathenism, and Judaism. Unanimity, if attainable at all, was plainly not to be gained except at the expense of much indoctrination and discussion.

In view of these conditions, it must be allowed that an earnest doctrinal activity was legitimate to the age. It was among the great providential tasks of that era to labor for an adequate statement and exposition of the faith. This conclusion, however, does not imply that the task was executed altogether in a legitimate manner. As a matter of fact, abnormal factors and false methods claimed a large place. Relief from the strong outward pressure of heathen persecution inclined brethren to be less tolerant than heretofore, of differences among themselves. The characteristic disputatiousness of the Greeks added fuel to controversy in many quarters. The untamed populace of the large cities looked to theological strife as to a coveted theatre for the exercise of the same fierce partisanship and lawless impulses which had characterized them as heathen. Companies of monks, in lack of engrossing occupation, were naturally possessed with a zest for controversial warfare, and disposed to prove their superior piety by extra heat against heresy. The emphasis laid upon a correct creed became an occasion, to the unthinking, of confounding faith with orthodoxy, and so of exaggerating enormously the relative worth of the latter, and the merit of its defence. The interference of the government frequently complicated and embittered the strife. The history, in consequence, presents phases decidedly repulsive to enlightened sentiment. Brotherly discussion, on the basis of reason and revelation, was often made to give place to force and finesse. Zeal for truth often passed over into dogmatic rage, and invective usurped the place due to argument.

Fixing the attention on the darker side, one might easily incline to the verdict that this whole period was characterized by waste rather than by acquisition. But in reality this era of unintermitted agitation was far from being fruitless. If false elements claimed a place, there was still an earnest examination of truth on its merits. Alongside the superficial and the external, there was a profound intellectual engagement. Some of the noblest minds which God has given to the Church applied their resources to the questions in dispute. Those questions, in some instances, were of as vital concern as are the cardinal conceptions of God and of man's relations to Him. In fine, this polemical period is entitled, as it certainly is destined, to be a factor in theological thinking for all time. Opinions may differ as to the worth of its positive decisions, but all well informed and unbiased minds must value the illustration which it affords of significant types of belief.

Second Period.

320-726.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

THE attitude of the Church in this period toward heathen philosophy was, in large part, the same as in the preceding centuries. We observe the same twofold method of using the philosophers,—on the one hand friendly quotation, on the other sharp criticism, according as opinions were deemed agreeable or contrary to Christianity. We note, also, the same dominant belief, that heathen philosophy, as compared with the Christian oracles, contains only fragments of truth. The main difference between the two eras concerns the ratio between appreciation and disfavor. Even here no very radical diversity can be asserted; yet there is ground for the conclusion that in the present period there was somewhat of a tendency toward a slackened interest in the classic systems of philosophy. The current of appreciation, at least in the closing centuries of the period, was relatively narrower than it was in the era of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen. The development that went on in the mind of Augustine was, in a measure, reflected in the age. His later utterances, as compared with his earlier, exhibit the philosopher giving

place to the theologian. We find him, in his *Retractations*, taking pains to qualify the praises which he had bestowed upon the different Greek schools. Examples, it is true, of a very intimate alliance with philosophy appear in the latter part of the period; but the main current of the age was in a different direction, — more toward an inert and satisfied orthodoxy than toward the speculative activity and ambition which might serve to create an interest in the nobler products of heathen culture.

The preference which the preceding age entertained for Plato, descended to this age. He was regarded as the most lofty in spirit and the most nearly Christian in doctrine of all the heathen philosophers. Eusebius of Cæsarea frequently points out the agreement between the Platonic writings and the Scriptures. (*Præp. Evang.*) Ambrose styles Plato *princeps philosophorum*. (*De Abraham*, I. § 2.) Augustine speaks of him as “that noble philosopher” (*De Trin.*, XII. 15), and affirms that he “is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles.” (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 4.) He also commends various points in the Platonic conception of God, the chief defect being, in his view, a failure to apprehend the divine humility which came to manifestation in Christ, and is, above everything else, the effective instrument for conquering the sinful pride of men. (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 5–11; *Confess.*, VII. 9; *Epist.*, CXVIII.) The statements of these writers may be taken as a fair index of the relative estimate which their age placed upon Plato.

By the great majority of theologians Aristotle was still ranked as decidedly inferior to Plato. This is apparent from the fact that they assume in common the pre-eminence of Plato, and take no pains to distinguish Aristotle from the mass of subordinate philosophers. Some instances also occur of a positive disparagement of Aristotle. Thus Theodoret declares that his antagonism to Plato was ill-grounded; that he was the author, not of better, but of

much worse dogmas than his master, inasmuch as he denied the immortality of the soul, and limited the providence of God. (Græc. Affect. Curat., Sermo V.) The dialectics of Aristotle are described by Gregory of Nyssa as an evil art (*κακοτεχνία*), and an occasion of impiety to the arch-heretics of his time. (Contra Eunom., I.) A like opinion is implied by the language of Epiphanius, who characterizes the Arians as "the new Aristotelians." (Hær., LXIX. 69.) References of this latter order indicate that Aristotle was cultivated to a certain extent by Christian writers, but at the same time that he was cultivated in a way to prejudice his claims upon the appreciation of the Church at large. Champions of the trinitarian faith, calling to mind the preference which such heretics of a previous age as Artemon and Theodotus had shown for the Aristotelian philosophy, and observing that later and kindred heretics found in the same philosophy a chief source of their dialectic subtilties, very naturally were inclined to regard Aristotle with suspicion and disapprobation. Still, the period shows a measure of advance in his favor. The Arians having been put to rout, an opportunity was, in time, provided for viewing the Aristotelian philosophy apart from association with radical heresy. We have, accordingly, in the sixth century, tokens of a growing appreciation for Aristotle. Among the means of commendation were the translations and commentaries by Boëthius.

The relative place of Platonism, however, is not adequately determined by mere comparison of its fortunes with those of Aristotelianism. For Neo-Platonism was a very significant factor in the religious and philosophic thought of the period. As this in part coincided with Platonism, its spread involved to some extent the spread of the latter. Still it had its specific features, and it is incumbent upon us to take note of these, and to ascertain to what extent, as a distinctive philosophy, it usurped the place of original Platonism in the uses of Christian writers.

Ammonius Saccas, who taught in Alexandria in the first half of the third century, is sometimes named the founder of Neo-Platonism, but the roots of the system go back at least to Philo. In Plotinus, who flourished in the third quarter of the third century, it acquired its developed form. Later exponents, such as Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Proclus, made no essential advance upon the ideas of Plotinus; on the contrary, they showed a disposition to lower the philosophical character of Neo-Platonism by the wide scope which they gave to various superstitions. Jamblichus, in particular, led on in this direction. Much account was made by him of theurgic arts.

Neo-Platonism represents the last stage in the development of Greek philosophy. It was the philosophy of the mixed cosmopolitan era, in which, as a consequence of Greek and Roman conquests, Oriental elements were plentifully intermingled with the civilization of the more western countries. It was also the philosophy of an age religiously restless and aspiring, an age dissatisfied with the inherited systems of worship and thought, and longing for a more perfect knowledge of God and of the world to come. In harmony with these conditions, Neo-Platonism was (1.) eclectic, (2.) strongly tinged with Oriental mysticism, (3.) a professedly religious philosophy, or one giving a large measure of attention to man's religious wants. As respects its Oriental and religious character, the description by Zeller may fitly be quoted. "Neo-Platonism," he says, "is the intellectual reproduction of Byzantine imperialism. As Byzantine imperialism combines Oriental despotism with the Roman idea of the state, so Neo-Platonism fills out with Oriental mysticism the scientific forms of Greek philosophy. . . . It is clear that in Neo-Platonism the post-Aristotelian philosophy has lost its original character. Self-dependence and the self-sufficingness of thought have made way for a resignation to higher powers, for a longing for some revelation, for an ecstatic departure from the do-

main of conscious mental activity." (Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.) Ackermann, upon the same points, remarks: "That which characterizes New Platonism chiefly on the side of religion is its theosophy and theurgy. Both of these apparently had their origin in the East. Every one who is only moderately acquainted with these things knows that this effeminate and voluptuous kind of divine illumination and piety is especially at home in India, and that the formulas of conjuration, by which it is pretended that the divine powers can be made subject to the human will, form a principal constituent of the Asiatic religions. With the theosophy are connected the pantheistic and emanational ideas of New Platonism, and the necessary consequence of the theurgy is an extraordinary cultivation of the doctrine of demons." (The Christian Element in Plato.)

Some of the cardinal ideas of Neo-Platonism, as they are found in the writings of Plotinus, are the following. God is the absolutely simple and transcendent, without self-consciousness, without will, above everything that can be named, above even existence itself. He is the fountain of all things, which He originates, not with knowledge and will, but by a necessity of nature, such as is the shining of the sun. The nearer subordinate beings stand to Him, the more they resemble Him, though the most remote still bear His impress, and it is the one divine life which streams through all things, and the one divine power and essence which come to manifestation in all. Next to the solitary Monad, as the first emanation from the same, stands the Reason (*νοῦς*), the self-conscious Spirit, the head of the world of Ideas, or the Idea inclusive of all others. From this, by an unconscious and necessary emanation, is derived the World-Soul, the medium between the supersensible and the sensible, the immediate ruler of nature. From out of the World-Soul proceed from eternity the different orders of souls, — the divine souls (or subordinate gods), the demoniacal, and the human. Matter is akin to formlessness and nonentity, and the ca-

larity of possessing a material body is due to the sins committed by souls in a previous state. The ideal state of the soul is one of complete emancipation from the material, and of union with the supreme God, the absolute ground of all existence. Moral and ascetic living and spiritual contemplation are preparatory to this state, but its actual attainment is through the ecstasy in which thought and volition are entirely eliminated, and the soul has immediate vision of God. This ecstasy may be enjoyed in this life. (Plotinus is reputed to have experienced it several times.) Those souls that fail in this life to fit themselves for the divine fellowship, are condemned in the hereafter to transmigration into new bodies. Evil is nothing substantial; it is an accident; it lies essentially in the subjection of the soul to the material and sensible, but is not an attribute of matter as such.

The above description may serve to suggest the leading points in which Neo-Platonism differed from the system of Plato. Taken as a whole, it was less scientific, more disposed to accommodate the tendencies of the existing heathenism, more eclectic. It diverged from Plato in the extreme emphasis which it put upon the negative conception of God and in compromising His personality, in its doctrine of emanations and strong pantheistic bias, in its dependence upon an ecstatic transporting of the soul as a means of union with God in this life, in its patronage of theurgic arts.

Evidently the divergences from original Platonism were largely such as to be the reverse of a commendation to Christian theologians. To this is to be added the fact that Neo-Platonism in the earlier portion of the period was palpably one of the strongest supports of the declining system of heathenism, and helped to nurture no less an enemy of the Church than Julian the Apostate. Under such conditions a much higher appreciation was naturally entertained for Plato than for the later school. Few Christian writers in the first part of the period were probably

conscious of any special obligations to Neo-Platonism, or thought of it as comparable in value to the system of the great philosopher. Still, it infected to some degree the intellectual atmosphere of the age, and writers unconscious of borrowing therefrom may, nevertheless, have had their thinking colored by some of its tenets. In particular, its ascetic teachings and its doctrine of God's transcendence, or elevation above all understanding and definition, may be suspected of having acted upon the thought of the Church.

As the period went on, however, Neo-Platonism commanded something more than this indirect influence. Individuals appeared as appreciative students, and of some it even became the chosen philosophy. Augustine, on the whole, indicates a rather favorable estimate. He indulges in quite frequent quotations from the leading writers of the school, and speaks of them as the most illustrious of recent philosophers. (*De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 12.) It cannot be affirmed, however, that he borrowed outright much of their teachings. In Synesius, belonging to the first part of the fifth century, we have an example of a professing Christian who was in large part a Neo-Platonist. He had been a friend and disciple of Hypatia, and after his conversion to Christianity did not regard himself as obligated to renounce some of the most characteristic beliefs of the system in which he had been indoctrinated. Another bishop of about the same date, Nemesius, was imbued to some extent with Neo-Platonism. It found, also, a measure of influence with the Eastern monks of the sixth and seventh centuries. But the writer of greatest historical consequence, who made, in this age, a positive alliance with the New Platonism, was the one who wrote under the assumed name of Dionysius the Areopagite. His works comprise treatises on the Celestial Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Divine Names, and Mystical Theology, besides several epistles. The time at which the pseudo Dionysius wrote was not earlier than the middle part of the fifth century. Erdmann decides that

he was a Christian who had been educated in the school of Proclus.

The works of Dionysius first gained acceptance with an heretical party, the Monophysite monks of the East, to whom their mystical type of piety was congenial. The Catholic Church in the first instance regarded them as spurious, and reminded the Monophysites, who cited their statements (in the year 533), that writings which had never received a mention during the Arian and Nestorian controversies could not have the antiquity claimed for them. This opposition, however, was of short duration. The mystical and hierarchical elements in the works were in accord with the general drift of the age, and bore down the most palpable and conclusive evidences against their genuineness. They soon won a wide-spread recognition in the Eastern Church. In the seventh century they were formally defended by the presbyter Theodorus, and were admired and used by the philosophizing monk Maximus. Within the Latin Church, as early a writer as Gregory the Great speaks of Dionysius as "*antiquus videlicet et venerabilis pater*" (Hom. in Evang., XXXIV. 12), while by the mediæval scholasticism and mysticism of the Latin Church he was generally regarded as the veritable Areopagite of New Testament history, and was ranked as no mean authority.

The main peculiarities in the teachings of the pseudo Dionysius are the following: (1.) An extreme emphasis upon the transcendence of God. On this point he rivals Philo and the most radical of the Neo-Platonists, repeatedly naming God the super-essential, and declaring that He is to be described by negation rather than by affirmation. (2.) The doctrine that the knowledge of God is most perfectly reached by an absolute separation from the world and self, and indeed by a kind of transcendental nescience, — an experience essentially identical with the Neo-Platonic ecstasy. (3.) Representations which have a pantheistic

sound, or which seem to leave no room for real being outside of God. (4.) The definition of evil as negation or privation. (5.) An elaborate scheme of the angelic hierarchy. (6.) The distinction between an exoteric and an esoteric theology.

From this enumeration it is plain that the system of the pseudo Dionysius had prominent points of kinship with Neo-Platonism. But, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that there were some prominent points of contrast. The theory of involuntary emanations, for example, which Neo-Platonism taught, was rejected, and in its place was put the doctrine of free creative acts.

SECTION II. — MONASTICISM.

IN the preceding centuries individuals had chosen an ascetic mode of living. They had not, however, become widely distinguished as a class from the general body of Christians. In the early part of the fourth century, this incipient and unorganized asceticism was succeeded by monasticism as a prominent factor in church life. The contagious example of Anthony drew thousands of hermits into the deserts of Egypt and of the neighboring countries. Before the death of Anthony, the cloister life was instituted by Pachomius, and it soon rivalled the hermit life in the number of its votaries. Monasticism moved on with the force of an invincible tendency. An easy conquest was made of the East. The opposition of the West proved but a temporary barrier. In the fourth and fifth centuries, men of conspicuous talent, like Martin of Tours, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and John Cassianus, appeared as advocates of the monastic *régime*, and in the first half of the sixth century it obtained from Benedict of Nursia a constitution admirably adapted to extend its sphere and to perpetuate its influence in the Latin Church.

A uniform effect of monasticism upon doctrinal development cannot be affirmed, since monasticism itself was far from being a uniform fact. We find it the servant of an ignorant zeal, rating bodily austerities above knowledge and culture, supplying an army of hot-headed zealots to controversial warfare. But, on the other hand, we find it the patron of learning, and sending forth from its discipline some of the broadest and most enlightened minds with which the Church was favored. It appears as an enemy of the true Christian ideal, assigning a false superiority to the external over the internal, nurturing the impression that piety belongs to a mode of life, rather than to a temper of heart, substituting a legal for an evangelical type of religion, dishonoring grace by imputing salvation to works. On the other hand, however, men appear in the cloister whose experience of ascetic rigors has only deepened their conviction of the worthlessness of all outward mortifications and works when disconnected from the grand essentials of inward piety, — men zealous in their advocacy of spiritual conceptions of divine requirements. In some instances monasticism was predominantly of the contemplative type, and made alliance with a mystical theology; but in other instances it was imbued with a practical spirit, and served as a right hand of missionary enterprise, and of the aggressive work of the Church in general. The one feature pertained more to the East, the other to the West.

Still there were traits in monasticism sufficiently general to authorize an estimate of its total influence upon doctrinal development. (1.) A system so generally admired, and laying such stress upon outward peculiarities, must have favored an exaggerated impression as to the worth of external works. After all allowance has been made for exceptions, it must still be granted that monasticism tended to the substitution of a legal for an evangelical type of piety. (2.) Monasticism added a certain impetus to the bias of

the age toward the marvellous and the magical. As might be judged from the mass of miracles claimed for the monks, their mode of life created a special appreciation for supernatural workings and experiences. The solitude of the hermit's cell, or even the comparative isolation of the cloister life, favored the fullest growth of the mystical and imaginative bent of the heart; such a bent naturally forwarded belief in the transcendent nature and magical effect of sacramental rites, and in the mysterious character of the worship in general.

SECTION III.—THE ALLIANCE OF CHURCH AND STATE.

THE espousal of Christianity by Constantine brought the State and the Church at once into close relation to each other. A strict constitutional union was not, indeed, forthwith effected. There were no definite articles specifying the extent of the Emperor's prerogatives within the ecclesiastical sphere. His obvious ability, however, to bestow great benefits upon the Church, together with the disposition of the age to accord him an arbitrary sovereignty, secured him ample opportunity to interfere with spiritual matters. We find, accordingly, the first Christian Emperor summoning a general council for the settlement of doctrinal questions, publishing its decrees, banishing ecclesiastics dissenting from the authorized creed, prohibiting the assemblies of heretics and confiscating their houses of worship, paying salaries to the clergy from the state treasury, confirming to the bishops certain judicial functions. Succeeding rulers were not less disposed to extend their administration over the affairs of the Church. Every one of the six ecumenical councils convened within the period was assembled at the call of an Emperor, and in some of them the imperial presidency was quite as conspicuous as the episcopal. In individual instances, Emperors assumed, on

their own authority, to issue decrees for the direct settlement of doctrinal points. Justinian and Zeno, among others, went to this length of interference.

The doctrinal bearing of such a condition of things is sufficiently obvious. The inevitable tendency was to repress free speculation, and to induce an inert orthodoxy. The State may have had no power adequate to reverse the main theological currents of the age, but it did have power, when allying itself with those currents, to limit dissent, to raise barriers against innovating opinions, and so to help a stereotyped form of theology to maintain its supremacy. Where the State was strongly in the ascendant, as was the case in the East, free thought gave way to despotism, and doctrinal development finally came to a standstill. In this quarter the work of theologians after the seventh century was mainly retrospective, consisted in reproducing and arranging what had already been brought forward by good authority. In the West the State was obliged to divide the rule with the Church, or even to yield to the supremacy of the latter. These features, on the whole, offered a rather better opportunity for a free theological movement than was feasible under the overshadowing imperial despotism of the East. Still, in the Latin Church the conditions were none too favorable to such a movement. The persecuting temper of the State itself, or its subjection to the will of the hierarchy, often provided a temporal sword against heretics and dissenters, and gave a wide sweep to spiritual despotism. The greater doctrinal activity of the West in the mediæval period, as compared with the East, is probably to be imputed to the greater vitality of a new and growing civilization, quite as much as to any relative lack of external repression.

SECTION IV.—AUTHORS AND THEIR CHIEF WORKS OF
DOGMATIC IMPORT.

	Writings.	Date of Death.
I. GREEK WRITERS OF THE ARIAN ERA.		
Eusebius of Cæsarea	{ Ecclesiastical History; Evangelical Preparation; Evangelical Demonstration; On Ecclesiastical Theology	A.D. 340
Athanasius	{ Against the Heathen; On the Incarnation of the Word; Orations against the Arians; Exposition of the Faith; On the Decrees of the Council of Nicæa; Epistles to Serapion; Against Apollinaris	373
Basil	{ Homilies on the Hexaemeron, etc.; Against Eunomius; On the Spirit	379
Gregory Nazianzen	{ Orations	390
Gregory of Nyssa	{ Book on the Hexaemeron; On the Formation of Man; Catechetical Oration; On General Notions; Against Eunomius; Against Apollinaris	395
Cyril of Jerusalem	{ Catechetical Discourses	386
Didymus	{ On the Trinity; On the Holy Spirit.	395
II. GREEK WRITERS OF THE CHRISTOLOGICAL ERA.		
Epiphanius	{ Against Heresies	403
Cyril of Alexandria	{ On Worship in Spirit and Truth; Against Nestorius; Commentaries on the Old and the New Testament	444
Diodorus of Tarsus	{ Fragments	394 (or earlier).
Chrysostom	{ Homilies on the Old and the New Testament	407
Theodore of Mopsuestia	{ Commentaries on the Twelve Prophets, and fragments of other works	429
Theodoret	{ Healing of the Heathen Affections; Dialogues; Heretical Fables; Commentaries; Ecclesiastical History	457
Socrates	{ Ecclesiastical History	After 439
Sozomen	{ Ecclesiastical History	After 443
Evagrius	{ Ecclesiastical History	After 593
Maximus	{ On Various Questions of Holy Scripture; Dialogues on the Holy Trinity; On the Theology of the Son of God and the Economy of His Incarnation	A. D. 662

	Writings.	Date of Death.
III. LATIN WRITERS.		
Hilary of Poitiers	Tractates on the Psalms; On the Trinity	A. D. 368
Ambrose	Treatises on the Hexæmeron, Paradise, Cain and Abel, Noah and the Ark, Abraham, and other Old Testament Themes; On Mysteries; On Sacraments; On the Holy Spirit; Exposition of Psalms	397
Rufinus	Eremitic History; Ecclesiastical History; Apology for his own Faith; Exposition of the Symbol	410
Jerome	Numerous Commentaries and Epistles	419
Augustine	City of God; Confessions; Enchiridion; On the Trinity; On the Spirit and the Letter; On Nature and Grace; On Marriage and Concupiscence; On the Soul and its Origin; On Grace and Free Will; On the Predestination of Saints; On the Gift of Perseverance; Against Julian (two treatises); Reply to Faustus, the Manichæan; Anti-Donatist Writings; Tractates on the Gospel of John; Exposition of the Psalms; Retractations; Numerous Sermons and Epistles	430
John Cassianus	Colloquies; On the Incarnation	After 432
Vincentius	Commonitorium	About 450
Faustus, Bishop of Rhegium	On the Grace of God and the Free Will of the Human Mind	About 490
Gennadius	On Illustrious Men; On Ecclesiastical Dogmas	After 495
Prosper of Aquitaine	Responses for Augustine; On the Grace of God and Free Will; Carmen de Ingratis	A. D. 455-463
Fulgentius	Three Books to Monimus; On the Truth of Predestination and the Grace of God; On Faith	533
Salvianus	On the Government of God	After 455
Leo the Great	Sermons and Epistles	A. D. 461
Mamertus Claudianus	On the State of the Soul	About 473
Gregory the Great	Books of Morals, or Exposition of the Book of Job; Homilies on Ezekiel and the Gospels; Dialogues; Epistles	A. D. 604
Isidore of Seville	On the Life and Death of Saints; Commentaries on the Old Testament; On the Lord's Nativity, Passion, and Resurrection, Kingdom and Judgment	636

Inasmuch as the first stage of the Christological controversy occurred before the close of the strife with Arianism, there were writers who participated in both. Still, the first group of Greek writers may properly be regarded as pre-eminently connected with the Arian era, and the second with the Christological. Diodorus of Tarsus, it may be observed, came as early as one or two in the preceding list. Nevertheless, as a founder of the Antiochian school, which was a main factor in the Christological controversy, he is most appropriately located with the second group.

The entire list of authors given lived and died within the Catholic Church. Theodore of Mopsuestia, however, was fated (more than a century after his death) to be anathematized for heresy, and John Cassianus, Vincentius, Faustus, and Gennadius were to be criticised more or less as representatives of Semi-Pelagianism.

The more prominent writers among those ranked as heretics were, in connection with Arianism, Arius, Aëtius, and Eunomius; in connection with Christology, Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Eutyches; in connection with Pelagianism, Pelagius, Cœlestius, and Julian of Eclanum. Little from the writings of these men, besides the quotations of opponents, is extant.

In the Greek Church of this period Athanasius stands at the head as respects dogmatic importance. In near proximity to him appear Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa. Cyril of Alexandria, though his character may provoke severe criticism, must be allowed quite an eminent place as a theologian. Some of the writings of Theodoret were subjected to censure in the time of Justinian. Nevertheless, he was one of the most clear-headed of the Greek theologians of the fifth century, and withal, a very faithful representative of the dominant faith of his Church and age. Eusebius of Cæsarea was not fully orthodox, and, in the opinion of those near to his time, succeeded better as an historian and apologist than as a theologian.

Theodore of Mopsuestia was somewhat inclined to independent thinking, and, in some points, stepped aside from current beliefs.

In the Latin Church, Augustine towers above all other writers of these centuries. His theological system, whatever may be thought of its merits, must be ranked, in point of actual influence, as one of the foremost in history. It is still no inconsiderable factor in both Romish and Protestant Christianity. After Augustine, Hilary, Ambrose, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great appear as conspicuous exponents of the Catholic theology. In scholarship, Jerome, the author of the Vulgate translation of the Bible, no doubt excelled all other Latin writers of the period, Augustine himself not excepted. As respects dogmatic significance, however, several names must take precedence of his.

SECTION V.—SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. INSPIRATION AND AUTHORITY OF THE SCRIPTURES.—In this period, as in the preceding, a very emphatic view of scriptural inspiration was entertained. The sacred writers were commonly regarded as organs of the Holy Spirit, and so completely under His guidance that their words were altogether infallible and divine. Such a theory may be discerned in the statement of Eusebius, that to suppose a mistake on the part of a sacred author, such as the substitution of one proper name for another, must be counted the height of presumption. (Comm. in Psal., XXXIII.) To the same effect is the declaration of Augustine, that he considered himself bound to yield to the canonical Scriptures "such implicit subjection as to follow their teaching, without admitting the slightest suspicion that in them any mistake or any statement intended to mislead could find a place." (Epist., LXXXII.) Again he remarks, "All the divine writings are in full agreement with each other." (Serm., I.)

"All that He was minded to give for our perusal on the subject of His own doings and sayings, He commanded to be written by those disciples, *whom He thus used as if they were His own hands.*" (De Consensu Evang., I. 35.) Not less indicative of a strict theory of inspiration are his comments on the Septuagint translation. The deviations of this version from the Hebrew, where not due to the error of a copyist, were, in his view, to be imputed to the direction of the Holy Spirit. (De Doct. Christ., II. 15, IV. 7; De Civ. Dei, XV. 14.) Surely if translators were thought to have been under such plenary guidance, the original writers must have been regarded as lifted far above all liability to error. Gregory the Great, in the preface to his exposition of the Book of Job, remarks, "It is superfluous to inquire who wrote these things, since the Holy Spirit may properly be regarded as the author of the book. He Himself, therefore, wrote these things who dictated that which was to be written." In the same connection he affirms that it was not unnatural for the sacred authors to write about themselves, because, filled with the Holy Spirit, they were drawn above themselves, as it were became exterior to themselves (*quasi extra semetipsos fiunt*), and so expressed judgments concerning themselves as if they related to others. Many writers coincided with Gregory in describing the Spirit as the real author of the sacred books. Cyril of Jerusalem, for example, speaks of the Holy Spirit as having uttered the Scriptures. (Catech., XI. 12, XVI. 2. Compare Basil, Hom. in Psal., I. 1; Hilary, Tract. super Psal., Prolog., § 5; Ambrose, Hexaem., I. § 7.)

The human element in the Scriptures was not wholly unrecognized. Jerome even went so far in one connection as to intimate the possibility that the apostolic writer in a certain sentence followed rather his outbreking human temper than the guidance of the Spirit. (In Epist. ad Galat., Lib. III., Chap. V.) Chrysostom took notice of the

differing style and tone of different writers, and of their diverse statement of the minor details of the same events. (Hom. I. in Matt.) Augustine also seems to have allowed a certain scope to the free agency of the writer. (De Consensu Evang., I. 2, II. 12.) According to the strictures of the sixth ecumenical council, Theodore of Mopsuestia passed very free criticism upon the Solomonic writings and the Book of Job. If a true account was given of the case, an exceptional position was occupied by this independent writer. On the whole, it was a very limited recognition which the Church rendered to the human element in the Scriptures. The dominant theory was equivalent to that of full verbal inspiration.

But while the sacred writers were regarded as pliant organs of the inspiring Spirit, they were not regarded as unconscious organs. As in the preceding period, the Montanist theory of an absolute trance was repudiated by the Catholic Church. We find it expressly rejected by such writers as Athanasius, Basil, Epiphanius, and Jerome. (Orat. contra Arianos, III. 47; Comm. in Isaiam, Proem., § 5; Adv. Hær., XLVIII. 3; Comm. in Nahum, Prolog.)

2. INTERPRETATION AND USE OF THE SCRIPTURES. — A genuine advance was made in scriptural exegesis by the Antiochian school, as represented by Diodorus, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Theodoret. Paying large regard to grammatical and historical considerations, and departing from the idea that the Bible is a book of sacred enigmas, they sought to get at its sense much after the style of modern interpreters.

Taking the Church at large, however, the allegorizing method may be said to have been still in the ascendant. The leading Latin writers, as well as those affiliating with the Alexandrian school, cultivated it extensively. Many of the pages of Ambrose are about as prodigal of mystical meanings as are the commentaries of Origen. As an example, we may specify the prefiguration of Christ, which he

finds in Jacob, as the husband of two wives, inasmuch as Christ is the consort both of the law and of grace. (*De Jacob et Vita Beata*, II. § 25.) Augustine also made a liberal use of allegory. Yet it should be noticed that outside of the Antiochian school we find a measure of restriction imposed upon the allegorizing method. Thus Basil rebukes those who are not content with the literal sense of the account of creation, but, yielding a loose rein to their fancy, conjure up some mystical meaning for such terms as water, plant, fish, and beast (*Hexaem.*, IX. 1); and Augustine, besides giving considerable scope in practice to the more sober style of interpretation, distinctly rejects Origen's theory that a spiritual sense is contained in all Scripture. "In this prophetic history," he says, "some things are narrated which have no significance [that is, spiritual or typical sense], but are, as it were, the framework to which the significant things are attached." (*De Civ. Dei*, XVI. 2.)

The Scriptures in these centuries were viewed as the common property of Christians, a most desirable possession for believers generally, so that it was esteemed necessary to translate them into the language of any nation or tribe newly converted to Christianity. The right of the laity to read them was undisputed, as is clear from the testimony of Chrysostom and others. Chrysostom advocated with great frequency the diligent perusal of the Scriptures by all classes. (*Hom. in Matt.*, V.; *Hom. in Johan.*, XI., XXXII.) He taught the people that, so far from considering this the task of priests and monks, they ought to regard it as specially needful to themselves as a safeguard against the manifold temptations of the world, in the midst of whose strife and turmoil they were placed. Responding to the plea that the Bible could not be understood by all, he said, "On this account divine grace caused these books to be written by tax-gatherers, fishermen, tent-makers, and shepherds, ignorant and unlearned men, in

order that no one of the ignorant should be able to take refuge in this pretext, in order that their contents might be understandable, in order that those working with their hands, the slave, and the most unlearned of all, might be able to derive benefit therefrom; for those who were favored with the grace of the Spirit composed all this, not, like other writers, for the sake of fame, but with sole reference to the salvation of their readers." (See the ample quotations in Neander's Chrysostomus.) It is true that we find one or two who entertained a less generous view of the common privilege to read the Bible. Gregory Nazianzen regarded it as a matter for regret that no provision was made by the Church for a graduated introduction to the Scriptures, and thought that a wise discretion would select certain books for a certain age and grade of understanding. (Orat., II. 48, 49.) Basil also thought that there was room for discrimination, and feared that the weak might suffer harm from an indiscriminate reading of the Old Testament. Neither Basil nor Gregory, however, had any objection to the reading of the Bible by laymen as such. The limitation which they favored amounted simply to the prescription for youth and ignorance of a certain guidance in the matter.

But while there was the opposite of a prohibition of the Bible to the laity in the theory of the age, there were serious practical obstructions to its general perusal. In the West the inundation by the barbarian tribes induced a wide-spread ignorance. In the East the fixedness of orthodoxy, the limited scope given to individual interpretation, together with the decay of the life of religion, left little ambition for the general study of the Bible.

3. THE RELATION BETWEEN SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.—It may safely be characterized as the prevailing view in this period that the full substance of Christian doctrine is contained in the Scriptures, and that in this respect no supplement is to be looked for, whether in tradition or else-

where. Leading writers affirm the dogmatic sufficiency of the sacred books. "The holy and inspired writings," says Athanasius, "are entirely adequate for the announcement of the truth." (*Contra Gentes*, § 1.) Cyril of Jerusalem teaches that in the mysteries of the faith no one is authorized to bring forward anything whatever which cannot claim the support of the Scriptures. (*Catech.*, IV. 17.) "Among the things," says Augustine, "that are plainly laid down in Scripture, are to be found all matters that concern faith and the manner of life, — hope, to wit, and love." (*De Doct. Christ.*, II. 9.) Having expressed his unqualified submission to the canonical Scriptures, he adds: "As to all other writings, in reading them, however great the superiority of the authors to myself in sanctity and learning, I do not accept their teaching as true on the mere ground of the opinion being held by them; but only because they have succeeded in convincing my judgment of its truth, either by means of these canonical writings themselves, or by arguments addressed to my reason." (*Epist.*, LXXXII.) Vincentius speaks of the completed canon of Scripture as sufficing and more than sufficing. (*Commonitorium.*)

Only minor exceptions appear to the standpoint illustrated by the preceding paragraph. The statement of Augustine, "I should not believe the Gospel except as moved by the authority of the Church" (*Contra Epist. Manich.*, V.), cannot properly be quoted against a belief in the dogmatic sufficiency of the Scriptures. The reference here, as the context implies, is not to the specific contents of the Gospel, but to the fact that it was the testimony of the Church which in the first instance led him to receive the Gospel as a genuine and divine revelation. The exceptions to the view that the Scriptures are the complete treasury of Christian doctrine are found in particular with Basil and Gregory Nazianzen. Basil points to various customs, such as signing of candidates with the cross, turning to the

east in prayer, use of a particular form of invocation in the eucharist, blessing the baptismal water and the anointing oil, threefold immersion in baptism, renouncing of the devil and his angels in baptism, as resting upon apostolic tradition rather than upon the written Word; and by reference to these he attempts to justify the customary formula for paying homage to the Holy Spirit. (De Spiritu, §§ 64–68.) His general statement suggests the idea that some doctrinal points might be contained in tradition that are not embraced in the Scriptures. At the same time, it is to be observed that Basil, as a matter of fact, bases upon the sole authority of tradition only ceremonial and ritualistic points. For the dogma of the Spirit's divinity, as well as for every other essential article of faith, he finds proofs in the Scriptures. "The Old Testament," says Gregory Nazianzen, "clearly proclaimed the Father, the Son more obscurely. The New made the Son manifest, and hinted (ὡπεδείξε) the divinity of the Spirit. Now the Spirit associates with us and gives a clearer manifestation of Himself." (Orat., XXXI. 26.) This language evidently assumes an advance beyond the disclosures of the Scriptures. However, the advance is not to a dogma altogether new, but to a fuller revelation of one already contained in the sacred record.

In the theory of the Church at large, tradition was regarded as supplementing the Scriptures in the way of an authoritative exposition of their contents. Inasmuch as the Arians and other heretics sought to uphold their views by the quotation of scriptural texts, there was a strong incentive on the part of Catholic Christians to challenge their interpretation by an appeal to tradition. Hence we have the case of men who, while they acknowledged the dogmatic sufficiency of the Bible, so far as content is concerned, insisted that arbitrary and capricious interpretations must be avoided by reference to tradition.

As it was felt that there might be spurious traditions,

there was occasion to define the marks of the genuine, and of attempts in this direction that of Vincentius is especially noted. Three marks, according to him, distinguish valid tradition; viz. *universitas, antiquitas, consensio*. What the Church in all lands has confessed, and confessed from the first, and confessed with the united voice of the great majority of her fathers, teachers, and priests, has upon it the impress of truth, and may claim apostolic sanction.

Tradition, no doubt, held a wider place, practically, than was allowed to it theoretically. Its extreme convenience in controversy tended to bring it into requisition. It was much easier to say, in justification of a tenet, that it had long been current in the Church, and ought therefore to be regarded as having come down from the apostles, than it was to make a thorough examination of scriptural evidence upon the subject. Conspiring with this convenience of an appeal to tradition was the weight which came to be attached to the decisions of ecumenical councils. As these councils were great bulwarks of the Catholic faith, Catholic Christians were naturally inclined to magnify their importance. The idea was early entertained that they were under the special guidance of the Holy Spirit. The councils themselves claimed as much by customarily prefacing their decrees with the apostolic formula, "*Visum est Spiritui sancto et nobis*," as well as by assertions in specific instances that the voice of a council was the voice of God. The decrees passed by the Nicene fathers were pronounced by the council of Chalcedon to be in every way unalterable, "for it was not they who spoke, but the Spirit Himself of God and the Father." Said Gregory the Great: "I confess that I receive and venerate the four councils [those of Nicæa, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon] as I do the four books of the Holy Gospel." To the same effect is the language of Justinian: "The doctrines of the four councils we receive as we do the Holy Scriptures, and observe their rules as the laws." (Justinian, Novella

CXXXI.) Thus emphatically was recognized an extra-Biblical authority. Now this naturally added to the importance and authority of tradition in the eyes of the Church. It accustomed men to look elsewhere than to the Bible for a doctrinal standard. Moreover, in proportion as there was an unwillingness to regard the decrees of councils as innovations, and it was troublesome to make out for them a scriptural basis, there was a tendency to look upon them as definite expressions of traditions which had been in the Church from the beginning. So the councils became tributary to the growing stream of tradition and traditionary authority.

Some concession was made to the idea of a secret tradition. Basil, for instance, speaks of certain phases of the Church ceremonial, resting upon tradition, as having a meaning concealed from the masses, and designed to be concealed, at least for an interval. With the pseudo Dionysius, we find the distinct assertion of a twofold tradition. "It is to be observed," he says, "that the tradition of theologians is twofold, the one secret and mystical, the other open and more manifest, — that symbolical and pertaining to mysteries, this philosophical and affording demonstration." (Epist., IX.) Again he remarks: "It is unlawful to give a written interpretation of the consecratory invocations, and to make public their hidden sense, and the virtues which God works in them." (De Eccl. Hierarch., VII. 10.)

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I.—EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.—A Christianity which had triumphed over heathen polytheism was less under pressure to establish the doctrine that there is one true God, than a Christianity still struggling for existence and slanderously charged with impiety and atheism. Moreover, the great controversies upon other themes by which the Church was agitated tended to throw this theme into the background. We might expect, therefore, to find in the age of polemics relatively less interest in proofs of the divine existence, than was apparent in the age of apology.

Still the subject was not left without examination. Sufficient reference appears to evidences based upon external nature, and upon the internal and spontaneous testimony of the soul, to show that the current arguments of the preceding period were still in the minds of theologians. (See Athanasius, *Contra Gentes*; Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.*, XXVIII.; Augustine, *Confess.*, X. 6.) Moreover, we find a new class of arguments, something more in the line of the metaphysical than anything which the preceding centuries brought forward. Three writers in particular aspired to this order of proofs; viz. Diodorus of Tarsus, Augustine, and Boëthius.

Diodorus argues on this wise. Change implies a beginning; that which is unstable and can come to an end must

lack the characteristic of eternity, must have had an origin. All things in the world are observed to have had a beginning, or to be liable to the change which implies a beginning. It will not do to predicate simply an endless line of changes. For change, as being equivalent to that which is effected, demands, as an antecedent, an effector or cause. The unchangeable, the first cause, must be back of the series. And the amazing wisdom exhibited in the manner in which changes are interwoven indicates that the unchangeable first cause is a supreme personal intelligence. (In Photii Bibl., Codex CCXXIII. Compare Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, VIII. 6.)

Augustine points out to Evodius, his partner in the dialogue, that there are three things in man, — existence, life, and intelligence, or the mind as the seat of reason and wisdom. He brings him to confess that the last is the highest, the first being shared with inanimate nature, and the second with the brutes. He also induces him to confess, that, if anything higher than this can be found, it is to be called God, or rather that the highest entity above the human reason is to be so named. Then he endeavors to show that there is something higher than the reason or wisdom of the individual. As there are true and unchanging laws of numbers, so, he argues, there are true and unchanging laws of wisdom. It is not something determined by the individual, so that there are as many wisdoms as there are wise men. All the wise share in the same wisdom in proportion as they are wise. Wisdom or truth, accordingly, transcends the individual, has an absolute and universal character. Having reached this conclusion, Augustine reverts to the preceding confession of Evodius, and adds: "If, indeed, there is anything more excellent, that is God; but if there is not, truth itself is God." (*De Lib. Arbit.*, II. 3-15.) In brief, Augustine reasons from specific intelligence or truth to the universal, to God as the living and absolute truth.

Boëthius argues that the apprehension of the imperfect necessitates reference to the perfect, inasmuch as the imperfect can only be defined as that which comes short of the perfect. God, whom the common conception of men shows to be the chief good, is the embodiment of this perfection which we are compelled to recognize. (De Consol. Phil., III. 10.)

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. — The anthropomorphic conception of God, represented in particular by Tertullian in the first period, had its radical votaries in this age. They constituted, however, but a small minority, being made up chiefly of the Audians, who appeared in Syria in the fourth century, and of a faction of the Egyptian monks. By these parties a body was ascribed to God.

Theologians generally were strongly inclined to emphasize the transcendence of God, to affirm the impossibility of any adequate knowledge or definition of His essence. The later Arian chiefs, Aëtius and Eunomius, were exceptions. Eunomius is even credited with saying that "God Himself is not better acquainted with His essence than are we." (Socrates, Hist. Eccl., IV. 7.) This conclusion followed, of course, from peculiar premises respecting the divine essence. Eunomius, more distinguished for polemical subtlety than for philosophical depth, located the essence of God in His being *unbegotten*; and as unbegotten is an understandable notion, he inferred that the essence of God may be fully known.

A view so radical as that of Eunomius very likely incited Catholic theologians to a more positive and repeated expression of their theory of the divine transcendence than they would have indulged otherwise. But a theory of this nature was not due to a mere reaction. It was part of the general system of thought within the circle of Catholic theology. It appears in works of Athanasius, written with no apparent reference to the Eunomian or any equivalent view. We find him intimating that we cannot tell what God is,

but only what He is not (Epist. ad Monachos, § 2), and describing Him as *ὑπερέκεινα πάσης οὐσίας*, beyond all essence. (Orat. contra Gentes, § 2.) Basil, in conscious opposition to Eunomius, gives a more full and positive expression to the same order of ideas. God is represented by him as being above the category of quality. No name has ever been discovered by which His essence may be expressed. Our knowledge of God is rather a knowledge of His relations to the world than a knowledge of His essence. (Adv. Eunom., I. 14; Epist., VIII., XVI., CLXXXIX., CCXXXIV.) Gregory Nazianzen, in commenting on the Platonic maxim, that it is difficult to come to a knowledge of God, and impossible to declare Him, remarks: "In my view, to declare Him is indeed impossible, but to come to a knowledge of Him is still more impossible." (Orat., XXVIII. 4.) He says also that divinity is nameless, and adds: "As no one has ever inhaled the whole atmosphere, so has no mind ever fully comprehended, or any form of expression compassed the nature of God." (Orat., XXX. 17.) This last statement might be taken as an intimation that Gregory, notwithstanding his radical comment on the Platonic maxim, admitted the possibility of some partial apprehension of the real nature or essence of God, and not merely of His relations to the world. And the next paragraph in the same oration looks quite as definitely in the same direction. "So far," says he, "as we can discern, *ὁ ὢν* and *ὁ θεός* are somehow more than other terms the names of the [divine] essence, and of these *ὁ ὢν* is the preferable." In thus making this term, which he considers descriptive of absolute being, a measurably fitting term to describe the essential nature of God, Gregory evidently assumes a certain knowledge of that nature. As already noted, the pseudo Dionysius carried to great lengths the idea of God's transcendence. Maximus also used very strong language in his references to the subject. (Epist. VI., ad Archiepisc. Joan.)

In the Latin Church we find Hilary teaching that the human faculties are fitted to take in a certain knowledge of God; but one must be content to observe the appointed limits, since any attempt to transcend them can only result in the loss of the knowledge already possessed, just as excess of light brings blindness to the eyes. (De Trin., X. 53.) Augustine, who may be regarded as representing, among the Latin writers of the period, the maximum of stress upon the divine transcendence, teaches that God is above comprehension, so that anything which one may be pleased to regard as God is not God if it is once comprehended. (Serm., LII., CXVII.) He argues that God is above the category of substance, since substance, as being that in which something inheres, is contradictory to the ineffable simplicity of the divine nature. God is, therefore, to be called essence rather than substance. (De Trin., VII. 5.) The category of quality is also brought into question. God is to be regarded "as good without quality, great without quantity." (De Trin., V. 1.) What are called qualities or attributes of God may conveniently represent Him to human infirmity, but who is assured that they properly describe Him as to His essential nature? The term *just*, for example, may be so far surpassed by divine excellence, that it will scarcely appear a more appropriate designation of God than the manifestly inappropriate expression which describes Him as repenting. (Serm., CCCXLI.) To this may be added Augustine's declaration, that creatures, though they may be called beautiful and good, in comparison with God are neither beautiful nor good, nor even existent. (Confess., XI. 4.) Compare the statement of Gregory the Great: "*Omnia enim humana, quæ justa, quæ pulchra sunt, Dei justitiæ et pulchritudini comparata, nec justa nec pulchra sunt, nec omnino sunt.*" (Moral., XXXV. 2.) Some of these representations look like a foreclosure of all attempt at a real definition of the divine nature. It is to be observed, however, that Augus-

tine, in admitting the propriety of the term essence (*essentia*) stops short of the point of complete negation. As the context indicates, the *essentia* of Augustine is closely akin to the *ὁ ὢν* of Gregory Nazianzen.

It is hardly necessary to add, that the more radical assertions concerning the transcendence of God were not consistently followed out by those who uttered them. Take, for example, Basil's theory that all the terms applied to God describe His relation to the world rather than His essence; how much ground would it leave to infer from the Scriptures that the Son is of the same essence as the Father? The Scriptures treat of God almost exclusively in His relations to the world, and if these relations are not truly indicative of the divine essence, of course they are not truly indicative of sameness of essence in the Divine Persons. Yet neither Basil, nor others indulging a similar order of representations, had any idea of cutting short the scriptural proof of the doctrine of identity of essence. The facts illustrate what has already been noticed in connection with the writers of the first period; namely, the struggle between opposing tendencies; between a tendency to exalt God by predicating the unfathomable mystery of His nature, and a tendency to trust in Christianity as a genuine revelation of God.

The emphasis upon the transcendence of God may be imputed in some degree to the practical demands of the trinitarian theory, which no doubt required a background of mystery in the divine nature; but it was due more largely to the religious philosophy which had been dominant in the Church since the middle of the second century.

Among the standard conceptions of the divine attributes was the notion that they must not be regarded as in any way compromising the absolute simplicity of the divine nature. This was a point strongly insisted upon by Augustine. God, as he teaches, is incomparably more simple than the human mind. Whatever pertains to God, His

relations excepted, is of His substance. Attributes and substance in Him are identical. "In the human mind, to be is not the same as to be strong, or prudent, or just, or temperate; for a mind can exist, and yet have none of these virtues. But in God, to be is the same as to be strong, or to be just, or to be wise, or whatever is said of that simple multiplicity or multifold simplicity, whereby to signify His substance." (De Trin., VI. 4.) "If we say eternal, immortal, incorruptible, righteous, good, blessed, spirit, only the last of this list, as it were, seems to signify substance, but the rest to signify qualities of that substance; but it is not so in that ineffable and simple nature. For whatever seems to be predicated therein according to quality, is to be understood according to substance or essence. For far be it from us to predicate spirit of God according to substance, and good according to quality, but both according to substance." (De Trin., XV. 5. Compare De Civ. Dei, XI. 10; Tract. in Evang. Joan., XX. 4.) From the identity of the attributes with the essence follows their identity with each other. "God is truly called in manifold ways, great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatsoever other thing seems to be said of Him not unworthily; but His greatness is the same as His wisdom; for He is not great by bulk, but by power; and His goodness is the same as His wisdom and greatness, and His truth the same as all those things; and in Him it is not one thing to be blessed, and another to be great, or wise, or true, or good, or, in a word, to be Himself." (De Trin., VI. 7.)

The impassibility and immutability of God were commonly assumed. Time and space were counted foreign to Him, categories which His nature transcends. Hilary describes Him as *extra locum* and *ante ævum*. (De Trin., II. 6.) Augustine represents that God does not fill space like an extended body, but is always wholly everywhere. (De Civ. Dei, XVI. 5.) And the same terms are employed by Gregory the Great. (Moral., XVI. 31.) As being above

time relations, God dwells in an eternal now. "In æternitate omnia stant," says Augustine. (Serm., CXVII.) The divine consciousness is free from any experience of succession. "All things simultaneously are at hand in one glance." (De Trin., XV. 7.)

The view of Origen, that the supposition of a power in God to sin is derogatory to His omnipotence, found expression in this period. Thus Gregory Nazianzen remarks: "We say that it is impossible for God to be evil, or to be not at all; for this would argue impotence and imbecility in God rather than power." (Orat., XXX. 11.) Similar expressions are found with Augustine. (De Nat. et Grat., LVII.; De Civ. Dei, V. 10.)

A certain deficiency appeared in the Greek Church as respects the consideration of the moral attributes of God. This naturally revealed itself in the related fields of doctrine. In particular, its influence may be discerned in a lack of care and depth on the subject of human depravity and the work of redemption. On the whole, the Latin Church struck deeper upon these subjects than did the Greek Church.

SECTION II. — THE TRINITY.

1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY.—Previous remarks have indicated that Arianism affiliated especially with the Aristotelian philosophy. The influence of Aristotelianism, however, was more conspicuous in the later representatives than in the founder of the system. No doubt there is something in the spirit of Arius, and in his mode of arguing, which might be counted indicative of the student of Aristotle rather than of Plato. Still there is insufficient ground for predicating any very positive connection with the former. We find Arius deviating from Aristotelian definiteness in assuming the unfathomable mystery of the supreme God, and on this very score subjected to criticism

by the Aristotelian Arians. The Arian historian, Philostorgius, though he extols Arius to the skies, yet asserts that he is "involved in the most absurd errors, because he everywhere affirms that God cannot be known, or comprehended, or conceived by the human mind; and not only by men, but also not even by His own only-begotten Son." (Hist. Eccl., II. 3, as quoted by Photius.) So far as the originator of Arianism is concerned, the teachings of Philo may be regarded as holding a prominent place among its philosophical antecedents. As Hefele remarks: "Like Philo, he exaggerated the distinction between God and the world. Like Philo, he admitted an intermediate being, who, being less than God, was the divine organ of the creation of the world." (Conciliengeschichte.) These were fundamental conceptions with Arius, and justify a certain association of his system with that of Philo, though in other respects noteworthy differences between the two might be specified.

In the theological sphere antecedents to the Arian controversy were supplied by the different stages through which the doctrine of the Son had passed. The Church in the second century had relatively a strong interest in establishing the Son's divinity and unity in essence with the Father. In the third century the long struggle with Sabellianism gave an occasion for a strong emphasis upon the distinct personality of the Son. The fourth century had the difficult task of reconciling the two conceptions. In the main, the Church at the opening of this century was true to the central currents of thought in the preceding centuries, and desired to retain as essential dogmas both the unity of essence and the distinct personality. But some were impatient with the troublesome task of reconciliation, and, yielding themselves without reserve to the reaction against Sabellianism, were ready to sacrifice unity of essence in order to make the personality more distinct. As already indicated, the latter interest had inclined some theologians of the third century to favor a certain subordination of the

Son. In Arianism this tendency passed on to a radical extreme.

A third class of antecedents ought not to be overlooked. It is not without significance that the Arian controversy came in a transition era, an era which marked the transference of the great mass of the heathen population of the Empire to the Christian Church. That this influx gave somewhat of a bias to polytheism is clearly evinced by the history of saint-worship. Such a bias was favorable to the doctrine of a gradation of gods, and so paved the way for Arianism. That so many of the barbarian tribes embraced Arianism before accepting the Catholic faith may also be taken as an indication that polytheistic antecedents were favorable to the spread of Arian doctrines, though this line of facts may be accounted for, in part, by reference to the missionary efforts of the age.

2. RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE PARTIES IN THE CONTROVERSY. — From about the year 320 (when Arius, who was then a presbyter in the Church of Alexandria, gave prominence to his peculiar views) to the council of Constantinople, in 381, the Arian controversy raged without any real cessation. During this period a great variety of outward fortunes befell the different parties. In the first section of the interval the Catholic party was in the ascendant; then the Semi-Arians, together with the secret Arians, who, for the time being, trained under their banner, held the field; then the Arians began to usurp a leading place; then, finally, the Catholic party came to the front, and was crowned with a full victory.

These varying fortunes were due in no inconsiderable degree to external causes, such as the interference of the imperial court and sceptre. Eliminating such factors, we may define the relative strength of parties as follows. In the Latin Church, the Catholic or Nicene faith was dominant from the beginning to the end of the controversy. Seeming alienation from this, so far as it is on record for this

quarter, had little basis of conviction, and was, in the main, the result of outward pressure. In the Greek Church there was more of a division. The strict Arians were ever the smaller faction. According to Sozomen, they numbered seventeen in the council of Nicæa, at the commencement of its sessions; but of these only two persistently refused to sign the creed of that council. The measure of outward success which they secured was due largely to their skilful alliance with the Semi-Arians, and their manipulation of court influence. The latter factor availed them especially under the administration of Valens. The Semi-Arians were at one time a considerable fraction of the Greek Church. They numbered many influential adherents, though the majority of the more able and earnest minds were in the Catholic party.

It should be noticed, however, that the term "Semi-Arian" has a considerable latitude of meaning. The main body of the party approximated to Origen's theory of the Son. They denied that He was created out of nothing. They applied to Him divine predicates, such as eternity and immutability. At the same time they viewed him as subordinate to the Father, and in place of the Catholic term *ὁμοούσιος* they put the term *ὁμοιούσιος*, thus characterizing the Son as of like essence with the Father rather than of the same essence. In a number of synods, (as that of Antioch in 341, Philippopolis in 343, Antioch in 344, Sirmium in 351, Ancyra in 358,) the Semi-Arians condemned the distinctive tenets of Arianism. Some of them, no doubt, were quite as much in sympathy with Arianism as with the Catholic faith; but the more conservative wing was separated less widely in theory from the latter than from the former. Indeed, some who are ranked as Semi-Arians on account of their rejection of the Catholic shibboleth were moved to this rejection by little else than fear of Sabellianism. They could claim, also, a seeming excuse for their scruples, in the fact that Marcellus, who, in the early part

of the controversy, was a prominent representative of the Catholic party, gravitated into a doctrine which at least was in close affiliation with the Sabellian. Photinus, a disciple of Marcellus, developed views very similar to those entertained by Paul of Samosata.

3. THE ARIAN DOCTRINE OF THE SON. — The Son, according to Arius, is a middle being between God and the world. He was the instrument of God in fashioning the world, — a needed instrument, since the world is unworthy of direct contact with the Supreme Being, and unable to bear Him. Neither true humanity nor true divinity pertains to the Son. He is without the human soul, and without the essence and attributes of God. No essential predicate of deity can be affirmed of Him. He was created from nothing, and is simply the most exalted of creatures.

It is true that Arius at one time spoke of the immutability of the Son, as appears from his letter to Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria, by whom he was brought under censure. But in his later statements this predicate was surrendered, and nothing in the Son superior to creaturehood with its characteristic mutability was acknowledged. In the principal dogmatic work of Arius, the *Thaleia*, we find such sentences as these: "Not always has God been Father, but there was a time [or moment] when He was alone, and was not yet Father; later He became Father. Not always was the Son existent; for since all things arose from nothing, the Logos of God also was created from nothing, and there was a time when He was not. God was alone, and not yet was the Logos and Wisdom. But when He willed to create us, then He made a being whom He called Logos, and Wisdom, and Son, in order to create us through Him. There are two Wisdoms, one properly so called and existing with God, and in this Wisdom the Son was made, and only as sharing in this is He called Wisdom and Logos. In nature, like all creatures, the Logos is mutable, and in the free use of His own power, so far as

He pleases, remains good. Since God foreknew that He would be good, He gave to Him by anticipation this glory, which man, from the exercise of virtue, subsequently obtains. The Logos is not truly God. As all things are foreign and unlike to the essence of God, so also is the Logos altogether alien and unlike to the essence and property of the Father. The Father is invisible to the Son, and the Logos is able neither to see nor to know the Father fully and accurately. For of a truth not only does the Son fail to know the Father accurately, but also the Son does not know His own nature." (Athanasius, *Orat. contra Arianos*, I. 5-9.)

Arianism was able to affirm quite a wide interval between the Son and other creatures, inasmuch as it assumed that He was the immediate production of the Supreme Being, while other creatures were made through Him as the instrument of that Being. It could also refer to the constant use of His free will in righteous conduct, as distinguishing Him at least from the great mass of moral agents. Still, it was only a "fantastical under-God" (to use Dorner's phrase) that Arianism made out of the Son; and, on the whole, His distance below essential deity was made more prominent than His superiority to humanity. The more radical Arians, so far from allowing that the Son is of the same essence as the Father, were forward to proclaim that He is of dissimilar essence.

In the field of rational evidence Arianism showed more sharpness in attacking its opponent than ability in constructing its own system. Some of its efforts here may be regarded as a counterpart of its artful attempts to manipulate court influence. "The dialectic arguments of the Arians," says Baur, "were often only small subtleties, drawn from single propositions, and calculated to throw opponents into a momentary perplexity." (*Lehre von der Dreieinigkeith*.) Judging from the references of different writers, Arianism made much out of the following dilemma

which it constructed for the Catholic party: The Son was generated either with or without will, on the part of the Father. If the former alternative is accepted, then the eternity of the Son is sacrificed, since an act of the Father's will is made anterior to His existence; if the latter is accepted, then despite is done to the dignity of the divine nature, since God is set forth as the victim of compulsion. Another chosen device of the Arian dialectics was an unmeasured emphasis upon the contrast between the terms "ungenerated" and "generated," or "unbegotten" and "begotten." Eunomius in particular magnified the import of this contrast. He maintained that these terms are fundamental to the conception of Father and Son; that indeed they stand for their very essence. It follows, therefore, that the natures of the two are as wide apart as the import of the terms. An impassable chasm stands between the unbegotten and the begotten. They are mutually exclusive. The nature of the former can in no wise be communicated to the latter.

In the field of Scripture, the Arians dwelt upon such texts as seem to make the Son inferior to the Father, less in knowledge and power, dependent for the prerogatives of His kingdom, and for all things pertaining to His being and glory. In their exegesis of Prov. viii. 22, they enjoyed the benefit of the Septuagint version, which reads, "God created me," instead of the allowable rendering of the Hebrew, "God possessed me." Other favorite passages were Matt. xxviii. 18; Mark xiii. 32; Luke xviii. 19; John xiv. 28, v. 19; 1 Cor. xv. 28.

4. THE NICENE DOCTRINE OF THE SON.—The essentials of the Catholic doctrine of the Son were laid down at the council of Nicæa in 325, soon after the beginning of the Arian controversy. The vindication of the Nicene creed appears, therefore, as the main task of the Catholic party throughout the controversy. In view of this fact, the teaching of the Fathers generally, who championed the Catholic

cause till its final victory at Constantinople in 381, may not inaptly be called the Nicene doctrine of the Son, or the doctrine of the Nicene fathers. The creed adopted at Nicæa is as follows: "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, begotten of the Father, the only-begotten, that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, and Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance (*ὁμοούσιον*) with the Father; by whom all things were made, in heaven and earth; who, for us men, and for our salvation, came down and was incarnate, and was made man; He suffered, and the third day He rose again, ascended into heaven; from thence He cometh to judge the quick and the dead. And [we believe] in the Holy Ghost. And those who say, there was a time when He [the Son] was not; and, He was not before He was made; and, He was made out of nothing, or out of another substance or thing, or the Son of God is created, or changeable, or alterable, — such the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church condemns."

A creed like this, designed to command universal assent, would, of course, be likely to be quite as moderate in its dogmatic statements as the theory of the dominant party. The conditions assure us, as also a review of authors will abundantly prove, that the Nicene creed did not exalt the Son more than did the beliefs of the Catholic party at large.

In their exposition of the generation of the Son, the Nicene fathers made an advance on the teaching characteristic of at least a portion of the fathers of the preceding centuries. This appears in a twofold respect. In the first place, they were very clear and positive in the declaration that the generation is to be regarded as eternal, something to be associated with the Godhead as such, so that we cannot properly conceive of the first Person in the Trinity apart from the category of fatherhood. This point, touched

upon in the creed above, was often asserted by Catholic writers. Athanasius, for example, describes the generation of the Son as taking place *ἀνάρχως καὶ αἰδίως*, without beginning and from eternity. (Expos. Fid., § 1.) The Son, he says, is eternal, as the wisdom of God is eternal. As effulgence is always at hand where there is light, so the being of the Son is parallel with that of the Father. (Orat. contra Arianos, I. 9, 25, II. 32. Compare Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV. 7, XI. 13; Basil, Adv. Eunom., II. 16; Hilary, De Trin., III. 3, XII. 21.) In the second place, the Nicene fathers regarded the generation as proceeding, not from an act of will, but from a necessity of nature. They were cautious, it is true, about admitting the word "necessity." Thus Ambrose represents that the generation is by nature, rather than by will or by necessity; but he had in mind necessity in the obnoxious sense, as implying compulsion, rather than that inner necessity which is absolutely acceptable to the will, if not under its control. His language is as follows: "Sicut bonus pater non aut ex voluntate est, aut necessitate, sed super utrumque, hoc est natura; ita non generat ex voluntate aut necessitate Pater." (De Fide, IV. 9.) Ambrose here was following in the wake of Athanasius, who indulged about the same representation, rebutting the Arian charge that the Nicene theory imposed necessity upon God, and asserting that the generation is by nature (*φύσει*) rather than by will. (Orat., III. 62-66.)

Like Origen, the Nicene fathers seem to have conceived of the generation, not as something accomplished once for all, but as something parallel with the eternal life of the Son, ever complete and ever continued. Its precise nature they did not pretend to unfold. On the contrary, they repeatedly taught that it is an unfathomable mystery, that there is no image adequate to its explanation, that it is a gross perversion to attach to it any corporeal or earthly sense. (Athanasius, Expos. Fid., § 1; De Decret. Synod.,

§ 11; Orat., II. 36; Basil, Adv. Eunom., II. 17; Gregory Naz., Orat., XX. 11; Eusebius, Dem. Evang., V. 1; Ambrose, De Fide, I. 10.)

The most important item in the Nicene creed, in the view of its defenders, was the phrase describing the Son as *homousion*, or consubstantial with the Father. If the term was not regarded as absolutely essential in an orthodox system, the idea attached to it was so regarded. Men like Athanasius conceived that Christianity must surrender its claims to be the perfect religion, unless its Redeemer, the Son of God, was allowed to be of the same essence as the Father. In teaching sameness of essence, on the part of the Divine Persons, the Catholic writers, as their language again and again indicates, meant to teach their substantial equality. "Eternal and one," says Athanasius, "is the divinity in the Trinity, and one the glory of the holy Trinity." (Orat., I. 18.) Again he speaks of the Son as "by nature equal to the Father, and consubstantial with Him, because He is begotten of the essence of the Father." (De Incarn. et contra Arianos, § 4.) Cyril of Jerusalem testifies that nothing pertaining to the honor of divinity is wanting to the Son; that Father and Son have one and the same glory. (Catech., IV. 7, VI. 1.) "In Christ," says Hilary, "is the fulness of divinity." (De Trin., I. 13.) He represents Him also as the perfect from the perfect, true, infinite, and perfect God, equal in power and honor to the Father. (De Trin., II. 8-11, III. 17, X. 50.) Ambrose speaks of the Son as "*Deus ex Deo*," "*Princeps ex Principi*," "*æqualis ex æquali*," "*Deus omnipotens et perfectus*," less than the Father only as respects the servant form. (Enarrat. in Psal., XXXV.; De Fide, I. 2, II. 8.) To statements of this kind may be added what a later paragraph will reveal, namely, that in their interpretation of Scripture the Nicene fathers sought to avoid every meaning adverse to any divine predicate in the Son. They disallowed, for example, any limitation of the Son's knowledge, — uniformly insisted

on interpreting Scripture in harmony with His complete omniscience.

In fine, according to the drift of Nicene trinitarianism, the only subordination to be affirmed of the Son is that pertaining to personal relations. He is less than the Father simply as being generated, simply as holding the place of Son. Fatherhood and sonship are the ground of the distinction between the two Divine Persons. They are distinguished as subsisting by different modes. This distinction, however, is not one which reaches to the divine essence. As father and son in the earthly sphere, though standing in different relations to each other, as Adam and Abel, though coming into being by different modes, are not to be accounted of diverse essence, so neither are the Divine Father and Son to be regarded as different in essence. (Athanasius, *Orat.*, II. 35; Basil, *Adv. Eunom.*, I. 25, II. 4, 5, IV. 1; Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, XXIX. 16; Gregory of Nyssa, *De Fide*; Ambrose, *De Fide*, IV. 8.)

The answers rendered to the chief metaphysical objections of the Arians have already been intimated by the preceding paragraphs. The dilemma designed to show that the Nicene theory compromised either the eternity of the Son or the freedom and dignity of the Father, was met with a counter dilemma. Athanasius, for example, asked the Arians whether God was good with will, and told them that, on their own principles, if they should answer in the affirmative, they must confess that there was a time when God was not good; if, on the other hand, they should answer in the negative, they must allow that God was good by necessity and against His will. As respects both the divine goodness and generation, the true statement, in his view, was that they are by nature, not by will, yet in no wise against will. (*Orat.* III. 59-66.) The Arian objection, based on the assumption that the terms "unbegotten" and "begotten" are significant of the very essence of Father and Son, and therefore significant of natures widely con-

trusted, was met with a denial of the assumption, and with the affirmation, as appears in the paragraph immediately preceding, that unbegotten and begotten are expressive of relations or personal peculiarities, and not of essence. Indeed, the Nicene fathers made bold to assert that the two terms indicate community of essence rather than the contrary; that, according to all analogy, the begotten ought to be of the same substance as the begetter.

The Catholic writers did not confine themselves to the defensive, but brought, among others, the following charges to bear against the Arian theory: — 1. Affiliation with heathen polytheism, inasmuch as it paid homage to a Saviour who was understood to be a creature. (Athanasius, *Epist. ad Episcopos*, §§ 4, 13; *Orat.*, III. 16; Ambrose, *De Fide*, I. 13.) 2. Making the Son of God of secondary importance to the world of creatures, since He appears to have been created for their sake rather than the contrary. (Athanasius, *Orat.*, II. 30, IV. 11.) 3. An illogical theory of mediation. According to Arius, says Athanasius, the work of creation demanded a medium, inasmuch as the creature could not sustain the immediate presence and action of God. But if the Son is only a creature, then He needs a medium between Him and God, and this medium, as being also a creature (for the Supreme God alone is not made), will need another medium, and so on. Indeed, creation appears as an impossibility on the Arian conception of God and of the creature. It is an incongruity, moreover, to attach power to create out of nothing to a being who is Himself created out of nothing. (*De Decret. Synod.*, § 8; *Orat.*, II., 26, 27.) 4. Offering to men only an imperfect Saviour, since the Son, if He does not possess true divinity, is not fitted to unite man to God, and cannot command absolute confidence. (Athanasius, *Orat.*, II. 70; Ambrose, *De Fide*, II. 13.) 5. Leaving the world without a true and adequate revelation of God, since the Son, if He is not of the same substance as the Father, and does not know Him

truly and perfectly, cannot truly and perfectly reveal Him. (Basil, Adv. Eunom., II. 32.)

In their treatment of the scriptural evidence, the Nicene fathers endeavored to offset the Arian proof-texts by such as the following, which ascribe divine titles, attributes, activities, or honors to the Son: Matt. i. 23, xxviii. 20; John i. 1, ii. 24, 25, vi. 64, xvi. 15, xx. 28; Rom. ix. 5; Col. i. 15-17; Titus i. 3, ii. 13; Heb. i. 2, 6, 8, 10-12, xiii. 8; 1 John v. 20; Rev. i. 8, v. 12, 13. At the same time, moreover, they sought to escape the Arian sense in the texts of their opponents by applying them to the human aspect of Christ, to His servant form in this world, or to His mediatorial office. Referring to Prov. viii. 22, and related passages, Athanasius says: "There is plainly a reasonable ground and cause why such representations as these are given of Him in the Scriptures; and it is because He became man, and the Son of Man, and took upon Him the form of a servant, which is the human flesh. And since He became man, no one ought to be offended with such expressions; for it is proper to man to be created, and born, and formed to suffer toil and pain, to die, and to rise again from the dead." (Epist. ad Episcopos, § 10.) Other writers generally gave the same interpretation of the text in Proverbs, though we find Eusebius noting the fact that the original Hebrew implies the idea of possession rather than that of creation. (De Eccl. Theol., III. 2.) Similarly, Matt. xxviii. 18 was applied to Christ in His human character, it being argued that the pre-existent Son was already lord and possessor of all things in virtue of being their Creator. (Athanasius, In Illud, Omnia Mihi Trad., etc.; Orat., IV. 6. Compare Augustine, De Trin., I. 12, 13.) The same office of the Son was also regarded as a guaranty that Mark xiii. 32 is not to be taken in an absolute sense; for, how, it was asked, could He who created all things and gave them their adjustment, be ignorant of a part of His own work, not know how He had Himself or-

dered the times? "Per eum," says Hilary, "enim tempora, et in eo dies est; quia et per ipsum futurorum constitutio est, et in ipso adventus sui dispensatio est." (De Trin., IX. 59.) Nothing argues Athanasius, could be more foolish than the idea that the Son, who knows the Father, and who Himself gave origin to the times and seasons, and to all things, should not also know their end, be able to declare the time of the great consummation. (Orat. III. 42, 43.) It was concluded, therefore, that this sentence was spoken dispensationally. As Athanasius puts it, Christ, humbly associating Himself with men, declared His ignorance, as a man, of the judgment day; as Hilary and some others put it, Christ's declaration of ignorance imported simply that it was no part of His earthly office to make known the day, and that He was not to be inquired of upon that point. (De Trin., IX. 66-73. Compare Basil, Adv. Eunom., IV.; Chrysostom, Hom. in Matt., LXXVIII.; Augustine, Serm., XCVII.; De Trin., I. 12.) Luke xviii. 19 was explained as in no wise showing that Christ is not possessed of absolute goodness, the design of Christ being, not to decline the epithet, but to rebuke the superficial spirit of the young man, or to test his faith. (Hilary, De Trin., IX. 16; Expos. Evang. secund. Luc., VIII. 68. Compare Augustine, De Trin., I. 13.) John xiv. 28 was regarded as indicating either the secondary position of the Son in the line of personal relations, the fact that He is generated by the Father (Athanasius, Orat., I. 58), or the inferiority which pertained to Him, as having emptied Himself and taken the servant form, wherein He might be said to be less, not only than the Father, but also than Himself. (Ambrose, De Fide, II. 8. Compare Augustine, Tractat. in Evang. Joan., LXXVIII.; Leo the Great, Serm., XXV.) The delivering up of the kingdom to the Father, as foreshadowed in 1 Cor. xv. 24-28, was understood to mean neither the acquisition by the Father of a dominion hitherto foreign to Him, nor the loss to the Son of one previously enjoyed.

In like manner, the subjection of the Son was understood to imply neither previous lack of subjection nor subsequent increase of subjection. Christ, it was claimed, presents the kingdom to the Father in presenting to Him the souls made subject by His redeeming work. And Christ is destined to appear in subjection to God the Father, in that He is destined to appear as the head of a body, viz. a redeemed race, brought into full subjection to God. The subjection is not to pertain to the Son viewed by Himself, but as holding a corporate relation to men through the connecting bond of His humanity. (Theodoret, *Interp. Epist. I. ad Cor.*; Athanasius, *De Incarn. et contra Arianos*, § 20; Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, XXX. 5. Compare Augustine, *De Trin.*, I. 8, 10.)

5. THE NICENE DOCTRINE OF THE SPIRIT. — Parties adverse to the divinity of the Son were still more adverse to the divinity of the Spirit. Arianism appeared here at its farthest remove from a Christian consciousness, according personality to the Spirit, but at the same time regarding Him as a creature subordinate to the Son. As represented by Basil, Eunomius taught that neither deity nor power to create is to be ascribed to the Spirit. (*Adv. Eunom.*, III. 5.) Semi-Arianism was inclined to rank the Spirit below the Son in about the same degree that it ranked the Son below the Father, and in some instances to a greater degree. Eusebius of Cæsarea, who, notwithstanding his nominal acceptance of the homoousion creed, had a certain bias to Semi-Arianism, predicated a very emphatic subordination of the Spirit. He describes Him, indeed, as vastly exalted above the creature world at large, and having a place in the unity of the Trinity, but still as inferior to the Son, and among the “all things” created by Him. (*De Eccl. Theol.*, III. 5, 6.) In the later stages of the trinitarian controversy a party of Semi-Arians who came to acknowledge the Son as divine, and in all respects like to the Father, refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Spirit. As Macedonius was a prominent

representative of this party at Constantinople, they frequently were mentioned under the name of Macedonians. According to Gregory Nazianzen (*Orat.*, XXXI. 5), there were some who regarded the Spirit as a mere activity or energy; but the great inferiority of these either in number or in influence, or in both, may be assumed with entire safety. A survey of the different parties conveys the decided impression that in the Nicene era the personality of the Spirit was almost universally accepted.

The Catholic creeds appear very moderate in their references to the nature of the Holy Spirit. The creed of Nicæa simply says, "We believe in the Holy Ghost." That of Constantinople also, though more ample than the foregoing, is less explicit on this subject than on the nature of the Son. The following is its statement: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, who is Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets." These brief and general references may be regarded as largely the result of expediency. It was felt that the doctrine of the Son's divinity was the first in the logical order, and that for the time being its acceptance ought not to be hindered by giving a prominent place in the creeds to the divinity of the Spirit, a doctrine still more unacceptable to heterodox parties.

As regards the convictions of the Catholic party on the subject of the Spirit, there is no proper cause for doubt. The same men who are known as champions of the divinity and consubstantiality of the Son appear also as champions of the divinity and consubstantiality of the Spirit. Athanasius clearly affirms that the Spirit has the divine nature, and the same unity with the Father which belongs to the Son. (*Epistolæ ad Serapion.*) Cyril of Jerusalem speaks of the Spirit as knowing and sharing the nature of God, as above the category of created things, as having a place in the unity of the Trinity, as omnipotent in gifts. (*Catech.*, VI. 6, VIII.

5, XVI. 3, 4, 22.) Basil, in criticising the Eunomian statement that the Spirit is third in order and in nature, rejects the latter clause as decidedly heterodox. (Adv. Eunom., III. 1.) Gregory Nazianzen, whatever he may have said about the obscurity of the Scriptures on the nature of the Spirit, had no hesitation about acknowledging His divinity. Father, Son, and Spirit, he says, are one in respect to divinity, three in respect to peculiarities. (Orat., XXXI. 9.) Didymus and Gregory of Nyssa also defended the doctrine of the Spirit's divinity. The language of the latter in repeated instances implies the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Father. (See, for example, his *De Communibus Notionibus*.) Among the Latin fathers, Hilary indulges very little in the line of definite specifications on the nature of the Spirit. Ambrose, on the other hand, plainly enunciates his belief in the Spirit's divinity and sameness of essence with the Father. (De Spir. Sanct., I. 2, 5, 7, 12, III. 16.)

Among the chief points urged in behalf of the divinity of the Holy Spirit were: (1.) His place in the baptismal formula; (2.) the enormity of sin against Him, as appears from the words of Christ and the story of Ananias and Sapphira; (3.) the scriptural teaching that God dwells in believers by means of the Spirit, whereas there could be no truly divine indwelling if the Spirit were not divine; (4.) participation in functions, such as creation, which are above the range of the creature. (See Athanasius, *Epist. ad Serapion*; Basil, *Adv. Eunom.*, Lib. III.; *De Spiritu*.)

The creed of Constantinople describes the procession of the Spirit as being from the Father. In the Greek Church this became the current phraseology. Epiphanius appears as an exception to the theologians of his region, in allowing a double procession, that is, a procession from Father and Son. (Anchoratus, § 9.) On the other hand, the Latin Church, as the writings of Augustine and others show, was strongly inclined toward the doctrine of a double proces-

sion. Ultimately the different positions assumed upon this point came to be regarded as a principal dogmatic disagreement between East and West. The chief importance of the subject lay in its bearing upon the relative honor of the Persons of the Trinity.

The doctrine of the Spirit's divinity came to a substantial triumph at the council of Constantinople in 381. Thus was completed the Nicene doctrine of the triune God. The reconciliation of the threefold personality with the unity of God was regarded as sufficiently attained by the affirmation of the oneness of the Persons in essence. To this, however, some added the consideration that there is a single principium in the Godhead, the source of the personality of the Son and of the Spirit being the Father. (Athanasius, Orat., IV. 1; Gregory Nazianzen, Orat., XX. 6. Compare Eusebius, De Eccl. Theol., I. 11, II. 6.) Some expressions, especially on the part of Gregory of Nyssa, verge in appearance very closely upon tritheism. This is the case where he attempts to illustrate the unity in essence of the Divine Persons by referring to the fact that three men, as, for example, Peter, James, and John, have a common essence, viz. that of humanity. But on the whole the writings of Gregory indicate that he did not design that this illustration should be taken unqualifiedly. "It is incorrect to say," remarks Dorner, "that Gregory conceives the hypostatic distinctions in the Trinity to be related to each other as are two individual men; for, on the contrary, he rather reduces the entire distinction between Father and Son to this,—that the former is the *αἰτίον*, the latter *αἰτιατόν*, whereas the distinctions between actual men are much deeper."

As respects the terminology of Catholic trinitarianism, it cannot claim the merit of uniformity through the whole era under consideration; by its close, however, it was quite definitely fixed. In the Greek Church the distinctions which we find with Basil and the two Gregories claimed gen-

eral acceptance. *Οὐσία* became the term for the essence, *ὑπόστασις* for the personality, while for the peculiarity, or *ιδιότης*, of each Person a special term was employed, that of the Father being denoted by *ἀγεννησία*, that of the Son by *γέννησις*, that of the Spirit by *ἐκπεμψις*. In the Latin Church, *persona*, though differing in its primary significance from *ὑπόστασις*, was used as its equivalent. The mutual indwelling of the three Divine Persons, the eternal circuit of the divine life, was expressed by the term *περιχώρησις* or *συμπεριχώρησις*.

6. THE AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. — As distinguished from Nicene trinitarianism, the Augustinian shows a greater interest in eliminating all elements of subordination from the conception of Son and Spirit, and also in conserving the unity of God. It may be said that logically both involve the same species of subordination, namely, that which is inseparable from the ideas of generation and procession, a subordination in personal relations. But the subordination herein involved may receive very different degrees of emphasis, as more than one era in doctrinal history shows. Notwithstanding its identity in leading propositions with the doctrines of the preceding age, the Augustinian teaching had its distinctive tone and bias. This appears in the first place in the carefulness of Augustine to associate the three Divine Persons as far as possible in every divine activity. The following may serve as examples of oft-recurring statements: "The same Son was sent by the Father and the Son." (*De Trin.*, II. 5.) "Let it not be supposed that in this Trinity there is any separation in respect of time or place, but that these three are equal and coeternal, and absolutely of one nature; and that the creatures have been made, not some by the Father, and some by the Son, and some by the Holy Spirit, but that each and all that have been or are now being created subsist in the Trinity as their Creator; and that no one is saved by the Father without the Son and the Holy Spirit, or by the Son

without the Father and the Holy Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit without the Father and the Son, but by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the only one, true, and truly immortal God." (Epist. CLXIX. ad Evodium.) "We have already determined that not only the Father, nor only the Son, nor only the Holy Spirit, appeared in those ancient corporeal forms and visions, but either indifferently the Lord God, who is understood to be the Trinity itself, or some one Person of the Trinity, whichever the text of the narrative might signify." (De Trin., III. Præf.) "I would boldly say, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of one and the same substance, God the Creator, the Omnipotent Trinity, work indivisibly; but that this cannot be indivisibly manifested by the creature; just as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot be named by our words, which certainly are bodily sounds, except in their own proper intervals of time, divided by a distinct separation, which intervals the proper syllables of each word occupy. . . . As, when I name my memory and intellect and will, each name refers to each severally, but yet each is uttered by all three; for there is no one of these three names that is not uttered by both my memory and my intellect and my will together; so the Trinity together wrought both the voice of the Father, and the flesh of the Son, and the dove of the Holy Spirit, while each of these things is referred severally to each Person." (De Trin., IV. 21. Compare XV. 11; Epist., XI.; Tract. in Joan., V.; Serm., LII., CXXVI.)

The distinctive character of Augustine's exposition of the Trinity appears also in the illustrations to which he most frequently recurs. An image of the Trinity, as he taught, is to be sought especially in the nature of man. The factors in human nature supplying this image are somewhat differently stated by Augustine in different connections. We find him citing being, knowledge, and love. "We both are," he says, "and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it." (De Civ. Dei, XI. 26-28.)

Again, he specifies being, knowledge, and will (Confess., XIII. 11), an enumeration substantially identical with the preceding, since love and will were regarded by him as in a measure equivalent terms; at least, he asks the question, "What else is love, except will?" (De Trin., XV. 20.) In another instance, he teaches that by pondering the single notion of love we may get a glimpse of the Trinity, for love always implies three things,—itself, him that loves, and that which is loved. "What is love," he asks, "except a certain life which couples or seeks to couple together some two things, namely, him that loves and that which is loved?" (De Trin., VIII. 10.) But perhaps that may be characterized as the cardinal illustration of Augustine which specifies *memoria*, *intellectus*, and *voluntas*, memory, understanding, and will, as supplying an image of the Trinity. (De Trin., X. 11, XIV. 6; Epist., CLXIX.; Serm., LII.) Memory, as the condition of the sense of identity, as making the mind at hand to itself, is a condition of the knowledge of self, and this again is a condition of love for that pertaining to self. (De Trin., XIV. 11.) In this connection of faculties or activities, the relations of the Divine Persons are in a measure shadowed forth. The mind in knowing itself begets a knowledge equal to itself, — an offspring corresponding to the Son; and the love which embraces this offspring, and unites it to the begetter, corresponds to the Spirit. (De Trin., IX. 12. Compare De Trin., V. 11, VI. 5, VII. 3; De Fide et Symbolo, IX.)

Thus Augustine anticipated, in all essential respects, the leading attempt of after times at a philosophical exposition of the Trinity, according to which the Son is the image of the Father, which He objectifies in cognizing Himself, and the Holy Spirit is the bond of fellowship between Father and Son, the issue of their mutual love. It is not to be assumed, however, that Augustine regarded this illustration as entirely adequate. On the contrary, he specifies the following defects: "In the first place, the similarity is found

to be imperfect in this respect, that whereas memory, understanding, and will are not the soul, but only exist in the soul, the Trinity does not exist in God, but is God. In the second place, who would dare to say that the Father does not understand by Himself, but by the Son, as memory does not understand by itself, but by the understanding? or, to speak more correctly, the soul in which these faculties are understands by no other faculty than the understanding, as it remembers only by memory, and exercises volition only by the will?" (Epist., CLXIX.)

In reconciling the doctrine of the Trinity with that of the divine unity, Augustine had recourse to the idea that the divine transcends the category of quantity. To absolute perfection, as he taught, there can be no addition. "In God, when the equal Son, or the Holy Spirit, equal to the Father and Son, is joined to the equal Father, God does not become greater than each of them severally; because that perfectness cannot increase." (De Trin., VI. 8-10.) With this may be compared his statement, that while each Divine Person is Almighty, there are not three Almighties, but one God Almighty. (De Civ. Dei, XI. 24. Compare Dorner's remarks on Origen, Period I. Chap. II. Sect. 2.)

The ideas and the phraseology of Augustine served as the basis of the so-called "Athanasian Creed," which no doubt arose in the Augustinian school. The most prominent characteristic of this creed is the boldness and definiteness with which it asserts the opposite sides of trinitarianism; — on the one hand, the coexistence of three Divine Persons and the possession by each of all divine predicates; on the other, the unity of God.

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

THE continuance in this period of Gnostic and Manichæan notions still gave occasion for asserting the theory that the world was created from nothing. As having had a distinct beginning, the world was regarded as strictly subject to time measures. Origen's theory, that creation must be carried back into eternity in order to do credit to God's immutability, and to answer the inquiry as to what God was doing before creation, was commonly repudiated. To the first consideration, Augustine replied that creation was in the will of God from eternity, and that what appears to us to have been of the nature of change was not such to God, as having been already embraced in His unchanging will. "In God," he says, "the former purpose is not altered and obliterated by the subsequent and different purpose, but by one and the same eternal and unchangeable will He effected regarding the things He created, both that formerly, so long as they were not they should not be, and that subsequently when they began to be, they should come into existence." (De Civ. Dei, XII. 17.) To the second consideration, Augustine opposed the fact that it is as difficult to explain why God put the world *where* He did, as it is to tell why he created it *when* He did; and moreover, that we are not to imagine any interval of time prior to creation, inasmuch as time was called into existence by creation itself. (De Civ. Dei, XI. 5, 6; Confess., Lib. XI.)

"If eternity and time," he remarks, "are rightly distinguished by this, that time does not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had not some creature been made, which, by some motion, could give birth to change? Since then God, in whose eternity is no change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do not see how He can be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be said that, prior to the world, there was some creature by whose movement time could pass."

Meanwhile Augustine himself advanced a notion, which, though having its patrons in different ages, was destined to call forth not a little criticism. We refer to the passage in which he seems to assert a continuous creation, to make the divine activity in upholding the world equivalent to the ceaseless exercise of creative energy. (*De Civ. Dei*, XII. 25.)

Certain sentences in the Mosaic account of creation (*Gen.* i. 1, ii. 4) were understood by some writers to indicate that the essence of all things was created at once, the process divided between the six days having reference only to the shaping or manifestation of individual things. Such is the import of the following sentence of Gregory the Great: "*Rerum quippe substantia simul creata est, sed simul species formata non est, et quod simul exstitit per substantiam materiæ non simul apparuit per speciem formæ.*" (*Moral.*, XXXII. 12. Compare Gregory of Nyssa, *Hexameron*.) Augustine notices that the creation of the heavens is mentioned prior to that of the earth, and seems to favor the supposition that by the former is to be understood an intellectual creation; namely, the angels. He conjectures, also, that the same order of beings may be denoted by the primal light. (*Confess.*, XII. 9, 17; *De Civ. Dei*, XI. 7, 9, 19.)

The age seems to have been inclined to regard the six

days as literal days. We find, nevertheless, with Augustine, a distinct suggestion of a different theory. "What kind of days these were," he writes, "it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible, for us to conceive, and how much more to say!" (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 6.) In several instances he implies that all things were made at once, the succession of days being used in the Mosaic account in accommodation to the succession which must enter into the contemplation of a finite intelligence. (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, Lib. Imperfect., cap. 7; *De Gen. ad Lit.*, Lib. IV. cap. 33.) But he appears not to have adhered uniformly to this conception. (*De Catech. Rud.*, XVII.) Of God's rest on the seventh day he says: "We are not to conceive of this in a childish fashion, as if work were a toil to God, 'who spake and it was done.' But God's rest signifies the rest of those who rest in God, as the joy of a house means the joy of those in a house who rejoice." (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 8, 31.) To this day, as Augustine further remarks, there is no evening; it signifies that day of rest for God's people upon which no nightfall shall ever come. (*Serm.*, IV.)

Physical evils, so far as they were imputed to the agency of the Creator, were regarded as a part of the discipline made necessary by the sinfulness of man. In forming the natural world, God designedly, as Theodoret taught, introduced defects, in order that there might be a safeguard against an idolatrous veneration of nature. (*Græc. Affect. Curat.*, III.)

SECTION II. — ANGELS AND DEMONS.

As respects the nature of angels, the fathers of this period agreed upon leading points very generally with each other, as also with the writers of the preceding centuries. They regarded angels as pure and blessed spirits, exalted above men by superior knowledge, and favored with exemption

from gross earthly bodies. Whether they have bodies at all, or not, was a question upon which many failed to render a definite verdict. Augustine evidently favored the supposition that they are possessed of refined ethereal bodies. (Epist., XCV.; De Civ. Dei, XV. 23.) Fulgentius says that the opinion that they possess corporeal as well as spiritual substance was held by many great and learned men. (De Trin., IX.) Mamertus Claudianus decides for the same view. (De Statu An., III. 7.) Gregory the Great speaks of them as spirits circumscribed by place. (Moral., II. 3.) Basil calls an angel an aerial spirit. (De Spir., XVI.) In another connection, however, he seems to include angels in the class of incorporeal things. (Adv. Eunom., IV.) Gregory Nazianzen describes angels as incorporeal, or very nearly so. (Orat., XXVIII. 31.) Ephræm is said to have ascribed to them igneous bodies. (Petavius, Theol. Dogmat., De Angelis, Lib. I. cap. 2.) A number of writers make the statement that God alone is strictly incorporeal, and so imply a kind of corporeity for angels. (Hilary, Comm. in Matt., Cap. V.; Cyril Alex., In Joan. Evang., Lib. IX. Cap. XIV. ver. 11; Faustus, Epist., IV.; Cassianus, Collat., VII. 13; Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XI., XII.) Perhaps, as has been suggested, some of these writers meant to denote by "corporeal" only the fact of subjection to space relations and limitations.

The notion that angels are divided into several ranks was carried out in an elaborate fashion by the pseudo Dionysius Areopagita. As he represents in his *De Cœlesti Hierarchia*, there are three classes of angels, each subdivided into three orders. The first class consists of Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim; the second, of Might, Dominions, and Powers; the third, of Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. The first class has immediate communion with God, and serves to enlighten the second, as that serves to enlighten the third. Only the inferior ranks recede from their heavenly station, in order to carry min-

istrations to men. Gregory the Great adopted substantially the scheme of Dionysius (*Hom. in Evang.*, XXXIV.), and prepared the way for its general acceptance in the Latin Church, though Augustine, before him, had confessed his total ignorance upon the subject of angelic ranks. (*Enchirid.*, LVIII.)

According to Augustine, and in harmony with his doctrine of the gift of perseverance, the angels, who kept their first estate in the time of the great apostasy, received, in reward for their fidelity, the assurance that they should never fall. (*De Dono Persev.*, XIII.; *Enchirid.*, XXVIII.) The scriptural evidence for this view he sets forth as follows: "The truth in the gospel promises to the saints and the faithful that they will be equal to the angels of God. (*Matt.* xxii. 30.) And it is also promised that they will go away into life eternal. But if we are certain that we shall never lapse from eternal felicity, while they are not certain, then we shall not be their equals, but their superiors. But as the truth never deceives, and as we shall be their equals, they must be certain of their blessedness." (*De Civ. Dei*, XI. 13. Compare *De Corrept. et Grat.*, XXVII.)

Pride was especially emphasized as the motive which precipitated Satan into apostasy. (Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XII. 1; Cassianus, *De Cœn. Inst.*, XII. 4.) As regards the other angels that fell, the old notion that lust after the daughters of men drew them to their downfall was still taught by some of the earlier writers of the period; at least they accepted the fact of a commerce with women. (Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, V. 4; Ambrose, *De Noe et Arca*, IV.; *Expos. in Psal.*, CXVIII.; *Serm.*, VIII. 58.) This notion, being based upon the traditional sense attached to *Gen.* vi. 2, naturally gave way before the new exegesis of the passage which Chrysostom and others advocated. (*Hom. in Gen.*, XXII. Compare Theodoret, *Hæret. Fab.*, V.; Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XV. 23; Cassianus, *Collat.*, VIII.

21.) In the new interpretation the "sons of God," instead of being regarded as angels, were identified with the Sethites. This left the fall of the other angels to be explained by motives like those which actuated Satan.

Those holding the old view might draw somewhat of a distinction between evil angels in general and demons, identifying the latter with the souls of the giants supposed to have sprung from the commerce of angels with the daughters of men; but it is not clear how the advocates of the new view could discriminate very definitely between the two. The distinction, indeed, was one that was never held very steadfastly by any class of Christian writers.

Unfallen angels were supposed to have much to do with the welfare of men. Occasional references show that the theory of a special angelic guardianship for individual men was still entertained. (Ambrose, *De Vid.*, IX.; Cassianus, *Collat.*, VIII. 17.) There is also mention of the idea that nations have their angelic superintendents. (Epiphanius, *Adv. Hær.*, LI. 34; Theodoret, *Hæret. Fab.*, V.) But whatever scope was assigned to this subordinate agency, it was not regarded as a substitute for the direct care of God over all His creatures. The doctrine of a special providence was vigorously maintained. Jerome took a thoroughly exceptional position in assuming only a general providence of God over the irrational animal creation. (Comm. in *Abacuc.*)

The agency of evil angels or demons, very much as in the preceding period, was regarded as operative in corrupting the hearts of men, in stimulating to heresy and crime, in producing violent diseases (though Posidonius, an eminent physician, took exception to this notion), and in fostering the arts of divination and all the lying wonders of heathenism. At the same time, it was regarded as agency limited both by the limited knowledge and power of the agents, and by man's ability to resist. For example, Augustine teaches that the production of marvellous trans-

formations is beyond the ability of demons, and that it is probable that they secure the appearance of miracle by merely presenting certain phantasms to the minds of those whom they would delude. (*De Civ. Dei*, XVIII. 18.)

The polytheistic tendencies which the heathen masses brought into the Church as they came over to Christianity, no doubt favored the worship of angels. But the New Testament prohibition of such worship (*Col. ii. 18*) was too definite not to receive a certain consideration, at least in theory. Eusebius speaks of Christians as honoring angels, but reserving worship for God. (*Præp. Evang.*, VIII. 15.) According to Theodoret, Christians believe in angels and acknowledge in them a certain pre-eminence over men, but at the same time regard them as fellow servants, and do not divide religious worship between them and God. (*Græc. Affect. Curat.*, III.) In the fourth century, a council convened at Laodicea condemned as idolatry a species of angel-worship, which seems to have had its votaries in that region. As late a writer as Gregory the Great declared the worship of angels foreign to the Christian dispensation. The acts of homage paid to them in Old Testament times are, as he maintained, no longer appropriate, since human nature has been so honored and exalted by the work of Christ. (*Moral.*, XXVII. 15.) No eminent writer in this period, except Ambrose, can be quoted as inculcating the idea that the intercessions of angels are to be sought for. A guardian angel, in his view, might profitably be addressed to this end, as well as the martyred saints. (*De Vid.*, IX.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — Apart from the Audians, there was little inclination in this period to regard the body as any part of that image of God in

which man was formed. So far as a distinction was drawn between the words "image" and "likeness," the view of the Alexandrian fathers of the preceding period was followed. Intellectual and moral attributes, as opposed to all qualities of the body, were considered the components of the divine image and likeness in man. (Athanasius, *Orat. contra Gent.*, § 2; *De Incarn. Verbi*, § 3; Hilary, *Tractat. super Psalm. CXVIII.*, Lit. 10, CXXIX.; Ambrose, *Hexaem.*, VI. 8; Augustine, *De Doct. Christ.*, I. 22; *De Trin.*, XIV. 4.)

The scriptural description of Paradise was commonly understood to be true in a literal sense; but many added an allegorical to the literal interpretation. Augustine, who may be regarded as largely representative of his age upon this subject, adduces two lines of allegorical meanings, and adds: "These, and similar allegorical interpretations, may be suitably put upon Paradise without giving offence to any one, while yet we believe the strict truth of the history, confirmed by its circumstantial narrative of facts." In the first series of figurative meanings which he mentions, "Paradise signifies the life of the blessed; its four rivers, the four virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice; its trees, all useful knowledge; its fruits, the customs of the godly; its tree of life, wisdom, the mother of all good; and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the experience of a broken commandment." According to the second, and, in his view, more suitable series of meanings, "Paradise is the Church; the four rivers of Paradise are the four Gospels; the fruit trees, the saints, and the fruit their works; the tree of life is the holy of holies, Christ; the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the will's free choice." (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 21.) Paradise was regarded as truly a garden of delights; the life of the first parents therein as a reflex of heavenly serenity and joy. "Nothing was wanting which a good will could desire, and nothing present which could interrupt man's

mental or bodily enjoyment. Their love to God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved. Their avoidance of sin was tranquil; and, so long as it was maintained, no other ill at all could invade them and bring sorrow." (De Civ. Dei, XIV. 10.)

As compared with the previous period the present showed a tendency to prefer the theory of a twofold nature in man to that of a threefold. The latter view still claimed some adherents in the Greek Church. Didymus of Alexandria, in particular, gave to it a definite and unmistakable expression. The Latin version of his work on the Holy Spirit gives his words as follows: "Sicut enim alia est anima, et corpus aliud; sic et aliud est spiritus ab anima." (§ 55. Compare Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XX.) On the other hand, Athanasius and Theodoret distinctly repudiated the threefold division. (Contra Apol., I. 13, 14; Dial., II.) A number of Greek writers also may be referred to who speak in general terms of man as twofold, thereby intimating that at least they did not distinguish widely and definitely between soul and spirit. (Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., III. 4; Basil, Hom. in Psalm., XXXII. 6; Gregory Naz., Orat., XL. 8.) The fact that Apollinaris employed the threefold division in the interest of his heretical Christology no doubt helped to discredit the trichotomist theory in the minds of some of these writers. In the Latin Church the leading theologians expressed themselves in favor of the twofold division. (Augustine, De Anima et ejus Origine, IV. 36, 37; De Fide et Symbolo, X.; Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XV., XX.; Gregory the Great, Moral., XI. 5, XIV. 15.) According to Augustine, the spirit is the nobler factor of the soul, "a certain rational portion of the same, of which beasts are devoid."

The natural immortality of the soul was universally accepted. As respects its incorporeal nature there was less

unanimity. Faustus of Rhegium maintained in distinct terms, that it is corporeal (Epist., IV.), and a number of writers (quoted under the subject of angelology) used language which seems to imply the same view. We may conclude, however, that Augustine and Mamertus Claudianus represented the main drift of the age in contending for the incorporeal nature of the soul.

On the generative function of human nature opinion was still very much divided. Gregory of Nyssa maintained that such a function was foreign to man in his original state, and that the human species was designed to be multiplied, not after the manner of irrational animals, but after the manner of angels. (De Hom. Opif., XVI.-XXII.) Augustine taught, that, apart from transgression, the command to increase and to multiply would have been fulfilled by the birth of children to the first parents; that, however, they would have been begotten without lust and born without pain. (De Civ. Dei, XIV. 23-26.) As to the actual origination of the individual, Gregory of Nyssa held the traducian theory. (De Hom. Opif., XXIX.) Athanasius seems to have adopted the same view; we find him teaching that in Adam was the principle of the propagation of the race. (Orat. contra Arianos, II. 48.) Theodoret, on the other hand, gave distinct utterance to the theory of creationism. (Græc. Affect. Curat., V.; Hær. Fab., V. 9.) In the Latin Church, Jerome, while stating that traducianism was the belief of the greater part of the Occidentals, expressed himself in favor of creationism. The same view had already been announced by Hilary. (Tractat. super Psalm., XCI. 3.) Augustine was not able to decide definitely between the two theories, though he saw that creationism involved some embarrassing points for his anthropology. (De An. et ejus Orig., Lib. I.; Epist. CLXVI. ad Hieron.) Jerome, yielding to the authority of Augustine, finally adopted the rôle of indecision, as did also Gregory the Great. (Epist., IX. 52.) Thus the

data which the period supplies certify to us the opinions of individuals, rather than any definite tendencies of the Church at large. Judging, however, from what appears in the next period, the drift was in the direction of creationism.

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — Unless the statement of Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 21) was aimed at certain writers of an earlier age, it must be concluded that there were some in this period who allegorized the account of the fall, and denied its literal sense. However, a definite substitution of an allegorical for the literal sense is not discoverable (so far as we are aware) in the writings of any prominent church teacher. Universally in the Catholic Church the essence of the fall was located in a misuse of the free will. The alternatives were at the disposal of the dwellers in Paradise. By nothing within or without was their will absolutely determined to the fatal trespass.

On the results of the fall the developments are of peculiar interest. No era more fruitful in connection with this part of anthropology is known to history. Nearly all the theological systems of later times were here anticipated, inasmuch as the opposite extremes, together with various intermediate types had their following. An enumeration of the different parties and their tenets will serve to show how broad a field was covered.

(1.) *The Greek Church.* — Anthropology not having received definite and thorough consideration in the Greek Church, we can point here to but very few exact statements upon the subject. Writers did not feel the same need of guarded and precise expression upon this topic as upon those which were connected with sharp and searching controversy. More emphasis, therefore, must be laid upon the general bent of their teachings than upon isolated statements.

Some strong expressions may be found with the Greek fathers of the period upon the effects of the fall. Thus,

Athanasius speaks of man as corrupted and made like to the beasts by the primal apostasy, as obnoxious before his birth to the servitude of corruption and the curse of the law. (In Illud, etc.; Orat., II. 14.) Gregory Nazianzen indulges similar language, speaking of man as wholly fallen, and as condemned on account of the disobedience of the first man and the fraud of the devil. (Orat., XXII. 13.) But there is abundant evidence that these and similar statements are not to be taken in an Augustinian sense. The same writers who employ them assert for the fallen man an element of free will, so that his salvation is dependent upon his own choice and endeavor, rather than upon any unconditional election of grace; and in some instances they describe the condition into which he is born as free from demerit. Gregory Nazianzen, for example, speaks of the blessedness of the saint as his own acquisition as well as the gift of God, associates the free endeavor of the individual with the grace which bestows the original powers of the soul and assists their operation, and describes those dying in infancy as unworthy of any punishment, inasmuch as they are free from wickedness. (Orat. II. 17, XXVII. 13, XL. 23. Compare Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. IV. 19-21, VII. 3; Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. Catech., XXX.; De Infantibus; Chrysostom, Hom. II. and XXXIX. in 1 Cor.; Hom. XVI. in Epist. ad Rom.; Theodoret, Hær. Fab., V. 18.)

In fine, the Greek anthropology unmistakably ascribed to the fallen man a measure of ability for meeting divine requirements, and on the whole portrayed his state as one of moral infirmity, rather than as one of radical corruption or positive guilt. It taught, as in the previous period, that the fall robbed man of the strong support which he had in intimate communion with God, and left the soul exposed to the assaults of the devil, and to the pressure of the sensuous nature. As a fair summary on the topic, the following may be quoted from Kahnis: "We may regard as common to

the Cappadocian fathers [Basil and the two Gregories], Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Cyril of Alexandria, and other Greek fathers of this time, the teaching that through Adam's sin death has come upon all men, together with a predominance of the sensuous nature, still without the loss of the power for good which lies in the reason and the free will, in virtue of which man, with the assistance of divine grace, can lay hold upon salvation, and strive after moral perfection." (Dogmatik.)

(2.) *The Latin Church before the Pelagian Controversy.*—The chief distinction between the Latin anthropology and the Greek at this stage was the more positive and distinct assertion by the former of the bearing of Adam's sin upon the moral condition of the race. Hilary speaks of a wickedness (*malitia*) which belongs to us on account of the condition of our common origin, of being separated in baptism from the sins of our origin, and affirms that in the error of Adam the whole human race went astray. (Tract. super Psal., CXVIII., Lit. 15; Comm. in Matt., X. 24, XVIII. 6.) We find him also quoted by Augustine as anticipating his own exegesis of Rom. v. 12, according to which the apostle teaches that the whole race sinned in Adam. (Contra Duas Epist., IV. 7.) Ambrose brings out still more amply and explicitly the corrupting force of Adamic connections. He teaches that an infant a day old is not free from sin; that the transgression of Adam and Eve sold us into servitude; that Christ alone among men was free from the contagion which is transmitted by generation; that we were all in Adam, fell with him, perished with him, and with him were ejected from Paradise. "Before we are born," he says, "we are stained with contagion, and before we see the light we receive the injury of the original transgression." (De Bono Mort., XI.; De Jacob, etc., I. 3; Apol. David, XI.; Expos. Evang. secund. Luc., VII.; De Excessu Frat., II. 6.)

At the same time neither Hilary nor Ambrose thought

that the inherited corruption is so unqualified as completely to bind the will. Both held the synergistic theory, which assumes a measure of moral ability in the fallen man. On this point Hilary went as far as the more radical advocates of free will among the Greek fathers, distinctly assigning to man the initiative in the process of moral recovery, and ascribing to divine agency the task of supplementing and perfecting what has already been begun. The following are among his statements: "Est quidem in fide manendi a Deo munus, sed incipiendi a nobis origo est. . . . Divinæ misericordiæ est, ut volentes adjuvet, incipientes confirmet, adeuntes recipiat: ex nobis autem initium est, ut ille perficiat." (Tract. super Psal., CXVIII., Lit. 14, 16.) Ambrose was inclined to give less scope to human agency, but he regarded it as a real factor in conjunction with grace, as is evident from the fact that he made predestination dependent upon foreknowledge of merit, and taught that abiding or not abiding in the blessings of salvation is in the province of the individual. (De Fide, VI. 83; Expos. in Psal., CXVIII. 9.)

Augustine, before the rise of the Pelagian controversy, stood substantially on the same ground as his predecessors in the Latin Church. This he himself abundantly acknowledged in his later works. In his "Retractations" he represents that at one time, not yet understanding the election of grace, he taught that God elected Jacob because of His foresight of Jacob's faith, that faith is the product of our own faculties which God follows with His gifts, and that all men can apply themselves to the fulfilling of God's commands if they will. (I. 23. 2, I. 10. 2. Compare De Prædest. Sanct., VII.)

(3.) *Pelagius and his School.* — Pelagius, a monk from Britain, came to Rome in the early part of the fifth century, and won there general esteem by his pure life. His peculiar theological views were first challenged in North Africa, where a synod in 412 excommunicated his disciple Cœles-

tius. Two synods in Palestine, whither Pelagius went, acquitted him of heresy. But the case was still pressed in the West. North African synods renewed their censure, and Roman bishops (416-418) pronounced the anathema against Pelagius and Coelestius, and required neighboring bishops to concur in the sentence of condemnation. A few refused compliance, among whom Julian of Eclanum is especially noteworthy. He clung to his convictions until his death, and both in character and ability may be ranked as the most eminent representative of the Pelagian party.

Pelagianism never gathered a sect, though here and there individuals continued to affiliate with its views. As a subject of real controversy, it pertained almost entirely to the West. The East never took the questions at issue into thorough consideration. The sentence which the council of Ephesus, in 431, passed against Pelagianism, was little else than a party expedient, due to a seeming connection between the Pelagian exiles and Nestorius, and to the desire to pay tribute to the authority of the West as something that was indispensable in the crusade against the accused bishop.

An even and placid experience on the part of the cultured monk was no doubt a factor in shaping his anthropology. No one who had felt to the full the outbreking force of intemperate passions and desires, and had passed through profound moral struggles, only to experience successive defeats until rescued by divine grace, would have had any inclination to originate such a system as came from Pelagius.

Pelagianism proceeds from the standpoint of an extreme individualism. The idea of the solidarity of the race is left by it completely in the background. Each individual is regarded as independent morally, as if each had come into being in the same manner as Adam.

Adam's fall, therefore, according to the Pelagian teaching, was simply the fall of Adam. No corruption which his

nature may have imbibed therefrom was transmitted to his posterity. (Augustine, *De Peccat. Orig.*, II.) Even physical death is not to be traced to that source; for the body is naturally mortal, and death would have been the lot of Adam and of all the race had there been no sin. So, at least, some of the Pelagians taught; though it would appear that this last point was not unanimously and steadfastly maintained. (Augustine, *De Gest. Pelag.*, XXIII.; *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum*, II. 66; *Contra Duas Epist.*, IV. 1, 2, 6; *Faustus, De Grat. Dei*, I. 1.) So far as Pelagianism allowed that death comes in consequence of the first transgression, it was careful to declare that it is not indicative of any guilt (except in Adam), and in itself is not to be regarded as an evil.

From this it follows that the only real evil which descended from the disobedient Adam was the power of an evil example. Indeed, there is no other channel for the transmission of evil. In no way, save by the power of an evil example, can the sin of one person transmit moral harm to another. A perverse example in parents tends to excite perverse conduct in children; and so the earlier generations mislead the later, though not necessarily, inasmuch as it is the prerogative of the will of each moral agent to rise superior to every vicious precedent. (*De Peccat. Orig.*, XVI.; *Opus Imp.*, II. 47.)

Freedom of will is the indispensable condition of moral character, of personal merit or demerit. And the very essence of this freedom lies in the power of contrary or alternative choice, the power in any given instance to choose either the good or the evil, and the one as truly as the other. "Whatever is bound by natural necessity is deprived of all freedom of will and deliberate choice." (*De Nat. et Grat.*, LIV.; *De Perfect. Just. Hom.*, VI.; *Opus Imp.*, VI. 9.) At the starting-point of every moral career lies this freedom of will. Apart from its exercise, no positive moral character, whether good or evil, comes into being. A good

or an evil nature is the product of voluntary actions, is the habit of will which results from its employment in a particular direction. "Nothing good," says Pelagius, "and nothing evil, on account of which we are deemed either laudable or blameworthy, is born with us, but it is done by us, for we are born not fully developed, but with a capacity for either conduct; we are formed naturally without either virtue or vice." (*De Peccat. Orig.*, XIV.)

Inasmuch as each individual has free will as his birth-right, and a free will which at the outset is unhindered by any corruption of nature, the inference is unavoidable that each is capable, in the use of his own native powers, of perfectly obeying the law of God. This is a possibility, too, which, according to Pelagianism, the case of Abel and others shows to have been actually realized. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, III. 23; *De Gest. Pelag.*, XXII.) Divine grace, as something added to man's natural powers, is not strictly indispensable; eternal life may be reached without it. Grace, in this sense, has simply the office of facilitating the attainment of the ultimate end, making its acquisition less arduous. (*De Grat. Christi*, XXVII.-XXX.) The Pelagian theory, therefore, clearly limits the province of grace, and magnifies that of individual effort. This is evinced by the items which the Pelagians felt constrained to include under the term "grace," such as our creation from nothing, our original faculties which make righteous conduct possible, and external revelation, as well as the forgiveness of sins and the direct working of the Holy Spirit upon the inner nature. (*Opus Imp.*, I. 94, 95, III. 114; *De Nat. et Grat.*, LVI.; *De Grat. Christi*, IV., XL.-XLV.; *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.*, XXV.) Had more stress been laid by them upon the last item, evidently there would have been less occasion to dwell upon those first mentioned in answering the charge that they ignored grace. Indeed, it was counter to the essential spirit of Pelagianism to allow much scope to the inner working of the Spirit, since any large

concession in this direction appeared opposed to its supreme interest in the doctrine of human freedom and ability.

In justification of its denial of corruption and guilt, as pertaining to the state in which the descendants of Adam are born, Pelagianism appealed to the mode in which the soul originates. Inasmuch as each soul, it suggested, is the product of a special creative act of God, there is no chance for the transmission of sin from soul to soul. Transmission, if it occurs at all, must be from body to body, since this part alone of the individual comes through natural propagation, — the heretical theory which makes the body by itself capable of sinfulness and condemnation. Pelagianism also appealed to the divine holiness, benevolence, and self-consistency, maintaining that it is contrary to these attributes that God should seek to perpetuate sin, and should charge it upon those who have and can have no part in its perpetration. "It cannot by any means be conceded," says Pelagius, "that God, who remits to a man his own sins, should impute to him the sin of another." In a like vein, Julian indignantly exclaims against Augustine: "The very God, you say, who commends His love in us, who loved us, and spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us, He Himself so judges, He Himself is the persecutor of infants, He Himself delivers little children to the eternal fires on the score of an evil will, though He knows that they could have neither a good nor an evil will." Again, the Pelagians claimed that, if the sin of another can harm men irrespective of all conditions on their part, then the righteousness of another ought to benefit them in the same unconditional way. "If Adam's sin was injurious even to those who do not sin, therefore Christ's righteousness profits those who do not believe." The Pelagians, moreover, charged the opposing theory with fatalism. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, III. 5; *Opus Imp.*, I. 48, III. 82; *Contra Duas Epist.*, II. 10.)

In reconciling their own view with the importance and

worth which the Church of that age attached to infant baptism, the Pelagians could only say that baptism transfers the infant from a *good* to a *better* state, — consecrates to be a member of Christ one already innocent and uncondemned. (De Peccat. Orig., XXI. ; Opus Imp., I. 54.)

(4.) *Augustine.* — The profound moral struggles of Augustine gave him the most decided views of man's depravity and moral bondage, while his experience of salvation equally magnified his impression of the sovereign grace of God. From his first entrance upon a Christian life he was inclined to place the moral weakness and demerit of man in infinite contrast with the saving power and free compassion of God ; and it was only natural that this distinctive bias should grow in strength as he grew in years. For a time, however, the task of refuting Manichæism, with its necessitarian traits, tended to check his bent toward an unqualified emphasis upon the moral helplessness of the natural man. But this restraint was finally more than offset by the stimulus which he received from the radical tenets of Pelagianism ; and in opposition to its doctrinal innovation he brought forward a counter innovation.

The innovating character of Augustinianism is beyond question. His more extreme tenets are not to be found with a single one of the preceding fathers. Like Origen, whom he resembled in mental fertility and excelled in argumentative force and precision, he pushed out beyond the sphere of thought and belief in which the age preceding him had revolved. That the one passed under the imputation of heresy, while the other was honored as a master of orthodoxy, was due to something else than their relative divergence from the antecedent theology of the Church.

Augustinianism appears as the reverse of Pelagianism in its starting-point, its spirit, and its goal. While the latter set out from a strict individualism, was self-dependent and self-confident in spirit, and sought to honor the native ability in man, and to incite him to the working out

of his own salvation, the former started from the idea of the solidarity of the race, was self-disparaging in spirit, and sought to glorify divine grace and nurture entire dependence upon God. The one placed religion more in acting, the other in believing. The one deferred to the dictates of a keen understanding, the other insisted upon an attitude of awe before the overshadowing majesty of God, and of reverential submission to the oracles which reveal His will. In fine, the history of theological thought presents few contrasts as deeply significant as is that between these two systems.

Augustine begins the connected chain of his teaching with a lofty ideal of man's original estate. There was logical occasion for this, since the greatness of the disaster resulting from the fall is made to appear less of an anomaly in proportion to the greatness of the crime and demerit which it involved. Adam, in his view, was not in mind and heart as an undeveloped child. He was rather the man of commanding mental and moral stature, clothed with princely attributes of wisdom and positive holiness. Adam's holiness was not, indeed, independent of the divine support, since no creature has independent holiness; it was, however, positive, involving a hearty impulse toward the love of God and obedience to His laws. No neutral state served as the starting-point of man's moral career. From the outset he was endowed with a good will. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 68; *Opus Imp.*, V. 1, 61, VI. 16.)

Conjoined with the positive righteousness or holiness of the unfallen man was a noble freedom. In this, as Augustine very clearly teaches, two elements are to be distinguished,—a more essential and a less essential; or, to borrow a different terminology, a real and a formal. The former is the unshackled life which the soul finds in the perfect love and service of the good. In this lies the very essence of freedom. The more absolutely the will is given up to goodness, and is bound by it, the more free is the

individual. The highest freedom, therefore, coincides with a certain necessity; not the necessity of outward constraint, but the necessity established by a normal bent of full strength in the inner nature. God is perfectly free in His holiness; yet He is necessarily holy. We freely will our own happiness; yet we find ourselves unable to will the contrary. The other element of the freedom of Adam in Paradise, the one so emphasized by the Pelagians, was the power of contrary choice. This is to be regarded as an accident of freedom rather than its essence. While it may be necessary to constitute one a probationary agent, it is not necessary to constitute one a free agent. It was given to Adam for probationary purposes. He was designed to outgrow it, and to issue into that highest freedom where sin is no longer possible (where the *non posse peccare* has taken the place of the *posse non peccare*), the state which all the redeemed are to reach in the future life. "It was expedient," says Augustine, "that man should be at first so created as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong; not without reward if he willed the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter. But in the future life it shall not be in his power to will evil; and yet this will constitute no restriction on the freedom of his will. On the contrary, his will shall be much freer when it shall be wholly impossible for him to be the slave of sin. . . . The first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin; the last was much greater, not to be able to sin." (Enchirid., CV.; De Corrept. et Grat., XXXIII.; De Nat. et Grat., LIV.; De Spir. et Lit., LII.)

But the transcendent opportunity before Adam, in the proper use of which he would have passed beyond the possibility both of sin and of death, was not improved by him. His love began to diverge in a measure from the supreme and unchangeable good, and to be drawn toward self. The supports of his integrity having been thus weakened, he

yielded to the tempter and committed the deadly trespass. In proportion to his lofty endowments, and the blessed life in which he had been insphered, was the guilt of his disobedience. The simplicity of the broken command, and the ease with which it might have been kept, also enhanced the enormity of his demerit. Indeed, no words can exaggerate the heinousness of Adam's apostasy. "Tanta impietate peccavit, quantam nos metiri atque existimare non possumus," — "He sinned with an impiety greater than we can measure or estimate." (*Opus Imp.*, III. 65, III. 57; *De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 12, 13, XXI. 12; *Enchirid.*, XLV., XLVIII.)

Results corresponding to his sin overtook the disobedient Adam. Upon body and soul the death sentence was speedily executed. At once Adam was smitten with mortality, and began to verge toward old age and corruption. The harmony of his nature was destroyed. The flesh began to war against the spirit. Affections common to man with the brutes arose in intemperate force. The will became enslaved; its freedom now amounted simply to a freedom to sin. The fallen Adam, left to himself, could not help sinning; he could at most only choose between greater and less sins; in no case could he act from that motive of pure love without which every act has an element of sin. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 21; *De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 17; *Enchirid.*, CVI.; *Serm.*, CLVI.)

All these features of the fallen Adam, the mortality, the corruption, the moral inability, and the guilt, pertain to his posterity no less than they did to him. His descendants are by birth what he was made by disobedience. (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 3.) "The whole race of which he was the root was corrupted in him." (*Enchirid.*, XXVI.) "All that are born mortals have the wrath of God with them, that wrath which Adam first received." (*Tract. in Joan.*, XIV. 13.) The corrupted and condemned man "begot corrupted and condemned children." (*De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 14.) "Una

erat massa perditionis ex Adam," — "There was one mass of perdition from Adam." (Serm., XXVI.) "Primus homo totam massam damnabilem fecit." (Serm. CLXV. Compare Epist. CLXXXVIII.; De Corrept. et Grat., XII.) "No man can will any good thing unless he is aided by Him who cannot will evil. And no man can believe on Christ, that is, come to Him, unless it be given to him." (Contra Duas Epist., I. 7.) "There is a necessary sin from which there is no freedom to abstain, which now is not only sin, but also the punishment of sin." (Opus Imp., V. 59.)

The reason for identity of moral condition between the fallen Adam and his posterity is the solidarity of the race, — the fact that all were in the first transgressor and shared in his trespass. "We were all in that one man, since we all were that one man who fell into sin. For not yet was the particular form created and distributed to us, in which we as individuals were to live, but already the seminal nature was there from which we were to be propagated; and this being vitiated by sin, and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man in any other state." (De Civ. Dei, XIII. 14. Compare Retract., I. 13. 5; De Nat. et Grat., III.; Epist. XCVIII.; Opus Imp., I. 48, IV. 104.)

The explanation, according to Augustine, of the unbroken transmission of the corrupt nature, notwithstanding parents are in many cases among the regenerate, lies in the fact that it is the old man rather than the renewed man that begets. Even in the regenerate, a certain concupiscence remains as a property, though not as a cause of condemnation; and this concupiscence, or lust, being operative in every natural generation, secures the propagation of the fleshly, fallen nature. Christ alone among men, as having been supernaturally conceived, escaped the taint with which the race is infected. (De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss., II. 11, 44; De Nupt. et Concup., I. 21, 28; Enchirid., XLI.; De Trin., XIII. 18.)

A parallel to the propagation of sin through diverse channels is supplied by nature, ordered on purpose of God (as Augustine suggests), that "this mysterious verity" might have some palpable evidence in its support. "As a wild olive grows out of the seed of the wild olive, and from the seed of the true olive springs also nothing but a wild olive, notwithstanding the very great difference there is between the wild olive and the olive; so what is born in the flesh, either of a sinner or of a just man, is in both instances a sinner." (De Nupt. et Concup., I. 21, II. 58; Contra Duas Epist., I. 11.)

The scriptural passage upon which Augustine especially depended for the proof of original sin, or the corruption and guilt descending to the race from Adam, was Rom. v. 12. (De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss., I. 11, III. 14; De Nupt. et Concup., II. 3; Contra Duas Epist., IV. 7; De Trin., IV. 12.) In this verse Augustine rendered ἐφ' ᾧ by *in whom* (in quo), instead of by *in that* or *because*, and thus found the doctrine that the race participated in the first transgression. Eph. ii. 3 was also quoted.

Having reduced the moral ability of the natural man to the vanishing point, Augustine could logically complete his scheme only by making divine grace the sole cause of man's recovery. The doctrines of unconditional election and irresistible grace came in, by natural sequence, after he had adopted his view of the results of the fall. But these topics may more appropriately be considered in another section.

(5.) *Semi-Pelagianism*. — A third party naturally came in between the Pelagian and Augustinian extremes. This had its headquarters in Gaul, and is known as the Semi-Pelagian school. Its earliest distinguished representative was John Cassianus, a learned monk and a disciple of Chrysostom. Later advocates of its tenets were Vincentius, Faustus of Rhegium, and Gennadius. A large proportion of the Gallic clergy were enlisted in its favor, and

it won the victory at the synod of Arles in 472, and that of Lyons in 475.

Semi-Pelagianism distinctly repudiated the Pelagian doctrine of man's complete moral ability. "No one of the righteous," says Cassianus, "is competent to maintain righteousness, unless moment by moment the divine clemency extends a supporting hand to his wavering and failing strength." (Collat., III., 12.) "It is most firmly to be believed," says Gennadius, "that in the transgression of Adam all men lost their natural power and innocence; and that no one through free will is able to rise from the depth of that ruin, unless uplifted by the grace of a pitying God." (De Eccl. Dogmat., XXII.)

On the other hand, Semi-Pelagianism distinctly repudiated the Augustinian doctrine of man's complete moral inability. It held that the fall of Adam entailed death and corruption of nature upon his posterity. This corruption, however, is not so radical as to eliminate the free will. The natural man can accept or reject the help of divine grace. Original sin in him involves moral infirmity, rather than complete impotence. "There remains in man always," says Cassianus, "a free will which is able either to neglect or to love the grace of God." (Collat., XIII. 12. Compare Faustus, De Grat. Dei et Lib. Arbit., I. 10; Gennadius, De Eccl. Dogmat., XXI., XLVI.) Holding this position, Semi-Pelagianism was, of course, exceedingly averse to the doctrine of unconditional election to eternal salvation.

(6.) *Moderate Augustinianism.*—While Semi-Pelagianism was of no little importance in Gaul for a century, it had in the same quarter opponents who were more or less decided advocates of Augustinianism. The drift finally turned, if not toward the latter, toward a modified form of the same. As represented by the council of Orange in 529, this moderate Augustinianism differed from Semi-Pelagianism in its greater stress upon inherited corruption, and in its distinct

declaration that divine grace always precedes the good works of men,—whereas some of the Semi-Pelagians, and among them Cassianus, taught that it was possible for man to take the initiative. The main distinction between it and strict Augustinianism was its negative attitude in respect to the doctrines of irresistible grace and absolute predestination. It commanded, no doubt, the favor of a very large proportion of the best minds in the Latin Church in the centuries succeeding its rise. “Gregory the Great,” says Schaff, “represents the moderated Augustinian system, with the *gratia præveniens*, but without the *gratia irresistibilis* and without a particularistic *decretum absolutum*. Through him this milder Augustinianism exerted great influence upon the mediæval theology. Yet the strict Augustinianism always had its adherents.”

The nature of sin in general, if not a subject of extended discussion, was considered by several writers. Among the more speculative fathers there was a tendency to adopt the negative conception of sin, the view which Origen had advanced. In thus allying sin, or moral evil, with non-entity, the idea seems to have been,—(1.) that there is no absolute will back of it, that it is not from the source of all being; (2.) that it is not a substance, but rather an accident; (3.) that as an accidental property it denotes pre-eminently a lack, a diminution of being, an encroachment of vanity and emptiness upon the soul.

A definition from this standpoint is given by Athanasius. “Non-existent,” he says, “are the evil things; but existent are the good, since they were made by the existing one.” (De Incarn., § 4; Contra Gent., §§ 4, 7.) “Evil,” says Basil, “is not a living and animated essence, but a condition in the soul contrary to virtue, produced in the sluggish by their falling away from the good.” (Hom. in Hexaem., II. 4.) Again he remarks: “Evil is the privation of the good,” as death is the privation of life and blindness the

privation of sight. (Hom., *Quod Deus*, etc., §§ 5, 7.) “We are not able,” says Gregory of Nyssa, “to think of any other origin of evil than the absence of the good,” — a view which he illustrates by the incoming of darkness upon the departure of light. (Orat. Catech., V.–VII.)

Augustine repeatedly defines evil as negation or privation. “What,” he asks, “is that which we call evil, but the absence of the good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present go away from the body and dwell elsewhere; they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere; when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.” (Enchirid., XI.) “Let no one look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the evil will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is to that which has less of being,—this is to begin to have an evil will.” (De Civ. Dei, XII. 7. Compare Tract. in Joan., I. 13.)

Notwithstanding the asceticism of the age, and the tendency practically to associate evil with the body, theologians very generally repudiated the notion that the body itself is essentially evil, or the prime source of evil. “It was not the corruptible flesh,” says Augustine, “that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. And though from this corruption of the flesh there arise certain incitements to vice, and, indeed, vicious desires, yet we must not attribute to the flesh all the vices of a wicked life, in case we thereby clear the devil of all these, for he has no flesh.” (De Civ. Dei, XIV. 3.) “The flesh is not evil, but to live according to the flesh is evil. . . .

The flesh will live agreeably to the soul, if the soul lives agreeably to God." (Serm., CLVI. Compare Theodoret, *Interp. Epist. ad Rom.*, VI. 13; Pseudo Dionysius, *De Div. Nom.*, IV. 27.) Chrysostom is often at pains to emphasize the same idea. "Mortality," he says, "is not the cause of sin: accuse it not: but the wicked will is the root of all the mischief. For why was not Abel at all the worse for his body? Why are the devils not at all the better for being incorporeal?" (Hom. in 1 Cor., XVII. Compare Hom. in *Epist. ad Rom.*, XI; Comm. in *Epist. ad Gal.*, V. 12, 17.)

Viewed from the standpoint of our relations to God, sin, according to Augustine, consists pre-eminently in pride or selfishness. "What," he asks, "is the origin of our evil will but pride? And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself." (*De Civ. Dei*, XIV. 13.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

DURING the earlier stages of the Arian controversy, very little attention was given to the subject of Christology. Catholic writers stopped short with the general assumption that Christ is both God and man, neither specifying the exact sense in which He might be called man, nor discussing the mode of harmonizing a plurality of natures with personal unity. But the Arian agitation itself finally served as an occasion of a specific consideration of Christology. While the stimulus may have come more immediately from Apollinaris, it was from Arianism that he received a principal incentive to the development and advocacy of his theory.

Arianism denied to the Redeemer a rational human soul, and charged the Catholic party with a substitution of two persons for the single Christ. Apollinaris of Laodicea, an ardent supporter of the Nicene faith, seems to have recognized a certain validity in the objection. He considered that it greatly simplified the view of the Redeemer's person to assume that, in incarnating Himself, He took simply the body with its life principle, or animal soul, the place of the rational soul being supplied by the Logos. This view, he argued, corresponds very exactly to the scriptural declaration that the Word became flesh. It is also specially commended by the fact that it removes from Christ's person the obnoxious factor of a human will, which in its nature

is mutable. To unite the Divine Son simply with the impersonal factors flesh and animal soul, is the most perfect offset to the Arian doctrine of a mutable Christ, and is also essential to the Saviour's perfection, since He alone is a perfect Saviour who stands above the liability to fall into sin. The doings and the sufferings of Christ appear clothed with a virtue adequate to their redemptive purpose only when they are associated directly with a divine subject. Moreover, without the human soul, Christ is a sufficient representative of humanity. He has the same three factors in His person which every man has, namely, spirit, soul, and body. While Christ as Logos or spirit is eternal and unchangeable and infinite, He is still, as spirit, in kinship with man, being the archetype of universal humanity, and destined from eternity to bear the human form.

The view of Apollinaris, notwithstanding the respect in which he had been held by the Nicene fathers, called forth their decided opposition. They regarded it as increasing the difficulty of scriptural exegesis by removing the factor with which Christ's exhibition of human traits might be associated, and as every way antagonistic to the saving office of Christ, since it neither brought the more essential part of human nature into union with the divine, nor made it possible to consider Christ a real example for men. Apollinaris, therefore, was formally censured, first by local synods, and then by the ecumenical council of Constantinople in 381. His Christology, viewed in its totality, was no doubt alien to the central current of thought in the Church. Still, a leading design of his, namely, to represent Christ's human nature as impersonal, was in harmony with the teachings which representative writers in the Church ultimately sanctioned.

The Greek fathers of the Arian era, who opposed Apollinaris, being chiefly interested in the divinity of Christ, greatly subordinated the human to the divine aspect. While they insisted upon the complete humanity of Christ,

they still regarded this as overshadowed by the associated divinity. By this order of representation, they thought to secure the unity of the Redeemer's person. "The teachers of this period," says Dorner, "thought it possible to avoid all dissonance, and to secure the unity by assigning to the divine aspect overpowering and sole-dominating power." This bent is especially noticeable in Gregory of Nyssa. As a drop of vinegar, he says, when cast into the sea, is transformed and becomes a part of the sea-water, so the flesh of Christ was transformed, and lost all its natural properties by union with the divine infinitude. (*Antirrhet. adv. Apol.*, XLII.)

Early Catholic Christology, in the Latin Church, was distinguished in general by considerable stress upon the human aspect. We find Hilary, however, the most eminent in christological respects among the Latin writers of the Arian era, assigning to the divine a marked predominance over the human. While he assumes a gradual development of the finite nature in Christ, he makes this not so much a free development of the human factor as the product of the shaping and controlling energy of the divine, which by this means prepares for a complete union of the two. He gives utterance also to the idea advanced by Clement of Alexandria; namely, that Christ was not by nature subjected to bodily necessities, and ate and drank merely to show the reality of his body. (*De Trin.*, X. 24.)

The more distinct recognition, in this period, of the human nature of Christ came from the Antiochian school. This was the school of biblical criticism. It studied the Bible in accordance with the maxims of a sober exegesis. Such study naturally drew attention to the wide contrasts which may be found among the attributes which the New Testament associates with Christ. At the same time much stress was laid upon freedom as a condition of moral excellence. Hence it came about that this school distinguished broadly between the divine and the human in Christ, — be-

tween Christ as Son of God and Christ as Son of Man,—and regarded the latter as developing much in the same free way as men in general. Theodore of Mopsuestia, in whom the tendencies of the school came to their boldest and most definite expression, undoubtedly did not fall far short of predicating simply a (peculiarly intimate) moral union between Christ as man and Christ as God,—a permanent association rather than a complete union of the two.

On the other hand, the Alexandrian school continued in the spirit of the Nicene fathers, who greatly subordinated the human to the divine. Instead of dwelling upon the distinction of the natures, they emphasized their unity. In pursuance of a mystical bent, they were disposed to regard the human as in some inexplicable way fused into oneness with the divine.

These two schools first came to a positive collision in the persons of Nestorius, Bishop of Constantinople, and Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria. Personal jealousies and ambitions had much to do with instigating and carrying forward the strife; but real doctrinal differences were involved. Perhaps neither the one nor the other was disposed to advocate, with a clear understanding of his own position, what might be called an heretical extreme; but each tended more or less toward such an extreme,—the one to the heresy of compromising Christ's personal unity, the other to the heresy of denying two natures in Him.

The immediate occasion of the outbreak was the declaration of Nestorius that *θεοτόκος* is not an appropriate term to apply to the Virgin, and that she ought rather to be called *χριστοτόκος*,—that is, mother or bearer of Christ, instead of mother of God. The term which he rejected had become quite well naturalized in the Church, and to challenge it seemed to the opponents of Nestorius a plain indication of a disposition to separate unduly the two natures in Christ, and indeed really to divide the one Redeemer into two persons. A crusade was accordingly begun against

Nestorius, which resulted in his defeat and banishment. The council of Ephesus, in 431, which sat in judgment upon him, accomplished little during its session in the way of a positive construction of Christology. The creed which came in as a supplement to its work, and was signed by representatives of the contending parties, was of the nature of a compromise, affirming at once the term *theotokos*, and ascribing two natures to Christ.

The extremists of neither party were satisfied with such a settlement. A sect was finally formed in the interest of the Nestorian doctrine, a refuge being found for the same within the Persian dominion. On the other hand, the radical wing of the Cyrillian party began to agitate for the doctrine of a single nature in Christ. This party found a mouthpiece in Eutyches, who presided over a cloister in Constantinople. He taught that the human attributes were assimilated to the divine in Christ, so that His body is not consubstantial with ours, and nothing human, in the stricter sense, is to be found in Him. Eutyches was condemned by a synod at Constantinople in 448; but his cause was zealously supported by the Alexandrian bishop Dioscurus, together with a large section of the Church in Egypt. The synod of Ephesus, in 449, was dominated by this party, and declared in favor of Eutyches. This decision, distasteful to the greater part of the Church, both on account of its doctrinal import and the violent measures by which it was gained, served as an incentive to the calling of a new ecumenical council. This was convened at Chalcedon in 451, and both in numbers and in doctrinal significance ranks among the foremost councils in the history of the Church.

Leo the Great, Bishop of Rome, took a principal part in the negotiations for the council, and its decisions followed his definitions, as they had been expressed in his letter to Flavian. The creed of Chalcedon is as follows: "Following the holy fathers, we unanimously teach one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ; complete as to His God-

head, and complete as to His manhood; truly God, and truly man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; consubstantial with the Father as to His Godhead, and consubstantial also with us as to His manhood; like unto us in all things, yet without sin; as to His Godhead begotten of the Father before all worlds, but as to His manhood in these last days born, for us men and for our salvation, of the Virgin Mary, the mother of God; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, known in two natures, without confusion, without conversion, without severance, and without division; the distinction of the natures being in no wise abolished by their union, but the peculiarity of each nature being maintained, and both concurring in one person and hypostasis. We confess not a Son divided and sundered into two persons, but one and the same Son, and Only-begotten, and God-Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ."

On the merits of this creed theologians, even those acknowledging both the divine and the human in Christ, have been divided. Some have regarded it as the most finished exposition of Christology which has been, or is likely to be, produced; but others, especially those writing from the standpoint of Lutheranism, have criticised it as seriously defective. While, as they maintain, it sets forth the factors that are to be acknowledged in Christ, it does not bring them into suitable reconciliation with each other. Dorner, among others, indulges this criticism. The one merit, in his view, of the Chalcedonian symbol, is that it points out the extremes that must be avoided, declaring "that no doctrine of the person of Christ can lay claim to the name of Christian which puts a double Christ in place of the incarnate Son of God, or which teaches either a mere conversion of God into a man, or, *vice versa*, of a man into God."

A long-continued agitation followed the council of Chalcedon. The cause of this was the opposition of a large party to the decisions of that council, their intrigues with

the government, and the attempts of the government to reconcile them to the Catholic Church. As advocates of only one nature in Christ, this party acquired the name of Monophysites. A sort of tribute was paid to them by the fifth ecumenical council, at Constantinople, in 553, inasmuch as it condemned certain objects of their special dislike; namely, Theodore of Mopsuestia, the anti-Cyrrillian writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas,—the so-called *Three Chapters*. This, however, is no indication that the views of the Monophysites were taken into favor by the Church, since the council was the mere product of diplomacy and governmental influence. At the sixth ecumenical council, held at Constantinople in 680, the doctrines of the Monophysites were decidedly repudiated. The compromise scheme, the so-called Monothelite, which acknowledged in Christ but one will, or one indivisible operation of will, (a scheme which the Emperors patronized with the design of winning back the Monophysites,) was condemned by this council. Thus was consummated the last prominent stage in a controversy which had disturbed the Church more or less for three centuries.

The Monophysites passed into a state of permanent schism. They are known to history in several branches, namely, the Jacobites, the Copts and Abyssinians, and the Armenians. The Maronites, as a sect, were an offshoot of the closing stage of the christological controversy, and were distinguished by their adherence to the Monothelite doctrine. It was the common tenet of the Monophysites that there is only one nature in Christ. They were not unanimous, however, in their conception of His person. Some favored the theory of Eutyches, and taught that the human attributes were changed in essence and assimilated to the divine. Others allowed the continuance of the human attributes, only denying that they were united into a second nature, and advocating accordingly a composite nature with two sets of attributes.

The section ought not, perhaps, to be concluded without a reference to the doctrine of the *kenosis*. When their statements are fully analyzed, the Catholic theologians of the period are found to agree upon this subject with the following sentence of Augustine: "When He [the Son of God] emptied Himself in order to assume the form of a servant, He laid not down what He had, but assumed that which He had not before." (Tract. in Joan., LV. 7. Compare Hilary, Tract. super Psal., LXV. 25; De Trin., X. 7; Fulgentius, Ad Tras., III. 10; Cyril of Alexandria, as interpreted by Dorner, Thomasius, and Bruce.)

SECTION II.—THE REDEPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

THE subject of redemption remained still among comparatively undeveloped themes. In conjunction with other views, the theory found place that the redemptive work was specially connected with the rights and the dominion of Satan. A few went to the full length of the Origenistic doctrine, and spoke not merely of a right in Satan over fallen men, but also of the cancelling of that right by the payment of a redemptive price. This was the case with Gregory of Nyssa. As he represents, men had sold themselves to the devil, and, like those who have parted with their liberty for money, were in a condition of slavery from which they could not justly be rescued by force. The just mode of recovery was to give the possessor the ransom which he desired. Christ came to be such a ransom. The spectacle of His wonderful life attracted the eager attention and avaricious desires of the devil. At the same time the garment of flesh which He wore concealed His divinity, and caused that the adversary should not be repelled by fear. Hence it came about that the devil regarded Christ as a most desirable prize, and was willing to accept Him as an equivalent for all those whom he held in the prison of

death. Thus far the account by Gregory presumes upon a right in Satan and the payment to him of a ransom. But, as in the case of Origen's description, the issue is a defrauding of the devil rather than an exchange with him. The flesh of Christ, as Gregory represents, served as a bait by which the devil was lured to his own defeat. At once he found his right over men lost, and himself powerless against the unveiled divinity of the Son of God. (Orat. Catech., XXII.-XXVI.) The divine artifice, or fraud (*ἀπάτη*), which Gregory himself allows that the transaction involved, is regarded by him as justified by its design. It was like the act, he avers, of a physician, who secretly mixes medicine with the food of a patient. The deception was for the good of all, the devil himself included. In other words, the "fraud" had not so much the character of a real fraud as of a wise and legitimate stratagem. This idea that the devil was outwitted by the incarnation appears with a number of writers who do not, like Gregory, intimate that the satanic claim upon men was relinquished in virtue of a contract. In such cases the only deception imputed to God would consist in providing conditions likely to be misinterpreted by the devil, and allowing him, in his sinful greed and malice, to misinterpret them.

The total theory of Gregory of Nyssa, including the notion that Satan had a claim which was cancelled by the payment of a ransom, found but a limited acceptance in the Greek Church. Gregory Nazianzen rejects it in emphatic terms, characterizing it as an audacious theory, and exclaiming, "Then had the robber received, not merely something from God, but God Himself, as a ransom, and a surpassingly great reward for his tyranny." (Orat., XLV. 22.) Other Greek writers may be cited, either as making no reference to the theory in question, or as indulging statements contradictory to a belief in the same. Epiphanius, for example, in his comments on the word "redemption," teaches that it by no means signifies acquisition by the payment of a

price, and refers for illustration to the usage of Paul, who speaks of "redeeming the time." (Adv. Hær., XLII. 8.) John of Damascus, representing the final drift of doctrine in the Greek Church, rejected, in terms similar to those of Gregory Nazianzen, the theory that a ransom was rendered to the tyrant. (De Fide Orth., III. 27.) In fine, the data seem to accord with the following verdict of Kahnis: "The doctrine of the payment of a ransom to the devil found little acceptance in the East." (Dogmatik, II. 3.)

In the Latin Church the theory never became current that the devil was the recipient of a stipulated ransom. One of the main ideas, however, upon which that theory was based, was quite generally entertained by Latin writers in this period; namely, the idea that Satan possessed a certain right over the apostate human race. We find it with Augustine, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great. "By the justice of God, in some sense," says Augustine, "the human race was delivered into the power of the devil. . . . But the way in which man was thus delivered into the power of the devil ought not to be so understood as if God did this or commanded it to be done; but that He only permitted it, yet that justly. For when He abandoned the sinner, the author of the sin immediately entered." (De Trin., XIII. 12.) "The pride of the ancient enemy," says Leo the Great, "not undeservedly asserted a tyrannic right (*jus tyrannicum*) against all men, and exercised no unmerited lordship over those whom he had enticed with their own consent from the command of God into subserviency to his own will." (Serm., XXII. 3.) "The devil himself," remarks Gregory the Great, "securing our fall in the root of the first parent, justly, as it were, held man under captivity, who, created with free will, yielded assent to him who counselled injustice." (Moral., XVII. 30.) In this last statement the phrase "*quasi juste tenuit hominem*" is not a little significant; it shows at least a doubt in the mind of Gregory about the "right" of Satan being in the proper

sense a right. As respects the way in which the right of Satan was cancelled, these three writers held in common that he lost his claim, not in virtue of any contract, or any payment under a contract, but by his own act in assailing the innocent Christ, and compassing, through his agents, His death. By visiting the penalty of sin upon the sinless, he lost his right over sinners; by exacting what was not due, he forfeited what had been due. "Certainly it is just," says Augustine, "that we whom he held as debtors should be dismissed free by believing in Him whom he slew without any debt." (*De Trin.*, XIII. 14. Compare *Serm.*, CXXX.; *Leo*, *Serm.*, XII., LX., LXI.; *Gregory*, *Moral.*, XVII. 30.)

The conception which these and later writers of the Latin Church had of Satan's right over men is defined by Baur as follows: "While, according to Augustine, the devil had the full property-right over men, Leo the Great declared it at least a tyrannic right; and Gregory the Great, although, on the one hand, he could not deny the reality of the right, on the other declared it only a seeming right; and the following teachers of the Church remain rather by the indefinite representation that man, in consequence of his sin, fell into the power of the devil." (*Versöhnungslehre.*)

Whatever prominence was given in any quarter to Satan's right, and the bearing of the redemptive work upon the same, no eminent writer limited himself to this aspect of Christ's saving office. It was characteristic of theologians in this, as in the preceding period, to contemplate the work of Christ from a variety of standpoints. Very frequently the death of Christ was represented as being a tribute or sacrifice to God, a means of vindicating His justice in connection with the exercise of clemency toward transgressors. Says Cyril of Jerusalem: "We were enemies of God through sin, and God had decreed that the sinner should die. One of two things, therefore, was necessary: either God, re-

maining true, must destroy all, or, using clemency, must annul the sentence issued. But behold the wisdom of God. He maintained both the sentence and the exercise of His goodness. Christ bore our sins in His own body on the tree, so that we, through His death, dead to sins, might live unto righteousness." (Catech., XIII. 33.) A very similar line of thought is given by Athanasius. (De Incar. Verbi, §§ 6-9; De Decret. Synod., § 14.) Among the reasons for Christ's death which Eusebius enumerates, he expresses one as follows: "That as a victim of God, and a great sacrifice, He might be offered to the Most High for the whole world." (Dem. Evang., IV. 12.) "The Only-begotten Son," says Basil, "who gives life to the world, since He offers Himself to God as a victim and oblation for our sins, is called the Lamb of God." (Hom. in Psal., XXVIII. 5.)

Hilary speaks of Christ as voluntarily offering Himself as a sacrifice to God the Father. (Tract. super Psal., LIII. 13.) "The blood of Christ," says Ambrose, "is the price paid for all, by which the Lord Jesus, who alone has reconciled the *Father*, has redeemed us." (Enar. in Psal., XLVIII. 15.) Augustine characterizes Christ as "the great High Priest, who offered Himself to God in His passion for us," and who "was able to expiate sins by dying, since He both died, and not for sin of His own." (De Civ. Dei, X. 6, 24; Enchirid., XXXIII., CVIII.; Confess., X. 43; De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss., I. 56, 61; De Nat. et Grat., II. Compare Leo, Serm., LXIV.; Gregory the Great, Moral., III. 14, IX. 38, XVII. 30.) At the same time Augustine was careful to teach that it is not to be imagined that the sacrifice of Christ by itself wrought any essential change in the disposition of God toward the race. "Let not," he says, "the fact of our having been reconciled unto God be so listened to or so understood as if the Son reconciled us unto Him in this respect, that He now began to love those whom He formerly hated; but we

were reconciled unto Him who already loved us, but with whom we were at enmity because of our sin. In a wonderful and divine manner, even when He hated us, He loved us; for He hated us in as far as we were not what He Himself had made; and because our own iniquity had not in every part consumed His work, He knew at once both how, in each of us, to hate what we had done, and to love what He had done." (Tract. in Joan., CX. 6.)

Acknowledgment was also given, especially in the Greek Church, to the mystical theory which views the incarnation as bringing an incorruptible life into organic connection with humanity, and so working its transformation from the corruptible to the incorruptible. "The manifested Word," says Gregory of Nyssa, "mingled Himself with the perishable nature of men, in order that, by communion with the divine, the human might be rendered divine; for this reason, by the economy of His grace He distributes Himself through the flesh to all the believing, uniting Himself with the bodies of believers, whose substance consists of bread and wine, in order that, by union with the immortal, man also might be a partaker of incorruption." (Orat. Catech., XXXVII. Compare Athanasius, *De Incar. Verbi*, §§ 8, 9.)

Recognition was furthermore given to the moral theory of the atonement, the theory which emphasizes the moral power upon the hearts of men of Christ's manifestation and work. Augustine, above all other writers, dwelt upon this aspect. Two factors in particular in the moral power of Christ, namely, divine love and divine humility, claimed his attention. "It was mainly for this purpose," he says, "that Christ came, to wit, that man might learn how much God loves him, and that he might learn this to the intent that he might be kindled to the love of Him by whom he was first loved, and might also love his neighbor at the command and showing of Him who became our neighbor." (De Catechiz., IV.) "What was so necessary," he inquires, "for the building up of our hope, and for free-

ing the minds of mortals cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair of immortality, as that it should be demonstrated to us at how great a price God rated us, and how greatly He loved us?" (De Trin., XIII. 10.) With no less emphasis, Augustine dwells upon the remedial virtue of the divine humility. Indeed, it was one of the thoughts to which he most frequently and fondly reverted, that divine humility, as it presents the most striking contrast conceivable to the pride in which lies the essence of human sin, is the most perfect remedy for sin. "As the devil," he says, "through pride, led man through pride to death, so Christ, through lowliness, led back man through obedience to life." (De Trin., IV. 10.) "Cure pride, and there will be no more iniquity. Consequently, that the cause of all diseases might be cured, namely, pride, the Son of God came down, and was made low." (Tract. in Joan., XXV. 16. Compare De Peccat. Orig., XLVI.; Epist., CCXXXVI.; De Fide et Symbolo, IV.)

The doctrine of Christ's descent into Hades was generally accepted by the Church. (Athanasius, Contra Apol., I. 5, 14; Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., IV. 11; Gregory Naz., Orat., XLV. 24; Cyril of Alexandria, De Ador. et Spir., VIII.; Hilary, Tract. super Psal., LIII. 14; Augustine, Epist., CLXIV.; Leo the Great, Serm., XXV.) Augustine, while he declared the mission to Hades to be beyond question, confessed that it was a rather perplexing subject to himself, since it was hard to see to whom a mission in that quarter could have applied. It could not have been for the benefit of the unsaved, since no probation after death can be admitted; and how it could have been needed by the saved, by saints who lived under the Old Testament dispensation, is far from clear.

That there was a supreme fitness in the chosen method of salvation was the universal belief; but it may be doubted whether theologians commonly entertained the idea that

no other method was in any wise possible. Augustine decidedly rejected the theory that God was absolutely limited to a single plan for saving men. (De Trin., XIII. 10. Compare Gregory the Great, Moral., XX. 36; Athanasius, Orat., II. 68.)

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

APART from Augustine, and those influenced by his teaching, it was the common belief of the Church that Christ died for all, and that it is the unfeigned will of God that all should partake of salvation through Him. The fact that some are saved and some are not was explained by reference to man's free agency, and not by an appeal to electing grace. The synergistic theory was taught, which affirms that the individual in his moral recovery works with God, and in such a way as to condition the result. In the Greek Church there was somewhat of a tendency to credit man with the power to take the initiative himself, or in some measure to anticipate grace. The same may be said of Hilary and of the Semi-Pelagian school in the Latin Church. (See references on p. 228 *et seq.*)

The Church at large, as in the previous period, regarded predestination, so far as it is connected with man's moral destiny, as conditioned by foreknowledge. Augustine himself at one time distinctly advocated this position, saying that God chose those who he foreknew would believe, and conjoining with this the statement that believing lies within man's power. First man believes, he said, and then God gives grace for good works. "Quod ergo credimus, nostrum est; quod autem bonum operamur, illius qui credentibus in se dat Spiritum Sanctum." (Quarund. Prop. ex Epist. ad Rom. Expos., LX.) Augustine's later teaching, therefore, was a departure from his own doctrine, as well as from that of the Church in general. Theodoret stood fully on Catho-

lic ground when, in his exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, he carefully guarded against every meaning prejudicial to the moral opportunity of all men, and taught that there are no vessels of wrath except those who have made themselves such by their own will. The Semi-Pelagian Faustus also gave expression to the opinion, not of a sect, but of the great body of Christians up to his day, when he wrote: "If one has been assigned to life and another to death, we are born not to be judged, but already judged. Nor on such a supposition can there be, in consistency, any equity of judgment. For if God has given nothing to the servant, what shall He demand back from the servant?" (De Grat. Dei et Lib. Arbit., I. 4.)

Augustine, having renounced his earlier view and adopted the theory that the natural man is morally helpless, could explain the fact that some are saved and some are not only by reference to the divine will and agency. Every heir of the fallen nature of Adam, as he now taught, being destitute of the ability to exercise faith and to do good works, is totally dependent upon God for the attainment of salvation. Until the individual has received a new heart, the action of divine grace is purely monergistic. Up to this point the human subject is merely acted upon. While unable to co-operate, he is equally unable to resist. "Almighty God can turn to the practice of belief men's wills, however perverse and opposed to faith they may be." (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., XXIX. Compare De Prædest. Sanct., XIII.) Those whom He wills to save are certain to be saved; for others salvation is an utter impossibility.

No account can be given of the decrees of God by which He has determined from eternity who shall be saved, at least as respects their individual application. "I confess that I can find no answer to make," says Augustine, in response to the question why God should choose one rather than another. (De Dono Persev., XVIII.) However, in his view a reason is apparent why there should be the two

general classes, the elect and the reprobate. Their contrasted destinies are needed to display both grace and retribution. "For both could not be displayed in all; for if all had remained under the punishment of just condemnation, there would have been seen in no one the mercy of redeeming grace. And on the other hand, if all had been transferred from darkness to light, the severity of retribution would have been manifested in none." (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 12.)

Regeneration, according to Augustine, is no sure token of election. Men inducted into the family of God by the new birth may still be among the non-elect. In that case they will be sure to die in sin. The truly predestinated are made partakers, not only of regenerating grace, but also of the *gift of perseverance*. (De Corrept. et Grat., XX.) In this world the possessors of this crowning gift are in general known only to God. Few are informed by special revelation that they will persevere to the end. (De Civ. Dei, XI. 12. Compare De Corrept. et Grat., XL.)

The number of the elect, as Augustine taught, is small in comparison with that of the non-elect. (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 12; Serm., CXI.) Yet the latter in the eternal purpose of God were designed merely for the advantage of the former. The vessels of wrath, as is explicitly stated, are born for the benefit of the elect. (Contra Julianum, V. 4. Compare De Prædest. Sanct., XXXIII.) The benefit accruing to the minority from the perdition of the majority is not very elaborately specified, but appears to have been located by Augustine especially in the gratitude and love toward God awakened in the saved by the disclosure of what they have been saved from. "It was right," he says, "that those who are redeemed should be redeemed in such a way as to show by the greater number who are unredeemed, and left in their just condemnation, what the whole race deserved, and whither the deserved judgment of God would lead even the redeemed, did not His unde-

served mercy interpose." (Enchirid., XCIX.) That the vessels of wrath should be born into a condemnation from which there is no possibility of escape, is justified by the fact that they sinned in Adam. (De An. et ejus Orig., IV. 16.) This left them absolutely destitute of all claim upon God. "There was no injustice in God's not willing that they should be saved, though they could have been saved had He so willed it." (Enchirid., XCV.)

Augustine, in the main, uses the term *prædestinatio* only in connection with those elected to eternal life. Instances occur, however, in which he speaks of a predestination to punishment and eternal death. (De An. et ejus Orig., IV. 16; Tract. in Joan., XLIII. 13, CX. 4.) Still no such positive and efficient decree was assumed for the latter as for the former case. Inasmuch as Augustine did not include the fall of Adam in the divine decrees, and the fall was regarded by him as having ruined the race, he could have meant by predestination to eternal death simply a decree that certain should be left in the perdition in which they were already involved by original sin.

For the scriptural proof of his theory of unconditional election, Augustine refers in particular to Rom. ix. 16, 18, 20; Eph. i. 4, 5. In answer to such a passage as 1 Tim. ii. 4, he says, in one instance, that God wills all to be saved in the sense that He inspires us so to will, this being appropriate for those who are ignorant as to who are the heirs of salvation. (De Corrept. et Grat., XLVII.) In another instance, he makes the teaching of the passage to be, either that no one is saved except by the will of God, or that men of all varieties of rank and condition are included in God's saving purpose. (Enchirid., CIII.)

It is to be observed that, while Augustine differed from the Church at large in excluding foreknowledge of conduct from the grounds of predestination, he did not dissent from the current view as to the essential relations of foreknowledge and predestination. It was no part of his doc-

trine that the certainty of all events has its basis in the divine predestination or foreordination. To be sure, in one instance he says of God that He "has predestinated all that is to be by sure and unchangeable causes" (Tract. in Joan., CV. 4); but more explicit statements show that some things were not understood by him to be included in the divine predestination, except in a permissive sense. We find him teaching that foreknowledge and predestination are not co-extensive; that "predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge, although foreknowledge may exist without predestination." (De Prædest. Sanct., XIX. Compare Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, I. 24, 29; Prosper, Pro Aug. Respon. ad Capit. Gallorum, XV.) This principle Augustine applies to the transgression of Adam, stating that God foresaw that he would make a bad use of his free will, and that He arranged His plans with reference to the fall, the fall itself having no place in His plans, except that He purposed to *permit* it to occur. (Enchirid., CIV.; De Civ. Dei, XIV. 27.)

As in the previous period, no broad contrast was drawn between regeneration and justification. The former, being identified with the baptismal grace, was made to denote in particular the remission of sin, though the idea of a certain moral renovation was not excluded. The broader sense of the term was foreign to current usage. Augustine shows the limited scope which he assigned the term, by placing it in contrast with conversion of heart. "In infants," he says, "who are baptized, the sacrament of regeneration is given first, and, if they maintain a Christian piety, conversion also in the heart will follow, of which the mysterious sign had gone before in the outward body." (De Baptismo, IV. 24.) To him regeneration in the technical sense signified, aside from the remission of sin, only initial conversion of heart. As respects justification, Augustine adopted what became the standard definition in the Latin Church, and understood by the term, not merely absolution, but the

change in the individual which makes him just or righteous; in other words, sanctification. "God justifies the ungodly," says he, "not simply by remitting his evil deeds, but also by giving him love, that he may depart from evil, and do good through the Holy Spirit." (*Opus Imp.*, II. 165.) "*Gratia Dei qua justificamur, hoc est, justi effici-mur.*" (*Retract.*, II. 33.)

While the importance of faith as a pre-eminent means in the appropriation of salvation was universally acknowledged, little attention was given by theologians in general to a consideration of its nature. Apart from the writings of Augustine, who gave the matter an exceptional measure of attention, there is scarcely anything deserving of special mention. In agreement with leading writers of the preceding period, Augustine regarded evangelical faith as inclusive of a right moral disposition. In some instances, it is true, he speaks of faith in a different sense. He says, for example, that "belief is nothing else than consideration with assent." (*De Prædest. Sanct.*, V.) Again, he remarks that it is possible for one to have faith and not to have love. (*Serm.*, XC.) But in such cases he was viewing faith in its more general meaning. Evangelical or justifying faith, as he abundantly indicates, was made by him to involve the elements of self-surrender and love. The following sentences may serve to indicate his position upon this point: "He indeed believes in Christ who both hopes in Christ and loves Christ. For if he has faith without hope and without love, he believes that Christ is, but does not believe in Christ." (*Serm.*, CXLIV.) "It is faith which is the initial principle whence good works first proceed." (*De Gest. Pelag.*, XXXIV.) "*Illa est laudabilis fides, ipsa est vera gratiæ fides, quæ per dilectionem operatur.*" (*Serm.*, CLVI.) "*Difficile est ut male vivat, qui bene credit.*" (*Serm.*, XLIX.) One of the most frequent specifications of Augustine regarding faith is the antecedent relation in which it stands to knowledge. In order to know,

as he teaches, we must first believe. "A certain faith is in some way the starting-point of knowledge." (De Trin., IX. 1.) "Ut intelligamus, prius credamus. Præcedit fides, sequitur intellectus. Fides gradus est intelligendi; intellectus autem meritum fidei." (Serm., LXXXIX., CXVIII., CXXVI.)

A consistent following out of the conception that faith is the principle from which good works proceed, as denying independent virtue to the latter, would evidently exclude the notion that salvation is dependent upon the merit of good works. As a matter of fact, we find writers in this period, especially in the Augustinian school, emphatically repudiating all trust in the merit of works as a ground of acceptance with God. Faith, as a principle of dependence upon divine grace, is declared by Augustine to be the channel of saving benefits under the new dispensation. "By the law of works," he writes, "God says to us, Do what I command thee; but by the law of faith we say to God, Give me what Thou commandest." (De Spir. et Lit., XXII.) In a like spirit, he teaches that the rewards which men receive from God are not so much rewards as free gifts. "We are to understand that man's good deserts are themselves the gift of God, so that when these obtain the recompense of eternal life, it is simply grace given for grace." (Enchirid., CVII.) "It is His gifts that God crowns, not your merits." (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., XV. Compare De Trin., XIII. 10, XIV. 15; Leo the Great, Serm., XLIX.; Epist., I.; Gregory the Great, Moral., XXII. 9, XXXIII. 21.)

But whatever tribute may have been paid to faith and to dependence upon divine grace, there were tendencies in the Church at large in a contrary direction,—tendencies to exalt outward works above the plane of mere fruits, and to emphasize them at the expense of the great subjective conditions of salvation. Among other things, the disposition to confound faith with orthodoxy worked to this effect. The definitions of the foremost theologians may, indeed,

have avoided this confusion, but it was not universally escaped. In the heated controversies of the time, the faith which the Gospel requires was often counted identical with the holding of an orthodox creed. Says the so-called Athanasian symbol: "Whoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith, which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. But this is the Catholic faith,"—viz. a long list of specifications on the unfathomable mysteries of the Trinity. Evidently faith, as an attitude of the soul toward God, was not likely to be duly regarded when subscription to an elaborate list of articles was so emphatically set forth as the test of saving faith. The symbol quoted is not, to be sure, a fair index of the feeling of the entire Church in these centuries, but it does represent no inconsiderable factor in the current of the age.

Another thing in line with the tendencies specified was the style in which works of mercy and self-discipline were commended. Even Augustine did not shun to speak of almsgiving as a means of propitiating God. (*Enchirid.*, LXX.; *Serm.*, XLII.) He describes this as the proper way of making satisfaction for the sins into which all are liable to fall daily, while for transgressions of the graver sort, such as violations of the Decalogue, greater severity must be practised upon one's self. (*Serm.*, CCCLI.) In like manner Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, John Cassianus, Theodoret, and others, emphasize the virtue of alms, and the need of special penitential inflictions to cancel sins involving serious demerit. Some of these writers, to be sure, may have had a way of reconciling their language with the supremacy of faith and the spirit of dependence upon grace; but their very language is indicative of a certain dogmatic drift of the Church in general.

A third thing favoring external works at the expense of the subjective conditions of spiritual life was the distinction

drawn between commands and evangelical counsels. "The church fathers of this time, in particular Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose, and Augustine, distinguished very definitely between commands and evangelical counsels, of which the first must be unconditionally observed by all Christians; the second rest upon free choice, but bring to those who observe them a higher reward." (Gieseler, *Dogmengeschichte*.) Such a distinction, made in the interest of monasticism, was no small step toward the mediæval view, according to which eminent holiness is the prerogative of a class, something dependent upon a special set of externals.

The growing practice of saint-worship may also be mentioned as an obstruction to spiritual conceptions of salvation. Before the close of the fourth century great value was very generally attached to the intercessions of the saints. During the next century a special pre-eminence among intercessors began to be assigned to the Virgin Mary. Two dogmatic principles favoring her exaltation were advocated, namely, her perpetual virginity and her freedom from actual sin. Writers quite generally, even in the early part of the period, speak of the former of these as though it was a matter of common belief. Of the latter, Augustine appears as the first prominent advocate, or rather as the first to state its credibility. Some of his contemporaries were very free to impute actual sins to the Virgin. (Basil, *Epist.* CCLX.; Chrysostom, *Hom. in Matt.*, XLIV.) While claiming in general, in opposition to Pelagianism, that none have lived without sin in this world, Augustine says: "We must except the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom I wish to raise no question, when it touches the subject of sins, out of honor to the Lord; for from Him we know what abundance of grace for overcoming sin in every particular was conferred upon her who had the merit to conceive and to bear Him who undoubtedly had no sin." (*De Nat. et Grat.*, XLII.) By this Augus-

tine meant to exempt the Virgin simply from actual sin, not from original. The doctrine of her immaculate conception had not yet been broached. Indeed, the Roman bishop, Leo the Great, indulges language which clearly assumes the contrary view. "Assumpta est," he says, "de matre Domini, natura, non culpa." (Serm., XXII.; Epist., XXVIII. 4.)

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

TENDENCIES to ecclesiasticism inherited from the preceding period were re-enforced in this period. As the Church advanced in material resources, and became more like a kingdom of this world, it was but natural that it should magnify its own sovereignty and disparage all hope of salvation outside of its borders. The conditions strongly favored the growth of the very natural impulse to ascribe sole legitimacy to that which has once acquired the ascendancy.

An occasion for a specific consideration of the nature of the Christian Church came in particular from the Donatists, a schismatic party of North Africa. They were zealous advocates of a strict discipline, and maintained that purity is an essential characteristic of the Church. This idea they carried so far as to hold that the harboring of unworthy members dissevers from the body of Christ the congregations who tolerate or uphold the abuse, and renders their sacraments null and void. Augustine, who was long and actively engaged in the controversy with the Donatists, allowed the need in general of a strict discipline; but he repudiated the Donatist test of ecclesiastical validity, maintaining that a sudden severance of offenders from Church fellowship is not always expedient; that often the tares must be allowed to grow with the wheat, and that the presence of the unworthy does not unchurch the worthy. The proper tests, as he claimed, are catholicity and apostolic

connections. In other words, the Church which is spread through all lands, and which has remained in communion with the congregations founded by the apostles, is the true Church. Some may be externally connected with this Church who are not truly parts thereof, not members of the body of Christ. These excrescences, however, will be cut off in time, and cannot impair the claims of the Catholic Church to be the one true Church.

Augustine did not hesitate to affirm that union with the Church, as thus defined, is essential to salvation. "Whoso," he writes, "is not in this Church does not now receive the Holy Ghost." (Tract. in Joan., XXXII. 7.) "You were born," he says to the baptized schismatic and heretic, "by the same words, by the same sacrament, but you shall not attain to the same inheritance of eternal life unless you shall have returned to the Catholic Church." (Serm., III.) Speaking of those who, like the Donatists, rashly hurry into schism, he maintains that they, "having most openly placed themselves outside in the plain sacrilege of schism, cannot possibly be saved." (De Baptismo, V. 4.) Leo the Great uses language of similar import. "Extra ecclesiam catholicam," he says, "nihil est integrum, nihil castum." (Serm., LXXIX.) Gregory the Great declares that there is no true martyrdom outside of Catholic unity; that heretics are unworthy of life, and can in no wise escape the wrath of God unless they come into the Catholic Church. (Moral., XVIII. 26, XX. 7, XXXV. 8.) It should be observed, however, with respect to Augustine, that he did not make actual connection with the Catholic Church absolutely essential to salvation. "If any one," he says, "were compelled by urgent necessity, being unable to find a Catholic from whom to receive baptism, and so, while preserving Catholic peace in his heart, should receive from one outside the pale of Catholic unity the sacrament which he was intending to receive within its pale, this man, should he forthwith depart this life, we deem none other than

a Catholic." (De Baptismo, I. 2.) To the same effect is the following, regarding unjust excommunication: "If any believer has been wrongfully excommunicated, the sentence will do harm rather to him who pronounces it than to him who suffers the wrong." (Epist. CCL., ad finem.)

The episcopate was deemed, as in the latter part of the previous period, a principal bond of church unity. The means of giving authoritative expression to the voice of the episcopal body was the ecumenical council. The Roman Bishop held simply the rank of a leading patriarch. While accorded a certain primacy in honor, he was not accorded a constitutional supremacy over the whole Church. This is clearly proved by the record of the ecumenical councils.

That no doctrinal infallibility was imputed to the Bishop of Rome is sufficiently evinced by the fact that the sixth ecumenical council anathematized Honorius I. for espousing the Monothelite heresy, and that, too, without betraying the least consciousness that the honor of the Roman see could be saved by fine-spun distinctions on the phrase *ex cathedra*. The council evidently regarded him as patronizing heresy in his highest official capacity; and its verdict has been concurred in by the most enlightened scholarship of the Romish Church in recent times. Hefele, for example, teaches that Honorius *ex cathedra* sanctioned heresy. (Causa Honorii Papæ; Conciliengesch., 2d ed., § 298.) The anathema against Honorius was repeated by the seventh and eighth ecumenical councils, and was also sanctioned, more or less explicitly, by a long list of Popes.

SECTION II.—THE SACRAMENTS.

By a sacrament was generally understood a holy mystery, a visible rite or transaction, which served as the medium of a secret grace. "These are called sacraments,"

says Augustine, "because in them one thing is seen, another is understood. What is seen has bodily appearance, what is understood has spiritual fruit." (Serm., CCLXXII.) Speaking of the baptismal washing, he remarks, "The word is added to the element, and there results the sacrament, as if itself also a kind of visible word." (Tract. in Joan., LXXX.)

A wide and indefinite range was still given to the term. We find Hilary, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great speaking of the sacrament of the Lord's Passion,— "*sacramentum passionis Domini*." Leo also styles it a great sacrament that man should be taken by God into the relation of sonship. (Serm., XXVI.) Augustine numbers among sacraments marriage, the Sabbath, circumcision, etc. (De Nupt. et Concup., I. 11; Tract. in Joan., IX. 2, XX. 2; De Spir. et Lit., L.; Serm., X.) The pseudo Areopagite specifies six Christian mysteries or sacraments,— baptism, eucharist, anointing, priestly consecration, dedication to monastic life, and the ceremonial for the dead (an anointing of the body of the deceased). But while baptism and the eucharist did not stand alone as sacraments, a certain pre-eminence was assigned them among sacramental rites.

BAPTISM.—The conditions of the efficacy of baptism in case of adults were understood to be repentance and faith. "Whence has water," asks Augustine, "so great an efficacy as in touching the body to cleanse the soul, save by the operation of the word; and that not because it is uttered, but because it is believed?" (Tract. in Joan., LXXX. 3.) A spirit counter to these conditions, as he plainly states, can nullify the grace of baptism, however legitimately in other respects the rite may be consummated. (De Baptismo, I. 12. Compare Cyril of Jerusalem, Procatech.) In case of infants, the conditions were regarded as adequately met through the sponsors. The faith of the godfather, as Augustine teaches, answers for the infant candidate. "Cre-

dit in altero, quia peccavit in altero." (Serm., CCXCIV. Compare *De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 38; *Tract. in Joan.*, LXXX.)

Valid baptism was universally regarded as the rite of regeneration, and as such efficacious for the complete removal of the condemnation coming from foregoing sin, whether original or actual. It was also generally regarded as conducive to a certain inward illumination and renovation. (Eusebius, *De Eccl. Theol.*, I. 8; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Pro-catech.*; Basil, *Hom.*, XIII. 1; Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, XL.; Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunom.*, II.; Theodoret, *Hær. Fab.*, V. 18; Ambrose, *Enar. in Psal.*, XXXVI. 63; Leo the Great, *Serm.*, VII., XVIII., LXIII.; Gregory the Great, *Moral.*, IV. *Præf.*, IX. 34.) Augustine, who defines the effect of baptism more specifically than was customary, states that, while it wholly removes original sin as a matter of guilt, it does not wholly remove it as a corruption of nature. (*De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 70, II. 4, 9, 44; *De Nup. et Concup.*, I. 28; *Contra Duas Epist.*, I. 27, III. 5.)

Baptism, being a necessary antecedent to church membership, was of course regarded not less than the latter a condition of salvation. Various writers indulge emphatic statements upon its necessity. Leo the Great declares that no one can be released from original sin, except through the sacrament of baptism. (*Epist.*, XV.) "Without the sacrament of regeneration," says Cassianus, "no one can escape eternal death." (*Collat.*, XIII. 19.) "We believe," writes Gennadius, "that to the baptized alone is there a way of salvation. We believe that no catechumen, except the martyr, though dying in good works, can have eternal life." (*De Eccl. Dogmat.*, LXXIV.) Augustine states that no one attains to God without baptism, — "*sine baptismo quidem nemo ad Deum pervenit.*" (*Serm.*, XC.) Fulgentius declares that whoever is not baptized, either in the name of Christ with consecrated water, or with His own

blood for the name of Christ and His Church, will undergo the burning of eternal fire. (*De Veritate Prædest. et Grat. Dei*, III. 19.) Gregory the Great teaches that those dying without the sacrament of salvation, before they have done good or evil, pass on to eternal death and perpetual torments. (*Moral.*, IX. 21.)

There was, however, a measure of exception to the theory of the strict necessity of baptism. Martyrdom, as in the preceding centuries, was commonly regarded as a full equivalent for the baptismal washing. Ambrose, while he declares in one instance (*De Mysterioriis*, IV.) that a catechumen cannot receive remission of sins unless he is baptized in the name of the Trinity, affirms that this grace was no doubt received by the deceased catechumen Valentinian, in virtue of his desire and purpose to be baptized. (*De Obitu Val. Consol.*, §§ 51, 75.) If, therefore, Ambrose is to be reconciled with himself, it must be concluded that in one instance he had in mind a voluntary neglect of baptism, and in the other an involuntary deprivation of the same. Augustine, too, while his theory leaves no chance for the salvation of an unbaptized infant, is constrained, at least in one instance, by the case of the dying thief, to admit that an eminent faith as well as martyrdom may save without baptism, where there is no opportunity for its administration. (*De Baptismo*, IV. 22.) In general, however, he emphasizes the indispensable need of baptism, and, in another connection than the above, suggests that the believing thief may after all have been baptized. (*Retract.*, II. 18.) The Pelagians were disposed to adopt a compromise theory as respects the fortunes of the unbaptized dying in infancy, holding that they receive salvation and eternal life, but not the kingdom of heaven, — “*salutem et vitam æternam præter regnum cælorum.*” (Augustine, *Serm.*, CCXCVI. Compare *De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss.*, I. 58; *De Peccat. Orig.*, XXIII.) A similar view was favored by Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa, both of whom declared the unbaptized

infant unworthy of any punishment, while at the same time they hesitated to affirm for it an heirship to the full measure of celestial glory. (Orat., XL. 23 ; *De Infantibus*.)

THE EUCHARIST. — That an extraordinary import should be attached to the eucharist accorded with the leading characteristics and tendencies of the period. An age more mystical than critical was naturally unwilling to stop with the more obvious sense of a rite which commemorates the crowning fact in the transcendent work of redemption. At the same time, the steady growth of hierarchical notions tended to magnify the significance of an ordinance, the manipulation of which was a prominent function of the priest.

As already intimated, the subject is one which gives much scope to expressions of a highly rhetorical nature. In such a case, it is an obvious rule of criticism that a single statement which cannot be understood in a figurative sense may outweigh, as evidence of real doctrinal belief, many statements which admit of being understood in such a sense. Applying this just rule, we need to feel no hesitation in laying down the proposition that the doctrine of transubstantiation was no part of the acknowledged doctrine of the Church at large, and that, if it was entertained at all, it was only as a peculiarity of individual belief.

In proof of the above proposition, we may quote the testimony of representative writers both of the East and of the West. Eusebius of Cæsarea speaks of memorializing at the table the sacrifice of Christ "by symbols, as well of the body as of the saving blood." (*Dem. Evang.*, I. 10.) The same writer, referring to John vi. 61-64, remarks: "By which things He desired to teach them that what they had heard about flesh and blood was to be understood spiritually. 'Think not ye that I speak of the flesh which I bear about, as if it were fitting that you should eat that; nor judge that I command you to drink the sensible and corporeal blood.'" (*De Eccl. Theol.*, III. 12.) Athanasius, commenting upon

the same passage, repudiates as emphatically as Eusebius the partaking of real flesh and blood. (Epist. ad Serapion, IV. 19.) With respect to both of these writers, it is to be noticed that their language implies a rejection in general of the idea that Christ imparts His literal body and blood, and not merely of this idea as connected with the single passage in question. Gregory Nazianzen calls the eucharistic elements types and antitypes of the body and blood of Christ, and of the salvation effected through Him. (Orat., VIII. 18, XVIII. 12.) He does this, too, with obvious reference to the *consecrated* elements. Referring to the claim that he had in mind the elements prior to consecration, Ullmann justly replies: "Not merely do the passages of Gregory contradict such a claim, but also the subject itself; for, before consecration, bread and wine are nothing but bread and wine without any further significance; and only by consecration can they become antitypes of the body and blood of Christ, let one understand thereby what he will." (Gregorius von Nazianz.) Theodoret testifies in the clearest manner to the belief that the consecrated bread and wine are symbols. "Say, therefore," he requests of his partner in the dialogue, "the mystical symbols, which are offered to God by the priests, of what are they the symbols?" (Dialog., II.) This language plainly gives the bread and wine the character of symbols *after* their consecration. With equal plainness he teaches that their essence is not changed, using, like other writers of the era, this very fact to illustrate the continuance of the human nature of Christ in its proper essence. The following passages need no comment: "He who termed His body grain and bread, and styled Himself the Vine, honored the visible symbols with the name of body and blood, not changing the nature, but adding grace to nature." (Dialog., I.) "The mystical symbols do not, indeed, after consecration, recede from their own nature. They remain in their former essence (*οὐσίας*), and figure, and

form, and can be seen and touched, even as before.” (Dialog., II.)

So far as the Latin Church is concerned, the testimony of two writers will be ample to sustain the proposition laid down, — the one being acknowledged by that Church as a prince in theology, and the other occupying its highest official position. Augustine, while he follows universal custom in naming the consecrated elements the body and blood of Christ, shows clearly enough, when he attempts to discriminate, that he did not believe them to be such in a literal sense. It is only after a certain manner, and in virtue of a certain resemblance, that they are so named. “Sicut ergo secundum *quemdam modum* sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est, sacramentum sanguinis Christi sanguis Christi est, ita sacramentum fidei fides est.” (Epist., XCVIII. ad Bonifacium.) Christ’s declaration that He would give His flesh to eat, he says, must not be understood carnally. “His grace is not consumed by tooth-biting.” (Tract. in Joan., XXVII.) He includes the eucharistic bread in a list of signs, such as the parted garment and the brazen serpent, and speaks as though it were consumed in its character as bread. (De Trin., III. 10.) Equally on the side of a symbolical interpretation, and against a transformation into actual body and blood, are the following declarations: “The Lord did not hesitate to say, ‘This is my body,’ since it served as a sign of His body, — Non dubitavit Dominus dicere, Hoc est corpus meum, quum signum daret corporis sui.” (Contra Adimant., XII. 3.) “It is not any bread and wine that we hold sacred as a natural production, — as if Christ were confined in corn or in vines, as the Manichæans fancy, — but what is truly consecrated as a symbol.” (Contra Faust., XX. 13.) “The feast, in which Christ commended to His disciples a figure (*figuram*) of His body and blood.” (In Psal., III. 1.) The Roman Bishop Gelasius, arguing like Theodoret for the integrity of Christ’s human nature, not-

withstanding its union with the Logos, states, in like unmistakable terms, that the bread and wine retain their essence after consecration. "Truly the sacraments," he says, "which we receive of the body and blood of Christ, are a divine thing, because through the same we are made partakers of the divine nature, and, nevertheless, the substance or nature of bread and wine does not cease to be, — tamen esse non desinit substantia vel natura panis et vini." (De Duabus Naturis in Christo.) The attempt of Bellarmine to assign this work, De Duabus Naturis, to another than the Roman Bishop scarcely needs to be noticed. Petavius refers it in very positive terms to Pope Gelasius. (Theol. Dogmat., De Incar., Lib. III. cap. 2.) Fulgentius, a younger contemporary of Pope Gelasius, quotes it as his production. (Epist., XIV. § 19.)

The doctrine of transubstantiation, therefore, being no dogma of the Church in this period, if entertained at all, was entertained only as a matter of individual opinion. But was it even thus held by any prominent Church teacher? A consideration of this question will lead us to an examination of writers who took less pains than the foregoing to make accurate definitions upon the subject, and whose total representation, accordingly, leaves their real belief more in the mist.

Cyril of Jerusalem, in one case, uses language which a writer would not have been likely to use after the doctrine of transubstantiation had been distinctly formulated, without designing it to be understood in the sense of that doctrine. He pleads that the transformation by Christ of water into wine makes it entirely credible that He should be able to transform wine into His blood, and states, moreover, that the consecrated elements, though having the appearance of bread and wine, are not such, but are the body and blood of Christ. (Catech., XXII.) On the other hand, however, he employs a comparison which is far from suggesting an actual change of substance. "As the bread

of the eucharist," he says, "after the invocation of the Holy Spirit, is no longer common bread, but the body of Christ, so, after the invocation, that sacred unguent is no longer a mere, or, if any one prefers so to speak, common unguent, but a charism of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, made efficient by the presence of His divinity." (Catech., XXI.) Now the oil was conceived to be changed, not by loss of its proper substance, but by the presence of a divine factor. It is plainly suggested, therefore, that Cyril may have regarded the elements as ceasing to be (common) bread and wine, simply in the sense that they become something more than bread and wine, the Divine Logos being joined with them and giving them a sacred character by His presence. This view, already announced by Justin Martyr and Irenæus, appears in an elaborated form with Gregory of Nyssa. (Orat. Catech., XXXVII.) Nothing beyond this view is necessarily indicated by the language of Cyril of Alexandria: "Do not doubt that this [change in the elements which makes them the life-giving body and blood of Christ] is true, since He Himself distinctly says, 'This is my body,' and 'This is my blood.' Rather receive with faith the word of the Saviour, for He who is the truth will not lie." (Comm. in Luc., XXII. 19.) Chrysostom, in his fervid rhetoric, uses expressions which might be understood to indicate the presence of the actual body of Christ in the eucharist. (Hom. in Matt., L.; Hom. in 1 Cor., XXIV.; Hom. in Eph., III.; Hom. in Joan., XLVI.) But rhetoric is not dogmatic teaching; and, besides, Chrysostom uses language which at least distinctly repudiates transubstantiation. The consecrated bread, he says, is worthy to be called the body of the Lord, "although the nature of bread remains in it." (Epist. ad Cæsar Monachum, quoted in Ridley's works, with comments on genuineness, Parker Society edition.) Hilary states that in the eucharist the flesh of Christ is truly received, and serves as the means by which He is joined in natural connection (*naturaliter*)

with believers. (De Trin., VIII.) This language, however, does not necessarily imply anything more than the view imputed to Gregory of Nyssa. The bread and wine, transfused with a heavenly virtue by their union with the Logos, may have been regarded by him as answering in all essential respects to the body and blood of Christ, and hence worthy to be so designated. Ambrose probably goes beyond every other writer of the period in the profusion of images, by which he illustrates the change wrought in the elements, referring to the transformation of Moses's rod, of the Nile, of the waters of Marah, and to the bursting forth of fire at the command of Elijah. (De Mysteriis, IX.) He also uses this expression, which looks very much like a positive assertion of the doctrine of transubstantiation: "Hoc quod conficimus corpus ex Virgine est,—This which we prepare is the body from the Virgin." (Ibid.) But, on the other hand, he affirms that the eucharistic food is not corporeal, but spiritual, and intimates that it is made the living bread from heaven simply by the union with it of the divine nature of Christ. (De Mysteriis, IX.; De Sacramentis, VI. 1.) Moreover, the change accomplished is named by him, in certain instances, a transfiguration. (De Incarn., IV.; De Fide, IV. 10.) It must be confessed, however, that it is quite as much the historical environment of Ambrose as the facts of his language, which would dictate the conclusion that he did not entertain the strict doctrine of transubstantiation. It seems contrary to the position which he occupied that he should have embraced this dogma,—a dogma not to be found among his predecessors in the Latin Church, and still rejected by the balance of the scholarly authority of that Church in the ninth century.

It appears, then, that the doctrine of transubstantiation was neither an acknowledged doctrine of the Church, nor one which was held by any considerable number of eminent theologians, if indeed it was held by any. Still, the lan-

guage of certain writers was in close affiliation with such a doctrine. The Church in this period was evidently drifting through a mystical maze in the direction of the amazing dogma of transubstantiation.

As to the positive theory of the eucharist which was most prevalent, Gieseler expresses the following conclusion: "It was the dominant teaching at this time concerning the elements of the eucharist, that the Logos so unites Himself with them as He did once with humanity, and that they receive thereby a divine power, and to this extent undergo an inner change and transformation. As related to the body and blood which Christ assumed in His incarnation, bread and wine were pronounced mere images and signs." (Dogmengeschichte.)

The eucharist was currently styled a sacrifice. As such it was associated with the sacrifice of Christ which it memorialized. In proportion, however, as there was no apprehension of the doctrine of transubstantiation, it is obvious that the eucharistic sacrifice did not have the meaning which it came ultimately to possess in the Roman Catholic mass. The benefits of this sacrifice were supposed to extend to the dead. The prayers of the Church for the departed, as Cyril of Jerusalem teaches, have great virtue when the sacrifice is upon the altar. (Catech. XXIII. 8, 9.) From Augustine we have this description of the sacrificial virtue of the eucharist: "When sacrifices either of the altar or of alms are offered on behalf of all the baptized dead, they are thank-offerings for the very good, they are propitiatory offerings for the not very bad; and in case of the very bad, even though they do not assist the dead, they are a species of consolation to the living. And when they are profitable, their benefit consists either in obtaining a full remission of sins, or at least in making the condemnation more tolerable." (Enchirid., CX.) Gregory the Great, writing nearly two centuries later than Augustine, illustrates the drift of the age in the strong emphasis which he

places upon the virtue of the eucharistic sacrifice both for the living and for the dead. The following are among his statements upon the subject: "Quoties ei hostiam suæ passionis offerimus, toties nobis ad absolutionem nostram passionem illius reparamus." (Hom. in Evang., XXXVII. 7.) "Si culpæ post mortem insolubiles non sunt, multum solet animas etiam post mortem sacra oblatio hostiæ salutaris adjuvare; ita ut hanc nonnunquam ipsæ defunctorum animæ expetere videantur." (Dialog., IV. 55.) This last statement Gregory supplements by narratives of instances in which souls were certified to have been released from their misery by the sacrifice of the altar.

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. CHILIASM. — According to the report of Epiphanius, the doctrine of Christ's personal reign on earth was still held by Apollinaris, and Jerome indicates that his view was shared by the uncultured multitude in Palestine. But already, in the early part of the fourth century, this doctrine had become comparatively obsolete. As to the thousand years which the Apocalypse specifies, Augustine suggests that they denote either the last thousand years of the world's history, or the whole duration of the world, the number one thousand being indicative not so much of definite time as of totality. By the reign of the saints in the millennial period, nothing further, as he teaches, is to be understood than the dominion which pertains to the Church. "The Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of heaven. Accordingly, even now His saints reign with Him, though otherwise than as they shall reign hereafter." (*De Civ. Dei*, XX. 7-9.) To obviate a millenarian use of the reference to the "first resurrection," Augustine taught that this denotes simply the resurrection of the soul from sin. (*Ibid.*, XX. 6.)

2. CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION. — It was the current doctrine of the Church at the opening of this period, that there is a twofold intermediate state; that the righteous in general pass to a happy abode, and there anticipate the more perfect bliss of heaven; while the lost, in a place severed from the

region of the saved by a great gulf, have a foretaste of their final doom.

There was a tendency, however, not to abide by this general representation. It was conceived that many who have received the sacraments of salvation, and may be regarded as heirs of eternal life, depart from this life in a moral state which calls for purgation. The incentive to define the nature and conditions of this purgation naturally worked with increasing force in an era of dogmatic construction. We find, accordingly, the primitive idea of a fire operative as a testing and destroying agent in immediate connection with the judgment, enlarged upon in important respects. A purifying agency of the fire, as well as a testing and destroying, began to be emphasized; moreover, the period over which it was supposed to extend was lengthened out. Considerable stress was laid by Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa on the purgation to be accomplished by such a fire. (Orat. XXXIX. 19, XL. 36; Orat. Catech., XXXV.) Ambrose, besides indulging the indefinite Origenistic representation that every one must pass through the flames before reaching Paradise (In Psal., CXVIII.), represents that those who do not come to the first resurrection must undergo burning for an interval equal to that between the first and second resurrection. "Qui autem non veniunt ad primam resurrectionem, sed ad secundam reservantur, isti urentur, donec impleant tempora inter primam et secundam resurrectionem; aut si non impleverint, diutius in supplicio permanebunt." (Enar. in Psal., I. 54.) Augustine took a step beyond this by teaching, or at least conjecturing, that any part of the interval between death and the judgment may be a purgatorial period. "Temporary punishments," he says, "are suffered by some in this life only, by others after death, by others both now and then; but all of them before that last and strictest judgment." (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 13.) "If it shall be said that, in the interval between the death of this body

and that last day of judgment and retribution which shall follow the resurrection, the spirits of the dead shall be exposed to a fire of such a nature that it shall not affect those who have not in this life indulged in such pleasures and pursuits as shall be consumed like wood, hay, stubble, but shall affect those others who have carried with them structures of that kind, this I do not contradict, because possibly it is true." (De Civ. Dei, XXI. 26.) Gregory the Great wrote upon this subject with more explicitness and confidence. What Augustine in the passage last quoted expressed in the form of a supposition, Gregory regarded as a matter for unquestioning belief. Indeed, the Romish doctrine of purgatory was very definitely outlined by him. He taught that the purgatorial fire burns those who depart from this life with the stains upon them of the more pardonable class of sins, and that the release of the tortured may be hastened by the prayers and sacrifices of Christians in this world. (Dialog., IV.) In confirmation of his theory various examples were brought forward, among others the case of the deacon Paschasius, who was released from the purgatorial fire in answer to the prayer of a bishop. "*Quia enim non malitia, sed ignorantiae errore peccaverat, purgari post mortem a peccato potuit.*" As already indicated, Gregory attached great virtue to the eucharistic sacrifice as a means of shortening the purgatorial suffering. The Scripture proof that certain sins may be pardoned after death, was found by Gregory in the statement that there is a sin which is to be forgiven neither in this world nor in the world to come. The implication of this passage is, as he maintained, that certain sins can be forgiven in this life, and certain even in the life to come.

The theory of purgatory naturally tended to a modification of the conception of the intermediate state. It nurtured the idea that inbred impurities make the difference between the fortunes of souls in the hereafter. It long had

been an accepted maxim, that genuine martyrdom is a complete purgation, and secures immediate entrance into the celestial heritage. What should debar others than martyrs from the same privilege, except remaining impurity? Those who die free from all sin, it was naturally argued, being at once fit for heaven, should enter at once upon its fruition; and of others, none should be excluded longer than the period required for purgation. Gregory the Great seems to have reached conclusions of this nature. We find him giving emphatic expression to the conviction that the souls of the perfectly righteous (*perfectorum justorum animæ*) are received immediately into celestial abodes, and enjoy the visible presence of the Redeemer. (*Dialog., IV. 25.*)

3. THE RESURRECTION. — While the teaching of Origen continued for a long time to have its influence with individuals, and inclined them to spiritualize more or less the conception of the resurrection, the dominant tendency was toward a literal view. Jerome and Augustine show the drift of the age, in that they advocate a very literal view in their later writings, though this involved some modification of statements made in their earlier works. The fate, also, of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople in the sixth century, who taught that the resurrection body will be impalpable, indicates which way the current of belief was moving. He was vigorously opposed, and his book was condemned to the fire. An exceptional view was that of the Alexandrian Philoponus, who held, on Aristotelian principles, that the body, by dissolution, loses its identity, and that the resurrection, therefore, is nothing else than the creation of a new body.

According to the literalists, the body of the resurrection state will possess the same members and be composed of the same substance as the body of this life. But while substantially the same, it will exist in a very different condition and manifest very different qualities. The body of

the saint will be transfigured, and healed of all its blemishes. As being perfectly obedient to the spirit, it will be a spiritual body.

Among the distinguishing features of the glorified body, Augustine enumerates the following: 1. It will be composed of material purified in the conflagration by which the end of the world is to be signalized. (*De Civ. Dei*, XX. 16.) 2. It will be capable of receiving material food, but will not need the same for its sustenance. (*Epist.*, XCV., CII.; *De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 22; *Serm.*, CCCLXII.) 3. It will not embarrass movement by weight, and can probably be transported at will with a celerity like the glance of the eye. (*Enchirid.*, XCI.; *De Civ. Dei*, XIII. 18; *Serm.*, CCLXXVII.) 4. It will in all cases conform to the stature of early manhood; no one in the resurrection will appear in the bodily form of an infant. (*De Civ. Dei*, XXII. 15; *Serm.*, CCXLII.)

Various rational evidences were adduced to establish the credibility of the resurrection, but no essential advance was made upon the arguments brought forward in the previous period.

4. FINAL AWARDS. — Near the end of the fourth century an unusual number of exceptions appears to the standing doctrine of the early Church on the endlessness of future punishment. One of the most conspicuous among these was Gregory of Nyssa. In unmistakable terms he reproduced the Origenistic theory of the corrective design of punishment, and of its destined cessation in the ultimate cessation of moral evil. (*De Hom. Opif.*, XXI.; *Orat. Catech.*, VIII., XXXV.) Gregory, in truth, was more of a restorationist than Origen, inasmuch as he did not assume, like the latter, the probability that the restored will again fall. A philosophical ground for his conclusion was found by him in the limited nature of evil. "Since evil," he says, "is never unbounded, but confined within certain limits, it necessarily follows that good becomes a successor to evil." Didymus of Alexandria is also credited with teaching the

limited duration of future punishment. The same view was held by Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Gregory Nazianzen, while he did not deny the endlessness of future punishment, betrays a certain inclination to favor the contrary theory, in that he suggests that it might be more worthy of the Divine Avenger to soften punishment, than to carry out to the letter the doom foreshadowed in the Gospel. (Orat., XL. 36.) From the Latin Church no prominent writer can be quoted as favoring a limited term of punishment, though Augustine indicates that there were Christians in his day who declared in favor of the same. (Enchirid., LXVII., CXII.) The citation, in a recent work, of Ambrose, as an advocate of a universal restoration, must be regarded as a mistake. While some general expressions may be found which seem to savor of that theory, more specific utterances show that his restoration scheme embraced simply the different grades of believers. All of these may hope for a purification. But the unbelievers, the *impii*, have no part in Christ. They rise not to judgment in the last day, but to punishment, since they are condemned already. As the Emperors who chastise offending *citizens* make no inquisition regarding the private life of the *barbarians*, but treat them in a mass as enemies, "so also Christ chastises those whom He loves; but aliens, as bound by a common condemnation for impiety, He delivers to eternal punishment, — *alienos tanquam generali damnatione impietatis adstrictos pœnæ donat æternæ.*" (In Psal., CXVIII.; Serm., XX. 24.)

The fact that already in the early part of the fifth century one could not advocate restorationism without incurring the odium of heresy, indicates that the doctrine of endless punishment must have been dominant in the closing part of the preceding century, notwithstanding the exceptions mentioned. Indeed, aside from these exceptions, nearly all the prominent writers of the period speak with-

out qualification of an eternal punishment or irreversible doom for the wicked. (Athanasius, *De Incar. Verbi*, § 56; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.*, II. 1, XV. 26, XVIII. 19; Basil, *Hom. in Psal.* XXXIII. 4, XLVIII. 5, LXI. 3; Chrysostom, *Hom. in Joan.*, XVII.; Epiphanius, *Adv. Hær.*, LIX. 10; Hilary, *Tract. super Psal.*, LV. 10; Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XXI.; Gregory the Great, *Moral.*, VIII. 15, 52, IX. 63, XXIV. 19; Jerome, *Comm. in Is.*, Lib. XVIII.; Genadius, *De Eccl. Dog.*, IX.)

That there are different degrees of punishment, as well as of reward, was the common verdict of theologians. Those denying the salvation of unbaptized infants regarded their lot as more tolerable than that of the lost in general. As respects the nature of future punishment, quite a literal view of the fire of Gehenna became prevalent, at least in the Latin Church. As eminent a writer as Augustine regarded actual fire as one of the agents in producing the torments of the lost. "The worm that dieth not," he says, "and the fire that is not quenched, which constitute the punishment of the wicked, are differently interpreted by different people. For some refer both to the body; others refer both to the soul; while others again refer the fire literally to the body, and the worm figuratively to the soul, which seems the more credible idea." (*De Civ. Dei*, XX. 22.) Not less in favor of the literal sense is the following: "For my own part, I find it easier to understand both [the burning fire and the gnawing worm] as referring to the body, than to suppose that neither does; and I think that Scripture is silent regarding the spiritual pain of the damned, because, though not expressed, it is necessarily understood that in a body thus tormented the soul also is tortured with a fruitless repentance." (*Ibid.*, XXI. 9.) Gregory the Great remarks on the peculiar nature of the Gehenna fire, — a fire which gives no light, and is able to burn forever without any replenishing of fuel. That he thought of it as material fire, is sufficiently evident from

the following language: "Gehenna ignis, cum sit corporeus, et in se missos reprobos corporaliter exurat, nec studio humano succenditur, nec lignis nutritur, sed creatus semel durat inextinguibilis." (Moral., XV. 29. Compare Dialog., IV. 29.)

The principal factors in the blessedness of the saved were conceived to be the knowledge of God, and fellowship with Him and with the household of heaven. In the Latin Church Augustine supplied the characteristic phrase for describing the crowning felicity of the world to come, in that he located this in the vision of God. (De Civ. Dei, XXII. 29, Serm., LXIX., CXXVII.) It is noteworthy, also, that Augustine supplied to succeeding Latin writers the most signal precedent for placing the whole reward of the Christian life in the hereafter. Before his glowing vision of the heavenly inheritance, all the happiness which may be found in this world, even in the noblest use of its opportunities, appeared as naught. After enumerating the manifold blessings of this life, he adds: "All these are but the solace of the wretched and condemned, not the rewards of the blessed. What, then, shall these rewards be, if such be the blessings of a condemned state? What will He give to those whom He has predestined to life, who has given such things even to those whom He has predestined to death? What blessings will He in the blessed life shower upon those for whom, even in this state of misery, He has been willing that His only-begotten Son should endure such sufferings, even to death?" (De Civ. Dei, XXII. 24.) "O that our hearts," he exclaims, "were in some measure aspiring after that ineffable glory! O that we were passing our pilgrimage in sighs, and loving not the world, and continually pushing onwards with pious minds to Him who hath called us! Were we loving God worthily, we should have no love at all for money. Money, then, will be thy means of pilgrimage, not the stimulant of lust. Thou art passing on thy journey, and this life is but a wayside inn.

Use money as the traveller at an inn uses table, cup, pitcher, and couch, with the purpose, not of remaining, but of leaving them behind." (Tract. in Joan., XL. 10.) A similar portraiture of this life as a sighing pilgrimage toward the object of all hope and aspiration occurs often in the writings of Gregory the Great.

Third Period.

726-1517.

INTRODUCTION.

WHILE in the preceding centuries the Greek Church was specially distinguished by theological activity, in the mediæval period the Latin Church holds by far the pre-eminence in this respect. The agency of the Greek Church in doctrinal development was wellnigh ended at the close of the Monothelite controversy. Subsequent to this there is little to record except the strife over the worship of images (726-842), and the consideration of this prolonged struggle belongs rather to general church history than to the history of doctrine. A prominent cause of this fixedness was the imperial despotism, with its policy of enforcing conformity to the chosen standards. To this was added the fact of a decline in the spirit and life of religion, such as naturally induced an unthinking acquiescence in ancient formulas, or left too little interest in truth to make it seem worth while to brave opposition in the assertion of private convictions. After the seventh century the activity of Greek theologians was confined mainly to collecting and systematizing the opinions of previous writers.

The most eminent example in this line of work was John of Damascus (about 676-756.) He distinguished himself in the iconoclastic controversy as the fervent and eloquent champion of images; but his great memorial is his dogmatic work, *Ἐκδοσις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου Πίστewς*. This, if not distinguished by much originality of thought, appears,

in respect of orderly arrangement and compact statement, a very creditable specimen, for that age, of a systematic theology. The principal sources from which he drew were the writings of the Cappadocian Gregories, Basil, the pseudo Dionysius, Aristotle, and Nemesius. In his method John of Damascus may be regarded as a forerunner of the Latin scholastics, and indeed a distinct historical connection may be affirmed between them. His work was translated into Latin in the twelfth century, and was often quoted during the crowning era of the scholastic theology. Peter Lombard had recourse to it, and speaks of its author in these flattering terms: "Joannes Damascenus, inter doctores Græcorum maximus." (Sent., I. 19. 13.) In the Greek Church the writing of John of Damascus continued to hold a foremost place among dogmatic works. None of his imitators became fairly his rivals. Among the more noteworthy of these were two writers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Euthymius Zigabenus and Nicetas Choniates (or Acominatus), the former the author of a *Πανοπλία δογματική*, the latter of a *Θησαυρὸς ὀρθοδοξίας*. Nicolaus of Methone, who lived about the same time, is noted for his work in refutation of the Platonist Proclus.

The later movements in the Latin Church were without any marked effect upon the Greek Church. The pride of the latter was unwilling to receive anything from Latin barbarism. A growing separation ensued between the two branches, a separation fostered by the rival ambitions of the Patriarchs of Rome and of Constantinople, by the political severance which ensued as the Roman bishops made alliance with the princes of the Franks, and by certain differences in doctrine, discipline, and worship, the more important of these having reference to the procession of the Spirit, the enforced celibacy of the priesthood among the Latins, and their use of unleavened bread in the eucharist. The exact date at which the separation may be said to have been consummated is not easily fixed. Perhaps it

may be located most appropriately at the middle of the eleventh century, when Michael Cerularius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, issued a vigorous condemnation of the errors of the Latins, and closed the churches in his neighborhood in which worship was celebrated after the Latin mode.

Apart, then, from John of Damascus, in the period upon which we now enter, our consideration is limited almost entirely to the West. We have to review the protracted efforts of Latin Christianity to complete and to fortify its dogmatic structure. We shall find it building upon plans which had already been outlined, adding here and there a new feature, until in the issue there appears a near approach to what is known in the modern era as Roman Catholicism.

Unlike the writers who figured in the opening centuries of the second period, and still more unlike those who initiated the era of speculative theology in the first period, the mediæval theologians entered upon a domain which had already been pretty well traversed. In every department of Christian thought they were confronted by standards more or less distinct and authoritative,—by the unimpeachable decisions of councils, or by the verdict of great masters in theology, like Augustine and Gregory the Great, whose word was looked upon as wellnigh decisive. The task, therefore, which they regarded as assigned to themselves, was not so much to discover truth as to systematize and defend what the Church in the previous centuries had already discovered to be included in its faith.

An important index of the weight attached to current authorities may be found in the history of heresies. They hold here a subordinate place as compared with the strength and influence which they had commanded in the preceding centuries. Deviations from the authorized faith, though numerous, were in the main local and limited phenomena, as will appear from the following enumeration of the principal cases of dissent. (1.) *The Adoptionists*, who ap-

peared in Spain, and were an occasion of controversy for a brief interval at the close of the eighth and during the first years of the ninth century. Their name is indicative of their distinguishing tenet, namely, that Christ, as to his human nature, is the *adopted* Son of God. (2.) *Gottschalk*, condemned in the ninth century to life-long imprisonment for teaching a double predestination, — a doctrine which claimed at the time a number of adherents, but no other eminent victim of persecution. (3.) *Berengar of Tours*, condemned in the eleventh century on account of his keen and vehement antagonism to the doctrine of transubstantiation, and constrained by the terrors of threatened punishment to an unwilling recantation. Though, as he averred, many held at that time the same view which he advocated, Berengar appears in public controversy as a single champion. (4.) *Roscelin*, condemned near the close of the eleventh century for teaching tritheism, an individual case. (5.) *Anti-hierarchical sects of the less moderate and evangelical stamp*. The history of this order of mediæval sectaries is one of the obscurest in the range of investigation. While it is certain that such sectaries appeared in the West in the eleventh and the succeeding centuries, not a few points respecting their origin and beliefs are problematical. Very likely they were connected with the sects of the East, among which the Paulicians and the Bogomiles held a prominent place, the former originating in Armenia about the sixth century, and long persecuted by the Byzantine government, the latter flourishing in Bulgaria in the twelfth century. While both of these had the merit of opposing the current worship of images and saints, both carried their opposition to ceremonialism to the extreme of rejecting water baptism, both were inclined to docetism in their view of Christ incarnate, and both entertained a dualistic theory, making the creator of the material world an evil principle. Similar views were held by the parties in the West, who were unearthed

in Aquitaine, at Orleans, Arras, Cambray, and in the neighborhood of Turin, in the first half of the eleventh century. At Orleans in 1022 thirteen were sent to the stake. Sectaries of this description continued to appear, acquiring as their most common designation the name of Cathari, and finding harborage especially in Northern Italy and Southern France. Those included under this term were in common anti-hierarchical and dualistic, but differed as to the degree of dualism which they affirmed. The more extreme were absolute dualists, predicating two original principles, a good and an evil. The Albigenses, who were made the object of such a fierce crusade in the early part of the thirteenth century, represented various shades of Catharist belief. Shortly before the outbreak of the war with the Albigenses, a sect, born seemingly altogether out of due time, appeared in Italy, the Jewish Christian sect of the Pasagii, who combined a conception of Christ much like the Arian with the doctrine of the continued obligation of the Mosaic law. The same era also witnessed the encroachment of pantheistic beliefs. Amalrich of Bena, a teacher in the Paris University, who died in 1207, is said to have given a pantheistic sense to the proposition that true believers are members of Christ. David of Dinanto, a reputed disciple of Amalrich, but probably quite as much indebted to the Mohammedan commentators upon Aristotle as to him, fell decidedly into pantheism. According to Thomas Aquinas, while Amalrich held that God is the formal principle of the world, David of Dinanto taught that he is the material principle of the same. (Sum. Theol., I. 3. 8.) This pantheistic leaven was imbibed by the Sect of the Holy Spirit, who denounced the ruling Church as Babylon and the Pope as Antichrist, and in apocalyptic style proclaimed the ushering in of a new era,—the age of the Holy Spirit, whose incarnation, they claimed, was begun in themselves. A number of these sectaries were condemned to the stake in 1210. A kindred set of views, as respects

the corrupt state of the Church and the advent of the age of the Holy Spirit, was published by the Abbot Joachim, in Calabria, at the close of the twelfth century, and in course of the next century found acceptance with the rigid section of the Franciscans, the Fratricelli. They gained a place also in some of the semi-monastic societies of the Beghards, together with pantheistic notions, like those entertained by the Sect of the Holy Spirit just mentioned, or by the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit, who appeared in various parts of Germany at the beginning of the fourteenth century. (6.) *Anti-hierarchical sects of the more moderate and evangelical stamp.* Here belong the Waldenses, the Wycliffites, and the Hussites. The Waldenses, starting from Peter Waldo of Lyons, in the last half of the twelfth century, were distinguished at first simply by their zeal in the study and dissemination of the Scriptures, and their emphasis upon the teaching function of all Christians instructed in the truth. At this stage they were not conspicuous for hostility to the hierarchy or its doctrinal system; but persecution drove them into opposition to the former, and to a rejection of at least some of the specifically Romish features of the latter. Neander credits them with rejecting transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass as defined by Romish standards, saint-worship, and the doctrine of Purgatory. The remote valleys of Piedmont and Savoy became their principal asylum. Wycliffe, who was the most important reformer before the days of Luther, and anticipated the Reformation at almost every point, left at his death, in 1384, quite a strong party in England; but after a few decades, the repressing efforts of the government had driven it into obscurity. Huss, who was martyred at Constance in 1415, though exalting like Wycliffe the authority of Scripture, made a less sweeping attack upon the peculiarities of Romish dogma. His followers in Bohemia were strong enough for a time to bear the brunt of a desolating war, but at length were reduced

to a small remnant. The Moravians remain as the surviving memorial of the Hussite movement.

As is apparent from this review, dissent was almost a constant factor in mediæval history; but at the same time it was largely sporadic, was kept within limits by the church authorities, was prevented from becoming dominant over any wide stretch of territory. Notwithstanding the various reactions against the hierarchical system, it commanded a vast, overshadowing power.

It is to be noted, however, that in the dominant ecclesiastical system itself strict uniformity in spirit and belief was not maintained. Even within the circle of reputed orthodoxy diverging movements and marked contrasts appeared. While scholasticism may be allowed to give the name to the period, inasmuch as it was the more characteristic development, mysticism was an ever-recurring factor. Within scholasticism itself also noteworthy differences manifested themselves,—different philosophical affinities and different interpretations of some of the fundamental truths of Christian theology. Mysticism, too, had its varied types, ranging from a simple emphasis upon the inner life to that enthusiastic portrayal of union with God which seems barely to escape pantheism. In fine, the mediæval period had its characteristic features and drift, but it had also its significant diversities. As compared with the Roman Catholicism of the present, the Latin Christianity of the Middle Ages may be pronounced the more diversified.

Third Period.

726-1517.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHY held in general an important place in the estimate of the theologians of this period. Some regarded it as identical with revealed religion, being the theoretical side of the same, and pronouncing a concordant verdict upon all its essential truths. Others held that philosophy, so far as it is competent to proceed, is in agreement with revealed religion, but maintained that some important truths of the Christian system, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, lie beyond the range of the natural reason, and so could not have been ascertained by philosophy proper in the use merely of its own resources. Others again, while they were ready enough to philosophize, affirmed that philosophy and Christian theology might be, and indeed are, in antagonism upon certain points. Others, finally, were inclined to have little to do with philosophy, and to regard it as of little utility to the Christian Church. The first standpoint seems to have been characteristic of Erigena and Abelard. The second was the more prevalent view in the crowning era of scholasticism, and was held by Alexander Hales, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas.

The third view emerged as scholasticism was on the eve of its decline, and was represented initially by Duns Scotus, and in a more ample and positive way by William Occam. The last view was naturally, in the different centuries, the view of the less speculative advocates of practical piety.

There was a tendency in the Middle Ages to exalt Aristotle as compared with Plato. At the culmination of this tendency, the verdict of the early centuries was completely reversed. Aristotle was lifted to a place of unrivalled eminence, and was deferred to as the great philosophic master. The explanation of this development is to be found in the differing demands of the two eras, and in the corresponding differences between the two philosophers. The early fathers were chiefly interested in spirit and content. Their highest appreciation was naturally elicited for a philosophy most akin to the spiritual impulses, the fresh life, and the up-reaching aspirations which the new leaven of Christianity generated in the hearts of its converts. Hence Platonism, with its spiritual and ideal elements, commanded a foremost place among all the treasures of ancient philosophy. The theologians of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, had a superior interest in the task of embodying truth in formulas and systems. They had inherited a mass of dogmatic statements from the fathers. The materials for a great theological structure were at hand. Their work, as they understood it, was to put the materials together, and to prove the right of each to a place in the edifice of Christian truth. Hence they had a special appreciation for logical and encyclopedic works, and this turned them of necessity toward Aristotle, the father of logic, the most encyclopedic mind of the ancient world.

Notwithstanding their approximation in such an important point as the theistic character pertaining to both, the systems of Plato and Aristotle differed widely. Like the minds whence they emanated, the one may be characterized as poetic, the other as prosaic. "Plato is richly gifted with

genial fancy : in Aristotle this is entirely wanting. In the former, genius, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, is the most distinguishing element : a most eminent and sound understanding characterizes the latter. Hence, with the former, thought enters the regions of the supernatural and mystical, while with the latter it remains throughout rationalistic." (Ackermann, *The Christian Element in Plato*.) Again, the one may be characterized as deeply informed with a religious spirit, the other as predominantly secular in tone. "In Platonism, the religious element is innate, and is properly the living germ from which the whole life is developed : Aristotle, in his elaborately finished scientific edifice, has constructed for himself a kind of theology, but of empty names and conceptions." (Ackermann.) "His [Aristotle's] philosophy considers principally man's particular condition on earth ; it purposes nothing more than a science suitable to this state ; whereas the science which Plato sought to establish was intended to soar high above the narrow limits of earthly relations, and sought to contemplate man, not in his present misery, but emancipated therefrom, and enjoying a higher and disembodied existence." (Ritter, *History of Ancient Philosophy*.) Both gave place to the idea of a personal God, and both entertained high conceptions of His transcendence ; but Aristotle brought God into less intimate moral relations with man. "While Plato speaks of being made like God through becoming just and holy, Aristotle asserts that all moral virtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God. He is not the God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to human cares, and interests, and sorrows." (B. F. Cocker, *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*.) Moreover, the doubt which Aristotle casts upon the personal immortality of the soul must be regarded as seriously abridging the significance of the relations between man and God. Again, Platonism may be described as distinguished by a strong interest in the ideal

and universal, while Aristotelianism had relatively a strong interest in the actual and the individual. "Plato finds his highest joy in the whole and the unit; Aristotle, in the mass and abundance of sharply defined particulars. The former raises himself above nature; the latter sinks himself into her, and into the observation of real objects." (Ackermann.) Hence the doctrine of ideas, in which Plato had such delight, was far from commanding the zeal, or even the assent, of Aristotle. Once more, in Platonism the element of intuition is conspicuous, in Aristotelianism that of analysis and systematizing. The course of the one was impelled more by deep, underlying convictions, that of the other by a bent to criticism and to logical construction. "Plato," says Prof. Cocker, "was intuitive and synthetical: Aristotle was logical and analytical. . . . To arrange and to classify all the objects of knowledge, to discuss them systematically, and as far as possible exhaustively, was evidently the ambition, perhaps also the special function, of Aristotle. He would survey the entire field of human knowledge, he would study nature as well as humanity, matter as well as mind, language as well as thought; he would define the limits of each department of study, and present a regular statement of the facts and principles of each science. And, in fact, he was the first who really separated the different sciences, and erected them into distinct systems, each resting upon its proper principles."

From these contrasted features it is evident that Platonism was the philosophy with which mysticism could most naturally form an alliance. History, to be sure, may point to instances in which mysticism has been found in conjunction with Aristotelianism; but a preponderance of instances verifies the judgment that Platonism is the congenial consort of mysticism, while Aristotelianism is suited to command special favor under a reign of scholasticism.

Viewed as the companion and patron of scholasticism, Aristotelianism may be credited with a certain practical

service. Without the control of such a factor, an age possessing so large an element of the romantic as did the mediæval, had it been left to the sole impulse of an ideal philosophy like Platonism, might easily have drifted into an exaggerated mysticism.

While Aristotle claimed a growing appreciation, in the first part of the Middle Ages he was still outranked by Plato, or at any rate not ranked above him. Eminent writers are found who repeat the verdict of the early fathers. Erigena speaks of Plato as *philosophantium de mundo maximus*, and as *philosophorum summus*. (De Divis. Nat., I. 31, III. 36.) Anselm, whatever his formal estimate may have been, shows a prominent affinity for Platonism in his system of thought. Abelard styles Plato *maximus philosophorum* and *summus philosophorum* (Intro. ad Theol., I. 17, II. 10; Theol. Christ., I. 5), and equivalent terms are used by John of Salisbury. At the same time each of these writers gives evidence that the age entertained a very high estimate of Aristotle. Erigena speaks of Aristotle as "the most acute among the Greeks," *acutissimus apud Græcos*. (De Divis., Nat. I. 14.) Anselm exhibits an appreciative acquaintance with the categories and logical methods of Aristotle. Abelard refers to him as *princeps dialecticorum* (Intro. ad Theol., III. 7); and John of Salisbury, while he was evidently not in love with his dialectics, allows that he is deservedly ranked next to Plato. (Polyc., I. 6, VII. 6.) But in the next century after Abelard and John of Salisbury, Aristotle claimed a vast pre-eminence over Plato. Philosophy became wellnigh identical, in the thought of theologians, with the system of Aristotle, and, instead of being called by his proper name, he was frequently mentioned simply as "Philosophus." So he is styled in innumerable instances by Thomas Aquinas, and the same usage appears with Duns Scotus and others.

Up to the twelfth century only a section of Aristotle's works, namely, some of his analytical writings, were in the

possession of Latin theologians. In that century his physics and metaphysics were made accessible. They came, however, by a roundabout course, being found with the Arabic scholars in Spain, and translated, together with the commentaries of Arabic philosophers, into Latin. The Jews, whose interest in trade led them from one country to another, were the chief agents in the work of translation, and sometimes rendered into Hebrew before rendering into Latin. But early in the thirteenth century translations directly from the Greek original were placed in the hands of Latin theologians. Alexander Hales is supposed to have been the first of the scholastics who was in full possession of the works of Aristotle. At this time the physics and metaphysics encountered the suspicion of the church authorities, the first being condemned in 1209, and both in 1215. In 1231, lecturing upon them was prohibited until further notice. Meanwhile this adverse verdict had little practical effect, and in 1254 the Paris University, without suffering any challenge, decreed the number of hours which should be given to the exposition of Aristotle's metaphysics and of his principal works on physics. Later, the voice of the Church declared that no one should obtain the degree of master who had not read upon Aristotle, this "precursor of Christ in things natural, as John the Baptist was in things of grace," — *præcursor Christi in naturalibus sicut Joannes Baptista in gratuitis*. (Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophie.)

As scholasticism waned, there was a relative decline in the appreciation of Aristotle. The closing part of the period witnessed a revived interest in Plato. This was especially conspicuous in Italy in the fifteenth century, where it was promoted in particular by the works of Ficinus. It is not without a certain justice, therefore, that Platonism has been styled the morning and evening red of mediæval philosophy.

Among subordinate sources, the writings of the Moham-

medan scholars are worthy of notice. The philosophy embodied in these may be described in general as Aristotelianism tinged with Neo-Platonism. Among those approaching most nearly to pure Aristotelianism was the distinguished Eastern sage and physician, Avicenna, who died in 1036. Most of his writings were made accessible to the West, in translated form, in the twelfth century, and won no inconsiderable appreciation from Christian theologians. Avicenna is quite frequently quoted by Thomas Aquinas. Less acceptable to orthodox tastes, but highly renowned for his genius and learning, was the Western philosopher Averroës, born at Cordova in 1126. Like Avicenna and others of the leading Arabic scholars, he was given more or less to the study and practice of medicine. His system was one of the products of a sceptical spirit which appeared within the bounds of Mohammedanism. It was essentially pantheistic, denying creation from nothing, the free determination of the Divine Being, and the personal immortality of the soul. On the Christian side, Raymond Lullus, that remarkable combination of scholastic logic with the fire of missionary zeal, is noted for his attempted refutation of Averroës. Of other Arabic scholars who acquired a reputation in the philosophic sphere, the principal in the East were Alkendi, Alfarabi, and Algazel; in the West, Avempace and Abubacer. Among the Jews who made alliance with the Aristotelian philosophy, Maimonides, born at Cordova in 1135, attained the highest fame. Avicbron, who preceded him, is also worthy of note as the author of the "*Fons Vitæ*," a work much quoted in the Middle Ages.

As already indicated, the writings of the pseudo Dionysius were held in high regard during the Middle Ages. John of Damascus speaks of him as a "man most eminent in theology." (*De Fide Orth.*, II. 3.) In 824 the works of Dionysius came to the West, as the gift of the Greek Emperor Michael II. to Louis the Pious. Before the close

of the same century they had secured one of their most distinct memorials in the West, namely, the strong impress which they left upon Erigena's system of thought. If the leading scholastics of the succeeding centuries were less influenced by the theology of the pseudo Dionysius as a whole, they still treated him with conspicuous respect, and deferred to his authority upon individual points, such as the scheme for the angelic hierarchy.

A philosophic theme of special interest to many of the scholastics was that concerning the force of general terms, or the nature of the *universalia*. Are there realities corresponding to such terms? was the chief question under discussion. Those who held that universal terms are expressive of genuine realities acquired the name of "realists"; those who denied that they indicate anything actual, and laid the whole stress upon the individual as opposed to the general, were called "nominalists."

Already ancient philosophy had given the example of different views upon this subject. Plato was in the most emphatic sense a realist, inasmuch as he taught that the universal (that is, the super-sensible ideas) precedes the individual, and indeed that the latter has real subsistence only by participation in the former. His view may not inaptly be expressed by the scholastic formula, *Universalia ante rem*. Aristotle, while he did not deny that there is a reality corresponding to general terms, strongly criticised the Platonic view that this reality is to be regarded as independent of individual things, and in actual subsistence anterior to the same. The reality, as he maintained, is to be found in individual things. In the essence of the individual the universal has its subsistence; white, for example, existing really only in concrete white objects. The formula for this view became *Universalia in re*, which may be described as the formula of a modified realism. The Stoics, finally, were nominalists, denying that there is any reality corresponding to general terms, either in or without

individual things, and holding that such terms are used simply as a convenient substitute for an enumeration of the resembling individuals comprised under them; the term "man," for example, standing for Socrates, Plato, and the whole list. The formula used to designate this theory was, *Universalia post rem*.

In the early part of the scholastic era realism was in the ascendant. Erigena and Anselm were realists more after the Platonic than after the Aristotelian standard. While they did not deny that universals have a subsistence in individual things, they regarded the former as antecedent to the latter, and as possessed of superior reality. The first of the scholastics to advocate nominalism with a distinct repudiation of the rival theory was Roscelin, a contemporary of Anselm. That his theory was regarded as an innovation may be inferred from Anselm's reference to the "modern dialecticians" with whom he associates him. (De Fide Trin., III.) The condemnation of Roscelin served for the time being to discredit nominalism as being connected with his heterodox theory of the Trinity. Realism descended from Anselm to William of Champeaux, and was set forth by him in such radical propositions as seemed to threaten a total sacrifice of the reality of the individual in favor of that of the universal. William, however, was called to a halt by the criticisms of Abelard. As to the position of Abelard himself, some difference of opinion has been entertained. Certain is it that he assumed an attitude of criticism toward both extreme nominalism and extreme realism. He accredited to general terms at the very least the expression of a mental reality, the concept in the mind of the one who employs them, and opposed this view to the idea that such terms are mere sounds; in other words, he held at least the doctrine of conceptualism. It would seem probable also that he was inclined to a modified realism, whether he maintained this with strict consistency or not. Erdmann says that to the *ante res* of William and the *post*

res of Roscelin he opposed his own formula, namely, *Universalia sunt in rebus*.

After Abelard, during the middle era of scholasticism, the prevailing theory was somewhat of a compromise, — predominantly Aristotelian to be sure, but deferring in a measure to the Platonic view, inasmuch as some stress was laid upon the pre-existence in the divine mind of the forms and patterns of all things, — though these pre-existing forms were not so positively associated with the essence of things as they had been by Plato and Anselm. This view, of course, involved no denial of the truth maintained by the conceptualist doctrine. At this time, therefore, the teaching of the scholastics corresponded essentially to that of Avicenna, who affirmed that “not only the *genera*, but all *universalia*, are as well *ante multitudinem* [that is, prior to the sum total of individuals], namely, in the divine understanding, as also *in multitudine*, as the real common predicates of things; finally also *post multitudinem*, as our conceptions formed by abstraction from things.” (Erdmann.)

In the closing era of scholasticism there was a reaction in favor of the long-repudiated doctrine of nominalism. This emanated in particular from William Occam. His teaching, though vehemently opposed at first, finally gained the ascendancy in the Paris University, as well as a large following in other quarters. Though rejecting realism, whether in the Platonic form or in that ascribed above to Aristotle, Occam does not seem to have indulged the more extreme phraseology of nominalism. He does not characterize general terms as mere sounds, and in the place which he gives to the corresponding mental conceptions illustrates the fact that nominalism so called and conceptualism have not always been separated by any very marked line of division.

At first thought this whole subject might seem foreign to the consideration of theologians. But no doubt it had its bearings upon theology. Realism as emphasizing the

universal, and to a large extent the super-sensible, has naturally a different goal from nominalism, with its stress upon the individual, or upon that which comes within the range of observation. The one theory, provided it penetrates to the feelings, tends to give a certain impulse toward spirituality; the other, the same proviso being understood, tends to foster a secular bias. The one theory, carried to an abusive extreme, so disparages the individual, and emphasizes the superior reality of the universal, that the former is reduced to the merely phenomenal, and the true conception of personality disappears in the maze of pantheism; the other, pushed to an extreme, nurtures indifference toward anything beyond the range of observation, and lands in deism or practical atheism.

One other item may properly command a passing notice. A philosophical distinction which played quite a conspicuous part in scholasticism was that between matter and form,—*materia* and *forma*. In the current view of the scholastics, the distinction was taken in the Aristotelian sense. Matter was characterized as the principle of potentiality, form as the principle of actuality. The one gives the indefinite substratum; the other supplies the determinateness necessary to real or concrete being.

SECTION II. — AUTHORS, SCHOOLS, AND SYSTEMS.

1. *Authors and their Chief Works of Dogmatic Import.*

	Writings.	Date of Death.
John of Damascus . . .	Exposition of the Orthodox Faith	After 754
Theophylact	Commentaries on the New Testa- ment	About 1112
Beda	Commentaries on the Scriptures .	A. D. 735
Alcuin	Against Felix; Against the Epistle of Elipandus; Commentaries on the Scriptures	804
Strabo	Commentaries on the Scriptures .	849
Rabanus Maurus	On the Institution of the Clergy; On the Universe; Commentaries on the Scriptures	856

	Writings.	Date of Death.
Paschasius Radbertus	{ On the Body and Blood of the Lord; On Faith, Hope, and Charity; Commentaries on the Scriptures }	A.D. 865
Gottschalk	Confession of Faith	867
Ratramnus	{ On the Predestination of God; On the Body and Blood of the Lord }	868, or later.
Erigena	{ On Divine Predestination; On the Division of Nature }	After 877
Hincmar	On Predestination and Free Will	A.D. 882
Berengar of Tours		1088
Lanfranc	{ On the Body and Blood of the Lord; Commentaries on Paul's Epistles }	1089
Anselm	{ Cur Deus Homo (a consideration of the atonement); Monologium; Proslogium }	1109
Odo of Cambray	On Original Sin	1113
Roscelin		After 1119
William of Champeaux		A.D. 1121
Guibert of Nogent	On the Pledges of the Saints	1124
Rupert of Deutz	{ On Divine Offices; On the Will of God; On the Omnipotence of God; On the Trinity and its Works }	1135
Hugo of St. Victor	{ Dialogue on the Sacraments of the Natural and the Written Law; On the Sacraments; Summary of Sentences }	1141
Abelard	{ Introduction to Theology; Christian Theology; Epitome of Christian Theology; Commentary on Romans; Scito Te Ipsum; Sic et Non }	1142
Robert Pullus	Eight Books of Sentences	1150
Bernard of Clairvaux	{ On Grace and Free Will; On the Errors of Abelard }	1153
Gilbert Porretanus		1154
Peter Lombard	{ Four Books of Sentences; Commentaries on Psalms and on the Epistles of Paul }	1164
Richard of St. Victor	{ On the Trinity; On the Incarnation of the Word; On the State of the Interior Man }	1173
John of Salisbury	Polycraticus	1180
Walter of St. Victor	{ Four Books against the Errors of Abelard, Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert Porretanus }	After 1180
Alanus	Summary upon the Catholic Faith, etc.	A.D. 1203
Peter of Poitiers	Five Books of Sentences	1205
Innocent III.	{ Decretals; On the Contempt of the World; On Alms; On the Holy Mystery of the Altar; Commentary on the Penitential Psalms }	1216

	Writings.	Date of Death.
Alexander Hales . . .	Summary of Theology; Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences; Commentaries on the Psalms and the Apocalypse . .	A. D. 1246
Thomas Aquinas . . .	Summary of Theology; Summary of the Catholic Faith against the Heathen; Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences; Commentaries on the Scriptures . .	1274
Bonaventura . . .	Breviloquium; Cenuiloquium; Commentary on the Books of Sentences, etc.	1274
Albertus Magnus . . .	Summary of Theology; Commentary on the Books of Sentences, etc.	1280
Roger Bacon . . .	Opus Majus, etc.	1292
Henry of Ghent . . .	Summary of Theology; Quodlibeta in the Four Books of Sentences	1293
Duns Scotus . . .	Questions on the Books of Sentences; Quæstiones Quodlibetales	1308
Raymond Lullus . . .	On the Articles of the Christian Faith; Controversy with the Saracen Homerius; On the Demonstration of the Trinity . . .	1315
Dante	Divina Commedia	1321
Eckhart	Sermons and short treatises . . .	1328-29
Durandus	Work on the Sentences of Lombard	1333
Occam	Questions on the Books of Sentences, etc.	1347
Bradwardine . . .	On the Cause of God against Pelagius	1349
Tauler	Sermons	1361
Suso		1365
Ruysbroek	The Ornament of Spiritual Marriage; The Mirror of Eternal Salvation; Samuel, or the Olden Contemplation	1381
Wycliffe	Triologus, etc.	1384
Huss	Tractate on the Church	1415
Gerson	On Mystical Theology; On Perfection; On the Meditation of the Heart, etc.	1429
Raymond of Sabunde .	Book of Natural Theology . . .	After 1430
Thomas à Kempis . .	Imitation of Christ	A. D. 1471
John Wessel	On Prayer; On the Sacred Eucharist; On Purgatory and Indulgences; On Ecclesiastical Dignity and Power; Propositions concerning the Power of the Pope and of the Church . . .	1489
Gabriel Biel	Epitome from William Occam on the Four Books of Sentences . .	1495
Savonarola	Compendium of Revelation; Triumph of the Cross; Sermons . .	1498

The writers of the Latin Church in this period may be grouped with reference to four different eras. The first era extends to the latter part of the eleventh century, the second to the beginning of the thirteenth century, the third covers the thirteenth century, and the fourth reaches from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the Reformation. Viewed in relation to scholasticism, the first may be described as in a measure an era of preparation, the second as a formative era, the third as a culminating era, and the last as an era of decline. At the beginning of these different eras stand in succession Beda, Anselm, Alexander Hales, and Duns Scotus. With respect to the last, however, it should be observed that he belongs quite as much to the culmination of scholasticism as to its initial decline, and so holds a position divided between the third and the fourth eras.

“Scholasticism” in this connection is used in the sense which is now currently attached to the term. By *scholasticus* was understood in the fourth century a man of culture; and this essentially was the significance pertaining to the word in the subsequent centuries. Each age, however, had its own conception of culture. A scholastic was one versed in the learning of the time, whether that was rhetoric, or logic, or dogmatics. In its modern acceptance, in the history of doctrine, the term designates a bent to dogmatic construction, both in the sense of a systematic presentation of dogmas, and an elaborate attempt to substantiate them by all available evidences. Mediæval scholasticism, accordingly, was the system which gave a comprehensive and orderly presentation of the dogmas of the Catholic Church, and endeavored to support them by the evidences of reason or philosophy, as well as by the recognized theological authorities. It was dominated by a formulating spirit, and was of the intellect rather than of the heart. Scholasticism was mediævalism on its intellectual side.

The first of the eras distinguished above, as compared

with the rest, was the period of minimum learning. Though embracing some intervals of partial illumination, especially that covered by the reigns of the early Carlovingians, it included the darkest sections of mediæval history. The writers of this time in general confined themselves within narrow limits. With little or no exhibition of intellectual boldness, they sought in the preceding Latin fathers both their propositions and the arguments by which they were to be defended. A remarkable exception, however, appeared in the person of John Scotus Erigena, a native of Ireland, but, as introduced to history, a resident of France. To the sources ordinarily consulted in his day he added the more speculative of the Greek fathers, such as Origen, the two Gregories, the pseudo Dionysius, and Maximus. Erigena's system was strongly tinged with Neo-Platonism. He proclaimed, indeed, no dissent from the traditional orthodoxy, but he was very ready, in his interpretation of its tenets, to bend it into conformity with his philosophical notions. Though subjected to a measure of criticism, Erigena escaped positive proscription. Some three centuries and a half, however, after his death, his principal work, "*De Divisione Naturæ*," was condemned to the flames. While he was less churchly in spirit than the great majority of the scholastics, and can hardly be placed within the bounds of the scholastic period, Erigena is nevertheless to be associated with scholasticism. He was in some sense a forerunner of the same. His maxim that "true philosophy is true religion, and conversely true religion is true philosophy," (*De Prædest.*, I. 1,) was only a more positive and unqualified statement of a principle that was fundamental with the leading scholastics. A certain relation also may be predicated between Erigena and mysticism. While his writings are in no wise conspicuous for the element of mystical devotion, they exhibit very decidedly the element of mystical speculation, or a class of ideas characteristic of the more radical and speculative mystics. Erigena appears as

an isolated phenomenon. We are obliged to pass on more than a century and a half before reaching any noteworthy manifestation of the scholastic spirit. Near the middle of the eleventh century we find somewhat of a presage of scholasticism in the use made by Berengar and Lanfranc of the Aristotelian logic, the former employing it in the interest of a free-spirited criticism, the latter in support of the orthodoxy of the day.

With Anselm, who followed Lanfranc as prior of the cloister of Bec in Normandy, and finally also as Archbishop of Canterbury, we may place the positive beginning of the scholastic period. While he gave a theoretical precedence to faith and emphasized the Augustinian maxim, *Fides præcedit intellectum*, he had at the same time a profound conviction of the rationality of the Christian faith, and placed a high estimate upon dialectics as a means of proving this rationality. Not a little skill and acumen were evinced by him in his endeavor to substantiate by reason the leading truths of Christian theology. At the same time, however, it must be allowed that he took too little account of the principle that something more than the mere weaving together of abstract conceptions is necessary in order to prove the actual. The high value which Anselm placed upon dialectics, or the exact employment of rational evidences, and his application of the same to specific questions of theology, may be regarded as supplying one great factor to the formative era of scholasticism. A second factor was the works designed to give a systematic presentation and defence of the whole system of the Catholic faith, and styled summaries of sentences. Such works were produced by Hugo of St. Victor, Robert Pullus, and Peter Lombard. The "Four Books of Sentences" by Peter Lombard, accommodated at once to a taste for dialectics and to a traditional spirit, since they both savored of logical method and quoted largely from the fathers, acquired an extraordinary popularity. For centuries this work served as a text-

book of theology, and was repeatedly made the subject of a commentary. Such was the standing accorded its author that he was currently mentioned as *Magister Sententiarum*, or simply as *Magister*. Peter Lombard, though a native of Northern Italy, is associated chiefly with Paris, having been first a teacher there and then bishop. Between Anselm and Lombard appeared a noteworthy character of the age, a brilliant dialectician, a teacher who won unbounded popularity with the younger generation, a representative specimen of the French mind, — Peter Abelard. Against the Augustinian maxim that faith precedes knowledge, Abelard was disposed to assert the rights of criticism, and to maintain that a secure and intelligent faith needs to be preceded by investigation. Less bound by the traditional faith than Anselm or Lombard, he no doubt deviated in some points from the dominant beliefs, though by no means so radically as some of his accusers assumed. Among these accusers was Bernard of Clairvaux, an advocate of faith as opposed to intemperate speculation, a representative of a piety at once practical and full of mystical ardor. Abelard was obliged to succumb before the opposition of Bernard and others, and, humbled by the condemnation of his teachings, spent his last days in retirement at the cloister of Cluny. In the school of St. Victor, founded by William of Champeaux, a mysticism having more affinity with dialectics than that of Bernard was cultivated. Among the leaders of this school Hugo presents a fine example of the union of scholasticism and mysticism. The same harmonious combination was also very well realized in Richard. Walter, on the other hand, judging from his principal work, lapsed into a feeling of bitter hostility to the methods characteristic of scholasticism.

Immediately after the Latin theologians came into full possession of the writings of Aristotle, scholasticism reached its highest bloom. Scarcely another century in Christian history has witnessed such elaborate efforts at dogmatic

construction as did the thirteenth. To be assured of this, one needs only to turn the leaves of the ponderous works of Alexander Hales, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, and Duns Scotus. These writers felt it their bounden duty to consider every conceivable question related to the Christian system, and from every possible point of view. So we find, for example, in the "*Summa Theologica*" of Thomas Aquinas, which may be regarded as the crowning product of scholasticism, propositions laid down by the thousand, and appended to each a minute specification of objections, and answers, and conclusions. It is to be noticed that all of these writers belonged to one or the other of the great mendicant orders, and also that each of them taught at Paris for an interval. Alexander Hales belonged to the Franciscans; Albertus Magnus and his more distinguished disciple, Thomas Aquinas, were Dominicans; Bonaventura and Duns Scotus were Franciscans. As these orders were rivals, it was only natural that they should fall into antagonism upon points where either of two views might be advocated without incurring punishment for heresy. Duns Scotus, in particular, showed a disposition to assume an attitude of criticism toward Thomas Aquinas, and, as each had zealous partisans, Thomists and Scotists were arrayed against each other. In this list of theologians the scholastic element was dominant. Bonaventura, however, like Hugo of St. Victor, combined with his scholasticism the characteristics of an orthodox mysticism, and laid strong emphasis upon the inner life of contemplation and intimate fellowship with God. A position outside the central current of his age was held by the English Franciscan, Roger Bacon. Possessed of an insight into the true method of investigation which distinguishes him widely from his contemporaries, he did not hesitate to criticise sharply the methods of the scholastics. He rebuked the acceptance of truth on the mere ground of custom, denounced a dependence upon the fathers which would lead

to a continual repetition of their errors, and insisted upon carrying back investigation to the original sources, to the Scriptures themselves, and to these as found, not in the Vulgate translation, but in the languages in which they were primarily written. A reference to Dante should also have place in this paragraph. He was the poet of scholasticism. In physics he followed mainly Albertus Magnus; in theology, Thomas Aquinas. No better index of his genius is needed than the fact that he was able to transform the dust of mediæval scholasticism into the flowers and foliage of an immortal poem.

Duns Scotus, as already stated, belongs at once to the culmination of scholasticism and to the era of its initial decline. To that decline he himself in a measure contributed. The extreme subtilty to which he carried his reasonings, together with the barbarous terminology to which he had recourse, was suited to call forth a reaction against the system which he represented. Moreover, there was a sceptical element in his thinking, not indeed as respects the dogmas of the Church, but as respects many of the arguments by which scholasticism had undertaken to defend them. "Strict faith," says Ueberweg, "in reference to the theological teachings of the Church and the philosophical doctrines corresponding with their spirit, and far-reaching scepticism with reference to the arguments by which they are sustained, are the general characteristics of the Scotist doctrine." (*History of Philosophy*.) Such a position (occupied quite as distinctly by Occam), abridging as it does the value of scholastic argumentation, was of course a poor recommendation of scholasticism. But other causes of decline combined with this. A current of doubt, not merely as respects the supports proffered by scholasticism to the system of Catholic doctrine, but as respects certain points in that system itself, made increasing progress, a current coming to open manifestation in the anti-hierarchical sects previously described, and existing no doubt more

or less where it was not openly manifested. Finally, the revival of classic learning in the fifteenth century begot a taste for polite literature which naturally was averse to the dry and ponderous elaborations of scholasticism.

As scholasticism declined, mysticism rose to greater prominence. Early in the fourteenth century mysticism of the more speculative type found in Eckhart one of its boldest and most gifted representatives. Tauler, Suso, and Ruysbroek, who followed him, while they touched upon some of the radical tenets of mysticism, did not on the whole give so wide a scope to a speculative temper. John Gerson, Thomas à Kempis, and John Wessel may be ranked as mystics of the more moderate class, so far as theoretical points are concerned. The last mentioned is fitly numbered among the important forerunners of Luther.

2. SCHOOLS.—Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury (668–690), a man of Greek antecedents, seems to have given a certain impulse to learning in England. In the century following him, England was able to boast of educating the most distinguished scholars of the time. The two most eminent centres of learning at the same date were the monastic schools of Yarrow and York. At the former Beda taught, from youth to the last days of his life. Six hundred monks, besides many strangers, are said to have been gathered under his instructions. York was the native place of Alcuin, and the theatre of his teaching, until he was called by Charlemagne to supervise the educational interests of his realm. The list of theologians which the ninth century records may be regarded as a testimonial to the work of the great prince, and the English scholar whom he called to his aid. Among these theologians, the pupil of Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, is specially noteworthy as an educator. The school at Fulda, with which he was connected for a long interval, accomplished not a little toward supplying a cultivated clergy to France and Germany.

After an interval of encroaching barbarism which reached

its climax in the tenth century, learning began to revive. In the eleventh century we find schools affording a theological training at Rheims, Chartres, Tours, and Bec. The last two, as already indicated by the reference to Berengar and Lanfranc, were in alliance with incipient scholasticism as fostering a new interest in dialectics. From this time an increasing zeal was manifested in the provision of schools, — a zeal which soon culminated in the great citadels of the scholastic system, the mediæval universities.

Toward the close of the twelfth century the schools existing at Bologna, Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge began to assume the proportions and the constitution of universities. Among these the University of Paris held a special eminence as respects theological culture. It remained throughout the Middle Ages the headquarters of scholastic philosophy and theology. Thither students streamed from all the lands of Latin Christendom. The number of strangers gathered in Paris for purposes of study is said to have exceeded at times the resident population.

3. ESTIMATE OF SCHOLASTICISM. — It cannot be denied that scholasticism has valid grounds of commendation. (1.) It was a product of wonderful intellectual industry, a complex, massive structure, which may well be compared with the great creation of mediæval art, the Gothic cathedral. (2.) It was a notable advance upon the method of dealing with theology in the previous centuries. The writings of the fathers in general give only scattered materials; to arrive at a system, the reviewer must himself go through the process of construction. In scholasticism we find the system already made, with divisions and outlines as definite and clear as could be desired. (3.) It was in large part the working out of a great and useful design, namely, the design to demonstrate the rational or philosophical nature of Christian truth. (4.) Many of its distinctions were of genuine worth as safeguards against errors, or as able

expositions of truths which Christian theology must ever acknowledge.

But, on the other hand, scholasticism may justly be charged with serious defects. (1.) It built its giant structure upon an insecure basis, in that it neglected historical criticism, and assumed that the existing Catholic faith was identical with that delivered by Christ and His apostles. (2.) It gave no proportionate or adequate place to Biblical study. Forbearing any searching or independent investigation, it was content to follow the traditional interpretations. (3.) It was quite largely characterized by an excessive valuation of formal logic, and spent time in constructing syllogisms that might better have been employed in finding trustworthy premises. (4.) It not infrequently gave place to questions and discussions that were prejudicial to a permanent interest in theology, inasmuch as they were irrelevant subtleties, and were better suited to serve as a means of mental gymnastics, than of real theological edification. (5.) In its striving for completeness of system and its readiness to invent a dogma to suit a custom, it introduced tenets which had no warrant either in Scripture or in the greater part of the preceding history of the Church. (6.) It bowed to the authority of the hierarchy, and aided spiritual despotism with the prestige of a theory subscribed by the most famous doctors of the Church.

4. ESTIMATE OF MYSTICISM. — It is the praise of mysticism that it is content neither with the exercise of the body in outward ceremonies nor of the mind in dogmatic distinctions, — that it is satisfied with nothing short of the life, that deep, unspeakable life, which is to be found only in the union of the soul with God. From this central trait it is evident that mysticism was a needed factor in the mediæval Church. It had an office to fulfil, as an offset to ceremonialism and scholasticism. And such an office it no doubt did fulfil to good effect. It helped to keep alive a sense of the claims of vital piety. It gave prominence to the indi-

vidual and subjective side of religion, and to such a means of nurturing this as the fervent preaching of the Word. In these respects it served in a measure as a forerunner of the Reformation. But, on the other hand, its nature exposed it to a twofold excess, to an ultra spiritualism or an undue depreciation of externals, and to a pantheistic conception of the relation of the creature to God. As is apparent from the list of heresies, neither of these forms of excess was wholly escaped by mediæval mysticism. Both no doubt were avoided by such men as Bernard, the Victorines, and Bonaventura. Whether the pantheistic extreme was avoided by Eckhart, and some others of the speculative mystics, is a question to be considered hereafter.

SECTION III. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

THE subject of Scripture inspiration was not accorded extended consideration in the Middle Ages. It may be inferred, however, that there was no essential departure from the dominant theory of the preceding period. While there was some recognition of the fact, that accounts of the same events, as given by different writers, differ in style and to some degree in apparent content, the general view awarded little attention to the human factor in the Scriptures. Theologians in the main were content to rest upon the simple assumption of infallible inspiration. The principles of interpretation most commonly accepted were substantially the same as those set forth by Augustino. The necessity of such an infallible revelation as is found in the Scriptures was maintained by Thomas Aquinas on the ground of the supernatural destiny of man. Inasmuch as man ought to live with reference to his true end, and this lies beyond the discovery of the natural reason, there is an imperative occasion for disclosures from the fountain of divine wisdom itself. (Sum. Theol., I. 1. 1.)

Much of the same lack of definite specifications which appears on the subject of inspiration is found also in connection with tradition, and its relation to Scripture. In the Greek Church, John of Damascus occupied about the same position as that ascribed to Basil (p. 183). Among the things authorized by tradition, but passed over by Scripture, he includes the veneration of images. (*De Fide Orth.*, IV. 16.) In the Latin Church, tradition no doubt was practically an authority of vast import; in the actual control of thought and belief, it took precedence of Scripture, since it both governed to a very large extent the interpretation of Scripture, and also insured the acceptance of tenets having no distinct Scriptural foundation. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be denied that theoretically somewhat of a preference was given to Scripture. "The authority of the sacred writings," says Erigena, "is to be followed in all things, since in them, as in certain sacred seats of its own, truth holds possession." (*De Divis. Nat.*, I. 64.) According to Thomas Aquinas, while reason and the testimony of the fathers may supply probable evidences in favor of doctrines, the fundamental and indispensable evidence is that contained in Scripture. "For our faith rests upon revelation made by the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, but not upon the revelation, if there has been any such, of other doctors." (*Sum. Theol.*, I. 1. 8.) "Authority," says Bonaventura, "resides principally in Holy Scripture, which in its entirety was originated by the Holy Spirit for the direction of the Catholic faith." (*Brevil.*, V. 7.) Nicolas de Clemangis quotes with approbation the following sentence of Jerome: "*Quod de scripturis sacris non habet auctoritatem, eadem facilitate contemnitur quam probatur.*" Within a limited circle a practical as well as a theoretical preference was given to the Scriptures. This was true to some extent of Roger Bacon. It was true of the more practical mystics, like John Wessel, as also of Wycliffe, Huss, and the Waldenses.

Wycliffe, in the most outspoken terms, declares the infinite superiority of the Scriptures to every other authority. "Since," he remarks, "according to Augustine all truth is in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly, it is plain that no other writing has authority or value, except so far as its opinions have been derived from Holy Scripture." (Trial., III. 31.)

Tradition, as heretofore, was commonly assumed to have an apostolic basis, being founded upon the oral as distinguished from the written word of the apostles. But meanwhile there was no care to prove the apostolic basis by the use of searching historical investigation. Long-continued currency of a tenet in the Church was taken as a sufficient evidence of its being substantiated by valid tradition. This, of course, gave a fictitious breadth to tradition. Church authority, that is, the existing hierarchy, had it in its power to seal as dogma that which was confirmed neither by Scripture nor by the opinion of the primitive Church. Indeed, *church authority* is a more accurate designation than *tradition* of the extra-Biblical basis of the Romish system. Some of the mediæval theologians were not far from discerning this. In individual cases we have acknowledgments respecting certain tenets, that neither Scripture nor tradition could be claimed for them. Thus Duns Scotus allows that the doctrine of the sacramental character is proved neither by Scripture, reason, experience, nor the writings of the fathers, and declares his acceptance of it on the sole authority of the [Roman] Church. (Sent., IV. 6. 9.) To the same effect are the statements of Gerson and Occam, that certain tenets rest upon revelations made to the Church subsequent to the apostolic era. Among tenets of this kind the former includes the immaculate conception and assumption of the Virgin, and the latter the doctrine of transubstantiation. (Gieseler.)

As the sheer authority of the Church became of such dogmatic import, it was natural to emphasize its infallibil-

ity in matters of faith. It was generally understood that the Church embraces a tribunal of unerring judgment. There was not, however, strict unanimity of opinion as respects the proper organ of this infallibility. Three different views came to the surface: (1.) that the prerogative to render infallible decisions on questions of faith belongs pre-eminently to the Pope; (2.) that it belongs to an ecumenical council; (3.) that it is to be predicated of the Church as a whole, and not of any specific member or section of the same. The Roman bishops were of course forward to advocate the first of these theories. Already in the eleventh century, Leo IX. showed himself an adept in exegetical magic, by finding the dogma of papal infallibility in the words of Christ to Peter, "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not." (Luke xxii. 32.) In the crowning era of scholasticism the papal claim seems to have been commonly accepted, as may be judged from the statements of Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, and Duns Scotus. The first of these quotes the passage in Luke in the papal sense, declares that the decision of difficult questions belongs to the Pope, and that he alone has authority to issue a new symbol of faith,—"*ad solam auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet nova editio symboli, sicut et omnia alia quæ pertinent ad totam ecclesiam, ut congregare synodum generalem, et alia hujusmodi.*" (Sum. Theol., II. 2. 1. 10.) But less than a century and a half after the death of Aquinas, the second theory came, at least for an interval, into the ascendant. The schism which disgraced the papacy, at the close of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, was adverse to the dignity of the papal office. At the same time, inasmuch as there were rival claimants, there was a pressing occasion to erect a supreme authority over the papal throne. There was a return, accordingly, to the opinion dominant in the great controversial era, that an ecumenical council is the highest tribunal of the Church, and the special instrument for defining the

faith. This view was explicitly and emphatically asserted by the council of Constance (1414-1418). The following is among its declarations: "The council of Constance, lawfully assembled in the name of the Holy Ghost, and forming an ecumenical council representing the Catholic Church, has its power immediately from Jesus Christ, to which [power] every person of whatever rank and dignity, the papal itself included, is bound to yield obedience in those things which concern the faith, the extirpation of the aforesaid schism, and the general reformation of the Church in its head and members." (Sessio V., Mansi.) The third view, which emphasizes the general consensus of the Church, rather than the determinations of a Pope or of a specific council, was held by Occam, and also by several writers of the fifteenth century, including Peter d'Ailly and Thomas Walden.

While the dogmatic pre-eminence of the Bible suffered from the encroachments of tradition and church authority, its practical influence was curtailed by its exclusion from the hands of the laity. In the Greek Church, though the reading of the Bible was no doubt reduced to a minimum, no general decree ever withheld it from the laity. In the Latin Church, also, no decree formally claiming to be ecumenical ever prohibited the Scriptures to laymen; but that occurred which was nearly equivalent. Inasmuch as the Waldenses and others were active in spreading the Bible in the language of the people, the reading of the same by laymen became associated in the minds of the authorities with heresy. A council held at Toulouse in 1229 forbade the laity to read the Old or the New Testament, with the exception of the Psalter in the Latin. A like decision was repeated by councils in 1233 and 1246. These were indeed provincial councils; but inasmuch as they were held under the sanction of the Pope, their decrees did not fall far short of a sweeping prohibition of the Scriptures to the laity.

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I. — EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES
OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE. — Anselm is distinguished among the scholastics by his confident attempt to establish the existence of God by an *a priori* argument, that is, by simple deduction from the idea or definition of God. We are to define God, he says, as the greatest that can be conceived, — “aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest.” (Proslog., II.) Even the fool, who says in his heart that there is no God, when he hears the above definition, understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, whether he recognizes its actual existence or not, just as the unexecuted design of a painter is in the painter’s understanding. So the fool is convinced that the greatest that can be thought is in the understanding (*in intellectu*). But the greatest that can be thought cannot be in the understanding alone, since to be in reality (*in re*), as well as in the understanding, or in the mental conception, is greater than to be in the latter alone. “Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu, et in re.” This is commonly styled the ontological argument.

Anselm’s argument was subjected to criticism by a contemporary. A monk by the name of Gaunilo suggested that to derive the actual existence of a thing from its mere idea is making too easy a matter of proof, and illustrated by reference to an imaginary island. According to report, there

is an island now lost to the knowledge of all voyagers. This island is blessed with such an affluence of riches and delights, that one would not venture to deny that it excels all other lands. But to be in reality, as well as in conception, is more excellent than to be in conception alone. Hence it follows that this undiscovered island has actual existence. (Liber pro Insipiente.) Anselm in his reply maintained that it is peculiar to God, as the highest conceivable entity, to be exempted from the possibility of being thought not to be; that all things which have beginning or end, or conjunction of parts, may be conceived not to be; but that the idea of a being who has neither beginning nor end, nor conjunction of parts, involves the necessity of predicated his actual existence. (Lib. Apol. contra Gaunil.)

The scholastics of the subsequent era accorded very little favor to the argument of Anselm. Some passed it by without notice, and others discredited its demonstrative force. Thomas Aquinas evidently regarded it as no satisfactory answer to one who is unwilling to admit that there is in reality any greatest conceivable entity. (Sum. Theol., I. 2. 1.) And this is no doubt true. Anselm in his argument does not get beyond mere conceptions, does nothing more than to call attention to the fact that one factor in the most perfect concept of the most perfect being is necessary subsistence. He starts with an idea, has nothing but an idea in his premises, and ought to have regarded himself as ending with a mere idea. Put into syllogistic form his argument is as follows:—

The idea of God is the idea of
the greatest conceivable being.

To be in reality, as well as in
conception, is greater than to be
in conception alone.

Therefore the *idea* of God (as
the greatest conceivable being) is
the *idea* of a really existing being.

The conclusion here is simply respecting the *idea* of the greatest conceivable being; and the argument is as far from

proving the real existence of such a being, as the idea of real existence is from identity with real existence itself.

Hugo of St. Victor, Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, and others of the leading scholastics, relied upon various applications of the *a posteriori* argument, or the argument from effect to cause. Hugo adduces, among other evidences, that which is supplied by the rational soul. As it belongs to the very nature of this to be active and self-conscious, and it is aware that it was not always so, it must have had a beginning. That beginning it could not have received from matter, inasmuch as in its spiritual essence it is widely distinguished from the sensible world. It must, therefore, have been created from nothing, and its author must have been unoriginated, since the unoriginated is the essential condition of originated things. (De Sac., I. 3. 6-9.)

"It is through creatures," says Thomas Aquinas, "that we arrive at the knowledge of God" (Sum. Theol., I. 88. 3), and he specifies five evidences for the existence of God, which may be derived from creatures: (1.) Motion implies a mover; and, since the chain of moving things cannot be carried back to infinity, there must be a mover who is himself unmoved. (2.) The efficient causes in the world must have, since nothing can be the cause of itself, as their antecedent, a cause which is uncaused. (3.) The existence of the class of contingent things, or things which are capable of not being as well as of being, involves the existence of something that is necessary; for the contingent is at some time out of existence, and the possibility of existence cannot be founded upon nonentity. The contingent must, therefore, be based upon the necessary; and as the necessary must have some fixed starting-point, there must be that which is *per se* necessary. (4.) Different grades of being are suggestive of an absolute crown to the series, being which embodies all perfections. (5.) The way in which the unintelligent things of the world are directed to the

attainment of beneficent ends, argues for a supreme intelligence over the world. (Sum. Theol., I. 2. 3. Compare Erigena, *De Divis. Nat.*, III. 4; Abelard, *Theol. Christ.*, Lib. V.; Pullus, *Sent.*, I. 1, 2; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, I. 5; Scotus, *Sent.*, I. 2. 2.) It is worthy of mention in this connection, that Thomas Aquinas had occasion to consider the objection that finite effects cannot give evidence of the existence of an infinite cause. His reply was, in substance, that effects are not necessarily proportionate to the cause; and, accordingly, while finite effects cannot fully acquaint us with the nature of the Infinite God, they may nevertheless indicate the fact of His existence. This is hardly satisfactory, and serves rather to support the negative proposition that the finiteness of effects does not disprove the infinitude of their author, than positively to establish the truth that there is an infinite author of the world.

Raymond of Sabunde is specially noteworthy as presenting a definite statement of the moral argument for the existence of God. The order and adaptation, as he infers by analogy, which exist in the outer world, exist also in the moral sphere. As corresponding to the eye there is the visible, to the ear the audible, and to the intellect the intelligible, so there must be that which answers to man's moral nature. Now in man's moral nature exists the fact of a felt responsibility or accountability. Every man knows that he is fitted for, and deserving of, rewards or punishments. His nature, therefore, points to a rewarder and punisher, to a judge of infinite perfections; for only such a judge can perfectly meet the conditions.

The mystics, with their strong emphasis upon man's native kinship with God, were of course inclined to emphasize the soul's spontaneous testimony to the fact of the divine existence.

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. — The mediæval theologians, like many of the writers of the preceding period, were disposed either to deny to man altogether a

knowledge of God's essence, or to reduce such knowledge to a minimum. "What the essence of God is," says John of Damascus, "we neither know nor are able to declare." (De Fide Orth., I. 2.) "Whatever we say affirmatively of God does not express His nature, but something about His nature. So when thou hast uttered the word *good*, or *just*, or *wise*, or any other term, thou hast not set forth the nature of God, but something about His nature," — τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν. (Ibid., I. 4.) Erigena maintains that God's essence is so hidden that He cannot be known by creatures even of the angelic order, except through the medium of theophanies. (De Divis. Nat., I. 8.) He teaches, moreover, that none of Aristotle's categories, or any terms known to language, are properly descriptive of God; that He is *ὑπερούσιος*, *ὑπερθεός*, *ὑπεραληθής*, *ὑπεραιώνιος*, *ὑπερσόφος*; that He is incomprehensible even to Himself. (Ibid., I. 14, 15, II. 28.) Hugo of St. Victor seems to deny that our present knowledge of God reaches to His essence, since he affirms that the different terms, such as *just* and *wise*, by which we describe Him, express not so much what is in God as the effects of His working in creatures, and states moreover that we cannot understand the *quid* or *qualis* of God. (Sent., I. 4; De Sac., I. 10. 2.) A knowledge of God *per essentiam*, or through a vision of His essence, is declared by Thomas Aquinas to be foreign to this life; God is known here by means of creatures, and the names applied to Him are derived from creatures, and are not properly expressive of His essence. (Sum. Theol., I. 12. 11, I. 13. 1.) "Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quod non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum." (Sum. contra Gentiles, I. 30.) According to Occam, it lies wholly beyond the province of man in this life to know what God really is, at least apart from direct revelation. Eckhart represents that the Godhead, or the Absolute (which, however, he regards as lying back of God), is void of all predicates; its nature is to be without nature.

But, on the other hand, we find, either stated or implied, a belief in man's ability to know somewhat respecting the essence of God. Such a knowledge is assumed by Anselm, notwithstanding his emphasis upon the divine transcendence, in his representation that the human mind, in its self-consciousness, intelligence, and will, affords a true image of the supreme essence, — “vera imago illius essentiae, quæ per sui memoriam, et intelligentiam, et amorem in Trinitate ineffabili consistit.” (Monolog., LXVII.) Alexander Hales teaches that the knowledge of God is both positive and negative; that God in His immensity cannot be known by the human soul except by the way of negation, — a denial, not of a true, but of an adequate or exhaustive knowledge. (Sum. Theol., I. 2. 1. 1, 2.) Albertus Magnus admits that it is possible to touch God with the understanding, *attingere Deum intellectu*, although it is not possible to comprehend Him. To the same effect is the distinction which Bonaventura draws between *cognitio per apprehensionem* and *cognitio per comprehensionem*. (Sent., I. 3. 1. 1.) Thomas Aquinas, while he affirms that none of the names which the sphere of creatures supplies really expresses the essence of God as it is, does not hesitate to offer statements which seem to imply some real knowledge of that essence. He says, for example: “Hoc nomen, *qui est*, triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen Dei.” (Sum. Theol., I. 13. 11.) “Deus est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate.” (Ibid., I. 3. 2.) “Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum.” (Ibid., I. 12. 1.) “In solo deo operatio est ejus substantia.” (Ibid., I. 77. 1.) It is to be observed, moreover, that Aquinas assumes that in the future life, by means of the gracious conjunction of God with the soul, a vision of His essence is to be enjoyed. (Ibid., I. 12. 1-11.) Duns Scotus

distinctly asserts that the human mind is competent in this life to form a valid conception of God, a conception in which God is apprehended quiditatively, or *per se*. His statement is as follows: "Dico, quod non tantum haberi potest conceptus naturaliter, in quo quasi per accidens concipitur Deus: puta in aliquo attributo, sed etiam aliquis conceptus, in quo per se et quiditative concipiatur Deus." (Sent., I. 3. 2.) The threefold way of rising from creatures to the notion of God, which had been suggested by the pseudo Dionysius (De Div. Nominibus, VII. 3), is developed by Durandus. He distinguishes the *via eminentiæ*, the *via causalitatis*, and the *via remotionis*. (Sent., I. 3. 1.) By the first, we ascend from the relative perfections of creatures to the absolute perfection of God; by the second, we reach the First Cause; by the third, we eliminate from the notion of God the imperfections in creatures. In pursuance of this method we attain to a knowledge of what God is in general, but not of what He is in particular,—*"quid est in generali, non autem in speciali."* (Ibid., I. 3. 2.) Finally, we have the statement, common to mediæval mysticism, that even in this life one may reach that supreme stage of contemplation in which he looks immediately upon God,—has a transient foretaste of the beatific vision. (See the mystical writings of Hugo and Bonaventura.) On the whole, the scholastic theology, notwithstanding some strong negative statements, assumes in reality a minimum of acquaintanceship with the essential nature of God.

The scholastics generally followed in the wake of Augustine in their conception of the absolute simplicity of God, and like him drew the inference that the different attributes assigned to the Divine Being are really one; that, in fine, all in God is God. (John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., I. 9; Erigena, De Prædest., II. 3; Anselm, Monolog., XVI., XVII.; Abelard, Theol. Christ., III.; Hugo, Sent., I. 6; Richard, De Trin., II. 18; Lombard, Sent., I. 5. 3, I. 8. 5, I. 45. 1.)

The argument of Abelard, that God is able to do only that which is becoming to Him, and that nothing is becoming to Him which He omits to do, and that consequently He cannot do more nor better than He does (Introduct. ad Theol., III. 5), was not favorably received by the scholastics. There was a common agreement, however, that the omnipotence of God is an infinite barrier against any act of sin by Him, inasmuch as to sin is to manifest a species of impotence. Says Thomas Aquinas, "God cannot sin, because He is omnipotent." (Sum. Theol., I. 25. 3. Compare Anselm, Proslog., VII.; Hugo, De Sac., I. 2. 22; Peter Lombard, Sent., I. 42. 3; Bonaventura, Brevil., I. 7.)

The omnipresence of God was so defined that it should appear that God is confined by no place, excluded from no place, partly included in no place, and wholly present in every place, — *ubique totus*. (John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., I. 13; Anselm, Monolog., XXII.; Hugo, De Sac., I. 3. 17; Richard, De Trin., II. 23; Lombard, Sent., I. 37. 1; Hales, Sum. Theol., I. 10. 2; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 8. 1.) The enigma of the divine omnipresence was set forth under the figure of a circle, whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. (Quoted by Alexander Hales from Hermes Trismegistus; used also by Bonaventura, Itin. Mentis in Deum, V.) In opposition to a mere dynamical presence, Hugo of St. Victor maintained that God is present in all things *per essentiam*; and Peter Lombard and Alexander Hales taught that God is in all things *præsentialiter*, *potentialiter*, and *essentialiter*, while He is in the saints, still further, *per gratiam*. Thomas Aquinas emphasized in particular the presence of God, as a working agent or cause. "God is in all things," he says, "not indeed as part of their essence or as accident, but as an agent is present to that in which he acts."

The omniscience of God was closely associated with His eternity. By the latter was understood not so much unend-

ing time as timelessness, or superiority to temporal succession. "*Æternitas est tota simul*," says Thomas Aquinas. (Sum. Theol., I. 10. 4.) Succession being ruled out, God's knowledge was necessarily regarded as equally covering past, present, and future, and as incapable of increase or decrease. The term "foreknowledge," it was claimed, is not strictly applicable to God, since all things are ever present to Him. (Anselm, *De Casu Diab.*, XXI.) It was stated also, by different writers, that His knowledge of creatures is not derived from them, but has its basis in Himself. (Hales, Sum. Theol., I. 23. 2. 1; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 14. 5, I. 34. 3.) In conformity with this conception, Bonaventura speaks of God as knowing the contingent infallibly, the mutable immutably, the dependent independently. (*Brevil.*, I. 8.) The same writer distinguishes three forms of the divine knowledge; namely, *cognitio approbationis*, *intelligentiæ*, and *visionis*. The first concerns the actual, which is at the same time acceptable to the will of God. The second concerns that which is possible to Himself or others. The third covers all the actual, all that has been, is, or shall be. (*Sent.*, I. 39. 1. 2.)

The absolute impassibility of God was so far unquestioned that it was thought necessary to maintain that God is compassionate only in the sense of relieving the suffering, and not at all in the sense of being brought by the bond of sympathy to suffer with those in pain and misery. (Anselm, *Proslog.*, VIII.; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 21. 3.)

While Aquinas regarded the will of God as fundamentally conditioned by His goodness, Duns Scotus made the will ultimate in God, and maintained that whatever is willed by God is good, for the very reason that it is willed by Him, and not, conversely, that He wills anything because it is good. (*Sent.*, III. 19. Compare Abelard, *Comm. in Epist. ad Rom.*, II. 5; Hugo, *De Sac.*, IV. 1.)

SECTION II. — THE TRINITY.

A HETERODOX exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity was no doubt given by Roscelin. In maintaining that unless Father, Son, and Spirit are three things (*tres res*), like three angels, the Father and the Spirit must also have been incarnated, he obviously fell into tritheism. Roscelin proceeded from the nominalistic standpoint, regarding the term "God" under which the Persons of the Trinity are subsumed as a mere abstraction. Gilbert of Poitiers (or Porretanus), proceeding from the opposite realistic theory, indulged a representation which was thought to savor of heresy, though he succeeded in escaping condemnation. The divine essence, as he taught, is related to God as humanity to the concrete man; that is, it is not God, but the *form* of God, or that which makes Him to be God. This form is common to Father, Son, and Spirit; and it is in this respect that the three otherwise distinguished Persons are one. Abelard's exposition of the Trinity was also called into question, but it cannot justly be charged with heterodoxy. While he represents that the three Persons correspond to power, wisdom, and goodness or love, he takes pains to affirm that this application of terms is not to be taken in a too exclusive sense, and that the Son and the Spirit are no less potent than the Father. (Introd. ad Theol., I. 8-10.) Indeed, on this score, the charge of Sabellianism is no more justified against Abelard than against Hugo, Richard, and others using the same or an equivalent phraseology. Again, too much account ought not to be made of the fact that Abelard allows the world-soul of the Platonic system to stand for the Holy Spirit of the Christian scheme. This evinces simply his desire to show that the best heathen philosophy approximated to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and not that he for himself was satisfied to regard the Spirit as merely and strictly

the world-soul. The Platonic term, in his view, sets forth a prominent aspect of the Spirit as the principle of vitality in the world, and especially in the souls of men. (Theol. Christ., I. 5.) Moreover, the illustrations which he draws from the three persons of grammar, and from the wax as compared with the waxen image, ought not to count too much against the orthodoxy of Abelard, for he did not regard them as adequate; at any rate, he lays down the principle that in proportion as the divine excels the created, it is difficult to find in the latter suitable similitudes of the former. (Introd. ad Theol., II. 10.) Abelard, too, was not the only scholastic who employed imperfect illustrations. As great a master of orthodoxy as Anselm refers to fountain, stream, and lake, as affording an image of the Trinity. (De Fide Trin., VIII.) Eckhart, inasmuch as he allowed no distinctions in the Absolute, was obliged to deny the absoluteness of the Divine Persons, and to reduce them to the rank of accidents, superinduced upon the Absolute. (Lasson, Meister Eckhart der Mystiker.)

Within the circle of orthodoxy the Augustinian representation was dominant, and no essential advance was made upon the same. The equality of the Divine Persons was emphatically asserted, and the cardinal illustration of their interrelation was that which Augustine found in memory (or self-consciousness), understanding, and will (or love). The Father, eternally cognizant of Himself, presents eternally an image of Himself, and so begets the Son. Love eternally conjoins the Begetter and the Begotten, and this love is the Holy Spirit. (Anselm, Monolog., *passim*; Hugo, Sent., I. 6; Richard, De Trin., III. 2. 14; Lombard, Sent., I. 3. 7, I. 10; Aquinas, I. 27, I. 36. 1; Bonaventura, Brevil., I. 2.) The meaning of the scholastics in calling the Spirit love cannot of course be properly apprehended, apart from their doctrine of the simplicity of the divine essence, and the consequent substantial identity of one predicate with all. Among the writers referred

to in this paragraph, Richard of St. Victor deserves special mention, as developing the idea that in the very nature of love a demand is founded for a plurality of Divine Persons. Love requires an object other than self; and the only adequate object of a divine love is a second Divine Person, and the proper communion in this love requires a third Divine Person.

As already indicated, different views of the procession of the Holy Spirit formed the principal dogmatic wedge in this period between East and West, the former holding zealously to a procession from the Father alone, and the latter tenaciously maintaining a procession from both Father and Son. The doctrine of the West was authoritatively promulgated by the council of Florence in these terms: "Spiritus Sanctus ex Patre et Filio æternaliter est, et essentiam suam, suumque esse subsistens habet ex Patre simul et Filio, et ex utroque æternaliter tanquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit." Among the rational evidences which the Latin theologians brought to bear upon the case, those urged by Anselm and Aquinas were perhaps the most significant. Anselm argued that the Holy Spirit is from the essence or deity of the Father, and inasmuch as this same essence is in the Son, He is of necessity from the Son also. (De Process. Spir. Sanct., VII., VIII.) Thomas Aquinas maintained that the distinguishing of Son from Spirit is dependent upon the opposing relations (*relationes oppositæ*) between them, and that consequently, if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son as well as from the Father, the ground of distinction between them falls away. (Sum. Theol., I. 36. 2.) This argument was regarded by Duns Scotus as far from conclusive.

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

THE common scholastic doctrine was that the world had a positive beginning, and was created *ex nihilo*, though both Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus allowed that reason by itself is not competent to demonstrate that the world has not always existed. Says Aquinas: "Mundum non semper fuisse sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative probari non potest." (Sum. Theol., I. 46. 2.) Some of the scholastics, however, while conceding only a temporal subsistence to the world as sensible, were not far from assuming its real subsistence from eternity. This was the case with the more radical advocates of realism, who regarded the ideas eternally present to the divine mind as the essential basis of all concrete things. To the nominalists, on the other hand, these ideas appeared to be only empty abstractions. The motive for creation was commonly described as simply the goodness or benevolence of God. Erigena held an exceptional position in maintaining that apart from sin there would have been no occasion for a sensible multifold world. (De Divis. Nat., II. 10.) In his representation also of the mode of creation, Erigena deviated from the standard doctrine, and affiliated with the Neo-Platonic theory of emanations. As a stream, he says, flows from its source without intermission, "so the divine goodness, and essence, and life, and wisdom, and all things which are in the Fount of all, flow forth, first into the primordial causes, and impart existence

to these; then, through the primordial causes, they pass into their effects in an ineffable mode, flowing always through the superior to the inferior; and again through the most secret pores of nature by a most hidden course they return to their fountain." (De Divis. Nat., III. 4.) In harmony with this view, and in the same connection, he describes the visible world as the form of the formless, the measure of the immeasurable, the locality of that without place, the temporality of the timeless, the utterance of the unutterable, the circumscription of the uncircumscribed, the essence of the superessential, etc.; and in more undisguised terms he says that God subsists in all things as their essence, — "*cum ergo audimus Deum omne facere, nil aliud debemus intelligere, quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam omnium subsistere.*" (De Divis. Nat., I. 72.) The emanational theory was taught also by Eckhart, together with the idea that the goodness of God always required the world. (A. Stöckl, *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, II. § 284.) In the system of either, therefore, there was undoubtedly a pantheistic element. It does not follow, however, from this that they adopted all the tenets (including the ultimate absorption of all finite being in the Absolute) of a radical pantheism.

As respects the time employed in the work of creation, the theory was frequently stated that the essence or material of all things was created at once, while the shaping and arranging of the material was extended over a period of six days. (Hugo, *De Sac.*, I. 5. 4; Lombard, *Sent.*, II. 2, II. 12; Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I. 74. 2.) The literal character of the six days seems not to have been generally disputed; Anselm, however, suggests that it might be necessary to assume that they were different from our present days. (*Cur Deus Homo*, I. 18.)

SECTION II. — ANGELS.

ANGELS were commonly described as incorporeal. In individual instances, however, a qualification was added. Thus John of Damascus says that they are incorporeal in comparison with material grossness, but not in an absolute sense, since God alone is absolutely incorporeal. (De Fide Orth., II. 12.) Peter Lombard notices that Augustine seems to have ascribed ethereal bodies to angels, but does not positively commit himself in favor of his view. (Sent., II. 8.) Bernard in one place speaks of angels as *corpore æthereos* (De Consid., V. 4); in another he waives opinion (In Cant., Sermon V.). The majority, however, spoke without qualification of the incorporeal nature of angels, and regarded the bodily form, in which they have appeared from time to time, as simply a temporary means of manifestation.

While Hugo of St. Victor taught that it does not pertain to a created spirit, having no body, to be in place, though it is subject to time relations (De Sac., I. 3. 16), Peter Lombard evidently believed that the incorporeal character of an angel, or created spirit, does not exempt altogether either from space or time relations. (Sent., I. 37. 13.) Aquinas adhered to the opinion of Lombard, and taught that angels are in place, though not after the manner of bodies. He decided that two angels cannot be in the same place at the same time (Sum. Theol., I. 52. 3); and from the fact that they are not compounded of material and form, he drew the inference that there must be as many species as there are angels. (Ibid., I. 50. 4.) Duns Scotus rejected the first as well as the second of these conclusions, and maintained that it is conceivable that two angels might be in one place at the same time, or that one angel might be at the same time in two different places. (See Werner's Johannes Duns Scotus.) Bonaventura decided that the order of the universe, rather than a natural impossibility,

prohibits two angels from being in the same place at the same time. (Sent., II. 2. 2. 4.)

The standard classification of angels was that given by the pseudo Dionysius, and already brought to the notice of theologians in the sixth century. As respects the perseverance of unfallen angels, the cause of the fall of Satan and his angels, and the agency of good and of evil angels, the views advocated did not differ materially from those that were current in the preceding period.

SECTION III.—MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION.—While theologians were agreed in applying both of the terms "image" and "likeness," contained in the account of man's creation, to his supersensuous nature, they still manifested a disposition to distinguish between the two. John of Damascus drew the definite Alexandrian distinction, according to which image denotes such essential factors of human nature as the power of knowing and willing, the likeness, the capacity for virtue, or factors whose development or extinction depends upon the individual. (De Fide Orth., II. 12.) Among Latin theologians a less definite distinction was made. Hugo of St. Victor, if we put his statements together, includes in the image wisdom, righteousness, goodness, knowledge, and rationality; in the likeness he places innocence, love, immortality, indissolubility, and spirituality. (Sent., III. 2; De Sac., I. 6. 2.) With this representation Peter Lombard agrees in part, and in part disagrees. He says the image consists in memory, intelligence, and love, the likeness in the innocence and righteousness which are naturally in the rational mind; or the image may be found in the knowledge of truth, the likeness in the love of virtue; or the image is all else pertaining to the soul, the likeness the essence of the soul as

immortal and indivisible. (Sent., II. 16. 4.) Abelard offers the peculiar view that the image applies especially to man and the likeness to woman, and explains by the statement, that, while woman resembles God in rationality and immortality, man has a nearer resemblance to God as the author of all things, since from man was derived the whole race, woman included. (Expos. in Hex.) Bernard, viewing the subject from a particular standpoint, finds both the image and likeness, in which man was created, in the threefold liberty from necessity, from sin, and from misery. (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., IX.) In general, man's resemblance to God was regarded as placing him upon a lofty plane. Abelard's declaration that man is the crown and goal of the whole creation (beneath the angelic), as God is the goal of man (Expos. in Hex.), was in full harmony with the current estimate. The unfallen Adam, as the realization of this ideal, was regarded as a partaker at once of superior knowledge and superior blessedness. According to Hugo, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, his knowledge of God was intermediate between that which is attainable by us in this life and that which is possessed by the saints who enjoy the beatific vision. (De Sac., I. 6. 14; Sent., II. 23. 4; Sum. Theol., I. 94. 1.)

A topic of no little import in the scholastic anthropology was that concerning the conditions under which man was made a recipient of original righteousness. There was a general agreement in the view that the righteousness of the unfallen man was not independent of grace. But this left room still for the question whether the grace was conferred from the instant of creation, or whether an interval elapsed before it was imparted. Thomas Aquinas decided in favor of the first of these opinions. "That man," he says, "was created in grace, the rectitude itself of the primal state in which God made man seems to require, according to Eccl. vii. 30: 'God made man upright.' For this rectitude involved the subjection of the reason to God, of the inferior

powers to the reason, and of the body to the soul. But the first was the cause both of the second and the third." (Sum. Theol., I. 95. 1.) The opposite view, however, seemed to command the most favor, being adopted by Alexander Hales, Bonaventura, and Duns Scotus. (Sum. Theol. II. 96; Sent., II. 29; Sent., II. 28.) According to these writers, man was created *in puris naturalibus*, a state in which the natural powers were free from disarrangement, but a state of innocence rather than of positive righteousness, which finally was conferred as a *donum superadditum*. The principal argument for this theory was found in the fitness of requiring man to pass through different stages, and to acquit himself meritoriously in each, as a condition of ultimate perfection. Says Alexander Hales: "Licet posset [Deus] homini simul dare naturam, gloriam, et gratiam, ut pulchritudo ordinis servaretur, maluit primo hominem facere in statu naturæ bene institutæ, et post addere donum gratiæ, deinde superaddere complementum gloriæ." A passing suggestion of the doctrine of the *donum superadditum* had been thrown out by as early a writer as Augustine. (De Gen. contra Manich., II. 8.)

Erigena pronounces Epiphanius quite too simple in assigning an earthly location to Paradise, and quotes with seeming approbation the theory of Origen, locating Paradise in the third or intellectual heaven, "that is, in man himself, so far as he is intellect." (De Divis. Nat., IV. 18.) But this was one of the erratic notions of Erigena. As may be judged from the references of Hugo, Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Durandus (Sent., III. 4; Expos. in Hex.; Sent., II. 17. 5; Sent. II. 17. 3), Paradise, in the common belief, was regarded as a place in the Orient, loftily situated and separated from inhabited lands. According to the opinion adduced by Peter Lombard, it is sufficiently high to touch the moon's circle. The life in Paradise was regarded as full of the fruition which comes from inward and outward harmony. As respects its duration before

disobedience drew down the sentence of banishment, Abelard ventured the suggestion that it probably extended over several years, inasmuch as the invention of a language, not to mention other things, must have required a considerable space of time. (Expos. in Hex.)

The twofold division of human nature as opposed to the threefold, the incorporeal essence of the soul and its natural immortality, were matters of common belief. An exception, however, in respect of the last of these tenets appeared in the Greek Church in Nicolaus of Methone, who made immortality dependent upon divine grace. Among Latin writers a question was raised, not indeed about the fact of immortality, but about the evidences for the same. The more approved opinion seems to have been that there are adequate rational evidences to establish the soul's immortality. This side of the question was represented more or less positively by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond of Sabunde, and among later writers was elaborately defended by the Platonizing Ficinus. Duns Scotus, on the other hand, denied that the immortality of the soul is capable of proof, apart from the authority of revelation. The question continued to elicit discussion till the early part of the sixteenth century, when Leo X. formally declared the natural immortality of the soul an article of faith, and reprobated the assumption of an antagonism between philosophical and theological truths.

As respects the mode of the soul's origination, the scholastic theology gave a decided verdict in favor of creationism. Leading writers pronounced this the orthodox theory, or rejected traducianism as anti-catholic and heretical. (Odo of Cambray, *De Peccat. Orig.*, II.; Lombard, *Sent.*, II. 18. 8, II. 31. 1, 2; Hugo, *De Sac.*, I. 7. 30; Pullus, *Sent.*, II. 8; Aquinas, I. 118. 2, 3; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, III. 6; Duns Scotus, *Sent.*, II. 31.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — Erigena, with his allegorical interpretation of the account of Paradise, was

of course disinclined to accept the literal sense of the story of the fall. In his view, the primal sin of man antedated this mundane existence, and indeed was its cause. An earthly body, described in Genesis as a garment of skins, was given in consequence of the fall; and the division of man into two sexes, so far from being included in his ideal condition, was one of the most serious consequences of transgression, a deplorable example of that breach of unity which results from sin. (Comm. in Joan.; De Divis. Nat., II. 6, 9, 25, 26, IV. 5, 6, 10, 12.) Erigena reveals here his study of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. It is needless to state that his views were entirely outside of the main currents of belief, and that theologians generally saw in the fall the literal transgression of a literal command.

In the Greek Church, the view entertained of the results of the fall was the same as in the preceding period. In the Latin Church the position occupied upon this subject may be described as Augustinian, with an increasing tendency, however, especially in the latter part of the period, toward dissent from some of the characteristic tenets of Augustinianism. The authority of Augustine was evidently a factor of profound influence; and consequently, even when it did not govern altogether the opinions of a writer, it was likely to incline him to disguise his disagreement as far as possible. Some of the most eminent writers did not differ materially from Augustine. This was the case with Anselm, Hugo of St. Victor, and Thomas Aquinas. In Alexander Hales, on the other hand, not to mention writers of less significance, a perceptible factor of dissent is manifest, and this becomes more conspicuous in the Scotist and Occamist schools. While, therefore, the scholastic theology was largely Augustinian in its conception of the fallen man, at the close of the scholastic era there was an anti-Augustinian current in the Latin Church. This current may not have been as wide and controlling as it became after the council of Trent, and especially after the Jansenist con-

troversy, but it carried the Romish Church a long way toward its later standpoint. This will be made to appear in the course of this section, as also in the concluding section of the next chapter. The topics considered here are (1.) the nature of original sin; (2.) the manner in which original sin is transmitted, or the ground of its imputation; (3.) the essence of free will; (4.) the amount of free will to be accredited to the fallen man.

In their conception of original sin, the scholastics in general agreed with Augustine in finding in it a defect or corruption of nature, and also personal guilt or condemnation. Abelard was an exception, in that he affirmed but a single element in original sin, denying that it has anything of the nature of guilt, and making it to consist simply in the bond to punishment to which the posterity of Adam were made obnoxious by his transgression. (*Scito Te Ipsum*, III., XIV.; *Comm. super Epist. ad Rom.*, II. 5.) Among those who connected original sin both with the nature of the individual and with his standing before God, there was some diversity of representation on the first of these points. Some maintained that original sin, as related to the nature, is simply defect, simply the absence of original righteousness, which absence, as it ought not to exist, is made a ground of condemnation. This was the case with Anselm. He did not deny, indeed he expressly affirms, that the soul of the fallen Adam was infected with carnal affections, and that this nature, thus infected, was transmitted to his posterity. But at the same time he located sin, not in the bodily appetites, but in the will, which follows them inordinately, and so remained by the conclusion that original sin is the absence of righteousness. (*De Concept. Virg.*, II., III.) Duns Scotus also, with express reference to Anselm, taught that original sin consists simply in the absence of original righteousness; the fleshly appetites, or concupiscence, as being natural, not falling by themselves under the category of sin. (*Sent.*, II. 30–32.) On the other

hand, Thomas Aquinas included the concupiscence in original sin, and declared that it is not mere privation; that while formally considered it is the privation of original righteousness, materially considered it is concupiscence, and involves a wounding of the soul. He says: "*Peccatum originale habet privationem originalis justitiæ, et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animæ. Unde non est privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus. . . . Peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis justitiæ. . . . Originalis justitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis. Et ideo omnes vires animæ remanent quodammodo destitutæ proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem; et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturæ dicitur.*" (II. 1. 82. 1-3, II. 1. 85. 3.) Hugo of St. Victor also included the concupiscence in the idea of original sin. He defines as follows: "Original sin is lust of evil and ignorance of good, — *Originale peccatum est concupiscentia mali et ignorantia boni.*" (Sent., III. 11; De Sac., I. 7. 26-28.) Alexander Hales regarded the destitution of original righteousness as the *culpa*, or ground of condemnation, and styled the concupiscence the *pœna*, or punishment of original sin. (Sum. Theol., II. 122. 2. 1. Bonaventura uses like terms in Brevil., III. 5; but Sent., II. 30. 2. 1 shows agreement with Aquinas.) The following is the statement of Hales: "*Originale [peccatum] habet utrumque in se, et culpam et pœnam: culpa est carentia debitæ justitiæ sive deformitas quædam qua ipsa anima deformatur; concupiscentia vero est ipsa pœna quæ in parvulis dicitur concupiscibilitas; in adultis vero dicitur concupiscentia actu.*" This theory evidently was closely akin to that of Anselm and Duns Scotus, the really distinguishing feature of which was that it placed the concupiscence, as an unregulated incentive, rather among the consequences than in the *culpa* of original sin.

There was also some diversity of representation as respects the way in which the sin of Adam gives rise to origi-

nal sin in his posterity. Anselm offered quite a significant account of the subject. He manifestly had no favor for the theory of direct imputation; he did not regard the race as having such an agency in the first transgression as to be immediately responsible therefor. His theory was that of mediate imputation. When his statements are put together, it is made to appear that the new-born infant is under condemnation, not because *he sinned* in Adam, but because he *possesses a nature* which was robbed in Adam of original righteousness, and mortgaged to sin. In a word, he is condemned, not because he was properly a coagent in Adam's trespass, but because he possesses in his nature the effects of that trespass. This interpretation of Anselm will be seen to have a sufficient basis in the following declarations of his: "In Adam omnes peccavimus, quando ille peccavit, non quia tunc peccavimus ipsi qui nondum eramus, sed quia de illo futuri eramus, et tunc facta est illa necessitas ut cum essemus peccaremus. . . . Aperte videtur [Rom. v. 14] significare quod non illis personaliter imputetur ipsa Adæ prævaricatio, aut aliquid tam magnum. . . . Quia natura subsistit in personis et personæ non sunt sine natura, facit natura personas infantium peccatrices. Sic spoliavit persona naturam bono justitiæ in Adam; et natura egens facta omnes personas, quas ipsa de se procreat, eadem egestate peccatrices et injustos facit." (De Concept. Virg., VII., XXII., XXIII. Compare Odo of Cambray, De Peccat. Orig., II.) According to Anselm, the condemnation involved in original sin is not cancelled except by baptism; and he declares, in the most undisguised terms, that all infants dying in original sin are without distinction damned,—"quod [peccatum originale] æstimo in omnibus infantibus naturaliter propagatis esse æquale, et omnes qui in illo solo moriuntur æqualiter damnari." (Ibid., XXVII.) Anselm's theory was closely connected with his emphatic realism, according to which he regarded the universal as preceding the individual, and the

person as only a concrete manifestation of a pre-existing nature. He seems, therefore, to have regarded the corruption of human nature at its source, in the first parents, as directly involving its corruption in all the race. But the majority of the scholastics felt the necessity of finding some other link between the individual and the corrupted Adam. As creationists, maintaining the independent origin of each soul, they could discover in the body alone a continuous chain of connection reaching back to the head of the race. Hence they regarded the concupiscence, inseparably connected in man's fallen condition with the propagation of the body, as in some way conveying a taint to the soul. So, among others, Hugo of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, Bonaventura, and Albertus Magnus interpreted the subject. (De Sac., I. 7. 24; Sent., II. 30. 4; Brevil., III. 6; Sum. Theol.) This view was criticised by Thomas Aquinas, as not properly accounting for the *culpa* in original sin, and seems not to have been altogether satisfactory to some who adopted it as the best available solution of the case; at any rate we find Hugo remarking, "We think it must be said that it is the secret justice of God by which the soul is held responsible for that sin which it had no power to avoid, and which it did not commit by its own will." (Sent., III. 12.) The theory to which Aquinas gives the preference falls back upon the general notion of race unity. "All men," he says, "who are born of Adam can be considered as one man, in so far as they agree in the nature which they receive from the first parent; as in the civil sphere all men who are of one community are regarded as one body, and the whole community as one man." (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 81. 1.) In the same paragraph Aquinas illustrates still further, by comparing the descendant of Adam to a hand, which is the instrument in a case of homicide. The homicide cannot be charged against the hand viewed by itself, but it can be charged against it in so far as the hand is a part of the man committing the homicide. So

the sin of Adam, and the wounds which it has inflicted upon a God-given nature, cannot be imputed to a descendant of Adam viewed by himself, since he had no independent will in their production; but they can be imputed to him viewed as a member of the Adam who, by a guilty exercise of will, gave them birth. The difference between this view and that of Anselm is quite apparent. Anselm emphasizes the fact that through race connection we are personally possessors of a *nature* which is defective and prone to sin; Aquinas emphasizes the fact, that through race connection we are members of a *person* who sinned, and by his sin insured to us a corrupted nature.

The formal element in freedom, or the power of contrary choice, was recognized with sufficient distinctness by various writers. This was the case with Duns Scotus, who styles the will the total cause of its own acts. (Sent., I. 39. 5. 15; II. 25. 1. 6.) It enters also into the definition of Durandus (Sent., II. 24. 2), and was emphatically asserted by Occam. Some of the statements of Thomas Aquinas seem to give it a place; however, the wide range which he assigns to divine efficiency reduces all second causes, the human will included, wellnigh to the rank of mere instruments. (Sum. contra Gentiles, III. 67, 89, 148; Sum. Theol., I. 83. 1, I. 105. 5.) Suarez numbers Aquinas, at least as respects some passages, with those who appear to identify the free with the voluntary. (Opuscula, p. 2.)

At the same time, the Augustinian notion of real freedom received much recognition from the scholastics. Anselm reproduces very distinctly and emphatically the theory of Augustine. "Free will," he says, "I do not think to be the power of sinning and not sinning; since, if this were its definition, neither God nor the angels, who are unable to sin, would have free will. . . . Power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom. . . . Since all freedom is power, freedom of will is the power to preserve rectitude of will, for the sake of rectitude." (De Lib. Arbit.) So, ac-

cording to Anselm, the essence of free will is not the power of contrary or alternative choice, but the power to pursue righteousness with unchanging fidelity, and he is most free who is farthest from the possibility of choosing evil. A kindred conception of free will appears with Hugo, Peter Lombard, and Bernard, in the specification that the ideal freedom is the *non posse peccare*, the inability to sin. (De Sac., I. 6. 16; Sent., II. 25. 6; De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., VII. 10.) Richard of St. Victor, while he probably agreed with the foregoing writers in the idea that the ideal state excludes the liability to sin, seems to have placed this feature under the category of power rather than of freedom, and he defines the latter as simply exemption from compulsion. "To be able," he says, "to do evil, pertains to infirmity; to be able to do good, to power: neither pertains to freedom. It is characteristic of freedom that its consent cannot be extorted or restrained. . . . It is one thing to have freedom, and another to have power. It pertains to freedom that it cannot be compelled to will anything; the privation of power consists in, not sufficing for the doing of anything good." (De Statu Interioris Hom., I. 13.) According to Richard, therefore, infirmity and freedom are not at all antagonistic.

As respects free will in the fallen man, there was an unmistakable departure from Augustine, a drift toward a less radical position. Augustine had taught that the fall extinguished the free will as a power to choose the good, so that, to become operative in this sense, it needed to be fundamentally resuscitated. And this theory had its advocates all through the Middle Ages. The party in sympathy with Gottschalk in the ninth century, and at a later date theologians as representative as Thomas Aquinas, stood substantially upon Augustinian ground in affirming the moral inability of the natural man. (Aquinas indeed is credited with admitting, on the whole, a larger element of necessitarianism than did Augustine.) But those who impliedly

or openly adopted a less emphatic view represent quite as strong a current of belief. Bernard associates free will with grace in the work of man's moral recovery, and in a way which, notwithstanding the strong emphasis which he places upon man's spiritual dependence, seems to reject the Augustinian theory of irresistible grace. "No one," he says, "is saved contrary to his will. For what is read in the Gospel, 'No one comes to me except my Father draw him,' likewise in another place, 'Compel them to come in,' is no obstacle; for truly however many the benignant Father, who wishes all to be saved, seems to compel to salvation, He judges no one worthy of salvation whom He has not first proved to be willing." (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., XI.) More noteworthy still is the position of Alexander Hales, as being one of the great masters of systematic theology. We find him teaching that the reception of grace is determined, not by the sovereignty of God, but by the receptivity of the one to whom grace is proffered; and that, while no one is able adequately to prepare himself for salvation, he who does what lies within his own power will obtain the needful assistance. (Sum. Theol., I. 28. Compare Neander's interpretation, Kirchengeschichte, VIII.) Duns Scotus made a still larger concession to the moral ability of the fallen man. Holding that the fall simply robbed man of original righteousness, that *in puris naturalibus*, or his estate by birth, he has the will intact, only without the beneficent guidance which the *donum superadditum* provided in the unfallen Adam, he maintained that, while man cannot reach the supernatural end designed for him without grace, he can in his own virtue avoid resisting grace, can fulfil all the requirements of natural morality, and can very likely love God above all else. (Sent., II. 25. 28. See also Werner.) Durandus did not fall much short of the position of Scotus. (Sent., II. 28. 2-4.) Quite as emphatically as the Scotist, the later nominalist school, represented by Biel and Occam, asserted the ability of the

individual to co-operate efficiently in the achievement of his salvation.

A departure from Augustine, as respects acknowledging a moral ability in the fallen man, involved logically a proportionate departure on the subject of the acquisition of merit, and also upon the dogma of unconditional election; but these topics are reserved for the section on the appropriation of the benefits of Christ's work.

As respects the nature of sin or moral evil, in general, it was characteristic of mediæval theologians to define it as negation or privation, and as needing, like darkness and cold, only a *causa deficiens*. Such expressions as the following are found: "Malum nihil aliud est quam privatio boni." "Omne quod est recte est." "Omne quod est bonum est." "Injustitia omnino nihil est, sicut cæcitas." "Peccatum nihil est." "Injustitia est nihil." "Causa omnis peccati est voluntas a Deo deficiens." "Peccatum non appetitio malarum rerum, sed desertio meliorum." (John of Damascus, De Fide Orth., I. 4, II. 30, IV. 20; Erigena, De Prædest., III. 3, X. 4, 5; Anselm, De Casu Diab., IX., XX.; Dial. de Ver., VII.; De Concept. Virg., V.; Abelard, Scito Te Ipsum, III.; Hugo, Inst. in Dec., IV.; Sent., III. 14; De Sac., I. 1. 10; Pullus, Sent., I. 11; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I. 14. 10; Bonaventura, Brevil., III. 1; Centil., I. 3; Wycliffe, Trial., III. 4.)

With this dominant representation others were conjoined; and the definition of sin was varied, according as the bearing of the sinner toward God, toward self, or toward finite good in general, was made the prominent point of consideration. Abelard was disposed to define sin as contempt of the Creator. "To sin," he says, "is to condemn the Creator; that is, not to do for His sake what we believe we ought to do for His sake, or not to abandon for His sake what we believe we ought to abandon." (Scito Te Ipsum, III.) Thomas Aquinas says in one place, "All sin consists

in the desire for some changeable good which is inordinately desired." (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 72. 2.) Again he remarks, "Inordinate love of self is the cause of all sin." (Ibid., II. 1. 77. 4. Compare Bonaventura, Tract. de Trib., etc.) Sin, according to Aquinas, has both an infinite and a finite aspect: as an aversion from the infinite and unchangeable good it is infinite; as a turning to changeable and finite good it is finite. (Ibid., II. 1. 87. 4.) Duns Scotus emphasized in particular, as the central feature of sin, an inordinate thirst after happiness (Werner); and Anselm touched upon the same thought when he represented the rational creature as having the two ends, righteousness and blessedness, set before him, and ascribed apostasy to the fact that the pursuit of blessedness was not properly subordinated to that of righteousness. (Kahnis, Dogmatik.)

The theory that evil on the whole is no detracting from the perfection of the universe claimed a measure of assent. Hugo represents that the added ornament and beauty which accrue to the good from contrast with the evil are a full compensation for the otherwise disfiguring presence of the latter. (De Sac., I. 4. 6.) Thomas Aquinas teaches that the perfection of the universe requires that there should be different grades of goodness, and hence, at the lower end of the scale, a changeable goodness, with the contingency, or rather certainty, which it involves of more or less defection from righteousness. "Ordo universi requirit quod quædam sint quæ deficere possint, et interdum deficient." (Sum. Theol., I. 48, 49.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE subject of the section may conveniently be treated under the following three topics: the theory of John of Damascus, Adoptionism, and the teaching of the Latin Church after the rise of Adoptionism.

The Christology of John of Damascus is interesting, as showing the interpretation of the Chalcedonian symbol, which became current in the orthodox Greek Church. That symbol states that Christ has the human nature in full, and the divine in full, and that these two concur in one person; but the precise relation of the natures to the personality it does not attempt to define. In John of Damascus we find an endeavor to give a further development upon this point. He teaches that the human nature in Christ never had any personality of its own; that in the God-man the pre-existing Logos supplied the element of personality. The moment a human nature came into existence, it appeared as the human nature of the Logos. In other words, in the incarnation the Son of God assumed, not a distinct personal being, but a human nature, to which personality was supplied by union with the already existing divine person. (De Fide Orth., III. 2.) From the united subsistence of the two natures, as he further teaches, there results a species of interpenetration. Especially is the human glorified by union with the divine. As fire penetrates iron, so that one cannot touch the iron without at

the same time touching the fire, so one cannot disconnect the human in Christ from the divine; and this it is which makes it proper to adore the flesh of Christ. (Ibid., III. 8.) Still each nature retains its own attributes. "We do not attribute," he says, "those things to the humanity which are proper to the divinity." (Ibid., III. 4.) The human soul of Christ, to be sure, had perfect knowledge from the first, but this knowledge is to be regarded as derived; it accrues to the soul through its union with the Logos. In general, the representation of John of Damascus emphasizes the subordination of the human to the divine factor. He acknowledges, indeed, a human will in Christ as a faculty, but places it in subject relation to the divine will, to which pertains the initiative in all acts of the God-man. (Ibid., II. 22, III. 18.)

The West, from early times, manifested relatively a strong interest in the human nature of Christ. While Monophysitism won the adherence of a large section of the East, its obscuration of the human attributes of the Redeemer commanded very little sympathy upon Western soil. Adoptionism may be regarded as a special and culminating manifestation in the West of the tendency to give emphatic acknowledgment to the human nature in Christ. It originated in Spain, and largely pervaded the Spanish Church in the latter part of the eighth century. Its chief exponents were Felix of Urgellis and Elipandus of Toledo. Condemned by several synods in the last decade of the eighth century, it soon lost adherents, and was reckoned in the list of vanquished heresies. Among the contemporary theologians who attempted its refutation, a conspicuous place was held by Alcuin.

The peculiarity of Adoptionism was expressed in the affirmation that Christ, as to His human nature, was not naturally the Son of God, and to become the Son of God in respect to this nature needed to be adopted. In His humanity Christ is the adopted head, of which believers, as

adopted children, are the members. The point in His earthly life at which His adoption was consummated was not very definitely fixed by the adherents of this view, but most placed it at the time of His baptism.

The distinction between an adopted and a natural Son of God seemed to the Church like a revival of the error of Nestorius. Hence we find Alcuin charging Felix with dividing Christ into two sons,—“*dividens Christum in duos filios, unum vocans proprium, alterum adoptivum, et in duos deos, unum verum Deum, alterum nuncupativum Deum.*” (Adv. Felicem, I. 1, 10, 11.) To this it was replied by the Adoptionists, that it was not at all in their intention to compromise the unity of Christ; that they acknowledged in Him but a single personality, the different terms applied having reference to the same person under different aspects. They maintained, moreover, that the distinction between a natural and an adopted Son is not only allowable, but requisite, since a natural son cannot have two fathers (the omnipotent God and King David), and if the term “adopted” is discarded, it is left to be inferred that the human, like the divine, is generated from the substance of the Father. (Quoted by Alcuin, Adv. Fel., I. 12, II. 12.) To this it was replied by Alcuin, that no father is able to have a son who is at the same time a son both by nature and by adoption. He argued also, that as soul and body, the mortal and the immortal, constitute one man, so the divine and the human in Christ, in virtue of the simple fact of their union, form the one Son of God. In other words, nothing but the union of the human with the divine was necessary in order that the former should participate, in the fullest sense, in sonship. No doubt the Adoptionists were not so deep in error as the charges of their opponents insinuated; but their phraseology was properly subject to criticism, as seeming to assign a kind of alien position to Christ’s human nature, until by a special act of adoption it was made to partake of sonship.

After the controversy with Adoptionism, there was a strong bias in the Latin Church toward the type of Christology represented by John of Damascus. Mediæval theologians not only concurred in his representation that the Son of God (or, as several were careful to state, the person, rather than the nature, of the Son) assumed a human nature, as distinguished from a human person, but in general allowed His humanity to fall into the background as compared with His divinity. This lack of an appreciative consideration of Christ as the Son of Man may perhaps be placed among the causes which, to a large extent, turned the stream of devotion toward the Virgin and the saints.

One of the more fruitful occasions of christological discussion in this era was the manner in which Peter Lombard treated the question, whether by reason of the incarnation God became anything which He was not before, or whether man became God. After mentioning two different senses in which the question might be answered affirmatively, and rendering his criticisms, he states the theory of those who would answer in the negative. (Sent., III. 6, 7.) This negative answer, as involving the denial that the human nature was incorporated into a divine person, left to that nature simply the place of a husk, or envelope, or external adjunct. As Peter Lombard took no pains to refute this theory (known as nihilianism), it was made a ground of severe censure from various quarters; but the fame of the Master of Sentences was too strongly supported to give way before the unfavorable comments.

The more radical doctrine of a *communicatio idiomatum*, or of the receptivity of the human nature for the divine predicates, seems not to have been generally entertained. Hugo of St. Victor teaches that, as the Spirit was given to the human nature of Christ without measure, the knowledge of all things must have been imparted to His human soul. (Sent., I. 16.) Thomas Aquinas, defining more specifically, says that, while the soul of Christ does not

comprehend the essence of God, or know the possibilities embraced in Him, it comprehends, through the Word, everything in the sphere of creatures,—"comprehendit enim in Verbo omnis creaturæ essentiam, et per consequens potentiam, et virtutem, et omnia quæ sunt in potentia creaturæ." (Sum. Theol., III. 10. 2.) As he denies omniscience proper to the human soul of Christ, so also omnipotence. "Since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it is impossible that it should have omnipotence." (Ibid., III. 13. 1.) Bonaventura speaks of a *communicatio idiomatum*, but it is evident that he regarded the divine predicates as belonging to the human nature of Christ only on the ground that all that is within the person may be viewed as the property of either nature belonging to the person, and not on the ground of an actual communication; indeed, he says, "It is not possible for the soul of Christ to be made equal to the Word, either in knowledge or in anything else." (Brevil., IV. 6.) Duns Scotus took a more emphatic view (than appears in these statements of Aquinas and Bonaventura) of the receptivity of the human for the divine, and taught that the soul of Christ sees in the divine Word all that the Word Himself sees. (Werner and Dorner.)

SECTION II.—THE REDEMPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

1. THE THEORY OF ANSELM.—While preceding writers may have touched upon the fundamental ideas of soteriology, none of them gave such a definite and organized development of the subject as we find in the "Cur Deus Homo" of Anselm. More than any theologian of an earlier date, he attempted what may be called a science of redemption. His endeavor was to show that the Christian plan of saving men through the agency of a God-man is not only a fit method, but the only possible method under the given con-

ditions. In accordance with the design of his treatise, he appeals, not to Biblical data, but to rational evidences.

Anselm repudiates at the outset the idea of any right in Satan over fallen men. That God did not rescue man from his thralldom by the strong arm of power, was in no wise due to the adversary himself. Having cast aside this stumbling-block, Anselm endeavors to show that the nature of God, and the relations of the creature to Him, require, as a condition of human salvation, the atoning work of a God-man.

No words, as Anselm conceived, can exaggerate the exaltation of God above the creature, or the absolute obligation of the creature to love and to obey Him. The maintenance of the divine honor is an end to which any end pertaining to the created universe, yea, to which the created universe, with the sum total of its interests, is utterly subordinate. Nothing can be conceived more intolerable than for the creature to rob the Creator of the honor due to Him. But all sin, as denying to God the obedience due, is of the nature of this heinous robbery. God cannot, therefore, make any concession to sin, and at the same time maintain the consistency and fitness to which He must be supposed to be supremely attached. He cannot remit sin, unless satisfaction is rendered. To remit the offence of a transgressor, and to restore without satisfaction, would be placing him who sins and him who does not upon the same footing; indeed, it would be granting larger freedom to unrighteousness than to righteousness, since if sin is neither atoned for nor punished it is subject to no law.

A demand for satisfaction, as a condition of remission, may also be seen when we consider the destiny for which men were designed. It entered into the Creator's purpose that they should fill up the gap made by the fall of angels. In order to do this properly, men must appear upon an equality with the unfallen angels. But a man who has sinned, and for whose sin no satisfaction has been made,

cannot be the equal of an angel who has never sinned. For God to exalt him to such a position would be to act contrary to the fitness of things.

So the nature of God, the relations of the creature to Him, and the divine purpose, require satisfaction to be made for sin, if it is to be remitted. But the sinner himself cannot make satisfaction for his sins. Every moment he is under obligation to render his utmost service to God. He can never do more than fulfil present duty; past transgressions incur a debt that he can never cancel, and it is no small debt either, for all sin against God has infinite demerit. No reasonable being will say that he would be justified in violating any, even the smallest, command of God, for the sake of anything or of all things outside of God. As one, then, ought not to sin against God, even for the sake of all that is not God, so, to make good his sin, he ought to give that which is of more value than all that is not God.

From these considerations it follows that God alone can make satisfaction for sin. But while none but God can make it, none but man ought to make it. "It is necessary, therefore, that the selfsame Person who is to make the satisfaction be perfect God and perfect man, since He cannot make it unless He be really God, and He ought not to make it unless He be really man." (II. 7.)

Christ incarnate, then, appears as perfect God and perfect man. As a sinless being, He is under no obligation to die. Consequently, in voluntarily surrendering Himself to death He establishes a merit,—a merit proportioned to the dignity of His person, and fully adequate to offset man's demerit. So great a merit deserved an extraordinary reward. But Christ, as being already possessor of all things, needed no gift for Himself. It remained, accordingly, that He should be allowed to elect man to receive the benefits which had been purchased by His sacrifice.

The theory of Anselm centres the redeeming work of Christ in His voluntary death. While he does not overlook

the healthful influence which comes from His example, he makes but minor account of this, and associates it rather with the appropriation, than with the primary provision, of salvation. The obedience which Christ rendered during His life he regards as no factor at all in the acquisition of merit, inasmuch as Christ, in rendering a righteous obedience to God, only rendered what is due, without distinction, from every rational creature.

It is to be observed that, according to Anselm, Christ renders satisfaction to divine justice, not directly, by bearing the penalty of broken law in the transgressor's place, but indirectly, by the acquisition of merit. The merit which he acquires in behalf of men is transferred to them, or placed to their account, and offsets the demands of divine justice, so far as those demands were a fixed barrier against any forgiveness of sins. The meritorious work of Christ satisfies divine justice, in the sense that it secures the honor of that justice, notwithstanding the forgiveness of sins is proffered. This may seem quite a liberal use of the term "satisfaction"; and indeed Ritschl charges against Anselm, that, while he begins with the idea of satisfaction, he ends with the quite different idea of merit, and its imputation to the sinner. (History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.) But in a certain sense, a merit which supplies to God a *sine qua non* of man's forgiveness, or of the maintenance of His honor in conferring such forgiveness, may be termed a means of satisfaction.

2. THE THEORY OF ABELARD. — No less than Anselm, Abelard repudiated the notion of a right in Satan, it being deemed by him absurd that a right claiming the respect of God could be secured by a crime. But in his positive conception of the atonement he differed widely from his predecessor. In place of the satisfaction theory, he advocated the moral theory; in place of a necessary tribute to the honor and justice of God, the constraining power of His revealed love. In other words, the central idea of Abelard

was that God reveals in Christ His great love; that this love prompts to returning love in us, from which follows naturally our emancipation from sin, and our acceptance with God. "Our redemption," he says, "is that supreme love wrought in us through the passion of Christ, which not only frees us from the servitude of sin, but acquires for us the true liberty of the sons of God; so that we fulfil all requirements rather through the love than the fear of Him who has exhibited toward us so great a grace, — a grace than which a greater, according to His own testimony, cannot be found." (Comm. super Epist. ad Rom., II. 3-5.) Abelard, to be sure, does not discard altogether the sacrificial aspect of Christ's work, or the idea of imputed merit. He recognizes a vicarious efficacy in the merit acquired by Christ, inasmuch as this comes in to supplement, in the sight of God, the deficiency of merit in the elect, or the imperfection of that love which is called forth in them by the revelation of divine love. But this is a subordinate consideration. Love revealed and drawing to returning love, this is the essence of Abelard's theory of the redemptive work of Christ.

3. VIEWS OF OTHER WRITERS. — Scholasticism as a whole was not characterized by an unqualified acceptance of either of the foregoing theories. Most of the mediæval theologians diverged, more or less, from Anselm's representation. In particular, there was a disposition to challenge the doctrine that the satisfaction made by a God-man was the sole possible means of accomplishing man's restoration. While it was allowed that this way was supremely agreeable to the divine nature, it was maintained by the majority of eminent writers that it lay within the sovereignty and the unlimited resources of God to adopt some other method. (Hugo, De Sac., I. 8. 10; Bernard, De Error. Abælardi, VIII.; Lombard, Sent., III. 20. 1; Hales, Sum. Theol., III. 1. 4; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 1. 2, 46. 2; Bonaventura, Brevil., IV. 1; Scotus, Sent., III. 20, IV. 15. 1.)

The idea of a right in Satan, though appearing in the ref-

erences of certain writers, claimed in reality but little place. The most emphatic statements in the direction of this idea, when analyzed, are found to concede only a *quasi* right. Bernard, indeed, in his intemperate polemic against Abelard, sharply rebukes him for his denial of a right in Satan; but when he comes to define that right, he makes it himself a pretty thin shadow of a right. He says: "This right of some sort (*quoddam jus*) in the devil against man, even if it was not justly acquired, but iniquitously usurped, was nevertheless justly permitted." (De Error. Ab., V.) In other words, it was just for God to permit Satan to hold sinful men in captivity, not that Satan had any right apart from this permission. It would seem that Bernard might easily have discerned that nothing was necessary to cancel this permission, or the so-called right based upon the permission, except the will of God to withdraw it; but, as a matter of fact, he held on to the Augustinian idea that it was cancelled by the violence of Satan against the sinless Christ. Bernard, it is hardly needful to state, was not confined to this line of representation, but rather was distinguished by his appreciation of the work of Christ as a satisfaction to God, and by his exhortations to believers to depend upon the same, instead of trusting in their own merits. Peter Lombard also adhered somewhat to the old phraseology respecting Satan's connection with the redemptive work; but how far he was, after all, from according a valid right to Satan, is sufficiently clear from the following statements: "Unjustly the devil, so far as he was concerned, was holding man; but man was justly held, because the devil never deserved to have power over man, but man deserved, on account of his guilt, to suffer the tyranny of the devil. If, therefore, God, who was over both, had been pleased to liberate man by power, he was able most rightly to liberate by the sole virtue of His command." (Sent., III. 20. 2.) A similar statement is given by Hugo, of whom it is to be noticed also that he borrows but mod-

erately from the traditional phraseology, since he pictures in the sequel, not a cancelling of a right in Satan, but rather an atonement for man's sin, which made it proper for God to become the champion of man against Satan. With Thomas Aquinas, as with Abelard, we find distinctly stated, in place of the idea of a right in Satan, the idea of God's right to punish man through Satan. (Sum. Theol., III. 48. 4.)

Any very positive drift on the subject of redemption, among the post-Anselmic writers, cannot be affirmed. The theme was treated with great freedom, the Church having set forth no authoritative doctrine. Most writers made account of a plurality of aspects, giving the greater emphasis to the one or the other, according to their preference. Hugo placed not a little stress upon the idea of satisfaction. "That man," he says, "might justly escape the punishment due, it was necessary that a man to whom no punishment was due should receive punishment for man. But no such man was found, except Christ." (Dial. de Sac. Compare De Sac., I. 8. 4.) Richard of St. Victor also dwelt upon the idea of satisfaction, and brought out very forcibly its subjective worth. "If man," he says, "had made no satisfaction, even though he should have no external avenger of his offence, he would suffer the vengeance of a gnawing conscience, and would never be able to obliterate fully the mark of confusion." (De Verb. Incarn., VIII.)

Peter Lombard gave prominence to the moral theory advocated by Abelard. After quoting from the apostle on the incomparable mode which God chose for commending His love, he adds: "The earnest of so great a love toward us having been given, we also are moved and enkindled to the love of God, who has done so great things for us; and through this we are justified, that is, being freed from sins, we are made just. The death of Christ accordingly justifies us, while by means of it love is excited in our hearts." (Sent., III. 19. 1.) But other points of view are

combined with this by Peter Lombard. In connection with the above statement, and in distinction from its explanation of justification by the death of Christ, he styles the death of Christ the one true sacrifice for extinguishing the punishments due to the demerits of men. He also represents Christ as providing for the salvation of men by the acquisition of merit, and says that He "merited for His members redemption from the devil, from sin, and from punishment, and the opening of the kingdom." (Ibid., III. 18. 1.)

Thomas Aquinas likewise viewed the subject from varied standpoints. Among other conceptions, he gave a prominent place to that of satisfaction, and indeed satisfaction in the more direct sense. "The Son of God," he says, "came into the world that He might make satisfaction for the sin of the human race. But one makes satisfaction for the sin of another, while he takes to himself the penalty due to another's sin. . . . He made a plenary satisfaction for us, in that He bore our griefs and carried our sorrows. . . . His goodness is shown in this, that when man was not able to make any adequate satisfaction, through any punishment which he might suffer, He gave to him one who should make satisfaction. . . . Anything is properly called a sacrifice which is done in consideration of the honor properly due to God, to the end of placating Him. It is manifest that the death of Christ was a true sacrifice." (Sum. Theol., III. 14. 1, 22. 3, 47. 3, 48. 3.) Again, satisfaction in the Anselmic sense, or by the acquisition of merit, is taught by Aquinas. The ground, however, of the imputation of this merit, he finds in the union of Christ with His members. "The sin of a single person," he says, "injures no one but himself; but the sin of Adam, who was constituted by God the source of the entire [human] nature, is carried over to others through the propagation of the flesh; and in like manner the merit of Christ, who has been constituted the head of all men in the things of grace,

extends itself to all His members." (Ibid., III. 19. 4, 48. 1, 49. 1.) Aquinas also evinces a very appreciative estimate of the points embraced in the moral theory. (Ibid., III. 46. 3, 49. 1.) Bonaventura moved in much the same circle of thought as Aquinas. (Brevil., IV. 1-10; Sent., III. 1 *et seq.*)

The conclusion of Anselm respecting the infinite worth of Christ's work, and its adequacy in itself to atone for the sins of the race, seems to have been generally acquiesced in by succeeding writers. According to Thomas Aquinas, it was more than an offset for the sins of mankind. "The passion of Christ," he says, "was not only a sufficient, but a superabundant, satisfaction for the sins of the human race." (Sum. Theol., III. 48. 2.) Duns Scotus made a new departure, by taking direct issue with this opinion. He argued that, inasmuch as the human will in Christ is the principle acquisitive of merit, and this must be regarded as finite, it was only finite merit which He acquired. He allowed, indeed, that in fact it suffices for an indefinite number of souls; but the ground of this sufficiency he located, not in itself, but in the divine will, which is the supreme law of right and propriety, and which can make the merit of Christ of as great a value as it is pleased to accept it for, — the so-called doctrine of acceptilation. (Sent., III. 19.) The representations of Durandus on the subject are much like those of Scotus. (Sent., III. 20. 1, 2; IV. 15. 1.)

The descent of Christ's soul into Hades was understood as in the previous period. The fruits of His mission there were supposed to be confined to His members. Unbaptized children, not being included in this category, were in no wise liberated by the visitation of Christ, as is distinctly taught by Aquinas. (Sum. Theol., III. 52. 1-7.)

The question whether Christ would have become incarnate if man had not sinned, received a measure of attention. Rupert of Deutz, Alexander Hales, Duns Scotus, Lullus, John Wessel, and some others, were in favor of an affirma-

tive answer. (Comm. in Matt., XIII. ; Sum. Theol., III. 2. 13 ; Sent., III. 7. 3 ; De Incarn.) As the subject was argued by Duns Scotus, a principal reason for this conclusion was discovered in the incongruity involved in the supposition that so grand an end as is realized in the glorified soul of Christ should have been conditioned in the divine purpose upon the contingency of man's apostasy. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, argued that, in a matter so entirely dependent as this is upon the will of God, we have no means of deciding except by reference to the Scriptures, and that the Scriptures, by everywhere associating the incarnation with the purpose to redeem from sin, make probable the conclusion that it would not have taken place if man had not fallen. (Sum. Theol., III. 1. 3.) Bonaventura also was favorable to the negative conclusion. (Sent., III. 1.)

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

IN the Greek Church the teaching of John of Damascus appears in no wise distinguished from that of his predecessors as respects the opportunity of every man to partake of saving grace, predestination in his view being conditioned by God's foreknowledge of the conduct of the individual. (De Fide Orth., II. 29, 30, IV. 19.)

In the Latin Church the doctrine of predestination in the Augustinian sense was largely current ; but at the same time many who accepted it were moved in so doing rather by the constraint of authority than by any hearty appreciation of the doctrine on its merits, and there were some in high standing who indulged statements involving its renunciation. On the whole, the drift was adverse to the doctrine of unconditional election. Some indication of such a drift may be discovered as early as the ninth century. It was then that Gottschalk advocated the doctrine of a twofold

predestination. According to his way of stating the case, the righteous are predestinated to eternal life, and eternal life is predestinated to them; the wicked are predestinated to perpetual punishment, and perpetual punishment is predestinated to them. (Confess. Prolixior. Compare Ratramnus, De Prædest.; Remigius, De Trib. Epist.) Now, the amount of exception which was taken to this teaching indicates something like an under-current of alienation from strict Augustinianism. It may be allowed, indeed, that the technical accord of Gottschalk's teachings with Augustine might be called into question, since the latter, in the great majority of instances, applied the term "predestination" only to the heirs of salvation. Inasmuch, however, as Gottschalk taught that God did not predestinate to sin, but only to punishment for sin, his view did not differ essentially from that assigned by his opponents to Augustine; namely, that the non-elect are simply left in their naturally sinful and condemned condition, this condition meanwhile making certain their everlasting punishment. It may also be allowed that a very respectable body of theologians agreed with Gottschalk, and openly proclaimed their agreement; as, for example, at the council of Valence, which declared in favor of a double predestination and a limited atonement. But to this it is to be replied that the issue was practically adverse to the doctrine of Gottschalk, and discouraging to its propagation. The general facts, then, of the controversy may be pronounced indicative of a drift adverse to strict Augustinianism. There was, indeed, no open disclaiming of the doctrine of predestination. The opponents of Gottschalk spoke freely of the predestination of the righteous. They also spoke of the predestination of everlasting punishment to the wicked, though not of the wicked to everlasting punishment. (Hincmar, De Prædest., XIX.; Erigena, De Prædest., XIV. 5, XV. 2.) But at the same time they employed statements showing a bias quite different from the Augustinian, and in fact verging pretty

close upon a denial of predestination as an unconditional decree of God. This appears especially in their teaching that Christ died for all, — a doctrine expressly asserted by a synod convened by Hincmar, and also affirmed more than once in his writings. (De Prædest., XXIV., XXVIII., XXXIV.) Now, if Christ truly died for all, then the benefits of His death ought to be available to all; and election or non-election ought to be conditioned upon the use or the neglect of means that are set before all alike. That Hincmar and his associates definitely asserted this conclusion cannot be affirmed. Their position is perhaps best described as a kind of illogical mean between Augustine and the Greek theologians (among whom Chrysostom is frequently quoted by Hincmar). They showed, at the same time, a certain disinclination to Augustinianism, and a disinclination to cut loose from the same.

Theologians generally, between Gottschalk and Alexander Hales, taught in tolerably clear terms the doctrine of a single predestination; but at the same time some of them gave place to statements indicative of more or less of an inclination to modify the doctrine. Hugo of St. Victor, it must be allowed, does not reveal much of this inclination. Some of his statements embody, in the most explicit terms, the doctrine of unconditional election. "God does not will," he says, "that all men should be justified; and yet who doubts that he is able?" (Sent., I. 14.) "Those who, according to their merits, are justly damned, through the grace of God could have been justly saved, if God had so willed. And again, those who through the grace of God are justly saved, according to their own merits, could have been justly damned, if God had not willed to save them." (De Sac., I. 8. 9.) In Anselm, we find quite a strong interest manifested in conserving the free will, and some of his statements look rather counter to the predestinarian basis. Thus, he seems to assign to predestination quite as little of a positive bearing upon the futurity of events as

he does to foreknowledge. He says: "Sicut præscientia quæ non fallitur, non præscit nisi verum sicut erit, aut necessarium, aut spontaneum; ita prædestinatio quæ non mutatur, non prædestinat nisi sicut est in præscientia. Et quemadmodum quod præscitur, licet in æternitate sit immutabile, tamen in tempore aliquando antequam sit, mutari potest, ita est per omnia de prædestinatione." (De Concord. Præscient. et Prædest. cum Lib. Arbit., Quæst. II.) Too much account, however, is not to be made of this representation of Anselm; for in the very treatise under consideration he declares for the doctrine of unconditional election, maintaining that grace alone can liberate the will from the bondage to sin in which it is placed by nature, and that this grace, according to the good pleasure of God, is given to some and withheld from others. Abelard, in one connection, seems to charge it wholly to the guilty torpor and negligence of the reprobate, that grace does not produce the same effect in them as in the elect. (Comm. super Epist. ad Rom., IV. 9.) Bernard, while he strongly emphasized dependence upon divine grace, like some others of the mystics, had a lively sense of the ethical value of a teaching favorable to freedom and responsibility; and accordingly, as was noticed in a previous section, we find him indulging some representations adverse to strict predestinarianism.

Among those representing the crowning era of scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas taught predestination in terms as emphatic as those employed by Augustine. His definition of predestination is as follows: "Predestination is a certain kind of disposition (*quædam ratio ordinis*), in the divine mind, of some unto eternal salvation; the execution, however, of this disposition is indeed passively in the elect, but actively in God." (Sum. Theol., I. 23. 2.) Reprobation is defined on this wise: "Since through divine providence men are disposed unto eternal life, it pertains also to divine providence that it should permit some to fail of that end;

and this is called reprobating." (Ibid., I. 23. 3.) That predestination is conditioned upon nothing in man, but is dependent solely upon the divine will, is stated very explicitly in the following: "It is impossible that the total effect of predestination should in any degree be caused from our side; because whatever is in man disposing him to salvation is altogether comprehended under the effect of predestination, including even the preparation itself for grace. For this does not take place except through divine aid." (Ibid., I. 23. 5. Compare II. 1. 109. 6, 1. 112. 3.) But other theological chiefs of the same era made a positive departure from the proper doctrine of predestination. This was the case with Alexander Hales. While he reproduces to some extent the traditional phraseology, he plainly evinces, on the whole, a disposition to deny the unconditional character of predestination. "Predestination," he says, "expresses not alone the will of God, but the will together with the foreknowledge that they [the elect] will make a good use of His gift. . . . He occupies the same attitude toward all, but not all occupy the same attitude toward Him; and accordingly predestination is not of all, because predestination is conditioned upon the foreknowledge that he [who is its object] will make a good use [through free will of divine gifts]," — *dicendum quod equaliter se habet ad omnes, sed non omnes equaliter ad ipsum; et secundum hoc non est prædestinatio omnium, quia prædestinatio ponit præscientiam quod iste sit bene usus.* (Sum. Theol., I 28. 2. 2.) Bonaventura, while he employs some representations that savor of unconditional election, uses others which seem to make salvation dependent upon the use of power and privilege available to each individual. "Although the free will," he says, "is not able to fulfil the law, or to work grace in itself, nevertheless it is inexcusable if it does not do what it is able, because grace gratuitously given (*gratia gratis data*) always is at hand to fortify, by whose support it is able to do what lies in itself, which being done, it has

the grace inducing a gracious condition (*gratiam gratum facientem*), which being obtained, it may fulfil the divine law." (Brevil., V. 3. See also Sent., I. 40. 2, 3; I. 46. 1. 1.) Duns Scotus, much in the same way as Alexander Hales, represents predestination as conditioned. He argues that it is possible for a predestinated person to be damned, in that it is possible for him not to be predestinated; in other words, that predestination depends upon something in the individual, and not merely upon the arbitrary will of God. "His will," he says of one assumed to be predestinated, "is not confirmed on account of his predestination, and so he is able to sin, and so for the same reason to stand finally in sin, and so to be justly damned; but as he is able to be damned, so he is able not to be predestinated." (Sent., I. 40.) Of reprobation he says: "Since to reprobate is to will to damn, reprobation will have on the part of the object some ground, namely, foreseen final sin." (Ibid., I. 41.) From the emphasis which Duns Scotus placed upon the absoluteness of the divine will, it might have been expected that he would have assigned to it a complete determining power over the destinies of men; but while he emphasized the divine will, he emphasized the human also, and really made the former conditioned to some extent upon the foreseen determinations of the latter. According to the testimony of the English theologian Bradwardine, in the decades following the death of Duns Scotus, there was a wide-spread defection from the Augustinian doctrine. In the preface to his work he compares the state of the Christian world to the apostate condition of Israel when Elijah stood alone against the prophets of Baal. "Almost the whole world," he says, "has gone after Pelagius into error." (De Causa Dei.) His own creed was a stringent predestinarianism. "Salvatio et damnatio cujuscunque procedit a voluntate divina, quæ invariabilis est omnino." (Ibid., I. 45.) The tenor of Wycliffe's teaching on this subject was the same as Bradwardine's. (Trial., II. 14; III. 7.)

Regeneration and justification were understood by the scholastics as by Augustine. By the latter was denoted, not simply absolution, but also the inward change wrought by infused grace, the being made just or righteous. The sentence of Peter Lombard, "Justificamur, id est, soluti a peccatis, justi efficitur," may be regarded as a standard exposition of the subject. Both of the two elements mentioned were included by Thomas Aquinas in the conception of justification. It is to be observed, however, that one at least of his specifications affiliates not a little with the Protestant view. He says that the justification of the sinner is wrought by God instantaneously,—"justificatio impii fit a Deo in instanti." (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 113. 7.) Now, unless in this connection he means simply inchoate justification, or the first distinctive stage of justification, his language needs reconciling with the canon of Trent, which speaks of a progressive increase of justification.

The assurance that one is in possession of the grace of justification is not, according to Aquinas, the common privilege of believers. In the main, one must be content with a reasonable conjecture, based upon the proper signs of the grace. In exceptional cases, however, in order to inspire confidence and courage for the prosecution of great undertakings, or for the endurance of great sufferings, assurance is bestowed by means of a special revelation from God. (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 112. 5.) This view found general acceptance in the Romish Church.

In the current definition of theologians, the faith which justifies was declared to be inclusive of the right inward disposition, the *fides formata* (*charitate*), as distinguished from the *fides informis*, or a mere intellectual assent. (Anselm, Monolog., LXXV., LXXVII.; Abelard, Comm. super Epist. ad Rom., II. 4; Lombard, Sent., III. 23. 4; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., II. 1. 114. 4, 2. 4. 3, III. 49. 1; Bonaventura, Centil., III. 37.) Meanwhile, it accorded with the interests of the hierarchy to emphasize the idea that un-

questioning submission to the authority of the Church is especially characteristic of faith, and the teachings of theologians were not altogether destitute of encouragement to the notion. Among formal definitions of faith, we have the following from Hugo of St. Victor: "Faith is a voluntary certitude respecting things unseen, holding a place above opinion and below knowledge,—*Fides est voluntaria absentium certitudo supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta.*" (Sent., I. 1; De Sac., I. 10. 2.) Very similar is the definition of Bernard: "Faith is a voluntary and certain foretaste of truth not yet unveiled." (De Consid., V. 3.) Bernard also, like Hugo, distinguished faith both from opinion and from knowledge proper.

Upon the subject of merit there was quite as wide a departure from Augustine as upon that of predestination. Augustine, indeed, spoke of the merits of the believer, but he regarded them all as essentially the gifts of God. In the system of Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine of radical dependence upon grace involved the placing of all human merits under the category of gifts. But Aquinas was not content with this general representation. We find him distinguishing between two orders of merit,—*meritum ex congruo* and *meritum ex condigno*. "A meritorious work of man," he says, "can be considered in a twofold wise: on the one hand, according to that which proceeds from the free will; on the other, according to that which proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit." (Sum. Theol., II. 1. 114. 3.) As the act of the free will bears no proper proportion to the transcendent destiny of the believer, so it cannot merit that destiny in the more positive sense, or *ex condigno*. Only so far as the Divine Spirit is the producing cause, can merit of this kind be acquired. As, however, it is fitting or congruous that, when a man acts according to his power, God should reward him according to the excellence of His power, man can merit, *ex congruo*, the great bestowments of God. Now, inasmuch as Aquinas

nas regarded the free will, in the natural state of man, as incapable of any movement toward God, it follows logically from his premises that even *meritum ex congruo* is based primarily upon divine grace, and that man can point to no merit as properly his own acquisition. But while this may be said when the different parts of his system are brought into connection, it must still be allowed that there was a certain tendency in the above distinction, at least in an age already on the road to legalism, to magnify human merit, to foster the idea of earning the rewards of the Christian life. The practical impression of the representation that a man in a certain sense earns a proprietorship in Christian rewards, would naturally be different from the simple Augustinian representation that all of man's merits are only gratuitous gifts of God. Even among those distinctly recognizing the Thomist principle that a certain primary grace lies back of all merit, there was room for the disposition to regard their works as purchasing an *increase* of grace. Among those giving a larger scope to human ability, there was naturally a broader concession to the idea of acquiring merit by works. Such was the case with Durandus. *Meritum de congruo*, as he teaches, is not dependent upon grace. (Sent., I. 17. 2.) In the Nominalist school, which commanded a wide place in the Church for a century and a half before the Reformation, a theory respecting merit was taught which had vastly more affinity with Pelagianism than with Augustinianism. In this school it was maintained that man *in puris naturalibus*, that is, prior to all action of grace, can obtain *merita de congruo*, and upon the ground of these the grace is bestowed which enables him to obtain *merita de condigno*. Here, evidently, merit, as a purely personal acquisition, takes precedence of grace, as a foundation of man's salvation. (Ritschl, History of the Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation.) With this aberration upon the subject of merit is to be compared another extreme development, namely, the doctrine of works of supererogation.

According to this tenet, many of the saints, excelling the requirements placed upon them, have earned (as did also Christ) merits beyond their own needs; and these, being in the keeping of the Church, may be applied by its authorities to the cancelling of the temporal penalties which are due to sins. This theory was outlined by Alexander Hales, and more fully elaborated by later writers. The following is the version given by Thomas Aquinas: "The reason why they [indulgences] are able to avail is the unity of the mystical body, in which many have exceeded in works of penitence their obligations (*supererogaverunt ad mensuram debitorum suorum*); and many also have patiently borne unjust tribulations, through which a multitude of punishments could have been expiated, if it had been due to them. Of which merits so great is the abundance that they exceed all the punishments due to those now living; and especially on account of the merit of Christ, which, although it works in the sacraments, is nevertheless not confined in its efficacy to the sacraments, but in its infinitude exceeds the efficacy of the sacraments. But the saints in whom is found a superabundance of works of satisfaction have not done works of this kind specifically for him who needs remission, but for the whole Church in common. And so the aforesaid merits are the common property of the whole Church. But things which are common to a multitude are distributed to individuals of the multitude, according to the decision of him who is at the head of the multitude." (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 25. 1. — Migne.) It is manifest, therefore, that the popular notions respecting works of merit, the great emphasis placed upon the atoning virtue of alms, pilgrimages, and various forms of penitential inflictions, were not altogether alien to the dogmatic teaching of the age. When we find such specifications as the above, or when we find great masters like Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas commending the repetition of the Lord's Prayer, the sprinkling of holy

water, beating upon the breast, etc., as efficacious means of cancelling certain kinds of sins (Sent., IV. 16. 4; Sum. Theol., III. 87. 3), we are compelled to allow that there were points of affinity between the theories of the doctors and the crude practices of the ignorant masses.

In investigating the subject of this section, one can hardly fail to observe how far the impersonal expression *grace* takes precedence of the personal expression *Christ*. While there were noteworthy exceptions, the ruling conception of Christian life among mediæval writers was a supply by various means from a treasury of grace, rather than appropriation of Christ as the soul's companion, and the all-sufficient spring of its life. The personal Redeemer stood in the background. While this result may be ascribed largely to a general conception of salvation, having its starting-point at least as far back as Augustine, it was no doubt helped on by the great prominence given to the saints and the Virgin. So much was interposed between the individual and Christ that He was placed of necessity at a distance.

Dogmatic specifications respecting the worship of the saints were made by different writers. Analogous to the distinction drawn by the Greek theologians between *λατρεία* and *προσκύνησις*, the Latins made a distinction between *latria* and *dulia*, the former denoting the species of worship due to God, the latter that due to the saints. (Hugo, Inst. in Dec., I.; Sent., IV. 3.) Between these the later scholastics placed the *hyperdulia*, as expressive of the worship due alone to the Virgin. (Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 25. 5.) With the worship of saints the veneration of their relics was associated, and the latter as well as the former was distinctly commended. (Ibid., III. 25. 6.) That the saints are cognizant of the prayers addressed to them was the prevalent theory, though Hugo was inclined to Augustine's view, that the saints of their own accord pray for men in this world; that God, knowing their prayers as well as the

petitions addressed to them, gives efficacy to the former in the direction of an answer to the latter. (De Sac., II. 16. 11.) The argument for the common view, as presented by Thomas Aquinas, is as follows. Perfect blessedness implies that one should have what is properly an object of desire. To know that which pertains to one's self is properly an object of desire. It pertains to the saints to render aid to those in need. Hence they have the knowledge which is suited to such a vocation; they understand in the Word, or through their vision of God, the vows, devotions, and prayers of men who have recourse to themselves. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 72. 1. — Migne.)

The perpetual virginity of Mary, and her freedom from actual sin, were regarded in this period as items of Catholic belief. The doctrine of her assumption, also, was commonly accepted after the ninth century. The dogma of her immaculate conception, on the other hand, claimed no very prominent advocate before the time of Duns Scotus. The contrary view appears with Radbertus, Richard of St. Victor, and others, who spoke of her as being sanctified in the womb, such a work of sanctification having of course no occasion, if she had been immaculately conceived. (Radbertus, De Part. Virg.; Richard, Explicat. in Cant., XXVI.) Bernard taught the same view; and while he had occasion to criticise the clergy of Lyons for observing a feast of the Virgin's conception, his words do not show that this was definitely a feast of the *immaculate* conception. (Epist. CLXXIV.) Thomas Aquinas, also, distinctly denied the immaculate conception. "The blessed Virgin," he says, "contracted indeed original sin, but was purified from the same before she was born from the womb, — Beata Virgo contraxit quidem originale peccatum, sed ab eo fuit mundata, antequam ex utero nasceretur." (Sum. Theol., III. 27. 2.) Bonaventura, too, was true to the trend of patristic and scholastic thinking, and taught very clearly that Christ alone of all the race was without original sin. (Tract. de

Trib. Tern.; Sent., III. 3.) Duns Scotus argued for the immaculate conception, on the purely theoretical ground that it was a fitting display of saving power, and specially honoring to Christ, that some one should have been constituted free from all sin even original, and that in behalf of no one could this power have been so properly displayed as in behalf of the virgin mother of the Lord. (Sent., III. 3. 1.) The Franciscans ere long adhered generally to the view of their master theologian; the Dominicans, on the other hand, contended against the same. Not till the pontificate of Pius IX. was an official verdict rendered in favor of the dogma of the immaculate conception. The topic, by the way, affords a fine example of how hierarchical authority in the Romish Church is able to set tradition at naught; for the fact is beyond question that the opinions of the fathers and of their successors, down to the closing part of the thirteenth century, are arrayed in substantial unanimity against the theory of the immaculate conception.

But if the Middle Ages failed to reach the highest point in the line of dogmatic tribute to Mary, they did not fail of rendering to her the highest tribute as respects actual worship. She was ranked as the crowned queen of heaven, and to the compelling power of her requests the divine will was supposed to yield ready assent. Books of devotion were written in her honor, and the language which is applied to God in the Davidic Psalms was transferred to her. A psalter, imputed to Bonaventura, though his authorship of it may be questioned, turns the highest ascriptions to the account of Mary by putting *Domina* in place of *Dominus*, or the Virgin in place of the Lord. “*Domina mea in te speravi, de inimicis meis libera me domina. In domina confido. Diligam te domina cœli et terræ, et in gentibus nomen tuum invocabo. Judica me domina, et discerne causam meam de gente perversa. Domina refugium nostrum tu es in omni necessitate nostra. Exsurgat Maria, et dissipentur inimici ejus. Beati omnes qui timent dominam nostram.*”

Domina probasti me, et cognovisti me, ruinam et transgressionem meam." (Psalterium Beatae Virginis.)

After surveying the mediums which were interposed between the individual and Christ, one can appreciate the discernment which led Wycliffe to suggest that it would be better to pass by the inferior mediators, and to appeal to Christ alone as being incomparably the best mediator, the most accessible, the most benignant, and the most compassionate. "Truly," he says, "it seems to be folly to leave the fountain yielding the more ready supply, and to approach to some turbid and remote rivulet, and especially where faith does not teach that the said rivulet has emanated from the living fountain." (Trial., III. 30.) In the closing reference, Wycliffe had in mind the doubtful saints, such as the scramble after the canonization of a favorite by monastic orders, and other parties, was likely, in his view, to introduce into the calendar.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

THE curtailment of Christian empire in the East by the Mohammedans, and the final separation of the East from the West, gave free scope in Latin Christendom for the development of the Roman idea of the Church. No strong ecclesiastical power appeared now to dispute the pretensions, or to limit the prerogatives, of the Roman bishops. Already in the latter part of the eleventh century, Gregory VII. vigorously asserted the leading points of the theory of papal supremacy, and in the thirteenth century the papal theocracy reached its culmination.

At the crowning era of papal rule, two ideas were dominant respecting the Church: (1.) that as a visible organism it is identical with the kingdom of God upon earth; (2.) that it is the patrimony of Peter, or, in other words, of the Roman bishop. In pursuance of the former idea, salvation was limited to those in actual connection with the Church, and subject to its authority. A measure of exception, however, was allowed. We find statements to the effect that an unjust excommunication is no cause of harm to the one whom it severs from church fellowship. Thus Robert Pullus declares that an anathema is of no effect against one not deserving censure, and that, while such a one is excluded by the priest, he is received by God. (Sent., VI. 61.) Thomas Aquinas also teaches that an unjust excommunication does not injure its victim, provided he

endures it with becoming meekness. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 21. 4. Compare Abelard, *Scito Te Ipsum*, XXVI.) In conformity with the second idea, a constitutional primacy was assigned to Peter among the apostles, the Roman bishop was regarded as heir to that primacy, and consequently as the head of the Church, the vicegerent of Christ upon earth.

The popes themselves, in this era, in defining their prerogatives, had a special occasion to place their position in contrast with that of temporal sovereigns, inasmuch as these were their most conspicuous rivals. Gregory VII. found in the sun and the moon what seemed to him an apt means of illustrating the relative dignity of the papal and the princely power. Innocent III., the greatest of the ecclesiastical monarchs of the Middle Ages, reaffirmed and enlarged upon the illustration. The following sentences of his leave no ambiguity as respects his view of papal rank. "Although the primary and principal foundation of the Church is Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, the second and secondary foundation of the Church is Peter. . . . After he [Peter] had consecrated the Roman Church with his own blood, he left the primacy of the Church to his successor, transferring in him the whole plenitude of power. . . . Single kings have single realms. But Peter, as in fulness, so also in breadth, surpasses them all, because he is the vicegerent of Him to whom belongs the earth and the fulness thereof. . . . As the moon derives its light from the sun, and is inferior to it at once in quantity and quality, in position as well as in effect, so the regal power derives the splendor of its dignity from pontifical authority." (Prima Collect. Decret., Tit. II., III. — Migne.) If anything was lacking on the part of Innocent III. to the most complete assertion of pontifical sovereignty, the lack was supplied in the bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII. In this bull the claim of the temporal power to anything like autonomy over against the spiritual is likened to

Manichæan dualism. With all the formality and precision of an *ex cathedra* decree, Boniface proclaims: "We declare, say, define, and pronounce, that to be subject to the Roman pontiff is for every human creature an altogether necessary condition of salvation," — *subesse Romano pontifici, omni humanæ creaturæ declaramus, dicimus, definimus, et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis.* (Quoted in Gieseler's *Kirchengeschichte.*)

By the earlier theologians of the period the full theory of the papacy was not entertained. Among other evidences of this is the interpretation that was given of Matt. xvi. 18. We find Beda, for example, saying that the rock upon which the Church is built is the Saviour whom Peter confessed, and in general commenting upon the passage in a way which assigns no exceptional eminence to Peter. (*Expos. in Matt.*) Radbertus draws out the same meaning, and condemns as false the representation that Peter is the foundation of the Church. "*Non enim, ut quidam male putant, Petrus fundamentum totius ecclesiæ est.*" (*Expos. in Matt.*) But later writers were in better accord with the papal theory. At the crowning era of scholasticism, which was also the crowning era of the papacy, theologians were not much behind the Popes themselves in their descriptions of papal sovereignty. Says Abelard: "The kingdom of Christ is the universal Church, so delivered into the power of Peter that nothing in it can take place without the command or permission of the Roman pontiff." (*Serm., XXIII.*) "Earthly power," says Hugo, "has the king for its head: spiritual power has the supreme pontiff. By as much as spiritual life is of higher rank than earthly, and the spirit than the body, by so much the spiritual power excels in honor and dignity the earthly or secular power." (*De Sac., II. 2. 3.*) Thomas Aquinas assigns to the Pope the supreme headship over the Church in matters of faith and administration, and speaks of him as ruling the Church in place of Christ. (*Sum. Theol., II. 2. 1. 10, 2. 39. 1.*)

Bonaventura styles the Pope the vicar of Christ, and the source of all ecclesiastical sovereignties. (Brevil., VI. 12.) Duns Scotus was also in full accord with the radical conception of papal absolutism. Soon after Duns Scotus, however, as was intimated in the closing section of the first chapter, the decline of the papacy in actual power and prestige was accompanied by a wide-spread tendency to modify the theory of the papacy in favor of the superior prerogatives of an ecumenical council. This tendency came to its most noteworthy expression in the decisions of the council of Constance. The council of Florence, on the other hand, was favorable to the dignity of the Pope, and styled him "the head of the whole Church and the father and teacher of all Christians." The scheme preferred by Wycliffe left no place at all to the Pope, nor indeed to any of the grades of the hierarchy, except presbyters and deacons. (Trial., IV. 15.) The principles of Huss, if less radical, still involved important modifications of the theory of the papal office.

A conception of the papal monarchy like that promulgated by Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries, was admirably suited to serve as a basis of spiritual despotism. This is not saying that they were actually in favor of despotic maxims and practices, but only that their theory was suited to give free scope to such. However, as a matter of fact, there is evidence that despotic notions were not altogether foreign to their minds. At least, we find Thomas Aquinas arguing for the entire legitimacy of bringing heretics and schismatics to terms, where it is possible, by physical coercion. Speaking of these classes, in distinction from those who have never embraced the Christian faith, he says: "Such are to be compelled by corporal means (*corporaliter compellendi*), to fulfil what they have promised, and to hold what they have once received." (Sum. Theol., II. 2. 10. 8, 2. 39. 4.) Capital punishment, he maintains, is none too severe for the heretic. "Far more

grievous is it to corrupt the faith, which ministers life to the soul, than to falsify money, which subserves the interests of temporal life. If, therefore, falsifiers of money and other malefactors are at once and with justice delivered to death by secular rulers, much more heretics forthwith, after being convicted of heresy, can be, not only excommunicated, but justly put to death." (Ibid., II. 2. 11. 3. Compare Durandus, Sent., IV. 13. 5.) As a guaranty that the practice should not fall behind the theory, the Fourth Lateran Council bound both temporal and spiritual lords to spare no diligence in searching out and punishing heretics and dissenters. If the temporal lord should delay to purge his land of heretical defilement, it was provided that he should be excommunicated, his subjects released from their allegiance, and his territory given over to those who would carry out the behests of the Church in exterminating heretics.

SECTION II. — THE SACRAMENTS.

A SACRAMENT was regarded by the scholastics as including two elements, namely, sign and grace. It was understood to be a visible sign and medium of an invisible grace. Among the formal definitions offered we have the following: "A sacrament is a visible form of an invisible grace conferred in it." (Hugo, Sent., IV. 1.) "A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing." (Lombard, Sent., IV. 1. 2; where also a sacrament is defined as the visible form of an invisible grace.) "Sacraments are visible signs divinely instituted as means of healing, in which, under the covering of sensible things, divine virtue secretly operates, so that from a natural similitude they represent, from their institution they signify, and from their sanctification they confer, some spiritual grace, by which the soul is cured of the infirmities of vices." (Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 1.) "Anything can be called a sacrament, either because it has in

itself some secret sanctity, or because it has some relation to this sanctity, either in the way of cause or sign, or something else." (Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 60. 1.) In its character as a sign, a sacrament, according to Aquinas, has a threefold bearing, as recalling the accomplished fact of Christ's passion, evidencing the grace which now has place in us through that passion, and preannouncing the glory that is to come. (Ibid., III. 60. 3.)

The relation of the grace to the visible sign was differently represented by different writers. Thomas Aquinas mentions an opinion that the grace is not made properly to reside in the visible sacrament, but is immediately communicated by God, as the ceremony of the sacrament is performed. This view he rejects, and teaches that the grace is truly made to reside in the visible sacrament, not indeed as a complete and abiding entity, but as the passing cause or instrument of a spiritual effect. "As there is," he says, "in the sensible voice a certain spiritual power for exciting the intellect of man, in so far as it proceeds from a conception of the mind, in this way also there is a spiritual power in the sacraments, in so far as they are ordained by God to a spiritual effect." (Sum. Theol., III. 62. 1-4.) The view of Duns Scotus was more in affinity with that rejected than with that accepted by Aquinas. (Sent., IV. 1.) Durandus makes the sacrament simply the *sine qua non* of grace, and distinctly denies that a causative virtue is made to reside in it. (Sent., IV. 1. 4. Compare Bonaventura, Sent., IV. 1. 1, 3.)

According to the theory toward which scholasticism gravitated, the sacraments work *ex opere operato*, or in their own virtue, so that the reception of the sacramental grace is conditioned neither upon the spiritual devotion of the candidate, nor upon the character of the officiating priest. What is required of the candidate is simply a general assent, or freedom from voluntary opposition to the sacrament. "A sacrament," says Duns Scotus, "confers grace from

the virtue of the work wrought; so that it is not required that there should be a good motion within, which may deserve grace, but it is sufficient that the recipient should not present an obstacle," — sufficit, quod suscipiens non ponat obicem. (Sent., IV. 1. 6. Compare Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 4; Biel, Collectorium, IV. 1. 3, quoted by Charles Hodge, System. Theol., Pt. III. chap. 20, § 4.) Meanwhile, however, it was not denied that a candidate receives certain extra benefit from those positive motions of the soul which befit a sacramental occasion. (Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 69. 8.) On the part of the priest, as was claimed, it is requisite merely that he cherish a general intention (*intentio habitualis*) to perform the sacrament, the formula of which he assumes to transact. "When any one," says Thomas Aquinas, "does not intend to confer a sacrament, but to do something derisively, such perversity takes away the verity of the sacrament, especially where he manifests his intention externally. A sportive or jocose intention excludes the primary rectitude of intention, through which a sacrament is accomplished." (Sum. Theol., III. 64. 10. Compare III. 83. 4; Lombard, Sent., IV. 6. 5; Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 5; Durandus, Sent., IV. 6. 2.)

The number of the Christian sacraments proper was far from being fixed in the earlier centuries of the period. John of Damascus speaks of but two sacraments. Some of the Latin writers mention two, others four, others, using the term in the broad sense current in the preceding centuries, a much larger number. Peter Lombard fixed upon seven. There was no special authority for his list, and some of the succeeding writers did not consider themselves bound by it. It was accepted, however, by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura (Sum. Theol., III. 65. 1; Brevil., VI. 3), and became the standard list. As enumerated by Peter Lombard, the seven sacraments are as follows: "Baptismus, confirmatio, panis benedictio, id est, eucharistia, poenitentia,

unctio extrema, ordo, conjugium," — baptism, confirmation, eucharist, penance, extreme unction, holy orders, marriage. (Sent., IV. 2. 1.) Pope Eugenius IV. (1431-47) gave his official sanction to this list.

1. BAPTISM. — The representations respecting the conditions of baptism, on the part of infants and adults respectively, were much the same as in the previous period. Speaking of adults, Hugo says, "In such, faith of their own is required, without which they obtain no remission." (Sent., V. 5.) To similar effect is the statement of Peter Lombard, that "those who come without faith, or feignedly, receive *sacramentum*, but not *rem*," — in other words, the form of the sacrament, without its gracious effect. (Sent., IV. 4. 2.) Bonaventura, also, taught that personal faith is requisite in an adult, in order that baptism should be efficacious. (Brevil., VI. 7.) The harmony of this demand for faith with the doctrine that the sacrament works *ex opere operato*, is not apparent at first sight. But probably all the faith that was deemed strictly essential in this connection was simply a general habit of belief, or *fides ut dispositio*, as Bellarmin terms it, and this much was regarded as involved in the absence of opposition to the sacrament. The Trinitarian formula was regarded as requisite, though the statement appears with Peter Lombard, that baptism in the name of Christ alone might be valid, provided no denial of the Trinity was designed. (Sent., IV. 3. 5.) The form of administering the water was not regarded as strictly of the essence of baptism. Peter Lombard, as not entering into a specific consideration of the form, speaks of baptism simply as immersion. (Ibid. IV. 3. 9.) Thomas Aquinas expressed somewhat of a preference for immersion, but regarded aspersion or affusion as equally valid. He says: "Ablutio fieri potest per aquam, non solum per modum immersionis, sed etiam per modum aspersionis vel effusionis, et ideo quamvis tutius sit baptizare per modum immersionis (quia hoc communior usus), potest tamen fieri

baptismus per modum aspersionis." (Sum. Theol., III. 66. 7. Compare Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 7; Sent., IV. 3. 2. 2.) In case of the imminence of death before the presence of a priest could be secured, it was considered allowable for a layman to baptize.

The effect of baptism proper was affirmed (as by Augustine) to consist in absolution from the guilt of all foregoing sin, original and actual, and in such an impartation of grace as modifies, but does not wholly eradicate, the corruption or concupiscence in the moral nature. (Anselm, De Concord. Præscient. cum Lib. Arbit., III. 8, 9; Pullus, Sent., VI. 1; Lombard, Sent., II. 32. 2; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 69; Bonaventura, Brevil., III. 7.) As regards the grace which ameliorates the inward corruption, and works a renewal in the heart, it was apprehended by different writers that this might be experienced in virtue of repentance and faith anterior to baptism. It was maintained, however, that in such a case there was still ample occasion for baptism, since there was left a certain obligation to punishment, and baptism could remove this as well as confer an increase of positive grace. (Hugo, Sent., V. 7; Lombard, Sent., IV. 4. 6; Aquinas, Sum. contra Gentiles, IV. 72.)

Exceptions to the necessity of baptism were allowed on the same grounds as by Augustine. Deprivation of the opportunity to be baptized was not regarded as excluding from salvation where an earnest desire for baptism had existed, accompanied by a suitable faith, or where life had ended in martyrdom. (Hugo, Sent., V. 5; De Sac., II. 6. 7; Bernard, De Bap., I., II.; Lombard, Sent., IV. 4. 5; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 68. 2.) As these compensations were out of question in case of the unbaptized dying in infancy, nothing was left, on the accepted premises, but to predicate their everlasting punishment. A mild type of punishment, however, as will be seen, was allotted them. Moreover, a few writers favored the possibility of their salvation:

Of such Klee mentions Biel, William of Paris, and Cajetan, and Petavius cites Gerson as well as Biel.

Baptism, together with the other two sacraments incapable of repetition, namely, confirmation and holy orders, was regarded as giving a certain indelible signature, or *character*, to the recipient. "In these [three sacraments]," says Bonaventura, "a triple character is impressed, which is not obliterated. In accordance with the first arises the distinction of believers from unbelievers; in accordance with the second, the distinction of the strong from the infirm and the weak; and in accordance with the third, the distinction of the clergy from the laity." (Brevil., VI. 6. Compare Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 63. 1-6; Duns Scotus, Sent., IV. 1.)

2. CONFIRMATION. — According to Bonaventura, the ordinary formula for confirming was as follows: "I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen." (Brevil., VI. 8.) The same writer states that the chrism is to be made from olive-oil and balsam. While in the Greek Church priests and deacons were regarded as qualified to confirm, in the Latin Church this function was confined to bishops. In its effect, confirmation was regarded as supplementing baptism, conferring strength in the standing to which the latter introduces. (Hugo, Sent., VI. 1; Lombard, Sent., IV. 7. 1; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 72. 5.)

3. THE EUCHARIST. — While some of the statements of John of Damascus suggest that he held the view current among his predecessors in the Greek Church, namely, that the bread and wine are made the body and blood of Christ simply in the sense that, in their union with the Divine Word, they hold a place analogous to that which was held by the body and blood which He received from the Virgin, other expressions of his savor of the full doctrine of transubstantiation. (De Fide Orth., IV. 13.) The Greek

Church in his time was no doubt upon its way to that doctrine, though not as yet united upon the same. This is sufficiently indicated by the diverse action of the two great councils convened during the iconoclastic controversy. The council of Constantinople, in 754, representing the party adverse to image-worship, declared in favor of the theory, that the eucharistic elements are related to the real body and blood simply as types or symbols. On the other hand, the council of Nicæa, in 787, dominated by the friends of image-worship, declared that the elements are types only before their consecration, and that by the act of consecration they are changed into the veritable body and blood of Christ. Later authorities of the Greek Church decided quite definitely for transubstantiation. The question, however, was not treated at the same length as in the West.

In the Latin Church, Paschasius Radbertus marked a new era, by inculcating with full intention, and in unequivocal terms, the complete dogma of transubstantiation. Alcuin, before him, seems indeed to have favored the dogma, but we have from him only brief references to the subject. (*Ad Paulinum*, *Epist.* *XLI.* Compare *Libri Carolini*, *IV.* *14.*) As the words of institution are uttered, so taught Radbertus, the substance of the bread is changed into the very body of Christ, the body born of the Virgin and suspended upon the cross; and likewise the substance of the wine is changed into His blood. That the body and blood, thus made present, are concealed under the accidents remaining from the previously existing bread and wine, has an adequate occasion in the principle that concealment stimulates desire, and gives exercise to faith, and so results in a higher valuation than would come from open disclosure. Among the evidences brought forward by Radbertus are instances of miracles, suited, as he maintains, to establish the fact of the real presence. The following may serve as an example: "While the blessed Basilus was publicly performing divine mysteries, a Hebrew mingled, as if he were a Christian,

with the people, desiring to examine into the nature of the service which was being administered. He saw an infant being divided in the hands of Basilius, and as all were communing he also came, and there was given to him that which was truly made flesh. Then he approached the cup filled with blood, as it truly is, and was made a partaker of it; and preserving remnants of both, and departing to his home, he showed them to his wife as a confirmation of the things told, and narrated what he had seen with his own eyes." Evidently Radbertus, though a man of fair ability and scholarship, was not in advance of his age as respects a critical turn of mind. The work, "*De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*," in which he developed his theory, was first given forth in the year 831.

While the theory of Radbertus was no doubt in affinity with the tendencies of the age, still among his contemporaries the preponderance of learned authority was against it. Ratramnus, in a treatise bearing the same title as that of Radbertus, attempted an express refutation of the doctrine of transubstantiation. Speaking of the elements, he says: "As respects creaturely substance, what they were before consecration, this also afterwards they continue to be," — *Secundum creaturarum substantiam, quod fuerunt ante consecrationem, hoc et postea consistunt.* (LIV.) He remarks, also, that as the people who believe in Christ are called His body, not in a corporeal, but in a spiritual sense, "so also it is necessary that the body of Christ should be understood, not corporeally, but spiritually," — *sic quoque Christi corpus non corporaliter sed spiritualiter necesse est intelligatur.* (LXXIV.) The reference of Hincmar, among other evidences, indicates that Erigena was no advocate of transubstantiation. (*De Prædest.*, XXXI.) The general tenor of his thinking favors the acceptance, in an unqualified sense, of the following words from his pen: "We immolate Him spiritually, and we feed upon Him intellectually, with the mind, not with the teeth." (*Comm. in Joan.*) The

writings of Rabanus Maurus and Walafrid Strabo, if they do not expressly repudiate transubstantiation, do not inculcate it, and indicate, by their line of representation, the same view that was advocated by Ratramnus. In the same category are placed also, by Baur and Gieseler, Christian Druthmar and Florus Magister; and Kahnis includes Amalarius of Metz. On the side of Radbertus were Hincmar of Rheims, and Haimo of Halldberstadt. It is evident, therefore, that scholarly authority in the ninth century was rather against than in favor of the theory of Radbertus.

In the dark and confused interval which lay between the ninth and the eleventh centuries, the doctrine of transubstantiation seems to have advanced toward ascendancy. As Berengar, in the eleventh century, boldly declared the unfounded and irrational nature of the doctrine, he found, indeed, those who sympathized with his views, but at the same time an opposition sufficiently strong to overwhelm him. Between Berengar and Innocent III. there was an occasional writer who departed, more or less, from the strict doctrine of transubstantiation. Rupert of Deutz, for example, held that, while the body of Christ is in some way conjoined with the eucharistic elements, the substance of the latter remains meanwhile undisturbed. In 1215, transubstantiation was definitely sealed by the Fourth Lateran Council under Innocent III., as a dogma of the Church. Thereafter only the bolder critics of the hierarchical scheme ventured upon open dissent. Wycliffe not only regarded the dogma as an error, but declares that among all infidelities it plunges men most subtly and deeply into apostasy from faith and from Christ. (Trial., IV. 6.) Wycliffe rejected also the doctrine of *impanation*, or coexistence, which had been entertained by John of Paris and some others, and according to which the bread and wine do not cease to be after consecration, but subsist in a modified character, together with the body and blood. The theory of coexistence is credited also to Biel.

While the Church came to assert as dogma that the real body and blood of Christ are received in the eucharist, a total survey of the specifications made is not calculated to foster a very profound sense of the reality in question. Thus it was held that in the last supper before the crucifixion the blood was in the chalice, and was received by the disciples before it was shed (Radbertus, *Expos. in Matt.*); that Christ held His body in His own hands, and divided it into parts and distributed it to His disciples, while yet He was sitting entire and unharmed in their presence (Odo, *Expos. in Can. Mis., III.*); that Christ partook of His own body, so that, in the same indivisible instant, He was that which eats and that which was being eaten (Aquinas, *Sum. Theol., III. 81. 1*); that the body of Christ is entire, not only in all the eucharistic services which may be simultaneously celebrated, but is entire under every particle of the apparent bread, so that it is not in any case divided by being distributed and eaten (Aquinas, *Ibid., III. 76*); that while the whole body of Christ—flesh, bones, nerves, and things of this kind—is under the appearance of bread, the body of Christ is not in the sacrament *localiter*, or *per modum dimensionum*, but only *per modum substantiæ*. (*Ibid.*) So the *real* body of Christ in the eucharist turns out to be the most unreal and ghostly thing of which human ingenuity ever attempted to draw the outlines. What is meant by eating this body, which so marvellously contradicts the characteristics of body, no ordinary mind can understand, any more than it can understand what is meant by combining circularity and rectangularity into a single notion, and getting the same between the teeth.

Among the curious questions discussed was whether the body of Christ would be received by a mouse or other irrational animal, if by mischance it should consume the host. Abelard, Peter Lombard, and Innocent III. answered in the negative. (*Epit. Theol., XXIX.*; *Sent., IV. 13. 1*; *De Sac. Altar. Myst., IV. 11.*) On the other hand, Alexan-

der Hales and Thomas Aquinas decided in the affirmative. (Sum. Theol., IV. 45. 1. 2; Sum. Theol., III. 80. 3.)

The completion of the dogma of transubstantiation fully supplied the proper theoretical basis to the doctrine of the eucharist as a sacrifice. All through the Middle Ages immense stress was laid upon this feature. The beautiful Christian idea, designed to be embodied in the rite, was made to recede behind an inferior Jewish conception; and the eucharist was associated with an altar of sacrifice, rather than with a table of communion and fellowship. As has already been stated, the benefits of the eucharistic sacrifice were supposed to extend to the dead in purgatory, as well as to the living in this world.

Among the practical consequences of the doctrine of the real presence in the eucharist, and the sacrificial character of the rite, was a tendency to limit the privileges of the laity as respects communing. The custom of administering the communion to children, in close connection with their baptism, was discontinued in the twelfth century. About the same time the practice of withholding the cup from the laity was set on foot. This was pure innovation, the common assumption of writers up to this era having been that those entitled to commune at all are to commune in both kinds. This was still the assumption of Hugo of St. Victor and Peter Lombard. Alexander Hales, who followed Pulus in justifying the withholding of the cup, speaks of this as being at that time practised wellnigh universally, — *fere ubique*. (Sum. Theol., IV. 53. 1.) Thomas Aquinas sanctioned the practice, but speaks in less emphatic terms of its actual prevalence. He says: "As respects, indeed, the sacrament itself, it is befitting that both the body and the blood should be partaken, because the perfection of the sacrament consists in both; and, therefore, because it pertains to the priest to consecrate and to perfect this sacrament, by no means ought he to take the body of Christ without the blood. But on the part of those partak-

ing there is need of the highest reverence and caution, lest anything happen which may tend to injure so great a mystery. But this is specially liable to occur in taking the wine, which, indeed, if it is taken incautiously, can easily be spilled. And because the multitude of Christian people has increased, in which are contained old persons, youth, and children, of whom some have not sufficient discretion to employ the caution which is due in the use of this sacrament, therefore the prudent custom obtains in certain churches (*quibusdam ecclesiis*), that the blood is not administered to the people, but is taken only by the priest." (Sum. Theol., III. 80. 12.) In justification of this robbery, the doctrine of *concomitance* was used, — the doctrine that the blood is by natural connection in the body, and so is necessarily taken with the latter. This, however, was an imperfect disguising of the fact that only a mutilated sacrament was given to the laity. Why have any cup at all, or any partaking of the cup, if the blood, in its full sacramental virtue, resides in the consecrated bread, or the body? It is noteworthy that as late and eminent a scholastic as Albertus Magnus recognized the force of considerations like this, and was adverse to withholding the cup from the laity. (Gieseler.) The first ecumenical sanction of the custom in question was given in 1415 by the council of Constance, though by this same body it was allowed that the custom was an innovation on ancient practice.

4. PENANCE. — The early Church emphasized inward repentance as a condition of forgiveness, and of those who had been excommunicated it required certain outward exhibitions of repentance. Auricular confession to a priest was not made binding, or regarded as necessary. In course of time, however, stress began to be given to the idea that one who had fallen into any grievous sin would pursue the course most to his advantage in taking the matter privately to the priest. This, in the first instance, was done, not for

the sake of being absolved by the priest, but to gain the benefit of his intercession with God, and perhaps also his prescription as to the works of satisfaction pertinent to the case. Far into the Middle Ages, the truth was recognized that sin may be pardoned without such confession, and that the priest has no higher than a declarative power in the matter, the forgiveness of sins belonging to God alone. But the hierarchical tendencies of the age were continually working toward a more emphatic conception of the priestly prerogative.

In the twelfth century, we find the belief current that three things are required of the sinner as a condition of remission; namely, contrition of heart, confession of mouth, and satisfaction by works. As respects the part of the priest, there was a conspicuous lack of unanimity at that time. One class of writers describe his office as simply declarative. His part, as they conceived, is to seal, by appropriate outward manifestations, the remission which God accomplishes. Here belongs Peter Lombard. Speaking of God's agency, he says: "He Himself alone through Himself remits sin, who also purifies the soul from interior stain, and releases from the debt of eternal death. But He has not conceded this to the priests, to whom, nevertheless, He has assigned the power of loosing and binding, that is, of showing men bound or loosed," — *potestatem solvendi et ligandi, id est, ostendendi homines ligatos vel solutos*. (Sent., IV. 18. 5, 6.) To the same effect are the words of Pullus: "A peccatis presbyter solvit, non utique quod peccata dimittit: sed quod dimissa sacramento pandat. Et quid est opus pandi nisi ut consolatio fiat pœnitenti." (Sent., VI. 61.) On the other hand, the Victorines Hugo and Richard taught expressly that the office of the priest is not merely declarative, — that while he cannot remit sins in his own virtue, he can take an actual part in the work of remission, as an appointed instrument of God. (De Sac., II. 14. 8; De Potest. Ligand. et Solv., XII.) The part as-

signed by Richard to the priest appears in the following sentence, from his work on binding and loosing: "Through Himself He absolves from the bond of obduracy; through Himself, and at the same time through His minister, from the debt of eternal damnation; through the minister from the debt of future purgation." (VII.)

Thomas Aquinas developed the subject still further in the direction taken by Hugo and Richard. In his theory, the absolving act of the priest appears as an integral and indispensable part of the sacrament of penance, and is not merely declarative of remission, but instrumental in effecting the same. His view of the priestly prerogative is clearly indicated by the formula which he prefers. Discountenancing the use of any such formula as "The omnipotent God have compassion upon thee," he says that the proper form of absolving is, "I absolve thee," — *Ego te absolvo*. (Sum. Theol., III. 84. 3.)

Among the three parts required of the penitent, the contrition was regarded as always requisite. As respects the confession, there was a manifest tendency to reduce to a minimum the exceptions allowed to its necessity. Later writers exhibit a less liberal tone than the earlier. Abelard allowed quite a wide margin to the discretion of the individual, even declaring it advisable that sins liable to occasion scandal should be withheld from confession. (Scito Te Ipsum, XXV.; Epit. Theol. Christ., XXXVI.) Peter Lombard considered confession to a layman as adequately meeting the case when no priest is at hand, and allowed, moreover, that remission might take place without any outward confession. (Sent., IV. 17. 2-5.) Thomas Aquinas declared in general terms the necessity of confession. "Confession," he says, "is necessary to him who has fallen into mortal sin." (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 6. 1.) He allowed, however, that in case of necessity confession might be made to a layman, but not as though a layman could administer the sacrament of penance proper. (Ibid., 8. 1, 2.)

Duns Scotus was adverse to the idea of confessing to any one but a priest. Confession, to be valid, was required to include all mortal sins that could be recalled. (Aquinas, *Ibid.*, 9. 2.) Respecting venial sins, the more general view was that they are not to be confessed; but Thomas Aquinas argued, that, inasmuch as the Church (at the Lateran council under Innocent III.) made it obligatory upon all Christians of suitable age to confess once a year, it followed, even if one had committed no mortal sins, that he should confess. Wycliffe was of opinion that it would be better for the Church if private confession to a priest were not required at all.

According to the teaching of the scholastics generally, contrition, confession, and the priestly absolution occasion the removal of the guilt of sin and the eternal penalty due to the same, but still leave a temporal penalty. This, unless cancelled by works of satisfaction or by indulgences, must be endured in purgatory. Hence satisfaction was enumerated with contrition and confession, as antecedent to the complete remission of sins (committed after baptism.) That indulgences cannot reach further than the temporal penalty was the accepted theory of theologians; but, on the other hand, the decrees of the Popes were so worded, in some instances, as to foster the impression that indulgences have efficacy to cancel the eternal as well as the temporal penalty.

5. EXTREME UNCTION. — According to Bonaventura, the integrity of this sacrament requires consecrated oil, vocal prayer, and the anointing of the sick in seven parts; namely, the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, the lips, the hands, the feet, and the loins. He says, also, that the sacrament is not to be administered except to adults and those who in the belief that death is at hand request it, and only by the ministry of a priest. (*Brevil.*, VI. 11. Compare Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. Sup. 30–33.) Among the spiritual benefits attributed to the rite was the cancelling

of venial sins. It was regarded also as an instrument of bodily alleviation, where this might be consistent with spiritual welfare. The repetition of the sacrament, in case of the recovery of the sick, was declared admissible by Thomas Aquinas.

6. HOLY ORDERS.—This sacrament was regarded as transferring its recipient across the wide interval, which, according to the hierarchical scheme, lies between the layman and the priest. Among clerical orders the priestly was ranked as the highest, ecclesiastical dignities above this not being accounted distinct orders. Seven different orders were distinguished, of which Peter Lombard gives the list as follows: “ostiarii, lectores, exorcistæ, acolyti, diaconi, subdiaconi, sacerdotes.” (Sent., IV. 24.) Among impediments to receiving holy orders, Thomas Aquinas places female sex, condition of slavery, guilt of manslaughter, and illegitimate birth. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 39.) Not all of these, however, were regarded as strictly insuperable.

7. MARRIAGE.—The analysis of this sacrament afforded the scholastics great difficulty. They were faithful heirs of the opinion that the state of virginal purity is superior to that of marriage. To reconcile this with the sacramental character of the matrimonial union was not easy, to say nothing about the difficulty of harmonizing such union with the definition of a sacrament in general. The best they could do was to assign an inferior rank to marriage, as compared with the other sacraments. (Abelard, Epit. Theol. Christ., XXXI.; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. 65. 2.) Durandus took the exceptional position that marriage is not so strictly and properly a sacrament as are the others, and only in a general sense (*largo modo*) can be so named. (Sent., IV. 27. 2.) The bond established by marriage was declared to be indissoluble, so long as both parties continue to live. (Lombard, Sent., IV. 31. 2; Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 62. 5; Bonaventura, Brevil., VI. 13.)

Evidently, from the Protestant point of view, the mediæval doctrines respecting the sacraments include some of the most objectionable features of the scholastic theology. To say nothing about such astounding particulars as the assumed change of a piece of bread into the body of Christ, the scholastic teaching, by its immense emphasis upon the value of the sacraments, and upon the prerogatives of the priest in ministering the same, lays strong and deep the foundations at once of an exaggerated ceremonialism and of spiritual despotism. It urges the individual to look to the sacraments for every grace, and yet gives him valid assurance of no grace, since the bare intention of the priest is able to nullify a sacrament.

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. **CHILIASM.**—Scarcely any place was given to chiliasm proper in mediæval thought. There was, indeed, in the tenth century, a wide-spread reference to a thousand years' reign of Christ. But the thousand years were regarded as dating from the beginning of the Christian era. The belief entertained, therefore, was quite unlike the chiliastic theory of a visible reign of Christ upon earth; it was simply a popular conviction that the year 1000 would witness the end of the world. In general the mediæval mind seems to have imitated Augustine in looking to the past, rather than to the future, for the beginning of the millennial reign.

2. **CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.**—The standard view upon this subject was substantially that which had already been advanced by Gregory the Great. Hell was regarded as receiving at once every departed soul not included among the heirs of salvation. Of the heirs of salvation, those free from all stain of sin were believed to pass at once into the enjoyment of the blessedness of heaven. (Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, II. 1. 4. 5, III. 59. 5.) At least, this was the thoroughly dominant view, as the Avignon Pope, John XXII., discovered when he attempted to propagate the opposite opinion, namely, that the righteous are not favored with the beatific vision till after the resurrection. Those in need of purification, as was taught, are detained in purgatory,—which Dante describes as a mountain, rising on the opposite side of the earth through a

succession of stages or terraces, and crowned with the earthly Paradise. One factor in the work of purgation is corporeal fire. (Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, VII. 2.) The pains of purgatory, though less than those of hell, are greater than any endured in this world. (Bonaventura, *Ibid.*; Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, IV. 20. 1.) The length of the purgatorial process depends upon the amount of the corruption to be purged away, and also upon the amount of assistance which is rendered through the sacrifices, alms, prayers, etc., of the living. As the rich can provide more abundant means of this kind, it would appear to follow logically that they have a certain advantage over the poor in the next world, as well as in this. And we find actually with Peter Lombard an open suggestion that this is the case; for he seems to favor the view that the rich man, having both the general and the special aids of the Church, while the poor man has only the general, is in a condition to obtain a more speedy, though not a more complete absolution, — “*celeriorem absolutionem, non plenior.*” (*Sent.*, IV. 45. 4.) Naturally, men like Wycliffe, who were disgusted with the practical abuses connected with the subject, were averse also to the theory of purgatory. The council of Florence gave the authoritative decision upon the general question. It decreed that those who die free from all stain of sin are received at once into heaven, and enjoy the vision of God in proportion to their merits; while those who die in mortal sin, actual or original, descend to different degrees of punishment in hell. Others are sent for a longer or shorter period to purgatory. Respecting these, the council defined as follows: “*Si vere pœnitentes in Dei caritate decesserint, antequam dignis pœnitentiæ fructibus de commissis satisfecerint et omissis, eorum animas pœnis purgatoriis post mortem purgari, et ut a pœnis hujusmodi releventur prodesse eis fidelium virorum suffragia, missarum scilicet sacrificia, orationes, et eleemosynas, et alia pietatis officia.*” (Concil. Collect., Mansi.)

3. THE RESURRECTION. — The Augustinian theory of the resurrection, as a literal restoration of the body, was completely in the ascendant. Erigena, however, was inclined to Origenistic views, and Durandus suggested that it would in no wise detract from the identity of the individual, even if the same material particles which composed the old body did not enter into that of the resurrection, inasmuch as matter by itself, not yet specialized by form, has no distinctive character, — “nullam entitatem, vel unitatem, vel pluralitatem habeat, sed omnia ista competunt ei per formam quæ si eadem est totum compositum erit idem.” (Sent., IV. 44. 1.) As respects the peculiar qualities and capabilities of the resurrection body, little advance was made upon Augustine’s representations. We note simply the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, that the body of the saint will reveal the glory of the soul, as a vessel of glass reveals the color of the liquid contained, and that a just gradation of punishments seems to forbid the idea that all the defects in the bodies of the wicked are to be retained in the resurrection. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 85. 1 and 86. 1.)

4. FINAL AWARDS. — Erigena uses some expressions, which, taken by themselves, might be regarded as teaching the doctrine of universal restoration. Such are the following: “If the divine goodness, which always, not only in the good, but also in the evil, operates in a goodly manner, is eternal and infinite, its contrary necessarily will not be eternal and infinite. . . . Wickedness is altogether opposed to the divine goodness. Therefore, wickedness will receive a consummation, and will remain, in no nature, since in all divine goodness will operate and will appear.” (De Divis. Nat., V. 26.) But in spite of such declarations (based upon the writings of Gregory of Nyssa), Erigena still found place for a species of future unending punishment. While he affirms that as to nature every one is to be completely saved, he does not affirm that every one in respect to his inward exercises is to be completely saved.

"It is one thing," he says, "that all wickedness generally in all human nature should be thoroughly abolished; it is another thing that its fantasies (*phantasias*), in the consciences of those whom it has vitiated in this life, should always be preserved, and in this way always punished." (Ibid., V. 31.) Erigena, as the above language indicates, was inclined to regard future punishment as merely subjective, and to make it consist in the disturbing fantasies of objects or ends which the worldly have illicitly pursued in this life, and for the acquisition of which the future life offers no opportunity. "As with empty dreams they will be tortured." (Ibid.)

Mediæval theology, as a whole, had no affinity with restorationism. On the contrary, it strongly asserted the endless doom of the wicked, and emphasized such elements of positive infliction as bodily torture. Dante was expressing beliefs that were regarded as beyond question, when he placed upon the entrance to the infernal region, —

"All hope abandon, ye who enter here";

or when he declared of the unhappy shades within, —

"No hope doth comfort them forevermore,
Not of repose, but even of lesser pain."

Dante's representation of hell, as a dark subterranean region, agrees with the view set forth by leading theologians. (Hugo, *De Sac.*, II. 16. 4; Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. Sup. 97. 4; Bonaventura, *Centil.*, II. 4.) The view of Guibert of Nogent, that by the fire of hell is perhaps denoted the inward burning of evil desire (*De Pignor. Sanct.*, IV. 4), was exceptional, the approved opinion being that it is corporeal fire. (Hugo, *De Sac.*, II. 16. 3; Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, III. Sup. 70. 3; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, VII. 6; *Centil.*, II. 4.) To give the subject a still grimmer aspect, some writers added to the torture of fire that of ice and piercing cold. (Pullus, *Sent.*, VIII. 32; Innocent III., *De Contempt. Mund.*, III. 4; Dante, *Inferno*, Cantos III.,

XXXII.) Innocent's statement upon this point is as follows: "The infernal punishments are diverse, according to the diversity of sins. The first punishment is of fire, the second of cold. Concerning these the Lord said, 'There shall be weeping and grating of teeth.' Weeping [there will be] on account of the smoke of fire, grating of teeth on account of cold."

Meanwhile, it was conceived that hell embraces many gradations of punishment, — an idea which Dante carried out by picturing hell as descending through successive and narrowing circles. The upper part was deemed the place of least punishment, and here were placed the *limbus patrum* and the *limbus puerorum*, that is, the quarter occupied by Old Testament believers till they were released by Christ, and the everlasting abode of unbaptized infants. These terms, according to Thomas Aquinas, while significant of different conditions, are not necessarily expressive of different localities; but, if they are distinguished in the latter respect, the *limbus patrum* is to be regarded as the superior place. (Sum. Theol., III. Sup. 69. 6.) The teaching of Peter Lombard, that the punishment of unbaptized infants consists simply in perpetual deprivation of the vision of God, was favorably received by the majority of subsequent writers. (Sent., II. 33. 5. Compare Aquinas, Sum. Theol., III. Sup. Append. I. 1.) Peter Lombard seems to have concluded that a certain inward grief results from this deprivation, but Aquinas exempts even from this. So also Durandus, who assumes that his view on this point was the accepted view among the theologians of his time. (Sent., II. 33. 3.) Dante describes the *limbus puerorum* as "the foremost circle that surrounds the abyss," and as a place of sighs rather than of wailing:—

"A place there is below not sad with torments,
But darkness only, where the lamentations
Have not the sound of wailing, but are sighs."


According to the poet, the same quarter includes the

more blameless of the heathen, those who have kept faithfully all the virtues, except the three theological virtues, faith, hope, and love. (*Inferno*, IV.; *Purgatorio*, VII.; Longfellow's translation.)

Over against the dark descending circles of perdition was pictured the region of reward, rising upward beyond the planetary spheres through three heavens filled with light, inhabited by beings who shine with bodily glory, and are still more radiant in the lustre of spiritual excellence, and who ever are refreshed with new draughts of knowledge and love, from Him in the vision of whom is their crowning felicity.

With writers of mystical tendency there was a disposition to pass by every other conception of future reward, in favor of the absorbing idea of union with God. Their language sometimes pictures such an emphatic reversion into God as seems to leave no place to human personality. This is the case with Erigena and Eckhart. The former mentions five stages in the process of reversion. "The first is the reversion of human nature, when the body is dissolved, and is recalled to the four elements of the sensible world of which it is composed. The second is fulfilled in the resurrection, when each one will receive his own body from the common mass of the four elements. The third is when the body shall be changed into spirit. The fourth is when spirit, and, to speak more clearly, the whole nature of man, shall revert into the primordial causes which are always and unchangeably in God. The fifth is when nature itself, with its causes, shall be moved into God, as air is moved into light. For God will be all in all, when there shall be nothing except God alone." (*De Divis. Nat.*, V. 8.) Eckhart uses quite as emphatic terms in describing the return into God, teaching that the whole universe of creatures, and the revealed God Himself, shall finally sink back into the primordial abyss of the Absolute. Still, after all, neither of these writers seems to have in-

tended to teach a complete elimination of the finite, or of human personality. Erigena, in immediate connection with the passage quoted, says: "The change of human nature into God is not to be regarded as a destruction of substance, but as a wonderful and ineffable reversion into the pristine state which it lost by sinning." He adds, also, illustrations which imply rather a certain assimilation to the divine in the way of glorification, than an absolute absorption into the same. As for Eckhart, while he conceived that the soul at its centre is to become identical with the divine essence, he seems still to have held that there is a certain periphery, or a certain fragment of finiteness, which will perpetually conserve a species of individuality.



APPENDIX.

I.

HISTORICAL ITEMS RESPECTING THE APOSTLES' CREED.

THE later, or received, form of the Apostles' Creed differs from the early Roman by the addition of several words or clauses. As may be seen in the following comparative view, the received form adds: (1) "maker of heaven and earth"; (2) "conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary," instead of *born of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary*; (3) "suffered"; (4) "dead"; (5) "descended into hell"; (6) "catholic," as applied to the Church; (7) "communion of saints"; (8) "life everlasting." It also repeats the epithet "omnipotent."

EARLY ROMAN FORM.

Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem.

Et in Christum Jesum, Filium ejus unicum, Dominum nostrum; qui natus est de Spiritu Sancto et Maria Virgine;

crucifixus est sub Pontio Pilato, et sepultus;

tertia die resurrexit a mortuis; ascendit in cœlos; sedet ad dexteram Patris;

inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos.

Et in Spiritum Sanctum; sanctam ecclesiam; remissionem peccatorum; carnis resurrectionem.

RECEIVED FORM.

Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, Creatorem cœli et terræ.

Et in Jesum Christum, Filium ejus unicum, Dominum nostrum;

qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto, natus ex Maria Virgine;

passus sub Pontio Pilato, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus; descendit ad inferna;

tertia die resurrexit a mortuis; ascendit ad cœlos; sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris omnipotentis;

inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos.

Credo in Spiritum Sanctum; sanctam ecclesiam catholicam; sanctorum communionem; remissionem peccatorum; carnis resurrectionem; vitam æternam. Amen.

Recent investigations have established the conviction that the early Roman form certainly dates back to the third century, and very probably to the second. Harnack infers that the legend of its composition by the apostles in company was well on foot at Rome in the early part of the fourth century. He draws also these conclusions: (1) The inroads of Arianism in Italy towards the close of the fifth century caused a preference, in Catholic circles, for employing a definite statement of trinitarian faith, and consequently a common use of the creed of Constantinople (381), to the neglect of the brief symbol ascribed to the apostles. (2) The Apostles' Creed, in its received form, was developed in Southern Gaul. (3) With the accession of the Carlovingians and the extension of their influence into Italy, the Gallic version of the creed was brought to Rome, and was soon installed there. (4) The legend which had been applied to the Roman form of the symbol was now attached to the new version, and gained full credence; insomuch that, up to the days of Laurentius Valla, or the eve of the Reformation, no one questioned that the creed was the joint composition of the apostles. In at least the later rendering of the legend, the very words which each of the apostles contributed were specified. (*Das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss.*)

II.

AUGUSTINE'S EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS.

"As in the grain," says Augustine, "all things subsisted at once which through intervals of time grew into a tree; so the world itself, when God created all things at once, is to be regarded as having had at once all things which were made in it and with it, when the day was made," etc. This language implies that by the creative act of God all things were posited in germ before they existed in their final and manifest form. It is not said, however, by Augustine, that one species of organic life came from another. Before his theory can be pronounced a distinct anticipation of modern evolu-

tionism it will be necessary to determine that he did not think of the different orders of living things as springing co-ordinately from the complex original germ. The whole passage from Augustine runs as follows: *Sicut in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia simul quæ per tempora in arborem surgerent; ita ipse mundus cogitandus est, cum Deus simul omnia creavit, habuisse simul omnia quæ in illo et cum illo facta sunt quando factus est dies: non solum cælum cum sole et luna et sideribus, quorum species manet motu rotabili, et terram et abyssos, quæ velut inconstantes motus patiuntur, atque inferius adjuncta partem alteram mundo conferunt; sed etiam illa quæ aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, quomodo nobis jam nota sunt in eis operibus, quæ Deus usque nunc operatur.* (De Gen. ad Litt., V. 23.)

III.

AMALRICH OF BENA, AND DAVID OF DINANTO.

The heterodoxy of Amalrich is said to have been principally included in these three propositions: (1) *Deus est omnia.* (2) *Quod quilibet christianus teneatur credere se esse membrum Christi, nec aliquem posse salvari qui hoc non crederet, non minus quam si non crederet Christum esse natum et passum, vel alios fidei articulos, inter quos articulos ipse hoc ipsum audacter audebat dicere adnumerandum esse.* (3) *Quod in charitate constitutis nullum peccatum imputetur.* Only the second of these propositions elicited special attention during the lifetime of Amalrich.

The Sect of the Holy Spirit was probably, to a considerable degree, an offshoot of the teachings of Amalrich. The synod of Paris, in 1209 or 1210, seems to have associated the two. It commanded the bones of Amalrich to be disinterred, while it sentenced representatives of the Sect to the flames.

The same synod condemned a writing of David of Dinanto. As a somewhat significant deduction which David drew

from his pantheistic basis, we may mention his theory respecting the way of reaching a knowledge of God. Knowledge, as he taught, commonly takes place by an assimilation of the knower and the known. The soul knows individual things, or things having form, by abstracting their forms and assimilating them to itself. But God has no form; He is rather the formless substratum of things. He must be known, therefore, by the way of identity rather than by that of assimilation. The soul can truly know Him only by renouncing its particular form and sinking back into the formless essence which is identical with God. (See Wilhelm Preger, *Geschichte der deutschen Mystik im Mittelalter.*)

IV.

ECKHART.

One of the most important of the departures which Eckhart made from the scholastic philosophy was his rejection of *purus actus* as applied to God and the affirmation of the principle of potentiality in the divine nature. "In just this point," says Preger, "that Eckhart incorporates into his idea of God this other principle of potentiality, lies his epoch-making importance for Christian philosophy. For the theosophy of Eckhart continued to work in the German theosophy of the following centuries, and came in a significant manner to new combinations and an enlarged scope in Jacob Böhme, and recently has attained to new and fruitful results, especially in Schelling's second philosophy and in Franz von Baader."

Among the opinions of Eckhart not specially referred to in the text, the following are worthy of notice: (1) The Mosaic account of creation is not to be taken literally. The representation of the work of creation as apportioned among successive days is an accommodation to human weakness. God spake, and it was done. "Nicht wähne, da Gott Himmel und Erde machte und alle Dinge, dass er heute eines machte und morgen ein anderes. Dennoch schreibt Moses

also. Er wusste es doch wohl viel besser: er that es aber um der Leute willen, die es nicht anders konnten verstehen noch vernehmen. Gott that nicht mehr dazu denn allein; er wollte und sie wurden." (2) The incarnation would have taken place if man had not sinned. In the view of Preger, Eckhart conceived that the Son possessed a species of body prior to the incarnation in time through the Virgin. (3) The Son is born of the Father in the soul of the believer in the same way in which He is born in eternity. (4) Dependence is not to be placed upon the saints or their relics. "Leute, was suchet ihr an dem todten Gebeine? Warum suchet ihr nicht das lebende Heilthum, das euch mag geben ewiges Leben? Denn der Todte hat weder zu geben noch zu nehmen." (5) The physical element is to be ruled out of the notion of future punishment.

It should be noticed, perhaps, that Preger takes exception to Lasson's exposition of Eckhart on the subject of the Trinity. Lasson says that Eckhart denies the absoluteness of the Divine Persons in the most emphatic and explicit manner. Preger maintains that the fact is quite otherwise. In the absence of an opportunity to consult Eckhart's writings, we will not attempt to decide positively, and will only remark that it is our impression that the word "accidents" does not adequately express Eckhart's conception of the Persons of the Trinity.

V.

TAULER AND SUSO.

These two men cultivated more the practical side of mysticism than Eckhart, and were less eminent exponents of the speculative side, not being his equals either in originality or in constructive genius. From this, however, it is not to be concluded that they confined themselves entirely to the devotional phases of mystical piety. On the contrary, they gave expression here and there to opinions every whit as daring as those of Eckhart; indeed, those very theories of

Eckhart which seem most to transcend the bounds of moderation were reproduced in their writings. As respects the soul's union with God, for example, it would be difficult to find in Eckhart sentences which more nearly imply the subversion of personal subsistence than the following from Tauler: "The man's being is so penetrated with the Divine substance that he loses himself therein, as a drop of water is lost in a cask of strong wine." "Will, knowledge, love, perception, are all swallowed up and lost in God." "While we are beholding we are not one with that which we behold; so long as there is anything in our perceptions or understandings, we are not one with the One." (Sermons, translated by Susanna Winkworth.) Some allowance, indeed, must be made for rhetorical extravagance in such statements. But the same allowance should not be denied to Eckhart. A fondness for paradox has ever been a characteristic infirmity of mystical writers.

VI.

THEOLOGIA GERMANICA.

The *Theologia Germanica*, written by an unknown author of the fourteenth or the fifteenth century, is mainly occupied with such practical teachings as might afford stimulus and direction in religious living. However, there is an occasional passage which has a speculative tinge, and shows that its author was not a stranger to the school of Eckhart. The following are conspicuous examples: "To God, as Godhead, appertain neither will, nor knowledge, nor manifestation, nor anything that we can name, or say, or conceive. But to God, as God, it belongeth to express Himself, to know and love Himself, and to reveal Himself to Himself." "Beside it, or without it [the Perfect], there is no true substance. That which hath flowed forth from it, is no true substance, and hath no substance except in the Perfect, but is an accident, or a brightness, or a visible appearance." "All knowledge of the parts is swallowed up when the

whole is known ; and where that Good is known, it cannot but be longed for and loved so greatly, that all other love, wherewith the man hath loved himself and other things, fadeth away." (Translation by S. Winkworth.) Referring to such sentences, Ullmann says : "It is true that the *Theologia Germanica* has pantheistic elements. Its pantheism, however, is not a pantheism of the speculative order, but of the most interior and profound piety, which only wishes to bring God most vividly near, spirit to spirit, heart to heart, and which withal gives full recognition to the personality of God, holds fast to the emphatic distinction between God and the creature, and submits itself in childlike lowliness to God" (*Reformatoren vor der Reformation*.) An honored place among mystical writings may be assigned to the *Theologia Germanica* as respects carefulness to guard against antinomianism, and intensity of stress upon the demerit of sin.

VII.

THE WALDENSES.

A statement of the belief of the Waldenses must take account of the fact that it was by a progressive advance that they broke away from Romish tenets, and that this advance probably did not take place at a uniform rate on the part of all affiliating with the sect. Among early sources, an account, which has been transmitted under the name of the inquisitor Reinerus, gives important information. It represents the disciples of Waldo as holding that a teaching which cannot be proved by the text of Scripture is without authority ; that the Church had repeated the sin of the Pharisees by imposing the burden of its traditions ; that certain impertinent additions to the baptismal ceremony should be abolished ; that a priest in mortal sin cannot celebrate the sacrament of the eucharist, and that transubstantiation does not take place in the hand of such a priest, but rather in the mouth of him who worthily receives ; that in-

dulgences are to be rejected ; that a bad priest cannot absolve, while a good layman can ; that every good layman is a priest ; that confirmation, extreme unction, and orders are not to be counted sacraments ; that the marriage of the clergy ought not to be prohibited ; that the worship of saints and relics, as also of images and pictures, is illegitimate ; that Purgatory is a fiction. (Quoted by S. R. Maitland, *Albigenses and Waldenses*.) From this summary it appears that for a considerable period transubstantiation was not commonly repudiated by the Waldenses.

The theory that the complete Waldensian creed was held from the earliest times by the Vaudois, in the Cottian Alps, though earnestly advocated by certain writers, is to be regarded as a fanciful hypothesis. A measure of reactionary sentiment against some features of the Romish system may have had a place in that region, especially in the time following the administration of Claudius of Turin, whose views we can easily imagine to have found some receptive minds ; but a Church in this mountainous district, holding steadfastly, from the first establishment of Christianity, a simple, pure, and apostolic type of doctrine, is discovered by the over-zealous apologist rather than by the historian.

VIII.

WYCLIFFE AND HUSS.

Numerous passages in Wycliffe's writings show that he very distinctly anticipated the formal principle of the Reformation, the sole binding authority of Scripture. The material principle, or the doctrine of justification by faith, was not urged by him with equal decision and explicitness. Nevertheless, he directed attention to this principle in that he disparaged trust in outward works, the indulgences and absolutions of the priesthood, the supererogatory merits and the intercessions of the saints, and pointed men to the sole and sufficient mediatorship of Christ.

The view of the eucharist which Wycliffe put in place of

transubstantiation bears close affinity with that afterwards taught by Calvin. The essential identity of the two may be inferred from their agreement in the following leading points: (1) The glorified body of Christ is locally confined in heaven. (2) It is not so present in the elements as to be received by the wicked. (3) Its presence is to be described as a spiritual and virtual or efficacious presence.

A true estimate of Wycliffe's influence must take account of his connection with the movement in Bohemia. That movement, it is true, did not receive its impulse entirely from abroad. There were agencies and influences native to the soil of Bohemia which tended to make it a theatre of a reform movement. Still the contribution of Wycliffe was unquestionably a factor of very great importance. Huss is not untruthfully described as a disciple of Wycliffe. He was indeed less radical in some respects. He continued, for example, to harbor the doctrine of transubstantiation, and was rather more tolerant than the English reformer toward the worship of saints. But he was essentially agreed with Wycliffe's fundamental propositions respecting the Church and the authority of the Scriptures. The recent publication of Wycliffe's *De Ecclesia* has made available the most decisive evidence that Huss was very largely indebted to the English theologian. As has been shown by Professor Loserth, some of the paragraphs of Huss are little else than excerpts from this treatise of Wycliffe.

IX.

JOHN WESSEL.

John Wessel, who wrote in the latter half of the fifteenth century, was eminently fitted by his broad learning and rational temper to discover and to expose the weak points in the current theology. Though a less radical innovator, on the whole, than Wycliffe, he made noteworthy departures from the Romish standpoint. (1) He asserted the primacy of the Scriptures over the Church. "For the sake of God,"

he says, "we believe the gospel, and for the sake of the gospel the Church and the Pope, not however the gospel for the sake of the Church." (2) In conformity with this position, he maintained that the teachings of the Pope, or of any church authority, are not in themselves decisive, but may legitimately be brought to the test of Scripture. A guarded expression of his position is given in the following: "So long as it appears to me that the Pope or the school or any company of men maintain something contrary to Scripture, I must first of all hold with the greatest care to the Scriptures; then, however, since it is improbable that such men should err, I must diligently search on both sides for the truth, still always with greater reverence toward the Scripture than toward any human assertion, from whomsoever it may come." (3) He claimed that the essential bond of union in the Church is an interior spiritual bond. "The unity of the Church under a pope is only accidental, not necessary." (4) If he did not openly reject the Romish theory of the real bodily presence of Christ in the eucharist, he laid the whole stress upon the spiritual appropriation of Christ by meditation and faith, and maintained that the essential grace of the sacrament may be received apart from the visible elements. (5) He denied the judicial function of the priest in the sacrament of penance, and reprobated the notion that works of satisfaction are to be included in the condition of remission. (6) He denounced indulgences as having no warrant either in Scripture, tradition, or reason. (7) He denied the penal character of the discipline in Purgatory, conceived of the purifying fire as a spiritual agency, and asserted that the period of purgation is determined by the subject's advance toward purity rather than by the suffrages of the Church. (See Ullmann, *Reformatoren vor der Reformation.*)

X.

SAVONAROLA.

The name of Savonarola has no very direct association with dogmatic reform. He held the scholastic theology, especially as taught by the great oracle of his order, Thomas Aquinas, with entire fidelity. As appears from his "Triumphus Crucis," he gave his full assent even to the theory of the papal monarchy (III. 10, IV. 6). It is true that he took the liberty to discard the censures of Alexander VI. But he did not regard him as a genuine representative of the papacy, inasmuch as he had gained his position by simony and stained it by enormous crimes. A legitimate pope was still in his view the rightful head of Christendom. Only in the fiery zeal with which he opposed the practical corruptions of the Church, the earnestness with which he summoned the people to amendment of life, the stress which he laid upon the more spiritual aspects of the accepted doctrines, and the assurance with which he proclaimed the speedy dawning of a great reform, did the work of Savonarola look toward that which began within two decades of his death.

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BY

HENRY C. SHELDON
PROFESSOR IN BOSTON UNIVERSITY

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CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

Fourth Period (A. D. 1517-1720).

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	3

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

Section 1. Philosophy	13
“ 2. Communions, Creeds, and Authors	29
“ 3. Scripture and Tradition	61

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

Section 1. Existence, Essence, and Attributes of God	84
“ 2. The Trinity	96

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

Section 1. Creation	104
“ 2. Angels	105
“ 3. Man	106

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

Section 1. The Person of Christ	134
“ 2. The Redemptive Work of Christ	138
“ 3. Appropriation of the Benefits of Christ's Work	153

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

	PAGE
Section 1. The Church	182
“ 2. The Sacraments	191

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. Chiliasm, or Millenarianism	213
2. Condition between Death and the Resurrection	213
3. The Resurrection and Final Awards	215

Fifth Period (A. D. 1720–1905).

INTRODUCTION	221
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CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

Section 1. Philosophy	223
“ 2. Communions, Creeds, and Authors	261
“ 3. Scripture and Tradition	281

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

Section 1. Existence, Essence, and Attributes of God	300
“ 2. The Trinity	311

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

Section 1. Creation of the World	319
“ 2. Angels	323
“ 3. Man	324

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

	PAGE
Section 1. The Person of Christ	348
“ 2. The Redemptive Work of Christ	353
“ 3. Appropriation of the Benefits of Christ's Work	362

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

Section 1. The Church	378
“ 2. The Sacraments	382

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. Millenarianism	389
2. Condition between Death and the Resurrection	391
3. The Resurrection	392
4. Final Awards	395

APPENDIX.

1. Attrition	401
2. Böhme and Baader	406
3. Position of the Greek Church on the Old Testament Canon	411
4. Beck's Trichotomy	412
5. Keim's Geschichte Jesu	413
6. Irving's Christology and Soteriology	415
7. Campbell's Theory of the Atonement	417
8. Albrecht Ritschl's Theological Views	418

INDEX OF SUBJECT-MATTER	423
ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF MAIN THEMES	457
INDEX OF AUTHORS	461

fourth Period.

1517-1720.

INTRODUCTION.

WE enter now upon an era in the history of Christian doctrine inferior in importance to none since the age of the apostles, — an era from which one might date, without presumption, the second birth of Christianity.

Remarkably fruitful in immediate results, the Reformation was still more fruitful in preparing for remote and permanent acquisitions. It bears comparison with the first century in the work of breaking down barriers. Primitive Christianity, by opening a way through the complex legalism and proud assumptions of Pharisaic Judaism, gained room for a glorious advance in religious thought and life. So the Reformation, in cleaving the fortifications of legality and pretentious infallibility by which the Romish hierarchy sought to perpetuate its spiritual despotism, provided inestimable opportunities of progress. Its work was absolutely indispensable. It bears unmistakably the marks of divine providence. Let hostile criticism say what it may ; let it point to foibles in the conduct or to crudities in the dogmas of the Reformers ; the fact still remains, that the Reformation purchased for Christianity the noblest opportunities and prospects which it has in the world to-day. If it gave scope for some temporary errors, it secured a chance for vigorous, healthy, and permanent growth. Designedly or undesignedly it placed men in the way of fulfilling their divine calling to freedom and intelligence.

The starting-point of the Reformation can be understood only by recalling the bent of the scholastic system. The more characteristic features of that system, as we have seen, tended to the common result of shadowing the direct relation of the individual to Christ. The views that were entertained of the person of Christ, of the Church, of the sacraments, of the merit of works, and of the saints, all combined to place the individual at a distance from his Redeemer. It mattered little that He was allowed to be the primary fountain of grace. The fountain was made so remote, and so many objects were interposed, that naturally, before the attention could pass beyond the motley throng, it was dissipated and lost. A crowd of rival agencies invaded the solitary eminence which is accorded to Christ in the New Testament. In place of dependence upon the personal Redeemer was put dependence upon the hierarchy and the means which it saw fit to prescribe. In fact, the standard teaching in the centuries preceding the Reformation robbed the individual of his rights as a citizen of the kingdom of Christ, and degraded him to the condition of a mere subject,—a subject slavishly dependent upon the priestly hierarchy. That hierarchy stood over him as his judge, and the sole dispenser to him of the grace of salvation. It pronounced opposition to its decrees among the most damnable of all offences, and magnified the virtue of blind submission. It reckoned all outside of its own circle in a state of religious childhood, incapable of ever reaching their majority in this world, and hindered their approach to the springs of knowledge in the Scriptures, or denied that approach altogether. It put reconciliation with itself in place of reconciliation with God. It appointed to the individual the conditions of pardon, and proclaimed his sins remitted or retained. It emphasized the sacraments as indispensable means of salvation, and yet gave the priest the power, by a perverse exercise of his will, to nullify the sacrament which he assumed to administer. It left the penitent without assurance of

having received the sacramental grace, as he could be certain neither of the valid ordination nor of the honest intention of the priest. In a word, the hierarchy, as judge over the individual, made him come to its tribunal for every grace, and sent him away without proper guaranty of any. This prerogative it could and did exercise quite differently under different circumstances. It could be very stringent or very lax. Just before the Reformation it assumed, to a conspicuous degree, the *rôle* of laxity, — acted the part of a frivolous, unscrupulous judge. Indulgence peddlers, like Tetzels and Samsons, represented that the Church is no hard and grudging mistress, but ready to deal out pardon with a lavish hand. An artificial legalism was joined with a shallow estimate of the demerit of sin. But through all this laxity the principle of absolute dependence upon the hierarchy remained the same, and the anathema was ready for any one who should dare to impeach its prerogatives.

As the essence of the Romish perversion consisted in depressing the individual and obscuring his direct relation to Christ, the starting-point of a true counteracting movement must needs be the exaltation of the individual to his proper independence and rights, and the emphasizing of his direct relation to Christ. Such was the starting-point of the Reformation. It began with an assertion of the rights of the individual, his release from arbitrary and unscriptural authority, his relative independence of ecclesiastical machinery, his privilege to come into direct relation to Christ, and to find therein assurance of salvation. Whether Luther fully apprehended it at first or not, his doctrine of justification by faith was a decided step toward the emancipation of the individual from the absolute authority of the hierarchy.

The proper ground for receiving a principle like this had been prepared in numerous minds and hearts by the opening of the sixteenth century. Ever since the closing era of the Crusades there had been a growing pressure against ecclesiastical restraints. The national spirit gathered strength,

and became more and more impatient and bold against the claims of the papacy. The new impulse given to commercial enterprise, the more energetic tone of secular industries, left a narrower sphere to that romantic zeal which responded readily to the calls of the Church. The efforts of the more earnest minds to reform the Church through such attempts as culminated in the councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle, though abortive in their immediate aim, left still their impress. The voices of such heralds of evangelical truth as Wycliffe, Huss, and Savonarola ceased not to reverberate in many hearts. The revival of classic studies and the many discoveries of the age gave a new impulse to freedom of thought, while the spread of mysticism enlarged the number of those who sought satisfaction to their souls rather in personal communion with God by prayer and meditation, than in the round of ceremonial observances.

All these developments served naturally as forerunners of religious freedom. There were many minds who only needed to hear a voice speaking with prophetic energy and confidence the word of religious emancipation, in order to their receiving it with deep conviction and joy. In the profound experiences of the monk of Erfurt, Providence prepared the prophet's voice that was required. The pre-eminently Pauline experience of Luther brought into his soul with midday clearness the idea of justification by faith. As he had proved to the full the death-working power of all attempts to justify one's self by means of works, the thought of justification by simple faith upon Christ came to him like a new gospel, like a message of glad tidings from heaven. The truth thus grasped penetrated to the utmost his deep and enthusiastic nature, and kindled a fire that must needs communicate itself to other hearts.

The Reformation as embodied in Luther began, not with a negative, but with a positive principle, and a positive principle concerning the acts and experiences of the in-

dividual soul. The primary question with Luther was not, How may I reform the Church? but, How may I be saved, and have assurance of my salvation? The work of tearing down was not at all in his thought at first. His starting-point was simply the principle of faith, ascending directly to Christ and grasping His word of promise, as the only and the sufficient way to assurance of salvation. But as this principle was contradicted by the Romish tenets, and still more by the Romish spirit and practice, its vigorous maintenance could not fail to bring about a collision.

Let us observe now the developments which followed. Among the results most immediately flowing from Luther's standpoint was an emphatic qualifying of the mediatorial power of the hierarchy. If the individual can come directly to Christ, and in the exercise of living faith in Him can find assurance of salvation, then he is evidently released from any absolute dependence upon the priest. The priest may or may not intend the sacrament; if only the believer apprehends Christ in the sacrament, he cannot fail of the proper grace. Not so much the act of the priest as his own faith is the vehicle of divine gifts. Romish authority was not slow to perceive this bearing of the Lutheran principle, and so was stirred up to hostile measures.

By the opposition which assailed him, Luther was driven to the still further result of asserting the sole authority of the Scriptures in matters of faith. This was not in his mind at the outset. At the time that he posted his theses (1517), he declared expressly that he was conscious of holding nothing which might not be proved by the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the papal decrees. He gave a deciding voice to the last, as well as to the first. He spoke of the Pope only in terms of respect, and of the abuse of indulgences as something unauthorized by him. But he soon found that papal patronage was by no means clear of the abuse,—that the Pope was jealous of any attempt to mend the affairs of the Church, and was determined

to proscribe the principle which his experience had taught him was the truth of God. Unable to surrender that principle, it only remained for him to deny the infallibility of the Pope. From questioning the authority of the Pope, it was an easy step to questioning the authority of the hierarchy which culminates in the Pope. So Luther came to the conclusion that neither pope nor council can lay claim to infallibility. Submission to them is not, therefore, an essential of membership in the Church of Christ. The only adequate authority of the Church is the Word of God.

The Scriptures having been made the final authority in matters of faith, the next question concerned the proper contents of the Scriptures and their interpretation. In the absence of an infallible pope or conclave, what shall determine the canonical character of doubtful books? What shall give assurance that the right interpretation is made? Here it only remained to make the Bible its own witness. Its testimony, it was said, comes with convincing power to the sincere heart. The Spirit of Christ within responds to His Spirit in the Scriptures. Better than anything else a Christ-consciousness is qualified to discern the divine impress upon a canonical book. The Scripture is also its own best interpreter. If one passage is obscure, another upon the same subject will be found to be clear. Every Christian must look into this treasury for himself, and judge for himself concerning its teaching, not indeed according to unregulated and capricious impulses, but with that chastened and spiritual temper which responds with ready appreciation to the evidences of divine truth. "To know and to judge of doctrine," says Luther, "so pertains to each and every Christian, that he is worthy of anathema who would detract a hair's breadth from this right." (Quoted by Köstlin.) So, in place of the fiat of the ecclesiastical power, was asserted the authority of Scripture as addressed to the individual and interpreted by him. The Reformation as a whole, to be sure, may not

have been consistent upon this point, — may have had its reaction against the full right of private interpretation; but the right was logically involved in the principles of the Reformation, and was more or less distinctly recognized by Luther and others.

The course of the Reformation as it appears in Luther's personal development may be regarded as largely representative of the Reformation in general. Advancement from one step to another may not have been made in precisely the same order in all instances. With Zwingli, for example, the emphatic starting-point was not so much a single doctrine enforced by an intense personal experience as the general principle of the supreme authority of the Scriptures. But whatever the order followed, the Reformation everywhere advanced toward the same list of principles as we have noticed in connection with Luther. Everywhere it assailed the main pillar of spiritual despotism by denying the infallibility of the hierarchy; everywhere it pointed the individual to the Scriptures for instruction, and to direct dependence upon Christ for the reality and the assurance of salvation.

In advancing on to Biblical ground, the Reformation, no doubt, approximated to the standpoint of the early Church. Yet it would not be giving an accurate definition of it to call it simply a restoration of primitive Christianity; at least, if under the name of primitive Christianity we include any considerable interval after the apostolic age. For the theology of the Reformation grasped the idea of justification by faith, distinguished between the visible and the invisible Church, and in general affirmed the purely subjective conditions of salvation with a clearness and emphasis which we seek in vain in much of the Christian literature of the first centuries. This was but a natural result of the different conditions of the two eras. A system wrought out in conscious antagonism to a contrasted system naturally has sharper outlines than one developed

apart from such antagonism. No wonder, then, that the Reformers, confronted as they were by the most elaborate structure of legalism and hierarchical pretension known to history, were enabled to lay hold with clear apprehension upon truths which the early fathers left ill-defined or in part compromised.

What is the natural goal of the Reformation principles? From what has already been said, it is plain that one answer must be, *Universal religious liberty*. Logically carried out, they prohibit all coercion in matters of simple faith. If there is no infallible interpreter of Scripture upon earth, then no one is authorized to set up his interpretation as a standard and to punish dissent therefrom. Each has the right to be his own interpreter, only subject to the limitation that, in publishing or acting upon his interpretations, he is not to violate the common decencies of civilized society. The Reformers, it is true, were not all faithful to this principle. To a lamentable degree they violated religious tolerance both in theory and in practice. The stern demands of self-preservation, fears of religious anarchy, and an intemperate ambition for the victory of their own scheme, obscured to many minds the proper inferences from their own general standpoint. But this is simply saying that individual narrowness, combined with adverse circumstances and influences, prevented the Reformation from speedily realizing its essential ideal. As the centuries have proved, and as the reason of the case dictates, its principles are the natural basis of religious liberty.

As all liberty has its liabilities to abuse, we could not expect an unmixed good from the religious liberty born with the Reformation. And in fact evils have appeared. Protestantism has, without doubt, run into a certain excess of individualism. It has not in general been possessed with an adequate sense of the guilt of a needless schism. Very slight grounds have given rise to new subdivisions, and to-day Protestantism numbers vastly more communions than

there is any rational occasion for. It must be allowed also that the intellectual freedom of Protestantism has often degenerated into license and issued in infidelity. Such facts are naturally so much capital in the hands of opponents. From the days of Bossuet down to the present, they have been industriously paraded. "We have seen," says a recent Ritualistic essay, "and do see, what the so-called emancipation of the intellect has done for Protestants. It has produced all the heresy, and schism, and infidelity of the last three hundred years, from Martin Luther to Joe Smith." But such critics are too headlong in their polemics, — are blind to a whole catalogue of truths. They forget that a valid and worthy faith grows only in connection with the privilege of free investigation; that, to whatever aberrations Protestantism may have given scope, it has vastly increased the aggregate of positive and intelligent faith in Christendom. They forget that a constrained belief is very apt to become a covert unbelief, a temptation to hypocrisy, and so far more disastrous in effect than an open expression of unbelief; that the more cultured portion of the Romish Church was honeycombed with scepticism just before the Reformation, and that the same fact is in no small degree repeated to-day. They forget that a discredited claim to infallible authority is among the most potent instruments to infect with infidelity and to drive into disgust with religion, and in the age of mental alertness upon which we are entering is likely to convert men into sceptics by the thousand and the ten thousand. They forget that a unity which is purchased at the expense of mental enslavement is a calamity, and that no more unity is desirable than can be realized on the basis of freedom and intelligence. The fault of Protestantism is not in its principles. It cannot detract aught from these without trespassing upon the birthright, yea, upon the divine vocation of the individual. The fault is in the imperfect application of its principles.

To expect this fault to be entirely corrected would, no doubt, be utopian ; yet it is reasonable to hope for a great amendment. It is possible that the centrifugal forces of Protestantism may in due time be held in check by factors that make for unity. It is possible that from free discussion, from the interaction of different systems, and from a practical testing of different views by their fruits, there may result a growing clearness and unanimity as to what are the essential elements of an evangelical faith, and what are only subordinate and non-essential elements. Thus an ever-strengthening bond of moral unity may be established, which may prepare for an organic unity of denominations so nearly kindred as to have no real cause of separation. In fact, there are positive and increasing tokens that such a movement is already in progress. Without presumption, we may predict, as the ultimate goal of Protestantism, a far deeper and truer unity than any which the artificial constraints of hierarchical sovereignty can preserve to Romanism.

Fourth Period.

1517-1720.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

THE same movement which emancipated theology from the bonds of scholasticism prepared also for the emancipation of philosophy. Modern philosophy proper, however, was not born till about a century after the dawn of the Reformation. The transition era, which began in the fifteenth century, extended to the early part of the seventeenth. This was a time of ferment and endeavor, but not of any thorough reconstruction of philosophy. The old scholastic Aristotelianism was not dethroned altogether, at least in the Romish Church; but rivals made their appearance here and there. There were champions of Platonism or Neo-Platonism, like Reuchlin, Agrippa of Nettesheim, and others who were influenced by the teachings of Ficinus and Pico. There were advocates of a purified Aristotelianism, or of the philosophy of Aristotle freed from its scholastic coloring. Some of the Reformers might be placed in this category. There were Anti-Aristotelians, like Peter Ramus and Nicolaus Taurellus. There were some who philosophized in a sceptical tone, like Montaigne, Charron, and Sanchez; others, like Paracelsus, Cardanus,

Telesius, Patritius, Bruno, and Campanella, who followed more or less in the wake of Nicolas of Cusa, and whose philosophy was pre-eminently a philosophy of nature. In some instances this natural philosophy was marked by a theosophic vein.

As the main currents of philosophy in the preceding ages might be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, so a review of modern philosophy carries us back to two eminent representatives, Francis Bacon and René Descartes. The same relative rank, to be sure, cannot be assigned to the later as to the earlier philosophers. Bacon and Descartes appear as less towering figures in the modern group, than do Plato and Aristotle in the ancient. Still they are to be accredited with an analogous position, and are of prime importance as representing diverse philosophical tendencies destined to long-continued and powerful influence in the realm of thought. Bacon and Descartes were alike opposed to the over-valuation of the syllogism characteristic of scholasticism. Both saw that it was rather a means of arranging the known, than of discovering the unknown. Both insisted upon analysis, or a sifting process, as the necessary antecedent of trustworthy conclusions. Both made greater thoroughness of method a prime demand. But from this point they diverged. Bacon directed the attention outward. His maxim was: Observe, experiment, carefully examine and arrange the results, and turn them to practical account in life. Observation and induction, according to him, are the pathway to certain knowledge, and knowledge is to be made subservient chiefly to utilitarian ends. Descartes, on the other hand, directed the attention within. His maxim was: Retire into the depths of your own consciousness, examine the contents of your own mind, find out its fundamental intuitions, the ideas which it cherishes with invincible clearness and force, and use them as the basis of all certain knowledge. Intuition and deduction, according to him, are the principal instruments in the dis-

covery of truth. Bacon's philosophy was in the line of empiricism and sensationalism; Descartes's had affinity with idealism.

Bacon (1560-1626) gave a limited range to philosophy; in fact, substantially identified it with natural science. Even such a question as the nature of the soul he regarded as largely beyond its sphere. "Although," he says, "I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly enquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion; for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth, but was immediately inspired; so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the proper subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance." (Advancement of Learning.) As respects the truths of revealed religion, he declares emphatically and repeatedly, that philosophy is not to meddle with them. The following statements from the treatise just quoted will serve to illustrate his position. "By the contemplation of nature to induce and to enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and has been excellently handled by divers. But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe. *Da fidei quæ fidei sunt.* For the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: that men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven. . . . To seek heaven and earth in the word of God, whereof it is said, *Heaven and earth shall pass, but my word shall not pass*, is

to seek temporary things amongst eternal; and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living. . . . Sacred theology is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature. . . . The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a reluctance in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a reluctance in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter and not to the author. . . . The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts; the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction therefrom. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. For after the articles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them for our better direction." Thus Bacon made as wide a chasm between theology and philosophy as the most extreme of the nominalist school had done. An obvious motive for his procedure was a desire to secure for philosophy an unrestricted freedom in the realm of nature. In all probability Bacon entertained a genuine respect for the Christian faith. Nevertheless, the limited scope which he allowed to reason in matters of religious belief will appear to many the reverse of a compliment to revealed religion.

No doubt it would be wrong to hold Bacon responsible for Hobbes (1588-1679). The former would have repudiated most emphatically many of the cardinal conclusions of the latter. Still, the system of Bacon was not without a degree of affinity with that of his friend Hobbes. The

two appear related as initial tendency and extreme development. Hobbes pushed on at once to a radical type of sensationalism. His psychology is purely materialistic, affirming that sensation is the basis of all mental activities, and that sensation is nothing but motion in the internal parts of a sentient being caused by the physical impact of external objects. Different psychological terms, such as sensation, memory, imagination, volition, etc., stand simply for these internal motions or vibrations, viewed at different stages or in different relations. Spirit, save as an accident of body, or as a peculiar kind of body, has no existence. To speak of incorporeal substance is to indulge a radical contradiction of terms. Naturally, on this physical theory there is no room for freedom in the sense of self-determination. Every volition is as strictly necessitated as is any event in nature. Man's liberty is as the liberty of water to flow in the channel by which it is confined. (*Leviathan*, and *Philosophical Rudiments*.)

Hobbes did not challenge the truth of revealed religion. On the contrary, he quoted the Bible as authority, and to a degree that is perhaps not paralleled by any other philosophical writer. He refers to the Sacred Scriptures as "the speech of God." He commends an unquestioning acceptance of the mysteries of religion, and says that they have the best effect, when, like pills for the sick, they are swallowed whole. But despite this exterior coloring, his system in its natural tendencies is radically antagonistic to religion. To say nothing of other features, the almost unlimited authority over the opinions and practices of men which he assigns to the earthly sovereign, tends to rob religion of all its nobler sanctions and to relegate it to the miserable rank of a piece of statecraft. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Hobbes puts the sovereign in the place of God. Whatever limitations some of his statements may seem to impose upon the authority of the ruler, they are mostly nullified when compared with other statements.

It matters little that he says that the laws of God must take precedence of those of the sovereign. For the sovereign is made by him the sole interpreter of all laws, sacred as well as secular, and "the word of an interpreter of the Scriptures is the word of God." (Phil. Rud.) It belongs to the magistrate to determine the Scriptural canon, to decide what doctrines are to be acknowledged, what forms of worship are to be tolerated, what external actions are to be reckoned virtuous or vicious. Whatever be his commands, they must be obeyed, unless they involve an affront to God, and the private reason must hesitate to call that an affront which the public reason declares is not. If the sovereign commands the worship of idols, though perhaps a subject of special eminence and influence had better submit to martyrdom than obey, an ordinary subject does well to obey. Commerce with another man's wife, if authorized by the sovereign, is no longer adultery. "By those laws, 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'Honor thy father and mother,' nothing else was commanded but that subjects should absolutely obey their princes in all questions concerning *meum* and *tuum*, their own and others' right." In fine, there is very little in the system of Hobbes to qualify the force of the following sweeping statement of his: "The civil laws are to all subjects the measures of their actions, whereby to determine whether they be right or wrong, profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious." (De Corpore Politico.)

Hobbes's theories were too extreme to command much acceptance. They were set forth also in a dogmatic way, and exhibit far more skill of assertion than fulness and cogency of argument. A successor of Bacon more genuine and influential by far was John Locke (1632-1704.) But before reaching Locke it is appropriate to notice a phase of philosophy outside of the main current in England. In opposition to the materialism of Hobbes and his conven-

tional morality, the Cambridge school (in the middle and latter part of the seventeenth century) cultivated an idealistic and spiritual philosophy, and were zealous advocates of immutable morality, of moral distinctions that are subject to no authority, not even to the will of God Himself. They were also profoundly convinced of the rational character of religious truth. Somewhat to the detriment of its own originality, this school quoted largely from Platonism, or Neo-Platonism,—from the latter perhaps more than from the former. Coleridge says they might be called Plotinists rather than Platonists. The more distinguished representatives of the Cambridge Platonists were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Henry More, and Ralph Cudworth. The names of Culverwell, Worthington, Rust, Patrick, Fowler, and Glanvill might also be added. Of the writings from this group, “The True Intellectual System of the Universe,” by Cudworth, is the most significant. More wrote copiously, but marred his reputation by many extravagant and fanciful notions. John Norris, author of an interesting treatise on the “Theory of the Ideal World,” was at once a disciple of the Cambridge theologians and of Malebranche.

Locke was true to the Baconian emphasis upon experience as the proper source of knowledge. In his noted “Essay on the Human Understanding,” he contends against the doctrine of innate ideas. He compares the mind in its original estate to an empty cabinet and to a sheet of blank paper. In reply to the question how the mind obtains its materials, he says: “To this I answer in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.” Locke here joins reflection with sensation as

a source of ideas, but his general teaching implies that the former must be supplied with certain materials from the latter before it can act. Indeed, he says, "I see no reason to believe that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on." The primary materials of thought, then, according to Locke, all come from without, and in this sense it may be said that there is nothing in the mind which was not previously in the senses.

Locke himself was no advocate of that extreme sensationism which verges upon or runs into positive materialism. But still there were features in his system in affinity with this type of thought. His general illustrations lie on the side of the supposition of the mind's passivity, and, though he must have regarded the power of reflection as an active power, he did not take great pains to emphasize this view. He showed also little enthusiasm for the doctrine that the soul is immaterial, and declared it conceivable that God could endow a parcel of matter with the power of thought. (Essay, and Letters to the Bishop of Worcester.) Moreover, the definition of liberty, which he gives in his Essay, as simply a power to do what one wills, if it were to be regarded as representing the whole mind of Locke upon the subject, would place him, at this point, in harmony with the demands of materialism. It is not surprising, therefore, that various students of his philosophy, both in England and France, went forward to build upon his foundations a materialistic structure. At the same time, it is to be noticed that one phase of his teaching, namely, that the immediate objects of the mind are not things, but rather ideas of things, served as a basis for idealism. These developments, however, are not to be dwelt upon here, as they belong to the next period.

In the bearing of his philosophy upon questions of religion, Locke appears somewhat in contrast with Bacon. Unlike the latter, he was not willing to allow that faith may be in contradiction to reason. "Faith is nothing," he

remarks, "but a firm assent of the mind; which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it." While he allows that what is improbable on grounds of reason may be made certain by revelation, he will not grant that anything contradictory to reason can be established in this way. "No proposition," he says, "can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever." This emphasis upon the harmony of faith and reason was coupled in Locke with the reverse of a mystical bent. He had little sympathy with the transcendental side of religion. The ethical system of Christianity held the place of chief importance in his estimate. In these features there was a certain affinity between Locke and the deistical school which flourished so extensively in England in the first half of the eighteenth century. Locke's sympathies, however, were with revealed religion, and he was utterly averse to being associated with the deists.

The system of Descartes (1596-1650), as well as that of Bacon, has propagated its influence through a long list of successors. Unlike the English philosopher, Descartes brought philosophy into close relation with theology; indeed, he regarded certain data pertaining to the latter as indispensable to any progress in the former. According to him, the idea of God belongs not at the end of the system, but at the very beginning, or at least within a step or two of the beginning. He says: "I very clearly see that the certitude and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of the true God." (Meditation V.) The first step lies in an appeal to self-consciousness, as expressed in the famous maxim, *Cogito, ergo sum*,—"I think, therefore I am." Though I assume to doubt everything, says Descartes, I must allow that there is something that doubts.

Doubting is thinking. Whether I am deceived in the idea that I have a body or not, I am sure that I exist as a thinking being. From this point I can advance securely only by an appeal to the existence of God. A perfect Creator and Ruler is the only adequate guaranty against the supposition that I am the victim of deception in my thoughts and experiences. Now I am certified of the existence of such a Being upon grounds (given in Chap. II. sect. 1) that are entirely conclusive. I have therefore the required basis of scientific certainty. I can trust my faculties, as respects all that they clearly and distinctly apprehend. (See Discourse of Method; Meditations; Principles of Philosophy.)

The overshadowing importance which Descartes assigned to the idea of God in the foundations of philosophy, was not unnaturally supplemented by an emphatic conception of the agency of God, or of His causal efficiency in the world. We find him, accordingly, predicating in strong terms the dependence of the creature. Conservation, he says, is distinguished from creation merely in respect of our mode of thinking. A kindred view appears in his definition of substance. "By substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence. And, in truth, there can be conceived but one substance that is absolutely independent, and that is God. We perceive that all other things can exist only by the help of the concurrence of God. And accordingly, the term *substance* does not apply to God and the creature univocally."

Descartes was careful to avoid collision with the doctrinal standards of his Church (Roman Catholic), and assumed a reverent attitude toward the mysteries of the faith. He says: "If perhaps God reveal to us or to others matters concerning Himself which surpass the natural powers of our mind, such as the mysteries of the incarnation and of the trinity, we will not refuse to believe them, although we may not clearly understand them; nor will we be in any

way surprised to find in the immensity of His nature, or even in what He has created, many things that exceed our comprehension." (Principles of Philosophy, Pt. I.) Nevertheless, his writings did not escape censure. His Meditations, and some other of his productions, were placed in 1663 on the prohibited list at Rome, with the words attached, *Donec corrigantur*.

The stress which he placed upon the divine causality was joined by Descartes with a very emphatic view of the contrast between mind and matter. Herein was supplied a foundation for the doctrine of *occasionalism*. This was distinctly advocated by Geulinx (1625-1669). Body and soul, as he taught, in their radical unlikeliness, cannot be supposed to have any inherent bond of union, any power to operate upon each other. In God alone must be sought the connecting link between them. Malebranche (1638-1715) was very positively committed to the same theory. There is no causal connection, he says, between soul and body. What transpires in the one can be only an occasion, not a cause, of any experience in the other. Going still further, Malebranche declares that there is no relation of causality between one body and another, or between one spirit and another. "No creature is able to act upon another by any efficacy properly its own,"—*Nulle créature ne peut agir sur aucune autre par une efficace qui lui soit propre*. (Entretien sur la Métaphysique.) The mind does not stand in causal relation even to its own ideas. It may be able to render attention; but attention is only the occasion of the presence of ideas, not the cause. The cause is the Divine Word, the Universal Reason. In other words, the mind sees all things in God, who is the place of ideas, as space is the place of bodies. From this it would seem to follow that revelation is the only proper warrant for assuming the existence of an external sensible world.

In the limited sphere which he assigns to second causes, Malebranche appears upon the verge of pantheism, — a goal

that was actually reached by his contemporary, Spinoza (1632-1677). Taking up the definition of substance thrown out by Descartes, Spinoza gave it a rigorous application, and drew the conclusion that there is only one substance. "Besides God," he says, "there can be no substance, nor can any be conceived." (*Ethica*, Pars I. Prop. 14.) He affirms that there is in God an infinite fulness of attributes, but he dwells only upon two, — thought and extension. While these express the same substance, they are radically contrasted, and void of all causal relation to each other. Finite things are simply these attributes viewed as differentiated. "Particular things," says Spinoza, "are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate manner," — *Res particulares nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur.* (*Ethica*, I. 25, cor.) The modes of thought are ideas or minds; the modes of extension, bodies. These always correspond to each other. "The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things." (*Ethica*, II. 7.) Both are absolutely determined by the divine nature. God works everything from an inner necessity, without free volition, without design. There is no such thing as final cause, save in human imagination. Man is a link in the chain of necessity, and imagines himself to be free only because he is ignorant of the causes of his determinations.

Spinoza, who was excommunicated by his Jewish brethren, did not unqualifiedly commit himself in favor of any particular religion. He seems, however, to have entertained a certain preference for Christianity. His system indeed allowed no place for a divine incarnation in the Christian sense, but he evidently reckoned Christ far above all other teachers as respects His knowledge of the mind of God, and declared that we might call His voice the voice of God, and say "that the wisdom of God, that is, the

wisdom which is more than human, put on humanity in Christ, and that Christ consequently is the way of salvation." (*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.) To the Bible Spinoza rendered a qualified assent, regarding it as pre-eminently pedagogical, or accommodated to the needs of practical piety rather than to those of theoretical knowledge. Miracles he utterly disallowed, holding that what is repugnant to the order of nature must of necessity be repugnant to the mind of God. The list of essential religious truths which he laid down is quite similar to that given by Lord Herbert, the patriarch of English deism. As respects the province of government in determining the standard of conduct and religious observance, he approximated to the radical position of Hobbes.

Extreme tendencies were thus manifested in the line both of the Baconian and of the Cartesian philosophy. An attempt at mediation naturally resulted. Leibnitz appears as the first great exponent of such an attempt; but his system may most advantageously be considered in connection with the philosophy of the next period.

These modern philosophies evidently could have exercised but a limited influence upon theology within the period before us. The main types of Protestant theology had already been developed before they made their appearance. Lutheranism throughout the period was hardly touched by them. The philosophy of Leibnitz, as systematized by Wolff, was the first of modern philosophies to displace the modified Aristotelianism which had been embraced in the Reformation era, and to exercise a potent influence within the Lutheran Church. Some of the Reformed theologians, as also some of the Roman Catholic, were influenced to a considerable extent by the philosophy of Descartes. The same philosophy was early brought to the attention of the Cambridge Platonists, and traces of its influence may be seen in their writings, though it was in part opposed by them. Some of the English theolo-

gians, at the end of the period, show not a little affinity with the spirit of Locke's philosophy.

As respects the worth of philosophy, a rather moderate estimate may be said to have been generally prevalent among Protestant theologians. Luther in the heat of his reforming zeal spoke very disparagingly of philosophy, reckoned Aristotle as a near neighbor of the devil, and called him the spoiler of pious doctrine. Luther indeed came to the conclusion to tolerate Aristotle, and credited philosophy with an important place in things natural; but he seems never to have regarded it as of much worth in things spiritual. He denounced the natural reason as the primary fountain of evils, and asserted that faith must rise superior to its dictates. Among those who followed, Daniel Hoffmann of Helmstedt rivalled the extremest utterances of Luther, and is said to have adopted the principle that what is against reason is for God. (Dorner, History of Protestant Theology.) But his position was exceptional. The great body of Lutheran theologians, like Melancthon, were ready to bring philosophy into relation with theology, only holding that its place is entirely subordinate. John Gerhard approved the position of Aquinas, that, while philosophy may offer probable arguments, it is never to be ranked as a full and independent authority in matters of theology, but always held in subordination to the Scriptures. (Loci Theologici, Procem.) Quenstedt manifested an extra degree of anxiety lest too large a space should be conceded to philosophy, but logically his statements assign to it about the same sphere as that defined by Gerhard. Hollaz drew a distinction between *pure* and *mixed* articles, regarding the latter as falling within the province of philosophy, or the natural reason, but the former as capable of being made known by supernatural revelation alone. We find Quenstedt complaining of the Calvinists as preposterously subjecting the mysteries of the faith to the authority of reason. (Systema Theologicum, De Theol. Prin.) This is by far

too sweeping. Very likely, in the present period, within the Calvinistic or Reformed Church, as a whole, there was more appreciation of philosophy than in the Lutheran. But in the former, as well as in the latter, it was commonly assigned a subordinate place, and there were, moreover, Reformed writers who were not a whit more disposed to laud its utility than was the average Lutheran theologian. Voëtius, for example, declares that human reason is neither the principle by which or through which, nor from which or why, we believe, and that it is not the foundation or law or norm of faith, in accordance with whose prescription we judge. (Select. Disput. Theol., De Rat. Hom. in Rebus Fidei.) Zwingli, while he made the Scriptures the one supreme authority, had quite a high opinion of the wisdom of the ancient philosophers. Bullinger seems to have regarded philosophy as of little service in religion. "Many men," he says, "hope that they can attain to true wisdom by the study of philosophy ; but they are deceived as far as heaven is broad. For philosophy doth falsely judge and faultily teach many things touching God, the works of God, the chief goodness, the end of good and evil, and touching things to be desired or eschewed." (Sermons, Decade I. 5.) Calvin taught that we are not to despise the wisdom of the heathen sages, the admirable displays of sagacity in their works, lest perchance we do despite to God, who is the only fountain of truth. But, at the same time, he held that the natural reason of man is almost blind as respects the nature of God in general, and wholly so as respects His paternal benevolence. "I do not deny," he says, "that some judicious and apposite observations concerning God may be found scattered in the writings of the philosophers ; but they always betray a confused imagination. They never had the smallest idea of the certainty of the divine benevolence toward us." (Institutes, II. 2.) Turretin, while he declares that the Word of God, and not our sense of the possibility or impossibility of a thing, is the norm of faith,

seems to have been unwilling to admit that there is any actual contradiction between reason proper and faith. "The mysteries of faith," he says, "are contrary to corrupt reason and are combated by it; but they are merely above and beyond right reason, and are not taught by it." In agreement with Gerhard, he teaches that theology and philosophy are related as mistress and servant. (*Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ*, Locus I. qu. 8-13.) One of the theories of Socinus implies a narrow capacity in merely human philosophy to acquaint men with divine truth, for he argues that specific revelations were the primary and indispensable basis of whatever knowledge of God has come into the world. (*Prælect. Theol.*, II.) The Arminian movement in its spirit and tendency favored, on the whole, an enlarged scope for reason in the field of theology; but the Arminians seem not to have set out with any special theory upon the subject. They were averse to ambitious speculation, and emphasized the dictates of the practical reason. Among English theologians, the Cambridge school, as already noted, assigned an important place to philosophy. They emphasized, indeed, the truth that spiritual enlightenment is radically conditioned upon the right spiritual disposition; but at the same time they regarded the reason as a link between man and God and a medium of divine illumination. "The spirit in man," says Whichcote, "is the candle of the Lord, lighted by God, and lighting man to God. . . . Therefore to speak of natural light, of the use of reason in religion, is to do no disservice at all to grace; for God is acknowledged in both,—in the former as being the groundwork of His creation, in the latter as reviving and restoring it. . . . To go against reason is to go against God." (Quoted by John Tulloch in *Rational Theol. and Christ. Philos. in England in the 17th Century*.) John Goodwin took about the same ground, maintaining that a good use of reason is essential to the best use of faith, and declaring that inconceivable mischief had been wrought by the doctrine that

men must lay aside their reason in matters of religion. (Redemption Redeemed, Preface.) Those who received Løcke as a philosophical master must of course have recognized a certain value in philosophy, as serving to illustrate the rational character of the Christian religion.

Petavius, as a representative of the Roman Catholic standpoint of the era, defends the utility of philosophy in the domain of theology. He assigns it, however, to the same subordinate rank to which it was relegated by many Protestant theologians. He says, "Faith ought by all means to take the lead, then reason and disputation to follow." (Theol. Dogmat., Prolegom. cap. 4.) "Nothing," says Pascal, "is so agreeable to reason, as the disclaiming of reason in matters of pure faith; and nothing is so repugnant to reason as the disuse of reason in things that do not concern faith." (Thoughts on Religion, Chap. V.)

SECTION II. — COMMUNIONS, CREEDS, AND AUTHORS.

1. RISE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIFFERENT PROTESTANT COMMUNIONS. — Though the Reformation received upon every hand a forward impulse from the powerful advocacy of Luther, its origin outside of Germany was in a measure independent of his agency. Simultaneously in different lands there was a quickened perception of Gospel truths. In Switzerland, France, and England, men were already turned toward the path of evangelical reform, when the fearless utterances of the German leader came to their encouragement.

As respects Protestant unity, therefore, the primary demand was not continued fidelity to a common leadership, but rather agreement and friendly alliance between different movements. Unhappily, the attempt to consummate this alliance proved abortive. A dispute broke out between the Germans and the Swiss upon the subject of the eucha-

rist. Attempts at a settlement, like the conference at Marburg in 1529, were unavailing. Luther could not agree with Zwingli, and, in the conviction that the Swiss were of a different spirit from his own, refused their offer of fellowship. So Protestantism appears as a divided stream almost at its fountain-head.

The two great branches into which the Reformation movement developed came to be designated respectively as the *Lutheran* and the *Reformed Church*. Whatever points of kinship these may have had, they early exhibited contrasted features. The Lutheran Church was animated more directly by antagonism to the Jewish element in Romanism, its burdensome and unspiritual legalism; the Reformed was conspicuous for opposition to the pagan element in Romanism. The former was mainly intent upon reforming the inner spirit, and was not in haste to change externals any farther than the new spirit imperatively required; the latter aimed to change externals, as well as the inner spirit, dealt with images in the temper of iconoclasm, abridged the ceremonial, and endeavored in general to get back to apostolic simplicity. In the Lutheran Church there was a leaning to idealism and mysticism; the Reformed, while not without a highly speculative bent, was relatively distinguished by a practical energy, a ready disposition to actualize ideas of Church and society. The Lutheran type dwelt largely upon the subjective condition of salvation, the faith of the individual; the Reformed emphasized the objective condition, the will and power of God. Evangelical freedom was the watchword of Lutheranism, and the New Testament its preferred ground in Holy Writ; the Reformed theologians magnified the conception of divine law, and had much recourse to the Old Testament for principles and illustrations.

The Lutheran Church had its headquarters in Central Germany, and spread to the North through the Scandinavian regions. The Reformed Church had its head-

quarters first at Zurich under Zwingli, then at Geneva under Calvin, and became established, outside of its Swiss home, in various parts of Germany, in France, in Holland, in Scotland, and in America. The *Church of England* has often been regarded as a branch of the Reformed Church; and very prominent facts may be quoted in behalf of this classification. At the time that it received its distinctly Protestant character, it was on terms of intimate fellowship with the Reformed churches on the Continent. Such exponents of the Reformed system of doctrine as Peter Martyr and Martin Bucer were then teaching in its universities. Moreover, it cannot be denied that its authoritative articles of religion show a distinct kinship with the Reformed type of theology. But, on the other hand, the Church of England had its distinct character from the outset. This may be described, in a single sentence, as a conservative bent, — a bias toward patristic authority. In pursuance of this, it retained much of the old liturgy and much of the old form of church government with its episcopal hierarchy, and its representative theologians were distinguished among Protestant writers by their frequent and reverent appeal to the early fathers. It is to be noticed, however, that almost from the outset there was a party in England (the so-called Puritans) to whom these characteristics of the national Church were the reverse of pleasing. The episcopal hierarchy, the ceremonies, and the vestments, were in the highest degree distasteful to them. Believing that the existing order was a compromise with Rome, and regarding the Genevan as the Scriptural model, they wished for a more democratic constitution of the Church, and for apostolic simplicity in worship. In a word, they were *Presbyterians*. Though persecuted by the government, they claimed the sympathy of no inconsiderable portion of the nation, and finally, through their intimate relation with the cause of civil liberty, came to a decided ascendancy during the rule of the Long Parlia-

ment. Among the opponents of the hierarchical constitution of the Church was also a party which went still farther than the Presbyterians. These were the *Independents*, who declared for the autonomy of each individual church or congregation. Their origin has sometimes been traced to Robert Brown. A work published by him in 1582 embodied some of their views on church polity; but there were other and more worthy pioneers, such as Barrowe, Greenwood, and John Robinson, the last a pastor of a church in England, and then of the society in Leyden which sent the Plymouth settlers to New England. The Independents in England were much inferior in numbers to the Presbyterians; but inasmuch as the great leaders, the military chiefs who finally grasped the reins of government, were from their ranks, they came for a time into a certain ascendancy. After the Restoration, both Presbyterians and Independents passed into the rank of proscribed sects. The Toleration Act of 1689 guaranteed to them freedom of worship, but left them under disabilities as respects the holding of civil offices.

Outside of the main current of Protestantism there was a movement, almost from the dawn of the Reformation, in the direction of *Unitarianism*. Among the earlier representatives of this movement were the Anabaptists John Denck, Lewis Hetzer, David Joris, John Campanus, and Melchior Hofmann; Adam Pistorius, from Westphalia; the Spaniard, Michael Servetus; the Italians, Claudius of Savoy, J. Valentine Gentilis, and Gribaldi. Between these there was little or no strict unity of belief or action, and none of them can be regarded as founders of a sect. Unitarianism first acquired the consistency of an organized communion in the last half of the sixteenth century. It may be regarded as having substantially reached this status in Poland between 1563 and 1565, though destined here to receive shape and name some years later from its most powerful leader. Poland and Transylvania in particular

offered a refuge to the Unitarians, whom the great body of Romanists and Protestants alike were unwilling to tolerate. In the latter country two of the prominent leaders were George Blandrata and Francis David. In consequence of a dispute between these men on the propriety of worshipping Christ, Faustus Socinus was called into Transylvania (1578). This learned Italian had received his views in part as a matter of inheritance from his uncle, Lælius Socinus. The latter belonged to a society of liberal thinkers at Vicenza, in the territory of Venice, which had been broken up by the Inquisition. Forced to flee, he took refuge in Protestant countries, residing mainly in Switzerland. Though his views were sufficiently radical, his somewhat modest and negative way of putting them saved him from proscription. Faustus inherited the manuscripts of Lælius, and carried out his theories into bold and dogmatic statement. From Transylvania, Faustus Socinus passed into Poland, in 1579. He was not received with a very cordial welcome. While some of the Unitarians there believed in the simple humanity of Christ, others were Arians or Semi-Arians. By many of them Socinus was regarded as extra radical in some of his views. But, favored by the patronage of persons of distinction and by his superior talents, he overcame all opposition, and in testimony to his ascendancy the Unitarians of Poland and Transylvania came to be known as *Socinians*. For about half a century the sect enjoyed a good degree of prosperity, and their headquarters at Racow became quite a celebrated seat of Socinian learning. But in 1638 persecution broke out, and twenty years later was issued the edict of their banishment from Poland. Some took refuge in Transylvania, where their descendants have maintained themselves down to the present time. Some, finding their way to Holland, became amalgamated with the Remonstrants and the Mennonites. In England Unitarianism had representatives during the major part of the period.

One of the most distinguished of these was John Biddle, who wrote several works near the middle of the seventeenth century. His opinions were much after the Socinian order, but different in some respects. English Unitarianism, however, can hardly be said to have crystallized into a sect till after the middle of the eighteenth century.

The origin of the *Remonstrants*, or *Arminians*, in Holland, was due to a reaction against strict Calvinism. Their founder was James Arminius. He was not, however, the first representative of the reaction in question. Koornheert and others had preceded him in quite a radical attack upon the Genevan doctrine. To obviate Koornheert's objections, some ministers of Delft issued a book in which they advocated an infra-lapsarian scheme in place of the supra-lapsarianism of Calvin and Beza. Arminius was called upon to answer their production. In the course of his investigation he came to entertain serious doubts about the validity of any and every form of the doctrine of unconditional election. He was also led to take liberal ground as respects subscription to creeds, and advocated the propriety of making but few articles obligatory, and these expressed as nearly as possible in Scriptural language. As Professor at Leyden, Arminius came into conflict with his colleague, Gomar, who was an upholder of the most stringent type of predestinarianism. The controversy, once started, continued to rage, and was in no wise slackened by the death of Arminius, in 1609. In consequence of a declaration (containing five articles of faith) issued in 1610, under the title of a Remonstrance, the followers of Arminius acquired the name of Remonstrants. Being condemned by the synod of Dort, in 1619, they were proscribed by the government, to which they were obnoxious on political grounds. After a few years, however, they began to enjoy a measure of toleration. The doctrinal system of Arminius, who is confessed on all hands to have been a man of most exemplary spirit and life, was the Calvinistic

system with no farther modification than necessarily resulted from rejecting the tenet of absolute predestination. A charge of Pelagian affinities can be made against him only on the basis of the most ultra Calvinism, or of an utterly inadequate acquaintance with his writings. His followers, no doubt, made a wider departure from the Calvinistic teaching. Even between Arminius and his immediate successor, Episcopius, quite an interval is noticeable as respects doctrinal bias. Some of the later generations of Arminians showed a certain affiliation with Socinianism. But this fact is not to be taken as indicative of the original essence of Arminianism. That it was no necessary outcome from the teachings of the founder is well evinced by the history of the Wesleyan theology.

The more sober and evangelical elements among the Anabaptists of the Reformation era came to be represented in the *Mennonites* and the *Baptists*. The former derived their name from Menno Simons, and originated in Holland in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. In some points they seem to have anticipated the Quakers. They rejected oaths, and reprobated wars and all kinds of violence. They regarded the Church as the company of the regenerate, and insisted upon strict discipline,—a schism having early occurred in their ranks on this subject. They excluded infants from baptism, and accepted Zwingli's exposition of the eucharist. They held peculiar views respecting Christ's person. On the doctrines of grace, the majority were inclined to the Arminian, as opposed to the Calvinistic type.

In England the Baptists showed a considerable energy in organizing societies in the time of Charles I. Their prior history is not very distinctly outlined. Hunt says: "The English Baptists originated among the Brownists of Amsterdam. The first was John Smyth, who, being convinced of the necessity of adult baptism, and having no one to baptize him, baptized himself." (Religious Thought

in England.) On the other hand, the Baptist historian, Cramp, speaks in general of those who had previously suffered under the name of Anabaptists as being in the proper list of Baptist martyrs. Whether reckoned from the earlier or the later date, the Baptists must be allowed to have had their full share of persecution. Cromwell, however, treated them with consideration, and they were recognized under the Act of Toleration in 1689. The founder of the American Baptists was Roger Williams, who also, in accordance with a charter applied for in 1643, became the founder of a colony in Rhode Island. Though not the first to take advanced ground upon the subject, Williams may still be reckoned among the pioneers of the cause of religious liberty, and in his colony the claims of that liberty were distinctly recognized. In England the early Baptists were Arminians. The rise of the first distinctly Calvinistic society was in 1633. (Cramp.) Those adhering to the original type were called General Baptists, while the Calvinists were styled Particular Baptists. In the American branch the Calvinistic teaching was predominant from the first. The Arminian communion, known as Free-will Baptists, was not organized till near the end of the eighteenth century.

At the middle of the seventeenth century, the era of the Civil War and the Commonwealth, a great variety of religious parties made their appearance in England, such as Ranters, Seekers, Familists, Behmenists, Muggletonians, Fifth Monarchy Men, or Millenarians, etc. Some of these were scarcely so much sects as schools of thought, and all of them were destined to appear rather as significant of the enthusiasms of the times than as sources of permanent influence. With another party the case was different. Though as eccentric in its guise as any of those mentioned, the society of *Quakers* or *Friends* proved its right to continued existence by a strength of conviction and tenacity of purpose which scorn and the fiercest persecution were

alike powerless to destroy. Very likely it acted as an absorbent upon various parties who had broken away from their old moorings. Speaking of an early period in its history, Cunningham says: "Quakerism was rapidly absorbing many of the smaller fanatical sects which had been generated in the high temperature of the times. Fox's divining-rod swallowed up the rods of the less mighty magicians." (International History of the Quakers.) Quakerism was an extreme reaction against formalism,—a reaction carried to the point of exalting the inner light above the text of the Bible itself. It belongs among the manifestations of the spirit of mysticism. After its founder, George Fox, its most noted contributors were Robert Barclay and William Penn, the former its ablest apologist and theologian, the latter its most efficient patron. As the colonizer of Pennsylvania, Penn prepared a favorable theatre for Quakerism in America, where its numbers soon surpassed those of the society in the mother country.

2. CREEDS, AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF DOCTRINE.

	Writings.	Date.
LUTHERAN.	Luther's two Catechisms	A. D. 1529
	The Augsburg Confession	1530
	The Apology of the Augsburg Confession	1530-1531
	The Articles of Smalcald	Signed in 1537.
	The Formula of Concord	1537
	The Saxon Visitation Articles	1577
REFORMED.	Zwingli's Sixty-seven Articles, Account of the Faith, and Exposition of the Christian Faith	1592
	The Tetrapolitan Confession	1523-1531
	The First Confession of Basle	1530
	The First Helvetic Confession, or Second Confession of Basle	1534
	The Consensus of Zurich	1536
	The Consensus of Geneva	1549
	The Hungarian Confession	1552
	The Gallican Confession	1557-1558
	The Scotch Confession	1559
		1560

	Writings.	Date.
REFORMED.	The Belgic Confession	A. D. 1561
	The Heidelberg Catechism	1563
	The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England	1563
	The Second Helvetic Confession	1566
	The Consensus of Sandomir (Polish)	1570
	Bohemian Confessions	1535, 1575
	The Irish Articles	1615
	The Canons of the Synod of Dort	1619
	The Westminster Confession and Catechisms	1647
	The Cambridge Platform (American)	1648
	The Confession of the Waldenses	1655
	The Savoy Declaration	1658
	The Helvetic Consensus Formula	1675
SOCINIAN.	The Cracovian Catechism	1574
	The Racovian Catechism	1605
ARMINIAN.	The [Five] Arminian Articles	1610
	Confession of the Pastors who are called Remonstrants (by Episcopius)	1621
GENERAL BAPTIST.	Declaration of Faith of the English People remaining at Amsterdam	1611
	The London Confession	1680
	The Orthodox Creed (from Baptists of Oxfordshire and vicinity)	1678
PARTICULAR BAPTIST.	The Confession of the Seven Churches of London	1644-1646
	The Confession of Somerset	1656
	A Confession of Faith put forth by the Elders and Brethren, etc.	1688
QUAKER.	Barclay's Fifteen Propositions	1675
ROMAN CATHOLIC.	Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent	1563
	The Profession of the Tridentine Faith	1564
	The Roman Catechism	1566
	The Bull <i>Cum Occasione</i> of Innocent X.	1653
	The Bull <i>Unigenitus</i> of Clement XI.	1713
GREEK.	The Orthodox Confession of Mogilas	1643
	The Confession of Dositheus, or the Eighteen Decrees of the Synod of Jerusalem	1672

Among Lutheran Confessions, that submitted at Augsburg to Charles V. and the dignitaries of the Empire, as the first grand declaration of Protestant principles, occupies the

first rank. It has claimed the widest assent, and intrinsically is best fitted to serve as an ecumenical creed. In its moderate tone we may discern the spirit of its author, Melancthon, who also wrote the *Apology*.

The *Smalcald Articles* were composed by Luther, as might be judged from their polemical vigor. They were designed to indicate the basis upon which the Protestants would stand if they were to have any part in the general council which was then under consideration.

The *Formula of Concord* is the most elaborate in its doctrinal statements among the Lutheran creeds. It is also highly significant as reflecting the earnest theological thinking and the heated controversies within the Lutheran Church during the preceding thirty or forty years. But there were many to whom it was not acceptable, and it failed of adoption in Denmark, Holstein, and some other districts. Moreover, though admired by the majority in an age of intense dogmatism, it lacked the simplicity and breadth requisite in a symbol that is to command a permanent suffrage. The composition of the *Formula of Concord* was the work of six theologians, prominent among whom were Jacob Andreä and Martin Chemnitz.

The *Saxon Visitation Articles*, designed as a safeguard to strict Lutheranism against the invasion of Calvinistic teachings on the sacraments and on predestination, had only a local acceptance, and are no longer in force even in Saxony.

Among the Reformed Confessions there are five which may be singled out as being of special importance: the *Heidelberg Catechism*, the *Second Helvetic Confession*, the *Canons of the Synod of Dort*, the *Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England*, and the *Westminster Confession*.

The *Heidelberg Catechism* was originally issued as a doctrinal compendium for the Palatinate, one of the seven electoral districts of the German Empire. Its authors were

Zacharias Ursinus and Caspar Olevianus. While it embraces the common tenets of the Reformed faith, it is unique in the standpoint from which it proceeds, its very first questions being concerning the needs and the only comfort of the soul under the burden of its sin and misery. Commended by its warm evangelical spirit, it soon found its way into all the Reformed churches on the Continent, and obtained recognition in Scotland and among the American colonists. Even down to the present day it has enjoyed a large degree of approbation.

The Second Helvetic Confession was composed by Bullinger, the successor of Zwingli at Zurich. Frederic III. of the Palatinate, under whose auspices the Heidelberg Catechism was prepared, was much interested to have it published, and in response to his desire, as well as to the call of the Swiss churches, it was given forth. It was received with much favor, being sanctioned not only by the Protestantism of Switzerland and the Palatinate, but by the Reformed Church in Poland, Hungary, France, and Scotland. Its statement of doctrine is full, and the Scriptures are abundantly quoted in corroboration.

The synod of Dort was convened in opposition to the Arminian movement, and published elaborate decisions on the subject of predestination and the related doctrines. Besides the theologians of Holland, representatives of various countries, such as England, Scotland, the Palatinate, Hesse, and Switzerland, had a place in the synod. In securing its immediate object it was quite successful, but it is generally understood that its ultimate result, especially in the English Church, was to help on the reaction in favor of Arminianism.

The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England were formed by a revision of forty-two articles which had been prepared under the supervision of Cranmer, and published in 1553. They were adopted by the two Houses of Convocation in 1563, and subscription to them was made obligatory

upon religious teachers by act of Parliament in 1571. The Thirty-nine Articles represent the English Church on the side of its connection with the general Protestant movement, whereas the Liturgy reveals more largely its connection with the Ante-Reformation Church. The statement on the subject of predestination is moderate, and admits of some latitude of interpretation. Probably those who framed the statement accepted in general the Reformed doctrine on the subject, but at the same time were not possessed by any such zeal for it as was felt in some other quarters. It was in harmony, therefore, with the original standpoint of the Protestant theology of England, when the ultra Calvinistic articles (the so-called Lambeth Articles of 1595), championed by Archbishop Whitgift and others, were rejected.

The Westminster Assembly was convened by order of Parliament in 1643. It met in the midst of the conflict between the Puritans and the throne, and was designed to prepare an ecclesiastical scheme in harmony with the principles of the former. The Assembly held 1,163 regular sessions between July 1, 1643, and February 22, 1649. On questions of doctrine its members were substantially agreed. On the subject of polity there was a diversity of view, the Episcopalians, the Independents, and the Erastians being in a measure represented. The Presbyterians, however, were in the majority, and finally claimed a complete ascendancy. The Confession was ready for publication in 1647, and was approved by the Parliament the next year, with the exception of some paragraphs relating to church polity. In Scotland it was adopted without modification. In New England, the Cambridge, Boston, and Saybrook synods expressed their general approval of the doctrinal portion. As was naturally dictated by the antecedents and the circumstances of its preparation, the Westminster Confession is a stalwart embodiment of the Calvinistic faith. No other great confession is equally

strong and explicit on the subject of predestination, unless it be the Canons of Dort. To be sure, it does not go at all beyond the Lambeth or the Irish Articles, and indeed must be allowed to have been formed more or less on the model of the latter. But the Lambeth Articles were never authoritatively promulgated, and the Irish Articles (composed probably by Archbishop Usher), though adopted by the convocation of the episcopal clergy of Ireland, were very soon superseded by the Thirty-nine Articles of the English Church.

The Socinians and Arminians did not share largely in the creed-making propensity of the age. The Racovian Catechism claimed the highest authority as an exposition of Socinian beliefs. For an adequate understanding of Arminianism recourse must be had to the writings of its most noted representatives.

The council of Trent (1545-1563) prepared the dogmatic code of modern Romanism. It closed the door against evangelical reform, set up impassable barriers against catholicity, and decided that the mediæval Church should be merged into a specifically Romish Church. The decrees of the council were designed to be an effectual offset to all the characteristic teachings of the Reformation. The attendance was small in the earlier sessions, but at the end two hundred and fifty-five members were present to give their signatures, two thirds of whom, however, were Italians.

The Roman Catechism was prepared in accordance with the directions of the council of Trent, but not till after the adjournment. Owing to this fact, it seems necessary to place it in the second rank of authorities, unless the Pope's approval of its publication be regarded as his positive sanction of its contents. It has occupied, on the whole, quite an important place among Romish standards, though the Jesuits in their controversy with the Dominicans on the subject of freedom and grace were disposed to challenge its authority.

Möhler places also the Profession of the Tridentine Faith, issued by Pius IV., among authorities of the second rank, but from the standpoint of the Vatican Council (1869-1870), it seems necessary to assign to it, as well as to the bulls of Innocent and Clement, unqualified authority. The first of these documents presents a form of assent to the Nicene creed and to the substance of the Trent creed, to be signed by all priests and teachers in Roman Catholic seminaries, colleges, and universities. The bull of Innocent condemns five propositions ascribed to the Jansenists; that of Clement, one hundred and one sentences in the Moral Reflections of Quesnel.

The most noteworthy confessions of the Greek Church in this period were issued in opposition to an abortive attempt to introduce Protestant teachings. The agent of that attempt was no less a man than Cyril Lucar, who became Patriarch of Constantinople in 1621. During a residence in Switzerland, he had imbibed the Reformed faith, and the confession which he prepared (1629-1633) distinctly asserts the main points of the Calvinistic system of doctrine. Cyril Lucar atoned for his innovating spirit with his life in 1638. Of the opposing confessions, that of Mogilas was the most elaborate. It was adopted in 1643 by a synod of Russian and Greek clergy, and in 1672 by the synod of Jerusalem, which at the same time adopted the Confession of Dositheus, or the Eighteen Decrees.

3. AUTHORS AND WORKS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE.

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
I. LUTHERAN WRITERS.		
Martin Luther	Christian Liberty; Babylonish Captivity of the Christian Church; The Enslaved Will; Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, etc.	A. D. 1546
Philip Melanchthon . . .	Loci Theologici (Fundamentals of Theology)	1568

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Andreas Osiander	A. D. 1552
Justus Jonas	1555
Nicolas Armsdorf	1565
Victorin Strigel	1569
Joh. Brenz	{ On the Personal Union of the Two Natures in Christ . . . }	1570
Joachim Westphal		1574
Matthias Flacius	1575
Martin Chemnitz	{ Examination of the Council of Trent; On the Two Natures in Christ }	1586
Tilemann Heshusius		1588
Jacob Andreä	1590
Nicolaus Selnecker	1592
Jacob Heerbrand	1600
Ægidius Hunnius	Saxon Visitation Articles . . .	1603
Leonhard Hutter	1616
Matthias Haffenreffer	1619
Joh. Arndt	True Christianity	1621
Joh. Gerhard	{ Loci Theologici; Catholic Con- fession }	1637
Melchior Nicolai		1650
Joh. Val. Andreä	1654
George Calixtus	{ Disputations on the Principal Subjects of the Christian Reli- gion; Epitome of Theology; Desire and Effort for Eccle- siastical Concord }	1656
Joh. Hülsemann		1661
Joh. F. König	1664
Joh. C. Dannhauer	1666
Joh. Musæus	{ Treatises in Refutation of Her- bert of Cherbury and of Spino- za; On the Use of the Princi- ples of Reason and Philosophy in Theological Controversies . System of the Fundamentals of Theology (Systema Locorum Theol.) }	1681
Abraham Calov		1686
Joh. A. Quenstedt	Didactico-Polemic Theology . .	1688
J. W. Baier	Compendium of Positive Theology	1695
Phil. J. Spener	1705
David Hollaz	Examen Theologicum	1713
J. G. Arnold	1714
Andreas Hochstetter	1718
A. H. Francke	1727
Christian Thomasius	1728
II. REFORMED WRITERS ON THE CONTINENT.		
Ulrich Zwingli	{ Commentary on the True and the False Religion; Sermon on Providence. (See also the Ta- ble of Confessions.) }	1531

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
John Calvin	{ Institutes of the Christian Religion; Commentaries on the Scriptures }	A. D. 1564
Simon Grynæus	1541
Martin Bucer	1551
Peter Martyr	1562
Wolfgang Musculus	1563
A. G. Hyperius	1564
Benj. Aretius	1574
Henry Bullinger	{ Sermons (and Second Helvetic Confession) }	1575
Zacharias Ursinus	{ Heidelberg Catechism (assisted by Olevianus) }	1583
Girolamo Zanchi	{ The Nature of God; The Works of God created in the Six Days; Predestination }	1590
Antoine de Chandieu	1591
Franciscus Junius	1602
Theodore Beza	{ Confession; Summary of Entire Christianity, or Description and Distribution of the Causes of the Salvation of the Elect and the Destruction of the Reprobate; Summary of Doctrine on the Subject of the Sacraments }	1605
Joh. Drusius	1616
Joh. Piscator	1625
John Cameron	1625
Joh. Wolleb	1626
J. A. Alsted	1638
Francis Gomar	{ Commentaries; Theological Disputations and Tracts }	1641
Joh. H. Alting	1644
Joh. Maccovius	1644
Friedrich Spanheim	1649
Gerard J. Vossius	Tractatus Theologici	1649
André Rivet	1651
David Blondel	1655
Pierre du Moulin	1658
Louis Cappel	1658
Moïse Amyraut	Treatise on Predestination	1664
Josué La Place (Placæus)	{ On the Imputation of the First Sin of Adam }	1665
Joh. Hoornbeck	1666
Joh. Coccejus	{ Summary of Doctrine concerning the Covenant and Testament of God; Summary of Theology }	1669
Jean Daillé	1670
Samuel Maresius	1673
Lucas Gernler	1675
Gisbertus Voëtius	Select Theological Disputations	1676
Abraham Heidanus	1678
James Alting	1679
Francis Burmann	1679
Francis Turretin	Institute of Elenchical Theology	1687

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Joh. H. Heidegger . . . {	Helvetic Consensus Formula ; Body of Christian Theology ; Marrow of Christian Theology }	A. D. 1698
Balthasar Becker	1698
Hermann Witsius	1708
Melchior Leydecker	1721
Campegius Vitringa	1722
III. SOCINIAN WRITERS.		
Lælius Socinus	1562
Geo. Schomann	Cracovian Catechism	1591
Faustus Socinus {	Theological Lectures ; Concern- ing Christ as Saviour ; Dispu- tation on the Invocation of Jesus Christ	1604
Valentine Schmalz . . . {	Racovian Catechism (assisted by Joh. Völkel and others) . . .	
Johannes Crell {	Commentaries ; God and his At- tributes ; Tract on the Holy Spirit ; Reply to the Book of Hugo Grotius on the Satisfac- tion of Christ ; Two Books on the One God the Father . . .	1633
J. L. Wolzogen {	Compendium of the Christian Religion	1658
Jonas Schlichtingius	1664
Andrew Wissowatius	1678
IV. ARMINIAN WRITERS.		
James Arminius {	Declaration of Opinions on Pre- destination, etc., before the States of Holland ; Theologi- cal Orations and Disputations }	1609
Conrad Vorstius	1622
Simon Episcopius	Theological Institutes	1643
Janus Uytenbogaert	1644
Hugo Grotius {	On the Truth of the Christian Religion ; Defence of the Cath- olic Faith respecting the Satis- faction of Christ	1645
Stephanus Curcellæus . .	Institute of the Christian Religion	1659
Philip van Limborch . .	Christian Theology	1712
Jean Le Clerc (Clericus) . {	Disquisitions concerning the In- spiration of the Holy Scriptures }	1736
V. WRITERS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.		
1. <i>Episcopalians.</i>		
Hugh Latimer	Sermons ; Disputation at Oxford	1555
Nicholas Ridley {	Treatise against the Error of Transubstantiation ; Disputa- tion at Oxford	1555
John Hooper	1555

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Thomas Cranmer	{ Answer to Gardiner (on the Eu- charist) }	A. D. 1556
Thomas Becon		1563
John Jewell	{ Apology of the Church of Eng- land; Treatise on the Sacra- ments }	1571
Matthew Parker		1575
William Whitaker		1595
Richard Hooker	The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity	1600
William Perkins	{ The Order of Predestination in the Mind of God; Treatise on God's Free Grace and Man's Free Will }	1602
John Whitgift		1604
Launcelot Andrewes		1626
Thomas Jackson		1640
John Davenant		1641
William Chillingworth	{ The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation . . . }	1644
William Laud		1645
John Forbes	Historico-Theological Instructions	1648
John Prideaux		1650
John Smith	Select Sermons	1652
James Usher	{ Body of Divinity (by question and answer); Intent and Ex- tent of Christ's Death and Sat- isfaction }	1656
Joseph Hall	{ The Old Religion; Episcopacy by Divine Right; Via Media . }	1656
John Hales	{ Treatise on Schism, and on the Lord's Supper }	1656
Henry Hammond		1660
Bryan Walton		1661
John Bramhall		1663
Jeremy Taylor	{ Treatises on Baptism, Original Sin, Episcopacy, etc. . . . }	1667
John Lightfoot		1675
Isaac Barrow	Sermons	1677
William Outram		1679
Benj. Whichcote	Sermons and Aphorisms	1683
Robert Leighton	Sermons and Theological Lectures	1684
John Pearson	Exposition of the Creed	1686
Henry More	{ Antidote to Atheism; Immortal- ity of the Soul }	1687
Ralph Cudworth	{ The True Intellectual System of the Universe; Immutable Mo- rality; The True Notion of the Lord's Supper }	1688
Edward Pocock		1691
John Tillotson	Sermons	1694
Edward Stillingfleet	{ Irenicum; Rational Account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion }	1699
Simon Patrick		1707

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
William Sherlock {	Discourse of Divine Providence; Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity }	A. D. 1707
William Beveridge	1708
John Mill	1708
George Bull {	Sermons; Apostolic Harmony; Apology for the "Harmony"; Defence of the Nicene Faith . . }	1710
John Norris	1711
William Cave	1713
Edward Fowler	1714
Gilbert Burnet {	Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles }	1715
Robert South	Sermons	1716
Joseph Bingham	Antiquities of the Christian Church	1723
Daniel Whitby {	Discourses on Election, Reprobation, etc. }	1726
Samuel Clarke {	Being and Attributes of God; Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity }	1729
Daniel Waterland	Vindication of Christ's Divinity	1740
<i>2. Scotch Presbyterians.</i>		
John Knox	Scotch Confession	1572
Andrew Melville	1622
Alex. Henderson	Solemn League and Covenant .	1646
Samuel Rutherford	The Covenant of Life opened, etc.	1661
Robert Baillie	1662
Thomas Halyburton . . . {	Inquiry into the Principles of Modern Deists; Natural Religion Insufficient }	1712
<i>3. English Presbyterians and Various Classes of Nonconformists.</i>		
Thomas Cartwright	1603
William Twisse {	Claims of the Grace, Power, and Providence of God }	1646
John Arrowsmith {	Westminster Catechisms (assisted by Dr. Tuckney and others)	1659
Richard Baxter {	Saints' Everlasting Rest; Unreasonableness of Infidelity; The Reasons of the Christian Religion; Universal Redemption .	1691
Edmund Calamy	1732
John Robinson	1625
John Goodwin	Redemption Redeemed	1665
Philip Nye	1672
John Milton {	Paradise Lost; Paradise Regained; Of Reformation; Of Prelatical Episcopacy; Treatise on Christian Doctrine . . }	1675
Thomas Goodwin	1679

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
John Owen	{ Doctrine of Justification by Faith; A Display of Arminianism; The Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance }	A. D. 1683
John Howe	{ The Living Temple; Inquiry concerning the Trinity . . . }	1705
Matthew Henry		1714
John Bunyan	{ Confession; Doctrine of Law and Grace Unfolded }	1688
Robert Barclay	{ An Apology for the True Chris- tian Divinity }	1690
George Fox		1691
William Penn	{ The Sandy Foundation Shaken; The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience }	1718

VI. WRITERS CONNECTED WITH NEW ENGLAND.

John Davenport		1641
Thomas Hooker		1647
John Cotton	The Covenant of Grace	1652
Richard Mather		1669
Cotton Mather		1728
Roger Williams	{ The Bloody Tenet of Persecu- tion for Cause of Conscience }	1683

VII. ROMAN CATHOLIC WRITERS.

Thomas Cajetan		1534
Desiderius Erasmus	The Free Will	1536
Albert Pighius	{ On Man's Free Will and Divine Grace, against Luther, Calvin, and others }	1542
Joh. Eck		1543
Joh. Cochläus		1552
Melchior Canus		1560
Juan Maldonat		1583
Carlo Borromeo		1584
Alphonso Salmeron		1585
Petrus Canisius	Summary of Christian Doctrine	1597
Louis Molina	{ On the Concord of the Free Will with the Gifts of Grace . . . }	1601
Gregory of Valencia	Analysis of the Catholic Faith . . .	1603
Gabriel Vasquez		1604
Francisco Suarez	{ Metaphysical Disputations; On the Concursus of God; On God's Knowledge of Future Contingencies, etc. }	1617
Francis Coster		1619
Robert Bellarmin	{ Disputations on the Controversies of the Christian Faith against the Heretics of this Age . . . }	1621
Francis de Sales		1622

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Martin Becanus	A. D. 1624
Adam Tanner	1632
Dionysius Petavius	Theological Dogmas	1652
Laurent Forer	1659
Blaise Pascal	{ Provincial Letters; Thoughts on } Religion	1662
John Bona	1674
Pierre Nicole	Theological and Moral Instructions	1685
Antoine Arnauld	{ The New Heresy (against Jesu- } its); The Perpetuity of the } Faith of the Catholic Church } respecting the Eucharist . . }	1694
Louis de Thomassin	Theological Dogmas	1695
Jacques B. Bossuet	{ Exposition of the Doctrine of the } Catholic Church; History of } the Variations of Protestant- } ism; Defence of the Declara- } tion of the French Clergy on } Ecclesiastical Power }	1704
J. B. du Hamel	1706
Richard Simon	{ Critical History of the Old Tes- } tament	1712
Francis S. de la M. Fénelon } Pasquier Quesnel	{ Explanation of the Maxims of the } Saints on the Inner Life . . }	1715
Natalis Alexander	Moral Reflections	1719
	1724

In Luther and Melancthon the Lutheran Church had a double source of theology. While these two master teachers agreed at the initial stage of the Reformation, they came ultimately to represent quite different dogmatic tendencies. Melancthon in course of time modified his position on the absolute working of divine grace, and showed an inclination toward Calvinistic views of the Eucharist and of Christology, as opposed to Luther's tenets on these subjects. That this drift of the younger theologian was not allowed to rupture the friendship between him and his powerful associate is probably to be taken rather as an evidence of the strength of that friendship, than of any essential change of view in Luther's mind. It is possible, however, that in his later years he may have been less vehemently attached to some of his most radical theories than at an earlier stage. In the Confessions, greater tribute, on the whole, was paid to

Luther's views than to those of Melanchthon; but the latter left their impress, and remained as a permanent factor in the theology of the Lutheran Church. Indeed, as respects the subject of predestination, the teaching of Melanchthon was destined to receive by far the wider patronage.

Among remaining Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth century, none can claim a higher rank than Martin Chemnitz, a broad-minded theologian, and a disciple in some respects of Melanchthon. An influential position was also held by John Brenz, Jacob Andreä, and Ægidius Hunnius.

The seventeenth century was the great era of Lutheran dogmatism. Many ponderous works, rivalling in the multitude of their distinctions the elaborate productions of the mediæval scholastics, were sent forth. The first place among the Lutheran scholastics of this century is to be given to John Gerhard. While disposed to follow the lines of Lutheran orthodoxy, he followed them as a man of great learning and mental grasp. The most distinguished representative of the more liberal spirit in theology in the same era was George Calixtus. The second place in the same general class is to be assigned to John Musæus. Dorner speaks of him as, next to Calixtus and Gerhard, the greatest theologian of the century. As exponents of the dogmatism and controversial zeal of the times a prominent place belongs to John Quenstedt and Abraham Calov.

The Reformed theology likewise had a double source. Zwingli and Calvin, with all their points of doctrinal affinity, differed to a noticeable degree. Zwingli, a man of keen judgment, with little appreciation of the mystical, was disposed to answer the problems of theology in accordance with the dictates of the practical reason. Calvin, a man of logical temper and speculative faculty, and less remote than Zwingli from mysticism, was inclined to solve theological problems according to the demands of certain fundamental conceptions of God's nature and of the unquestionable authority of His Word. Zwingli's system appears, on the

whole, the more moderate. His theory of original sin was milder than that of Calvin, his doctrine of the sacraments less mystical, his teaching on predestination more liberal as respects the scope of the divine choice unto eternal life, though quite as radical as respects the unconditional character of that choice. The great Confessions of the Reformed Church reflect the Calvinian rather than the Zwinglian type of doctrine. But the latter was destined to a wide patronage. Affinity with several of its distinct features may be seen, not only in Arminianism, but in some of the later developments of communions that primarily adhered quite strictly to the Calvinistic type. An effectual means of perpetuating Calvin's influence was embodied in his famous Institutes. This is no doubt a great work, and, despite some extreme phases, may justly entitle Calvin to be called the ablest apologist of the Reformation which the sixteenth century produced.

Among the theologians who followed Zwingli and Calvin as teachers of the Swiss churches, a foremost place belongs to Henry Bullinger, Theodore Beza, Francis Turretin, and John H. Heidegger.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century Holland appears as the most distinguished seat of theological literature in the Reformed Church. The records of her universities present, for this era, a long list of theologians, from which, however, it is difficult to specify names, since many appear as of about equal reputation. Gomar and Voëtius are noted as representatives of a stringent dogmatism, the one against Arminianism, and the other against Cartesianism. Vossius and Vitringa are in high repute as accomplished scholars. Coccejus is remembered as a distinguished founder of the "federal theology." He marked also an era by fostering the Biblical method of theology, as opposed to the scholastic.

After the founder, the most important exponents of Arminianism as a whole were Episcopius, Curcellæus,

and Limborch. These three represent substantially the same system of thought. Grotius, commonly reputed to have been the broadest scholar of the age, made important contributions to Christian apology and soteriology.

A particular controversy, rather than their general importance in theology, gave prominence to such French Protestants as Du Moulin, Amyraut, and Placæus. John Cameron, a forerunner of Amyraut, is given in the table among Continental theologians; for, though a Scotchman by birth, he appears in history as a teacher in France.

After Cranmer, Bishop Jewell and Richard Hooker deserve special mention among the writers of the English Church in the sixteenth century. In the next century an important place was held in the English (or the Irish) Establishment by Archbishop Usher, Bishop Joseph Hall, Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and Bishop George Bull. The talent of Hall and Taylor was indeed more literary than dogmatic, but a measure of doctrinal import pertains to their works. In the same century we have, as distinguished representatives of the broader and more rational spirit in the Church, besides some of the Cambridge Platonists, Chillingworth, John Hales of Eton, Stillingfleet, and Tillotson. Among those who figured in the closing years of the seventeenth century and the first part of the eighteenth, special mention may be made of Sherlock, Burnet, South, and Clarke. Waterland as a writer falls mainly within the bounds of the next period.

A glance at the table will supply the list of the more distinguished representatives of Scotch Presbyterianism. In England the essentials of Presbyterianism were stoutly championed as early as the reign of Elizabeth by Thomas Cartwright. The Westminster divines, with William Twisse at their head, were its stanch representatives at the middle of the seventeenth century. Richard Baxter, a voluminous writer of controversial theology, as well as a distinguished author of practical treatises, can hardly be identified with

any one party. He held a position analogous in some respects to that of Amyraut in France, seeking, without definitely breaking with Calvinism, to soften as much as possible its theoretical asperities. The Independents supplied such able writers as John Owen and John Howe; and we might also add the no less able John Goodwin, if it were proper to regard a man of such independent mind as representing anybody but himself. He occupied a singular position among the sectaries of his age, in resolutely and elaborately assailing the Calvinistic doctrines of unconditional predestination and a limited atonement.

Among Roman Catholic dogmatists of the period, Bellarmine claims the first place. A high reputation was also won by Petavius through his elaborate work, combining history and dogma. Suarez acquired considerable fame as a metaphysician. Bossuet was a powerful writer and an effective apologist, but not in the fullest sense a representative dogmatist of his Church.

4. PARTIES AND CONTROVERSIES WITHIN THE LARGER COMMUNIONS. — Lutheranism very soon became a battle-field of contending factions. Some of the strifes that arose originated in the partisan zeal and mutual jealousies of the disciples of Luther and Melancthon respectively. As in the apostolic era, the friendship and general harmony between Peter and Paul could not prevent their disciples from engaging in disputes and contentions, so the close bond between the two Reformers failed to bind their followers into unity of spirit. Admiration for Luther, divorced from his largeness of heart, led not a few to accept him as an oracle, and to denounce at once anything which appeared to disagree with his teaching. Naturally such zealots were poor interpreters even of their own oracle, and sometimes ran into extravagance by not properly qualifying one phase of his teaching by reference to another. Thus abundant material for strife was prepared. Further on, after the Church had settled down upon its

formulas and was bound with the chains of a lifeless orthodoxy, a new source of strife arose from the efforts of more generous spirits to break these chains, and to gain an adequate attention to the demands of practical piety.

The first controversy which falls under our notice is that which sprang from the Antinomian doctrine of John Agricola. Neglecting one part of Luther's teaching, Agricola pushed the contrast between the Law and the Gospel to an extreme, and declared that the former belongs to the external order and is in the province of the magistrate, — that the preacher has nothing to do with it, and should not attempt to make it a means of spiritual nurture. Luther himself took part in refuting Agricola.

Agricola was incited to a declaration of his views by some statements of Melanchthon which seemed to concede too much to good works. A kindred cause gave rise at a later date to a kindred declaration. Melanchthon had spoken of works as necessary, not meaning thereby to inculcate any trust in the merit of works, but to emphasize the idea that justifying faith must be an active faith. One of his disciples, George Major, going a little further in the same direction, declared (1552) that works are necessary to *salvation*, or, in other words, to the *continuance of the justification* which is indeed in the first place received by simple faith. To the zealous Lutherans this seemed a radical denial of the Gospel, and one of them, Nicolas Armsdorf, even went so far in his opposition as to indulge the expression that good works are dangerous to salvation. The controversy upon this point raged for a score of years or more.

The "synergistic" and the "crypto-Calvinistic" controversies (in the third quarter of the century) sprang directly from antagonism to Melanchthon's type of doctrine. The former term is indicative of the view, advocated by Major, Crell, Strigel, and other disciples of Melanchthon, that there resides in man a certain power of co-operating with or resisting the offered grace of God. Of course, all zeal-

ous champions of Luther's teaching challenged this theory. The term crypto-Calvinists was reproachfully applied to the party of Melanchthon on account of their leaning to the Calvinistic theory of the eucharist. In the Reformation era generally difference of view on the eucharist was ready fuel for strife, and the present instance was no exception. Polemic zeal was kindled to a flame. Such weapons of orthodoxy as the prison and exile were freely used. One distinguished crypto-Calvinist, Chancellor Crell, was brought to the executioner's block, ostensibly, indeed, for political offences, but really in satisfaction of controversial rancor.

The discussion of the eucharist naturally led into the field of Christology, inasmuch as Luther had supported his doctrine of the eucharist by predicating the ubiquity of Christ's body. From the consideration of the single property of ubiquity, an advance was naturally made to the question of the communication of divine properties generally to the human nature. It then remained to reconcile the supposition of such communication with the facts of Christ's humiliation, earthly life, and subsequent glorification. Various conclusions were reached by different parties. Some, following Melanchthon, denied the theory of communication; others asserted it in the most radical terms; others still labored to construct an intermediate theory. The Formula of Concord which attempted to settle this, as well as the other matters which had been in dispute, failed of its purpose. The controversy continued into the next century, and indeed did not fully lose its momentum until it had impinged against the horrors of the Thirty Years' War.

Other Lutheran controversies of the sixteenth century need here but a bare mention. Some agitation was caused by the theory of Andrew Osiander, that justification is not simply a forensic act, but an actual impartation of righteousness by an infusion of the divine nature of Christ. On this subject there was little division into parties, Osiander's view being assailed by theologians generally. Scarcely

more assent was commanded by the theory which Matthias Flacius Illyricus embodied in the strange assertion that original sin is the very substance of the fallen man.

The two great controversies inaugurated in the Lutheran Church in the seventeenth century were in consequence of reactions against the rigid and unspiritual temper of the age. The first arose in connection with the attempt of George Calixtus looking toward a union of the different Christian communions on the basis of a common allegiance to the great leading truths of Christianity. Naturally his well-meaning liberality only stirred to a fiercer zeal the self-confident and uncompromising spirit of dogmatism which it opposed. The second controversy sprang from the reformatory movement inaugurated by Spener in the last half of the seventeenth century, and known as Pietism. This movement was of a practical rather than of a theological cast. It made a vigorous protest against resting in mere dogmatical distinctions. Its aim was not so much to change the dogmas, as to transform the lives of the people. It wished to add practice and experience to theory, and to lead men to realize the gracious power of God in their hearts. At first it was very generally reprobated, and not a few theologians regarded its theory of the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit as savoring of wild-fire and excess of enthusiasm. But Pietism was effectively championed and commanded quite a wide influence, especially in the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

Reference should be made to another party in the Lutheran Church, if party it can be called, namely, the mystics. Here belong Caspar Schwenkfeld, Sebastian Frank, Valentine Weigel, and Jacob Boehme, the first two being contemporaries of Luther and Melancthon, the third dying in 1588, and the last in 1624. They were characterized in common by the disposition to rank the inner spirit above the letter of revelation. Schwenkfeld was perhaps the least given to speculative extravagance. His followers

assumed the status of a distinct sect. Frank and Weigel did not stop much short of pantheism. Boehme revelled in visions of divine mysteries, but was far from fulfilling the office of a revelator to the uninitiated. While his numerous writings contain not a few gems of philosophic thought, they contain much that is unintelligible, if not absurd.

In the Reformed Church the more important controversies, like the Arminian in Holland, and the Puritan in England, gave rise to separate communions, and so have already been sufficiently treated for our purpose, under the first topic of the present section. We notice here, therefore, simply the fact that the attempt of the French school of theologians, represented by Amyraut and Placæus, to modify some points of Calvinism, gave rise to quite an agitation, and that one of the main products of the opposition which it called forth was the Helvetic Consensus Formula. This confession was designed to uphold the strict Calvinistic faith, but was not long in force.

Mysticism did not find a very congenial soil in the Reformed Church, and appears there largely as an exotic. The English mystics of the latter part of the seventeenth century, John Pordage and his associates, Thomas Bromley and Jane Leade, drew much of their inspiration from Jacob Boehme, and like him claimed to receive light upon divine mysteries by means of visions. Jane Leade formed the idea of gathering the illuminated and regenerate in the different churches into societies. Some such societies, under the name of Philadelphians, were instituted, but did not flourish to any great extent. On the Continent, the French enthusiast, Jean de Labadie, and Pierre Poiret, were the most noteworthy Reformed mystics. The disciples of Labadie formed a small sect at Amsterdam. Poiret, the friend of Madame Bourignon, and the systematizer of her views, showed considerable genius for speculation, and wrote extensively. Among other novelties, he gave ex-

pression to some very peculiar notions on the subject of Christology. Labadie died in 1674, Poiret in 1719.

In the Roman Catholic Church the most noteworthy parties which had their origin in this period were the Jesuits and the Jansenists. Both won great distinction in the field of theological literature, the Jesuits supplying the greatest dogmatic writers of the Romish Church, such as Bellarmine and Petavius; and the Jansenists boasting authors of such genius and ability as Pascal and Arnauld, Nicole and Quesnel. The great controversy of the era was the one waged between these two parties, and this was but the culmination (with some additional points) of a strife reaching back to the time of the Trent council. Notwithstanding the decisions of that council, there was a party in the Church that continued to cherish the Augustinian doctrines on the subject of grace. Michael Baius, a teacher in the university of Louvain, gave forth such an undiluted Augustinianism that the Pope was incited, in 1567, to condemn seventy-six of his propositions. He seems, however, to have found sympathizers at his own university, as well as in other quarters of the Netherlands; for we find the theologians of Louvain and Douay, as also the Belgic bishops exhibiting a readiness to censure the Jesuits Less and Hamel, who were charged with having gone counter to Augustine. At this juncture fuel was added to the fire by the book of the Spanish Jesuit Molina, published in 1588, under the title, "*Liberi Arbitrii Concordia cum Gratia donis, Divina Præscientia, Providentia, Prædestinatione, et Reprobatione.*" This work took strong ground in behalf of human freedom and ability. The Dominicans, as being largely inclined to the Thomist or Augustinian theology, at once attacked the book of Molina. The Jesuits, on the other hand, though many of them were not in full sympathy with the views of Molina, felt constrained as a body, by the pride of their order, to defend him. A heated strife ensued. The Pope was appealed to, and took the case

under his consideration, but forbore to render a positive decision. In 1640, a new turn was given to the controversy, and the defence of Augustinianism passed into the hands of a new set of champions. The occasion was the publication of the "Augustinus" of Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres in the Netherlands. The Jesuits at once assailed this work, and were successful in eliciting a papal condemnation of five of its propositions. On the other hand, zealous friends of Augustinianism undertook its defence. At the same time, resorting to offensive measures, they vigorously attacked the Jesuitical casuistry. As respects outward fortunes, the Jesuits were finally the victorious party, and they were able also to point to the bull *Unigenitus* as an authoritative verdict of the head of the Church decidedly in their favor. The champions of Augustinian doctrines in this struggle, as defenders of the work of Jansenius, were called Jansenists. Their characteristic teachings exhibit, no doubt, a measure of affinity with Protestant standards. In their doctrines of human inability and divine sovereignty, they approached Protestantism of the Calvinistic type. In their opposition to a formal righteousness, in their emphasis upon a proper inner state as a condition of sacramental benefits, and in their stress upon the reading of the Scriptures, they approached Protestantism in general. But they were themselves utterly unwilling to own any affiliation with the Church of the Reformation. They wearied themselves to make out distinctions between their doctrines of grace and those of Calvinism. They hated Protestantism just about as intensely as they did Jesuitism. And in this they were not altogether inconsistent; for while in some respects they approximated to the teachings of the Reformation, they still held views about the outward unity of the Church, and many points in the list of Romish dogmas, utterly alien to the spirit of Protestantism.

A glance at the different phases of this protracted con-

roversy, to say nothing about minor contentions, such as that between the Dominicans and the Franciscans over the immaculate conception of the Virgin, between Gallicans and Ultramontanes respecting papal prerogatives, and between mystics and anti-mystics, cannot fail to convey the impression that Roman Catholicism in this period, with its one Church, was after all not much more homogeneous than Protestantism with its numerous communions.

Mysticism, of which there was a plentiful outcropping in this period, was in part persecuted and in part extolled and canonized by the Romish Church, — persecuted in Molinos, Madame Guion, and Fénelon, extolled in John Bona, and canonized in Carlo Borromeo, Theresa, and Francis de Sales. The distinction may not have been wholly arbitrary. But certainly, apart from adventitious circumstances that worked to his prejudice, there is little reason why Fénelon should not have been approved by the Church that raised Theresa or Francis de Sales to saintship. The recent condemnation of Molinos, on the score of his pronounced quietism, had caused a suspicious attitude toward mysticism. Madame Guion, as holding views kindred with those of Molinos, had been challenged. Fénelon thought her misunderstood and wronged, and undertook her defence. This brought against himself a combination headed by Bossuet. Fénelon was obliged to succumb, and to recant his book on the *Maxims of the Saints*. But though he lost his cause in this respect, he won it in a more extended sense. As Herder has remarked, "His Church indeed canonized him not, but humanity has."

SECTION III. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. POINTS IN CONTROVERSY BETWEEN ROMANISTS AND PROTESTANTS. — The main points on which Romanism and Protestantism stood in definite contrast with each other

concerned the canon, the standard Biblical text, the place of tradition, the interpretation and use of the Scriptures, and the grounds on which their authority is acknowledged. With respect to the subject of inspiration they were not strictly opposed, and some diversity of view appeared within the bounds of each.

Although quite a number of the mediæval writers had discriminated against the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, and a writer as recent and prominent as Cajetan had expressly decided against admitting them to the canon, the council of Trent found little difficulty in uniting upon the decree to place them without distinction in the list of canonical books. The suggestion of a double list, in which the books that had never been challenged should be ranked first, though favored by some, was unpalatable to the majority. (See Gerhard's quotations from Cajetan and others, *Locus I.* §§ 89-95; Sarpi, *History of the Council of Trent*, Book II., translated by Nathanael Brent.) The result was that the standard Old Testament of the Romish Church contains, besides the Hebrew canon proper, Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch (including the Epistle of Jeremiah), the two Books of Maccabees, and additions to Esther and Daniel.

The anathema was declared against any who should not receive the full list of books (the apocryphal included), as contained in "the old Latin vulgate edition," and this edition was decreed to be authentic in the following terms: "The sacred and holy synod ordains and declares, that the said old and vulgate edition, which, by the lengthened usage of so many ages, has been approved of in the Church, be, in public lectures, disputations, sermons, and expositions, held as authentic; and that no one is to dare or presume to reject it under any pretext whatever." (Session IV.) This decree, according to Sarpi, commanded a very general assent, though a few voices were raised in favor of the idea that no translation ought to be regarded as by any means

on an equality with the original. The authentic character assigned to the Vulgate is not understood, says Bellarmin, to mean that it is free from all mistakes, but only from serious errors, or such as affect faith and morals. Among excuses for preferring it to the original, he alleges that the extant manuscripts of the original are not altogether trustworthy, and that the Latin Church, as it was more orthodox than the Greek, may be presumed to have been more careful than the latter to guard its copies of the Scriptures from corruption. (*De Verbo Dei*, Lib. II. cap. 11.)

The language of the council of Trent implies that the Church is in possession of traditions which are of equal authority with the Scriptures, and that these traditions had their primary source in oral teachings of the apostles, which they received from Christ or the Holy Spirit. After a reference to such traditions, the decree reads as follows: "The synod receives, and venerates with an equal affection of piety and reverence, all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament, as also the said traditions, as well those appertaining to faith as to morals, as having been dictated, either by Christ's own word of mouth, or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession." Bellarmin distinguishes three classes of traditions, the divine, the apostolic, and the ecclesiastical. The first and second of these, the one resting on the sayings of Christ, and the other on those of the apostles, are declared by him to have the same force as the Gospels and Epistles. (*De Verbo Dei*, Lib. IV. cap. 2.) In harmony with the council of Trent, Bellarmin teaches that in matters of faith an authoritative tradition cannot have its primary source short of the apostles. From this it would seem to follow that the historical must be the one valid test of tradition. But that is by no means the position taken by Bellarmin. He gives indeed a place to historical investigation in his total list of tests; but he allows other grounds of conclusion to be decisive apart from this. "When the Universal

Church," he says, "embraces anything as a dogma of the faith, which is not found in the Divine Word, it is necessary to say that it is derived from apostolic tradition. The reason of this is the following. Inasmuch as the Universal Church cannot err, since it is the pillar and foundation of the truth, certainly what the Church believes to be of the faith is without doubt of the faith; but nothing is of the faith except that which God has revealed through apostles or prophets, or which is evidently deduced from those sources." (Ibid., cap. 9.) Again he remarks: "When the Universal Church holds to anything which no one but God was able to ordain, which, nevertheless, is nowhere found in written form, it is necessary to say that it was handed down from Christ and his apostles." (Ibid.) Now Bellarmin elsewhere defines the Church in terms which make it identical with the papal communion. Practically, therefore, on his principles, the authority of tradition is the authority of the papal communion of the present; in other words, the authority of the pope, or at most of the pope and the council. In thus throwing the main stress upon the infallibility and present authority of the Church, Bellarmin was true to the shrewdest instincts of Romanism, and chose the securest pathway for escaping the inconveniences of history. Bossuet, with less arbitrariness, but also with less caution, staked the cause of his Church to a larger degree upon historical proofs. "The Catholic Church," he says, "so far from endeavoring to tyrannize over the belief of her members, on the contrary has employed every possible expedient to bind herself, and to deprive herself of the means of introducing innovations. For these ends, not only does she submit to the Sacred Scriptures; but in order to stay or forever banish any arbitrary interpretations,—which cause sometimes the thoughts of men to pass for Scripture,—she ties herself, moreover, to interpret, and understand, whatsoever belongs to faith and morals, according to the interpretation and sense of the holy fathers.

She solemnly professes, that, from the interpretations of these enlightened personages she will on no occasion deviate. She declares in all her councils, as well as in all her professions and instruments of faith, that she does not receive any article of belief which is not exactly conformable to the tradition of each and every preceding century." (Exposition of the Doctrines of the Catholic Church.)

In conformity with these sentiments, Bossuet was much exercised over the statements of Simon, that Augustine in his doctrines of grace was an innovator, and drew the Church of the Occident away from its primitive standpoint upon this subject. Such teaching, he declared (in his *Défense de la Tradition*), was in no way to be reconciled with the integrity of tradition and the doctrinal authority of the Church, — a hazardous ground for an apologist of Romanism to stand upon, for the history of doctrine makes nothing clearer than that Augustine in some of the distinctive points of his teaching went counter, not merely to the great body of preceding Catholic writers, but to every one of them who passed any definite verdict on the same points, and, moreover, that in his new departure he was followed to a very considerable extent by the Latin Church. A safer course would have been to put dogmatic authority in the foreground, and leave history, as best it might, to adjust itself thereto, after the prescription, for example, of Pedro de Soto. "It is an infallible and catholic rule," says this writer, "that whatever things the Roman Church believes, holds, and maintains, that are not contained in the Scriptures, were handed down from the apostles; likewise, that all those observances whose beginning or origin is unknown or cannot be discovered, were beyond all doubt handed down from the apostles." (Quoted by Chemnitz, *Examen Decretorum Concilii Tridentini*.)

The decrees of Trent declare that it belongs to the Church "to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures," and forbid any one to make interpretations

not agreeable to her mind, even though there should be no design of publishing such interpretations. The organ of the Church, as an infallible interpreter, was understood to be either the council or the pope, or both together. In proving that there is such an infallible organ in the Church, Romanist theologians were wont to emphasize the practical need of such, which arises from the obscurity of the Scriptures.

The unrestricted reading of the Scriptures by the laity was regarded by Romish authorities as utterly inexpedient and dangerous. Translations of the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue were placed by Pius IV. in the prohibited list, and were allowed to be read only under certain limitations; only by those who, on the recommendation of the parish priest, should obtain a written permit from bishop or inquisitor. Some Romish writers even went so far as to liken the placing of the Scriptures in the hands of the laity to giving that which is holy unto the dogs and casting pearls before swine. (Gerhard, *Locus I.* § 492.)

Manifestly the whole tendency of Roman Catholic teaching on this subject was to overshadow the authority of Scripture by the authority of the Church; and to a very conspicuous extent its tendency was to make tradition itself to retreat into the background before church authority, or the fiat of the existing ecclesiastical officary. Indeed, in more than one instance it was explicitly declared that the authority of Scripture rests upon the authority of the Church. The Church, it was taught, sits in judgment upon books claiming to be Holy Scripture, and renders a final decision upon their claims. In the approbation of the Church the Scripture has its credentials. "All the authority," wrote Pighius, "which the Scriptures now have with us depends necessarily upon the authority of the Church." (Gerhard, *Locus I.* § 37.) And, according to Cornelius Mussus, Bishop of Bitonto, who acted a conspicuous part at the council of Trent, to get at the authorita-

tive verdict of the Church, it is not necessary to consult the whole list of Catholic fathers, for one pope is to be preferred to a thousand Augustines, Jeromes, and Gregories. (Quoted by Newman in his *Via Media*.) This, to be sure, was an extravagant saying, and not fully warranted by the standpoint of the Romish Church at that time; but it was not without its significance.

On some of the topics enumerated the standards of the Greek Church in this period approached the Romish standpoint. The Orthodox Confession maintains that the articles of faith owe their authority in part to the Scriptures, and in part to ecclesiastical tradition and the teachings of the councils and the fathers. The Confession of Dositheus declares: "We believe the authority of the Catholic Church to be no less than that of Holy Scripture." The same confession also pronounces in favor of the canonical character of the Old Testament Apocrypha. But the Greek Church seems not to have regarded itself as fully committed to this position. Certainly the implication of the Russian Catechism is, that the apocryphal do not stand on a full equality with the other books of the Old Testament.

The Protestants were united in rejecting the apocryphal books from the Old Testament. Among the considerations justifying their exclusion, they urged that they were written after the close of the prophetic era in Jewish history, and so presumably without prophetic inspiration; that they were not written in the proper language of the Old Testament, the Hebrew tongue; that their subject matter is without reference to Christ; that they are not quoted as dogmatic authority in the New Testament; that they were not received as canonical by the Jewish Church to which the custody of the Old Testament oracles was committed; that they were rejected in large part by the primitive Christian Church and by many later writers. (Gerhard.) As for the rest, Protestants acknowledged the same list of Scriptural books as Romanists. Luther, to be sure, was

disposed to deny that the Book of Esther in the Old Testament, and the Epistle of James in the New, are worthy of a place in the canon, and for a time at least doubted the authority of the Apocalypse. But Luther's position herein was exceptional. Protestants generally received without hesitation the full Hebrew canon, and while they did not overlook the fact that a few of the less important books of the New Testament could claim but little on the score of external evidences, were not disposed to challenge the canonical character even of these.

It was the common maxim of Protestantism, that, in respect of doctrinal authority, the preference must be given to the Scriptures in the original languages over any translation.

The Romish theory of tradition was denounced as involving the same trespass against the divine oracles as that which the Pharisees had committed against the law of Moses by their unwarranted and perverse traditions. An office indeed was accredited to tradition. The testimony of the early Church was allowed to have a certain weight on account of her proximity to the inspired teachers of the doctrines and institutions of Christianity. As already observed, many of the Anglican divines laid considerable stress upon the writings of the fathers of the first centuries. The same may be said of Calixtus, who thought that a basis of Christian union might be found in the consensus of the Church in its more incorrupt age. The majority, however, had but a moderate regard for patristic authority. Meanwhile, it was the common verdict of Protestant theologians that nothing which cannot be proved from Scripture is strictly binding, and nothing which is in any wise incongruous with Scripture is to receive any hearing at all. Without much qualification, therefore, we may take as representative of Protestantism on this subject the following statement from the Formula of Concord: "We believe, confess, and teach that the only rule and norm, according

to which all dogmas and all doctors ought to be esteemed and judged, is no other than the prophetic and apostolic writings both of the Old and of the New Testament. But other writings, whether of the fathers or of the moderns, with whatever name they come, are in no wise to be equalled to the Holy Scriptures, but are all to be esteemed inferior to them, so that they be not otherwise received than in the rank of witnesses, to show what doctrine was taught after the apostles' times also, and in what parts of the world that more sound doctrine of the prophets and apostles has been preserved."

Protestant writers were quite unanimous in denying that there is any infallible interpreter of Scripture upon earth. To make the Pope the authoritative interpreter, they claimed, was equivalent to putting him in place of the Bible. "If I should pretend," argues Chillingworth, "that I should submit to the laws of the king of England, but should indeed resolve to obey them in that sense which the king of France should put upon them, whatsoever it were, I presume every understanding man would say, that I did indeed obey the king of France, and not the king of England." So obedience goes to the Pope instead of the Scripture, when the Pope is allowed an absolute right of interpretation. The plea that the common man, says the same writer, cannot understand the Scriptures, and so needs to be directed to an infallible guide, points to no effectual escape from difficulties; for the common man can quite as easily gain a rational conviction of the sense of Scripture, as assure himself that this or that claimant of infallibility is really in possession of what he claims. (The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation.) The Scriptures, it was maintained by Protestant theologians generally, are not obscure on the great essentials. In respect of things necessary to salvation they adequately interpret themselves. Not every one, indeed, may be capable of properly understanding them. The gift of interpreta-

tion is not with the unregenerate; but equally it is not bound to power, or position, or numerical majority; it belongs to the truly pious everywhere. (Melancthon, *Loci*.) The common man ought to read the Scriptures, and he can sufficiently understand them for his practical guidance, if he comes to them with a diligent and spiritual frame of mind. Upon this point the statement of the Westminster Confession was fully representative. "All things in Scripture," says the Confession, "are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them." All this evidently amounts to a claim for the right of private interpretation; not that a man is not morally bound to take counsel of the best expositors accessible to him, but that he is not strictly amenable to any human interpreter, not judicially consigned to the direction of any church official or officials. To be sure, it was sometimes asserted, as, for example, in the Thirty-nine Articles, that the Church has authority in controversies of faith. (Art. XX.) But this authority was understood to be fallible, and indeed the Thirty-nine Articles say as much when they declare that general councils may err, and sometimes have erred. Now, evidently a fallible authority is not qualified to dictate to the individual, in absolute terms, his profession of faith. But practically there was a wide-spread disposition in this period to limit the right of private interpretation, as is plain from the history of religious persecutions. A zeal more ardent than considerate did not know how to reconcile one interest with another, and so ran into inconsistencies. The thinking of many, especially in the Calvinistic communions, was tinged by theocratic notions. They conceived that the Bible was meant to give the law to Church and to society, and that it

was dishonoring to God not to put that law in force. In their zeal and haste to bring it into force, they were not over careful to inquire how far they might proceed without trespassing upon the consciences of their neighbors. So they practically assumed the infallibility which they decried in Romanism, in some instances helping themselves with the lame distinction, that the Church, though not infallible itself, may determine infallible points, as an earthen pitcher may contain gold, and precious rubies, and sapphires, although there is no gold in the matter of the pitcher itself, but only clay. (Tulloch, *Rational Theology in England*.) But, as previously intimated, this development is to be regarded as only a passing episode of Protestantism, belonging to its formative stage. And even in this period there were influential parties within the bounds of Protestantism who were consistent advocates of the rights of private interpretation; such as Calixtus and his school in Germany, the Arminians in Holland, and the liberal school in the English Church represented by Chillingworth, Tillotson, Locke, and others.

The Church was allowed by Protestant writers to be a witness, custodian, and herald of the Scriptures, but they denied that Scripture authority depends upon the Church. The Scriptures, as they taught, depend not upon the Church, but on the contrary the Church depends upon the Scriptures. Their authority is intrinsic, and it is above the prerogative of any earthly power to take from it or to add to it in any degree. "The Word of God," said Luther, "is incomparably above the Church." (*De Captiv. Bab. Eccl.*) It was admitted, indeed, that the testimony of the early Church is a factor in the evidence for the canonical character of the received books of the Bible; but this admission was not designed to imply any authority in the early Church over Scripture, but simply to recognize that it had superior facilities for knowing what books were of apostolic origin. In general, much stress was laid

upon the witness of the Spirit in proof of the divine origin and truth of the Scriptural books. Other evidences were indeed given a place. Luther was disposed to judge of books claiming a place in the canon by their possession or lack of Gospel substance, their relation to the central truths of redemption. Many emphasized the majesty of thought and style which the Scriptures exhibit, and the cogency with which they address the conscience. Calvin, for example, says: "The Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things do of their taste. . . . If we read it with pure eyes and sound minds, we shall immediately perceive the majesty of God, which will subdue our audacious contradictions, and compel us to obey Him. . . . Read Demosthenes or Cicero; read Plato, Aristotle, or any others of that class; I grant that you will be attracted, delighted, and enraptured by them in a surprising manner; but if, after reading them, you turn to the perusal of the sacred volume, whether you are willing or unwilling, it will affect you so powerfully, it will so penetrate your heart, and impress itself so strongly on your mind, that, compared with its energetic influence, the beauties of rhetoricians and philosophers will almost entirely disappear." (Inst., I. 7, 8.) Still, no other evidence for the divinity and truth of the Biblical books was so much emphasized, for the major part of the period, as the *testimonium Spiritus*. This, it was held, is the source, not merely of a human persuasion, but of an infallible faith. Several of the confessions distinctly adduce the same as the decisive ground of assurance respecting the sacred canon. "We know these books," says the French Confession, "to be canonical, and the sure rule of our faith, not so much by the common accord and consent of the Church, as by the testimony and inward illumination of the Holy Spirit, which enables us to distinguish them from other ecclesiastical books upon which, however useful, we

cannot found any articles of faith." (Art. IV.) The Belgic Confession contains essentially the same declaration. (Art. V.) The Confession of the Waldenses emphasizes the *testimonium Spiritus*, together with the internal marks of Scripture, or the excellence and sublimity of its style and contents. The Westminster Confession, after stating that the testimony of the Church may properly move us to reverence the Scriptures, and that the heavenliness of their matter, the sublimity of their style, and the harmony of part with part, clearly evince that they are the Word of God, adds this strong declaration: "Yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts." (Chap. I.) Gerhard, and other representative Lutherans, such as Hülsemann, Dannhauer, König, Calov, Quenstedt, and Hollaz, gave a prominent place to the testimony of the Spirit among the attestations of the truth of Scripture. Quenstedt says: "The ultimate reason under which and on account of which with a divine and infallible faith we believe the Word of God to be the Word of God, is the intrinsic power and efficacy itself of the Divine Word and the testimony and sealing of the Holy Spirit speaking in and through the Scripture." Other proofs, he says, of whatever kind, will effect only a human faith and persuasion,—"*fidem tantum humanam et persuasionem efficient.*" (Systema, De Script. Quæst. 9.) Calvin gave the first place to the testimony of the Spirit, and assigned to rational considerations the office of confirming the persuasion wrought by the former.

A current of dissent from this view appeared among the Arminians. Episcopius suggested that one could not be well assured that he had the Holy Spirit, except by his conformity to Scripture already regarded as a divine standard; in other words, that consent to the divinity of the Scriptures, being prior to the guaranty that one has the

witness of the Spirit, cannot be primarily dependent upon that witness. (Inst. Theol., IV. Sect. 1. 5.) Curcellæus likewise regarded the argument from the testimony of the Spirit as decidedly vulnerable; not that he would deny that the agency of the Spirit is an important factor in producing faith in revelation. We may assume, he says, that the Spirit constrains to belief by certain secret suggestions, only we are not to set forth as the ground of belief that definite and indubitable witness which from the nature of the case pertains only to those who already believe. (Relig. Christ. Inst., I. 5.) According to Curcellæus, the principal guaranties of the truth of any writing are two: (1.) convincing evidence that the author was so well informed as to have no need to err on account of ignorance; (2.) convincing evidence that he desired to write the truth. (I. 3. Compare Episcopius, IV. Sect. 1. 2; Limborch, I. 4.) In applying these tests to the Scriptures, naturally much stress was laid upon the evidences of a divine vocation in the writers, such as miracles, prophecy, superhuman excellence of teaching, evident desire to honor God, readiness to record their own or their heroes' faults, willingness to encounter suffering and death for the sake of the truth. Towards the end of the period, there was a manifest tendency in favor of this line of apology, as opposed to laying the principal emphasis upon the *testimonium Spiritus*.

Before leaving this topic, we should notice that there were those among the Protestants who were inclined to assign a subordinate rank to the Scriptures, not indeed in favor of church authority, after the example of the Romanists, but in favor of the revelations of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the individual. This was the case with some of the Anabaptists, as also with the more radical mystics. Here belong also the Quakers. They regarded the Scriptures as the product of inspiration, and so necessarily true; but at the same time they assigned to them a secondary rank. The Spirit, said they, which

gave the Scriptures, is the primary rule; and the revelations of this Spirit in the heart of the believer, though never contradictory to Scriptural teachings, are of immediate authority, and so not subject to the written Word as a standard. This is stated as follows in Barclay's Propositions: "These divine inward revelations, which we make absolutely necessary for the building up of true faith, neither do nor can ever contradict the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or right and sound reason. Yet from hence it will not follow that these divine revelations are to be subjected to the examination, either of the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or of the natural reason of man, as to a more noble and certain rule and touchstone; for this divine revelation and inward illumination is that which is evident and clear of itself, forcing, by its own evidence and clearness, the well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly moving the same thereunto." (Prop. II.)

2. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION.—The strict theory of Scriptural inspiration which the Roman Catholic Church had inherited was met with a measure of dissent in the ranks of the Jesuits. Two members of their society, Hamel and Less, taught that, for a book to be divine and canonical, it is not necessary that all the words, or even all the thoughts, should be inspired; that indeed a canonical book might be purely human as to its authorship, like the Second Book of Maccabees, provided that afterwards it received the divine attestation that it contained nothing untrue. This doctrine was condemned by the theological faculties of Louvain and Douay (in 1588), and also by the Belgic bishops; and some years later the utterances of the Jesuit Jean Adam, implying that the sacred writers had sometimes indulged inexactness of expression, were challenged by the Jansenists. The result of the controversy, according to Alzog, was the gradual adoption of the theory of inspiration which was held by the better ancient expositors.

tors of the Antiochian school, such as Chrysostom. (*Kirchengeschichte*, II. § 350.) Bellarmin's references to the subject imply that, while God specifically dictated to the prophets their message, he gave to the historical writers only an incentive to their task, and such a measure of assistance in its prosecution as was necessary to secure them from error. (*De Verbo Dei*, I. 15.)

As represented in Luther, Protestantism started out with the profoundest reverence for Scripture in general, but at the same time without any very precise and technical theory of inspiration. Luther was quite free, not only in passing judgment respecting the canonical character of Scriptural books, but also in allowing room for a human element in those which he regarded as undoubtedly canonical. He noticed a lack of proper arrangement of the passages in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Hosea. He suggested that the prophets may have mingled some wood, hay, and stubble with the more solid and precious materials of their writings. He granted that some parts of Scripture evince a fuller inspiration than others, and thought it no serious thing to allow that there might be a few mistakes in incidental and unimportant items. (*Köstlin, Luthers Lehre.*)

Luther was not followed by the Lutherans in this freedom of criticism. The tendency among them was toward the theory of the strict verbal inspiration of every part of Scripture. Such was the dominant theory in the seventeenth century. Musæus, to be sure, in one place seemed disposed to question whether inspiration gave the very words of Scripture as well as the subject matter, and Calixtus taught, that, while the leading doctrines were matter of direct revelation, it is not necessary to assume for the remaining parts anything more than a divine assistance. But Calixtus, says Baur, was charged with heresy on this score, and Musæus was constrained to recant his doubts. (*Dogmengeschichte.*) The language of Gerhard is, to say the least, not far from implying verbal inspiration. Of

the Scripture writers he says: "Deservedly we call them amanuenses of God, hands of Christ, and secretaries and notaries of the Holy Spirit, since they neither spoke nor wrote by their will, but actuated, led, impelled, inspired, and guided by the Holy Spirit. They wrote not as men, but as men of God, that is, as servants of God and peculiar organs of the Holy Spirit." (Locus I. § 18.) Gerhard also expressed himself in favor of the theory that the vowel-points were as ancient as the Hebrew Scriptures, and, while they may often have been omitted in private copies, were assuredly inserted in the public and authentic copies. (Ibid., §§ 334-342.) Quenstedt advocated verbal inspiration in such sweeping terms as these: "The Holy Spirit did not merely inspire the prophets and apostles with respect to the matters and opinions contained in the Holy Scriptures, or the sense of the words, which they might express or embellish in their own phraseology and their own words, but also the very words and each and every expression used by the sacred writers the Holy Spirit individually supplied, inspired, and dictated." Again, he remarks: "Prophets and apostles contributed nothing of their own except tongue and pen." Diversity of style he attributes not to the diverse characteristics of the writers as the immediate cause, but to the accommodation of the Spirit, who was pleased to choose a style akin to that of His organ for the time being. Of course, from this standpoint, he allows no errors in Scripture, geographical, chronological, numerical, historical, or of any sort, at least none which are not to be charged to the mistakes of copyists. He scouts also the notion, that in the style of the New Testament there are any barbarisms or solecisms. Finally, he declares that the Divine Word, even before and apart from legitimate use, has an intrinsic power and efficacy for producing spiritual effects, as though there were a standing nexus between it and the power of God. (Systema, De Scrip. Quæst. 3-6, 16.) This last point was controverted by

Rathmann of Danzig; but on this, as well as on the other points mentioned, Quenstedt appears to have been largely representative of the Lutheranism of his day. Calov's theories were in every way as emphatic, both as respects the inspiration and the efficacy of Scripture. (*Systema Locorum Theol.*, Tom. I. cap. 4.) He maintained also that the Scripture, in respect of the divine power dwelling in it, is not a creature. (Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*.) Hollaz likewise accepted the dictation theory in all its length and breadth. (*Examen Theol. Proleg.*) In fine, a mechanical theory of inspiration, and a disposition to predicate a kind of magical virtue in the Scriptures, were rife. By a remarkable judgment upon extravagance, an extreme opposition to one phase of deism was avenged by approximation to another, and the effort to exalt written revelation beyond measure ended in putting the second cause in place of the primary,—in banishing the immediate agency of God in favor of the efficiency of a book.

A similar development occurred in the Reformed Church. Zwingli, on the whole, was less bold in dealing with the Scriptures than Luther; his view of inspiration, however, was not so strict but that he was free to allow some inaccuracies in historical matters. Calvin was less free than Luther to criticise the Biblical writers, and probably also less free than Zwingli. He seems to have been inclined to the theory of verbal inspiration. At any rate, he calls the apostles amanuenses of the Holy Spirit (*Inst.*, IV. 8), and imputes diversities of style to the choice of the Spirit. "I grant," he says, "that the diction of some of the prophets is neat and elegant, and even splendid; so that they are not inferior in eloquence to the heathen writers. And by such examples the Holy Spirit has been pleased to show that He was not deficient in eloquence, though elsewhere He has used a rude and homely style." (*Inst.* I. 8.) Turretin affirms that the sacred writers were so inspired both as

respects the subject matter and the words as to be preserved from all error. (Inst., Locus II. quæst. 4.) Voëtius sets forth the theory of verbal inspiration in these unequivocal terms: "It is to be held that the Holy Spirit in an immediate and extraordinary mode dictated all things which were to be written and were written, both the matters and the words, as well those which the writers were before ignorant of or not able to recall, as those which they knew very well, both the historical or particular, and the dogmatic, universal, theoretical, and practical." (Select. Disput., p. 32.) Besides such statements as the above, we have a significant index of the drift in the Reformed Church, in that there was a marked disposition to assert that the vowel-points belonged to the original Hebrew Scriptures. Such was the position taken by the Buxtorfs, at Basle. It was opposed by Louis Cappel, but was given a confessional rank in the Helvetic Consensus Formula. The language of the Formula is as follows: "The Hebrew version of the Old Testament, which we have received and hold to-day, as handed down by the Jewish Church to whom the oracles of God were formerly committed, is inspired (*θεόπνευστος*) both as respects consonants and as respects vowels (either the points themselves, or at least the force of the points), and both as respects matters and as respects words." (Can. II.)

Some of the Arminians taught a less stringent theory. Limborch, indeed, excuses the sacred writers from all errors. They may not, he says, have given an exact and precise narrative of some things that were of little importance, but even in such cases they have not made any untrue statements. (Theol. Christ., I. 4.) Episcopius, on the other hand, argues that it is not incredible that in some insignificant circumstances the Biblical writers may have expressed themselves inaccurately, and maintains that far less harm can come from openly acknowledging an evident inaccuracy, than from an attempt to cover it up by forced

and artificial explanations. (Inst., IV. Sect. 1. 4.) Grotius taught that small discrepancies, so far from weakening the general authority of Scripture, help rather to confirm it, since they forbid the supposition of artifice. (De Ver. Relig. Christ., Lib. III. § 13.) He indicated also his belief that much of the matter of the Bible, at least in the historical books, being sufficiently known by other means, was not delivered by the dictation of the Holy Spirit. Le Clerc likewise was quite free in his comments, especially on the Old Testament history. The Socinians, on the whole, held quite a strong theory of inspiration, but allowed the possibility of error in unessential points. Speaking of the New Testament, Socinus says, that either it contains no discrepancies, or none which are of any moment. (De Sacrae Scrip. Auctor., Cap. I.)

Among English writers, Baxter is noteworthy for his position on this subject. He did not allow that, as a matter of fact, there are any errors in the Bible, but he maintained that there might be, without any essential compromise of Biblical authority. "If we could not," he says, "free the text from every charge that in smaller things is laid upon it, and if we could not prove the writers infallible, and free from all mistakes in their writings, yet might we be sure that the doctrine of Scripture in the main is God's Word, and that the Christian religion is of God." Again, he remarks: "If we could only prove that the Holy Ghost was given to the penmen of Holy Scripture as an infallible guide to them in the matter, and not to enable them to any excellency above others in the method and words, but therein to leave them to their natural and acquired abilities, this would be no diminution of the credit of their testimony, or of the Christian faith." (Unreasonableness of Infidelity. Compare Gilbert Burnet, Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles.)

It is evident from this review that the claims of criticism were, for the most part, ignored in this period, and that

Scripture was treated almost wholly in the spirit of an unqualified dogmatism. No doubt this method had its advantages for the time being, as the Romish doctrine of infallibility has its advantages. But arbitrary assumption always comes at last to a day of reckoning. Extreme dogmatism is the natural forerunner of extreme license. It can hardly be doubted that the mechanical and untenable theory of Scriptural inspiration, which prevailed in the seventeenth century, helped in the ensuing era of reaction to impel rationalistic criticism toward the extreme of its destructive bias.

3. THE BEGINNINGS OF RADICAL CRITICISM. — English deism in this period rather laid a foundation for radical criticism than engaged in a specific prosecution of the same. The writings of Lord Herbert in the first half of the seventeenth century, of Blount in the latter half of that century, of Toland at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, of Shaftesbury in the early part of the eighteenth century, and the first work of Collins at the same time, were not so much occupied with a searching criticism of the Bible, as with commendations of the natural reason, and with insinuations against the truth and utility of anything in the Bible which might not square with the dictates of the natural reason.

The general theory of Hobbes respecting the prerogatives of the sovereign in matters of religion was degrading to the authority of the Scriptures; he indulged, however, in but little criticism, and in none which formally challenged Biblical infallibility. Moses, he says, did not write the Pentateuch; he wrote, nevertheless, all of it which the Pentateuch itself claims was written by him. (*Leviathan.*)

In Spinoza we have undoubtedly an example of the radical critic. His philosophical naturalism left, of course, no place for assuming a supernatural communication to the sacred writers. He allows in the prophets, indeed, an extraordinary faculty; but he makes it something entirely

within the plane of nature, and seems to view it merely as a peculiar subjective capability of a lively grasp, and an animated representation of religious truth. He remarks that statements like this, “‘To the prophets was given the Spirit of God,’ have no other meaning than that the prophets possessed certain special and extraordinary powers, that they were men more than commonly devout, and that they apprehended and knew the mind and purposes of God.” Again, he says: “The prophets were not gifted with any peculiar superiority and understanding, but only with a certain more lively faculty of imagination than the rest of mankind. . . . The gift of prophecy never made a prophet wiser or more learned than it found him.” (*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.*) Spinoza credits Moses with the authorship of a Book of the Law, the substance of which, with some explanatory additions by Ezra, is contained in Deuteronomy. Speaking of the Pentateuch, and the Books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings, he says: “When we regard the argument and connection of these books severally, we readily gather that they were all written by one and the same person, who had the purpose of compiling a system of Jewish antiquities, from the origin of the nation to the first destruction of the city of Jerusalem. The several books are so connected with one another, that from this alone we discover that they comprise the continuous narrative of a single historian. . . . I am led to suspect that Ezra was the man.” As for the Chronicles, they were perhaps not written before the era of the Maccabees. Daniel wrote the latter part of the book bearing his name, but the final composer or compiler of Daniel, as well as of Ezra, Esther, and Nehemiah (all these being from a single hand), was later than the age of Judas Maccabæus.

A less radical critic than Spinoza, but from his very different relations probably of greater significance in this era was the French Romanist, Richard Simon. Besides laying considerable stress upon the uncertainties of the

existing text of the Bible, Simon held that the original Old Testament documents, at least the Pentateuch and some others, were modified more or less by later editors. At the same time, he maintained that the editors were no less inspired for their work than the original authors, so that the authority of a sacred book in no wise suffers from the plurality of authorship. One ought not, he said, to admit more additions or modifications than there is clear evidence for, and he accused Spinoza of going to excess. But, on the other hand, he argued that to admit such as cannot easily be explained away, and to claim for them no less than for the original portions the sanction of the Divine Author of Scripture, is the most effectual way to offset the destructive criticism of Spinoza. "On this principle," he says, "an easy response will be made to all the false and pernicious consequences which Spinoza has pretended to draw from these changes and additions, to decry the authority of the divine books, as if these amendments were purely human ; whereas, he should have considered that the authors of these changes, having the power to write sacred books, had also the power to amend them. This is why I have made no scruple to bring forward some examples of these changes, and to conclude from them that all the contents of the sacred books were not written by contemporary authors." (*Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament*, Pref.). Various replies were made to Simon, one being by Spanheim ; and his theory was regarded both by Roman Catholics and Protestants as of dangerous tendency. His principal work was condemned and narrowly escaped destruction even to its last copy.

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I. — EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE. — Before the time of Descartes, the theologians of the period followed rather in the wake of Thomas Aquinas and the great body of the scholastics, than in that of Anselm, in their attempts to establish the existence of God. The main dependence was placed upon the various *a posteriori* arguments.

Arguments were drawn both from external nature and from the instinctive beliefs of the human soul. Calvin, among others, placed a strong emphasis upon the latter. "We lay it down," he says, "as a position not to be controverted, that the human mind, even by natural instinct, possesses some sense of a Deity. For that no one might shelter himself under the pretext of ignorance, God hath given to all some apprehension of his existence, the memory of which He frequently and insensibly renews. . . . All have by nature an innate persuasion of the divine existence, a persuasion inseparable from their very constitution." (Inst., I. 3.) What Calvin meant by this innate persuasion, is not altogether apparent. It is most probable, however, that he wished to teach simply that in the reason and conscience of man there are certain data which serve as a fixed ground of belief in the divine existence, and which are particularly effective to induce that belief when the quickening agency of the Divine Spirit is superinduced.

Upon this view of the case, it cannot be said that he anticipated the argument which Descartes based upon the innate idea of God. The statement of Calvin is rather akin to the early patristic idea, that man from his very constitution has an impulse toward the recognition of God; whereas, the force of Descartes's argument depends upon the supposition that the idea of God is such as the natural faculties could not have constructed.

In harmony with the position of Calvin, it was the common view that the light of nature is sufficient of itself to assure men of the divine existence. This view was challenged by Faustus Socinus (*Prælect. Theol.*, Cap. II.), and by others of the Socinians, although not by all, as may be judged from the position taken by Wolzogen. (*Compend. Relig. Christ.*) It was opposed also by Matthias Flacius, among the Lutherans.

Descartes's argument embodies two principal considerations: 1. The idea of God which is in the mind is such as the natural faculties could not construct; God alone adequately explains the presence of the idea of God. 2. The idea of God is such as of necessity to involve His real existence, just as the idea of a triangle involves three angles which together equal two right angles,—essentially the same argument as Anselm's. Descartes also argued that our want of consciousness of any power to conserve our own existence is indicative of a power upon which we are dependent. The first two considerations, however, are those which he most frequently emphasizes. Both, in our view, rest upon untenable assumptions; but as they have held quite an important place in doctrinal history, it is proper to quote from Descartes one or two of the passages in which they are most definitely set forth. "By the nature of God," he says, "I understand a substance infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent, that, the

more attentively I consider them, the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude, from all that I have before said, that God exists: for though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to this, that I myself am a substance, I should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite. And I must not imagine that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of the finite, in the same way that I comprehend repose and darkness by the negation of motion and light: since, on the contrary, I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and therefore that in some way I possess the perception (notion) of the infinite before that of the finite, that is, the perception of God before that of myself, for how could I know that I doubt, desire, or that something is wanting to me, and that I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison of which I knew the deficiencies of my nature. . . . God at my creation implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed upon His work." (Meditation III.) The following passage may serve as an example of Descartes's way of putting the second consideration: "When the mind reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them, that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect, and it observes that in this idea there is contained, not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal. And just as because, for example, the equality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; so, from its perceiving necessary

and eternal existence to be comprised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought to conclude that this all-perfect Being exists." (The Principles of Philosophy, Part I.)

A measure of assent to Descartes's reasoning appears among contemporary and succeeding writers. Coccejus seems to have agreed with the French philosopher in the conclusion, that the simple idea of God involves His real existence; at least, it is difficult to put any other construction upon the following statement of his: "He who denies that God is, says that the best, the most perfect, the necessary substance which effects all things and is in want of nothing, cannot be, and therefore that the necessary is not necessary, the eternal is not eternal." (Sum. Theol., Cap. VIII.) Cudworth thought that this phase of Descartes's argument was not adapted to convince an opponent, but appears for himself to have credited it with a certain force. To the other phase of the Cartesian argument he subscribed in these definite terms: "We affirm that, if there were no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other." (Intellect. System, Chap. V.) John Norris likewise taught that, if there were no God, we could not have the idea of Him, only objecting to making this idea the medium of revealing God to us. "Whereas," he says, "we see all things in God, so we see God in Himself, and not by any idea distinct from Him, or that is the effect of Him, it being impossible that God should be represented by anything less than Himself." (Theory of the Ideal World.) Stillingfleet also took considerable account of the Cartesian arguments. (Rational Account of the Grounds of Natural and Revealed Religion, Bk. III.)

But quite a proportion of writers ignored the reasoning of Descartes, and some assumed toward it a disparaging tone. Locke, of course, on his philosophical principles,

could not attach much value to such a line of reasoning. He allowed that the idea of a perfect Being might have weight with some, but thought it poor policy to leave more conclusive arguments in the background in favor of this. The list of proofs which he himself submitted is the following: (1.) Man is sure of his own existence. (2.) From nothing, nothing can come. (3.) Something must have existed from all eternity, the source of all power, and hence most powerful. (4.) Man knows that he has knowledge and perception. (5.) The knowing cannot come from the unknowing; hence an eternal intelligent power, or God. Upon the last of these points he remarks: "If it be said there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding, I reply, that then it was impossible that there should ever have been any knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge and operating blindly, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones." (Essay, Bk. IV. chap. 10.) Samuel Clarke was as little disposed as Locke to be satisfied with the Cartesian arguments; but he adduced one destined to be criticised quite as severely. Having laid down the position, that an attribute must have a substance in which to inhere, he said that we are compelled to think of space as infinite and always. We have then the attributes of a boundless immensity and duration, and must affirm consequently an infinite and eternal substance. (Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God.) Evidently such an argument is of little significance, for, even if its validity were granted, it would only prove what the blankest infidelity has commonly admitted, namely, that *something* has existed from eternity.

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.—Probably in this period there was less of disposition, on the average, to indulge extreme statements on the impossibility of knowing God, as to His essence, than was manifested in the patris-

tic and the scholastic era. While some strong expressions, like the declaration of Luther, that the essence of God is *plane incognoscibilis*, were indulged, the majority of Protestant theologians were content to emphasize simply the imperfection of our knowledge of the divine nature. Thus Gerhard says: "We indeed know God, but do not comprehend Him, that is, do not know Him perfectly, because He is infinite." (Locus II. § 90. Compare Calov, Tom. II. cap. 3, 4; Hollaz, Pt. I. cap. 1.) In like manner Limborch remarks: "The nature of God, on account of His infinite majesty, cannot be known perfectly by us in this world, in which we see only through a glass darkly." (Theol. Christ., II. 1.) But in general the great body of theologians in this era differed little from Augustine and the scholastics in their conclusions upon the essence and attributes of God. They asserted the simplicity of the divine nature in the same unqualified terms. John Howe, indeed, seems to have been opposed to the scholastic extreme upon this subject, and it was decidedly criticised by Vorstius; but the scholastic view was thoroughly dominant. The larger communions also conformed closely to the standard which had long been acknowledged respecting the eternity and the omnipresence of God, regarding the former as excluding succession, and understanding by the latter superiority to space relations, or the fact of complete presence in every place without limitation to any.

In some of the smaller communions there was a disposition to criticise the current view of God's eternity. Leading Socinian writers, such as Faustus Socinus and Crell, taught that eternity is only endless time, and that with God as well as with man there is a past, a present, and a future. (Socinus, Prælect. Theol., Cap. VIII.; Crell, Lib. de Deo, Cap. XVIII.) Some of the Arminian theologians were inclined to the same position. Arminius, indeed, was true to the traditional theory in ruling out succession (Disput. IV.), and Limborch declared that he was unable to decide posi-

tively either for or against it (Theol. Christ., II. 5); but Episcopius and Curcellæus criticised it in very positive terms (Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 9; Lib. II. cap. 3). To exclude time distinctions, said Curcellæus, is to leave one equally free to affirm, that, in respect of God, the world is yet to be created, and has already been destroyed, and the contrary. No doubt there was some occasion for such strictures in the neglect of the advocates of the old theory to harmonize satisfactorily the idea of God's timelessness with His recognition of the temporal order under which finite things subsist. Curcellæus was disposed to question also the current theory of omnipresence, and suggested that God, instead of being wholly in every place, may be in heaven as to His essence, and everywhere only in respect of power or influence. (Inst., II. 4. Compare Vorstius, Lib. de Deo et Attribut.)

The Socinians were distinguished by their denial of the divine foreknowledge of contingent events. The contingent, said Faustus Socinus, is in its nature unknowable, and consequently to exclude it from the divine foreknowledge is no more derogatory to the knowledge of God, than to exclude from His power that which in the nature of things is impossible is derogatory to His omnipotence. (Prælect. Theol., Cap. VIII. Compare Crell, Lib. de Deo, Cap. XXIV.) This theory was thought to be of special value in reconciling foreknowledge with human freedom. It is noticeable, however, that its defence involved somewhat of a tendency to abridge man's freedom, since it was found difficult to explain the facts of prophecy on this basis, unless it was conceded that God has the prerogative and power to make men act in a specific way. So we find Crell indulging this statement: "Nothing forbids that God in this or that matter should impose upon a man a necessity of willing that which is not base, liberty being left to him in other and the greater number of things."

Among Calvinistic writers, foreknowledge was closely as-

sociated with predestination, or even declared to be founded upon the same. Calvin says that it is not at all necessary to discuss the question whether the mere foreknowledge of God lays necessity upon future events, "since He foresees future events only in consequence of His decree that they should happen." (Inst., Bk. III. chap. 23.) Equivalent language is used by Beza. (Colloq. Mompelg.) Turretin, in explaining how God's foreknowledge is infallible, says, "The reason is, that the foreknowledge of God follows His decree, and as the decree cannot be changed, so neither can His knowledge be subject to mistake." (Inst., Locus III. quæst. 12.) "God foresees from eternity," says Coccejus, "what is to take place, because nothing is to take place without the agency of God. . . . What He sees as hereafter to come to pass, He sees in the decree, by which either He summons events to take place, or by which He has decided to supply to the sinning creature the concursus of the first cause, without which the second is not able to act." (Sum. Theol., Cap. X.) The Arminians, on the other hand, maintained that God does not need to exclude contingency proper, or to rule out alternatives by a positive decree, in order to foreknow an event. The proper opposite of certainty, they said, is uncertainty, and the proper opposite of contingency is necessity. The first two pertain only to the knowing subject, while the last two pertain to the events known. As that which is purely subjective imposes no constraint upon an object, so the certainty of the divine mind in no way interferes with the contingency of an event. Men, indeed, in the use of their own powers, can be entirely certain of a future event only on the ground of necessity, but God's ability to foreknow is not to be judged according to a human standard. He foresees the necessary as coming to pass in a necessary way, and the contingent as occurring contingently. (Curcellæus, II. 6; Limborch, II. 8.) The language of Gerhard implies the same position: "To say that a thing will take place contingently, is to say simply

two things, namely, that it will take place and that it is able not to take place. But these two things are not antagonistic to each other, because, as many things are able to occur which do not occur, so many things occur which are able not to occur; therefore, many things occur contingently. But that which is to occur contingently is truly to occur, and therefore can be foreknown. For everything which is true is capable of being known. Therefore knowledge does not exclude contingency." (Locus II. § 255.) By the contingency of an event Gerhard evidently meant its real contingency, or complete freedom from the category of necessity, and not that species of contingency which some Calvinistic writers affirmed when they described an event as contingent in relation to man, but necessary in relation to God. Cudworth, Clarke, and other eminent Anglican writers, were equally pronounced for the verdict that the divine prescience grasps the contingent in a way which in no wise interferes with its proper contingency. (Intellect. System, Chap. V.; Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God.)

In connection with the topic of foreknowledge, considerable discussion was expended upon the question whether a *scientia media* is to be predicated of God. As the phrase suggests, the question was whether a mean is to be affirmed between the two forms of divine knowledge which the scholastics had specified, namely, the *scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*, or God's knowledge of Himself and of what is possible to His omnipotence, and the *scientia visionis*, or the knowledge of that which is actually to occur by His efficiency or permission. The advocates of the *scientia media* maintained that, besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is in God a knowledge of what free agents would do under certain supposable conditions; that is, a knowledge neither of the simply possible, nor of that which is actually to be, but of that which would be under such and such circumstances. This theory was favored by Mo-

lina, Suarez, and other distinguished Jesuits, as helping to reconcile the divine election with human freedom. The Arminian theologians, Curcellæus and Limborch, also accepted it; at least, they imputed such a knowledge to God as the theory affirmed, though not disposed to quarrel with those who thought that this knowledge might properly be included under the old classification. A number of Lutheran theologians favored the theory. Calvinistic writers were commonly opposed to it, though as sturdy an advocate of predestination as Gomar gave it his sanction. (See list of advocates and opponents as given by Quenstedt, *Systema, De Attributis Divinis*, quæst. 7.)

It was commonly maintained that God wills necessarily whatever pertains properly to Himself, while He wills freely that which relates to creatures. Some who were inclined to extreme views of divine sovereignty asserted the Scotist maxim that the will of God is the absolute rule of right. Luther's words are quite as explicit as those of Scotus. He says: "There is no cause or reason which can be prescribed to the will of God as its rule or measure, since nothing is equal or superior to it, but it itself is the rule of all things. . . . Not indeed because He ought to will or to have willed so, is that which He wills right; but, on the contrary, because He so wills, it is bound to be right." (*De Servo Arbitrio*.) "The will of God," says Calvin, "is the highest rule of justice; so that what He wills must be just, for this very reason, because He wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be, Because He would. But if you go further, and ask why He so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found." (*Inst.*, III. 23.) Calvin, however, notwithstanding this strong statement, suggests after all that he meant not so much that God's will is absolutely the highest rule of right, as that it is one which we cannot transcend, and must regard as binding our own judgment;

for he adds, "We represent not God as lawless, who is a law to Himself." Beza says, "The will of God is the highest rule of justice." (*Ad Castel. Calum. Responsio.*) Equivalent language is used by Zanchi. (*De Natura Dei*, III. 4.) But not all of the Calvinistic writers were satisfied with this representation. Turretin, after propounding the question whether the will of God is the rule of right, says: "Some stand for the affirmative, maintaining that all moral good and evil depend upon the free will of God, and that nothing is good or just except as God wills. Others, on the contrary, stand for the negative, and acknowledge a certain essential goodness and justice in moral actions antecedent to the will of God, so that those things are not good and just because God wills, but God wills them because they are good and just." Turretin declares for the latter opinion, certain explanations being understood. His view is summed up in this sentence: "The will of God can be called and truly is the rule of righteousness extrinsically and in respect to us, but not indeed intrinsically and in respect of God." (*Inst.*, *Locus III. quæst.* 18.) This naturally was the position taken by the Arminians. "God can do," says Arminius, "whatever He wills with His own, but He cannot will to do with His own that which He cannot do of right. For His will is restricted by the limits of justice." (*Discussion with Francis Junius.*) The same view was emphatically asserted by the Cambridge Platonists. Moral distinctions, according to Cudworth, cannot depend upon mere will, any more than mathematical. "Truth is not factitious; it is a thing which cannot be arbitrarily made, but is. The divine will and omnipotence itself hath no imperium upon the divine understanding; for if God understood only by will, He would not understand at all." (*Immutable Morality; Intellectual System.*) "The reasons of things," said Whichcote, "are eternal; they are not subject to any power." (*Sermons.*) The same position is implied by the statement of Baxter,

that there are certain duties which are founded in the relation of our rational nature to the nature of God, and of which we must say that God wills them because they are good, and not that they are good because He wills them. (Unreasonableness of Infidelity, Pref.) Samuel Clarke defines the basis of moral obligation as follows: "The true ground and foundation of all eternal moral obligation is this, that the same reasons which always and necessarily *do* determine the will of God, ought also constantly to determine the will of all subordinate intelligent beings." (Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God.) Clarke and some others of the English theologians just quoted had the theories of Hobbes in mind as they wrote. In harmony with his political maxims, Hobbes enthroned arbitrary power at the centre of the universe. "God in His natural kingdom," he says, "hath a right to rule, and to punish those who break His laws, from His sole irresistible power. . . . Now if God have the right of sovereignty from His power, it is manifest that the obligation of yielding Him obedience lies on men by reason of their weakness." (Philosophical Rudiments.)

The period, on the whole, was distinguished by a strong emphasis upon the justice of God, and to none of the divine attributes was a more prominent place assigned than to this. A large proportion of Protestant theologians, as they held respecting the atonement the strict satisfaction theory, held also that a *justitia vindicatrix* must be predicated of God, or a justice requiring satisfaction as a condition of remission. Such a view was vehemently opposed by the Socinians. It was also rejected by the Arminians. Among Calvinistic divines it was challenged by Twisse and Rutherford, but Turretin, who approved it, speaks of it as a wellnigh universal opinion in his day. (Inst., Locus III. quæst. 19.)

SECTION II.—THE TRINITY.

IN the Lutheran and the Reformed Church generally, as well as in the Roman Catholic, the Augustinian theory of the Trinity, or that expressed in the so-called Athanasian creed, was emphatically asserted. Augustine's leading illustration, however, was not acceptable to all. "That speculation of Augustine," says Calvin, "is far from being solid, that the soul is a mirror of the Trinity, because it contains understanding, will, and memory." (Inst., I. 15.) Bossuet, on the other hand, reproduced essentially the Augustinian illustration. (Sermon sur le Mystère de la Trinité.) The principal creeds, as well as the writings of prominent theologians among the Lutherans and the Reformed, disallowed any inequality between the Divine Persons, and declared them to be, in the full sense, of one substance, power, and eternity. Calvin maintained even that the Son is to be called self-existent, implying thereby that generation applies to the Second Person as Son, but not as God, or that the personal relation, not the essence, is to be viewed as derived. He says: "Whoever asserts that the Son owes His essence to the Father, denies Him to be self-existent. But this is contradicted by the Holy Spirit, who gives Him the name of Jehovah." (Inst., I. 13.) Zanchi, on the other hand, did not hesitate to speak of the Father as the fountain of the entire deity in the Son (*De Uno Vero Deo*, Lib. VIII. cap. 1), and the Irish Articles state that the Father begets the person of the Son by the communication of His whole essence. Petavius strongly reprobated Calvin's position on this point. (Theol. Dogmat., Lib. II. cap. 3.) Evidently, however, the subject, as considered by these writers, involved little else than a question of words. So long as it is allowed that the essence in the Son is eternal, unoriginated, and the same as in the Father, the meaning of the Son's generation must

be essentially the same, whether the term *self-existent* be asserted or disallowed.

Among statements designed to reconcile unity of essence with triple personality, we notice that of Gerhard, which indeed only repeats an idea of Augustine. "In created things," he says, "persons and individuals being multiplied, the essences are multiplied in number, because no created essence is self-existent and infinite; but the divine essence is self-existent and infinite, and therefore, on account of its supreme simplicity, perfection, and infinity, is able to be in several persons." (Locus II. § 98. Compare Turretin, Locus III. quæst. 25.)

As an index of the extent to which dogmatism was carried in the Lutheran Church in the seventeenth century, we notice the fact, that eminent theologians declared that salvation is imperilled not merely by denial, but by ignorance of the doctrine of the Trinity. "The necessity of believing this dogma," said Quenstedt, "is so great that not only it cannot be denied, but even unknown by any one, except at cost of salvation." (Systema, De Trin., Sect. I. Thesis 4.) Gerhard used equivalent terms: "Trinitatis non solum negatio, verum etiam ignoratio est damnabilis." (Locus III. § 2.)

The Arminians, while they held to the doctrine of three Divine Persons in the Godhead, diverged from the current teaching upon the subject by an express emphasis upon the subordination of the Son and the Spirit. Arminius was not specially related to this development, and contented himself with denying, in opposition to Calvin's phraseology, the propriety of attributing self-existence to the Son. But Episcopius, Curcellæus, and Limborch were very pronounced in the opinion that a certain pre-eminence must be assigned to the Father over the Son and the Spirit. Episcopius says: "It ought not to seem strange, if to these three Persons one and the same divine nature is attributed, since the Scriptures so evidently attribute to them those

divine perfections which are proper to the divine nature. But I add, it is certain, from these same Scriptures, that to these three Persons divinity and divine perfections are attributed, not collaterally or co-ordinately, but subordinaately: so that the Father alone has that divine nature and those divine perfections from Himself, or from no other, but the Son and Spirit from the Father; and hence the Father is the fountain and source of all the divinity which is in the Son and Spirit. This subordination is to be diligently regarded, for it is of great utility, because by it not only is the foundation of tritheism removed, which equality of rank almost necessarily draws with it; but also His own glory is preserved in its integrity to the Father." In three respects, as he teaches, a pre-eminence is to be ascribed to the Father, namely, in order, dignity, and power, or right of dominion. He is first in order, as the other Persons are from Him; first in dignity, as it is more honorable to generate than to be generated, to cause to proceed, than to be caused; first in power or prerogative, for He has the right to give the Son and to pour out the Holy Spirit, but they have no such right over Him. (Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 32.)

Several of the Anglican theologians allowed that a certain subordination is to be predicated of the second and third Persons. This was the case with Cudworth, if it be concluded that he leaned to the theory which he ascribed to the early fathers; for he declared that their doctrine plainly involved a subordination. Moreover, like Curcelæus and Le Clerc, he maintained that the fathers taught, not a numerical unity of essence, but only a unity of species, not identity, but sameness in kind. (Intellect. System, Chap. IV.) Cudworth did not explicitly pronounce for this theory, but from the general tenor of his remarks one can hardly escape the impression that he sympathized with it in a measure. Bishop Bull undertook to prove that the early fathers generally conformed to the orthodox standard on the subject of the Trinity, but that standard, in his view,

must allow that the Son, even in respect of His divinity, is in a degree subordinate to the Father, inasmuch as He is from Him. (*Defensio Fidei Nicænæ.*) Pearson took the same ground, teaching that the Son is equal to the Father in respect of essence, but not in respect of the mode of His subsistence. "The Son is equal," he says, "in respect of His nature, the Father greater in reference to the communication of the Godhead. . . . There is no difference or inequality in the nature or essence, because the same is in both; but the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ hath that essence of Himself, from none; Christ hath the same not of Himself, but from Him." (*Exposition of the Creed, Art. II.*)

Samuel Clarke, in his "Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity," (1712,) pushed the aspect of subordination far toward the borders of Arianism. His position, as gathered from this work, might be described as a position of indecision between Origen and Arius. According to Clarke, the Scriptures do not definitely determine whether the Son was made from nothing or is of self-existent substance. On Scriptural ground we are not authorized to say that there was a time when He was not, but also we cannot predicate absolute eternity, and can only say that He was before the world was made, and from the beginning. The Scriptures, moreover, have not revealed to us whether the Son derives His being by a natural necessity, or only by a voluntary act of the Father. They ascribe to Him, however, all divine powers and perfections, except self-existence and independence. Of the Holy Spirit the Scriptures speak in higher terms than of any angel or other creature whatever; yet they make the Spirit subordinate to the Son, and nowhere apply to Him the divine name. (*Abstract by Le Clerc.*) No little agitation was caused by Clarke's treatise. It was commonly regarded as decidedly heterodox, though the author by the aid of explanations managed to satisfy the bishops. Among the replies called forth, that of Daniel Waterland is of the

greatest note. Waterland took the ground that the only subordination of the Son pertains not to nature, but only to order and office. He has all the divine perfections. While He is from the Father, and in that sense is not self-existent, He does possess necessary existence, "and self-existence as distinguished from necessary existence is expressive only of the *order* and *manner* in which the perfections are in the Father, not of any distinct perfection." (Second Vindication.)

The Quakers were opposed to the terms in which the doctrine of the Trinity was commonly set forth, and preferred to abide by Scriptural phraseology. They seem not, however, to have disowned the doctrine itself. Penn, after giving a list of rational arguments against the traditional theory, adds: "Mistake me not; we never have disowned a Father, Word, and Spirit, which are One, but men's inventions." (The Sandy Foundation Shaken.)

Among pronounced opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity on the Continent, Servetus obtained a special prominence by reason of his tragic fate. He was burned at the stake in Geneva, in 1553. His theory of the Son, as finally matured, reflected his pantheistic belief. In Christ, as he taught, the eternal Word, which pre-existed in God as an idea or potency, attained a personal existence. The Son has, therefore, a species of divinity in Him, but as person He dates only from the era of the incarnation. (Dorner.)

As previously indicated, the Socinians were the principal exponents in this period of an organized opposition to Trinitarianism. They maintained that the doctrine of three persons possessing a common essence is contradictory to reason, and attempted also to refute it on the basis of Scripture. In this endeavor they were able to employ the same proof-texts as the Arians had used, but on the whole were under greater pressure in their exegesis, inasmuch as they denied the pre-existence of the Son, which the Arians had allowed. They were able, however, to make a show of

meeting the texts which imply pre-existence. Their dealing with the opening of John's Gospel may serve as an example. The beginning which is here mentioned, according to their exposition, dates back only a few years before the time of writing, and denotes the commencement of the Gospel dispensation, while the creation of all things by the Word denotes the initiation of the new spiritual order.

According to the Socinian theory, Christ as to His real nature is simply man. They affirmed, however, that He must be regarded as distinguished in various ways from all others of the race. 1. He was conceived by the Holy Spirit. 2. The Holy Spirit dwelt in Him in peculiar fullness, and indeed may be said to have been joined "by an indissoluble bond to His human nature." (Racovian Catechism.) 3. He was perfectly holy. 4. He acquired special knowledge, before entering on His public ministry, "by ascending into heaven, where He beheld His Father, and that life of happiness which He was to announce to us; where also He heard from the Father all those things which it would behoove Him to teach." (Ibid.) 5. Since His ascension, all power has been given unto Him, as respects the work of salvation, and the government of the intelligent universe. "By His dominion and supreme authority over all things, He is made to resemble, or, indeed, to equal God. . . . Christ has absolute authority over our bodies and our souls, and rules not only over men, but also over angels, good and bad, and over death and hell." (Ibid.) He is possessed of all the knowledge requisite for such a dominion, being acquainted with the thoughts of all men, as well as their deeds. (Socinus, *Christ. Relig. Brevis. Inst.*; Wolzogen, *Compend. Relig. Christ.*) Indeed, Socinianism reversed the Catholic doctrine that a Divine Person descended to the plane of humanity, and taught that a man ascended to the plane of divinity. In consequence of this exalted position, Christ, as the Socinians were very zealous in affirming, is to be addressed in prayer. We are to bring all

our needs, temporal and spiritual, to Him, and are to worship and adore Him. "We are required," says the Catechism, "to acknowledge the Lord Jesus as one who has divine authority over us, and in that sense as God; we are bound, moreover, to put our trust in Him, and pay Him divine honor." Between His worship, however, and that due to God, there is this difference, that we adore and worship God as the first cause of our salvation, but Christ as the second. We direct this honor to God, moreover, as the ultimate object; but to Christ as the intermediate object. To worship Christ, to this extent, is clearly required by the Scriptures. Hence, "it is easily perceived that they who are disinclined to do this are so far not Christians; although in other respects they confess the name of Christ, and declare that they adhere to His doctrine." In the first edition of the Racovian Catechism a still stronger statement was made. Of those who refuse to invoke and adore Christ, it was declared: "They are no Christians, since indeed they have not Christ; for though in words they dare not deny Him, yet in reality they do." Socinus stigmatized the view of such as "that most infamous and detestable opinion." (Lindsey, Historical View.) This feature of the Socinian system was opposed by Francis David in Transylvania. His protests, however, were ineffectual, and only served to bring against himself the rod of persecution.

The Holy Spirit was defined as "a virtue or energy flowing from God to men and communicated to them." (Catechism.) Socinus speaks of the Spirit as *virtus atque efficacia Dei*, and says that a personal character ought no more to be attributed to it than to other properties or effects of God.

John Biddle, the most noteworthy of the pronounced opponents of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity in England in this period, espoused the Socinian view of the Son. While he affirmed the simple humanity of Christ, he still was able to say: "I believe that there is one chief Son of the most high God, or spiritual, heavenly, and perpetual

Lord and King, set over the Church by God, and second cause of all things pertaining to our salvation, and consequently the intermediate object of our faith and worship; and this Son of the most high God is none but *Jesus Christ*, the second Person of the Holy Trinity." (Confession of Faith.) On the nature of the Holy Spirit, Biddle diverged from the Socinian theory, declaring definitely for the proper personality of the Spirit, and regarding Him as the prince of good angels, much as Satan is the prince of the evil. "I believe," he says, "the Holy Spirit to be the chief of all ministering spirits, peculiarly sent out from Heaven to minister on their behalf that shall inherit salvation." (Letter to Sir Henry Vane. Compare his Twelve Arguments.)

John Milton, who was contemporary with Biddle, held a similar view of the Holy Spirit. He says that the Holy Spirit was produced by an act of free will, probably before the foundations of the world were laid, but later than the Son, to whom He is far inferior. (Treatise on Christian Doctrine.) Milton's view of the Son may be characterized as Arian or Semi-Arian. It has been supposed by many that John Locke and Sir Isaac Newton were also ill-affected toward the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. Their writings contain no positive disavowal of this doctrine, but quite plausible evidence may be quoted on the side of the suspicion that it was not favored by them.

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION.

As in all of the preceding centuries of Christian history, it was the common doctrine that the world was created from nothing. John Milton stood wholly apart from the general current in regarding the world as an efflux from God.

Some of the writers who touched upon the relation of creation to conservation fell little short of the Augustinian idea that the latter is nothing less than the former continued. Maresius is quoted as making the very explicit declaration, "*Conservatio est continuata creatio.*" (A. Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der Evangelisch-Reformirten Kirche*, § 44.)

The theory that the work of creation was consummated in six literal days was thoroughly dominant. (Calvin, *Inst.*, I. 14; Turretin, *Locus V. quæst. 5*; Coccejus, *Sum. Theol.*, cap. 15; Gerhard, *Locus V. § 21*; Quenstedt, *De Creatione*, quæst. 6; Calov, *Tom. III. cap. 2, art. 5, qu. 4*; Episcopius, *Lib. IV. sect. 3, cap. 3*; Curcellæus, *Lib. III. cap. 6*; Limborch, *Lib. II. cap. 21.*) A few Roman Catholic writers, as Cajetan and Serry, followed the view advocated by the Alexandrians, and favored by Augustine in some of his references to the subject, namely, that the creation of all things was effected in a single moment; but Petavius writes that in his day this view was almost universally repudiated. (*Theol. Dogmat., De Sex Dierum Opif.*, *Lib. I. cap. 5.*) Those who favored the hypothesis of six literal days did

not imagine that God needed this amount of time. He wrought, as they conceived, not as was possible to His omnipotence, but as His condescension to man's feeble power to contemplate His work dictated. Some, moreover, suggested that only a single moment of each of the successive days was occupied in creating. Thus Limborch says: "We do not believe that God bestowed six whole days upon creation, but that He created in a moment the work of each day; for God needs no time for accomplishing His works." (Lib. II. cap. 21.)

It is noteworthy that even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the pre-Adamite theory found a place. It was advocated by Giordano Bruno and by the Frenchman, Isaac Peyrère. According to the latter, who wrote about 1655, Adam was the head, indeed, of the Jewish race, but prior to his creation the father of the Gentiles had already begun to people the earth with his descendants.

SECTION II. — ANGELS.

The majority of theologians agreed with the scholastic theory that angels are purely spiritual, wholly destitute of bodies save as they may be assumed temporarily for purposes of manifestation. So decided, among others, Turretin, Gomar, Coccejus, Gerhard, Quenstedt, Calov, Hollaz, Perkins, and Usher. On the other hand, Zanchi and Grotius favored the supposition that angels have a corporeal as well as a spiritual nature. (Quoted by Quenstedt.) Bishop Bull said, "We cannot so certainly and positively tell what kind of spirituality that of angels is, whether it be void of all manner of corporeity, as modern divines generally hold, or joined with some certain corporeity, not of the grosser sort, either fleshly, or airy, or fiery, but most subtle and pure." (Sermon XI., Vol. I.) Roman Catholic theologians, such as Petavius, Bossuet, and Nicole, assumed it to be

an indubitable truth that angels have naturally no bodies. The last declared that this was the common teaching of theologians as being required by the language of the Lateran council, which calls angels spiritual creatures and places them in contrast with the corporeal. (Instructions Theol. et Moral.) That angels are ministers to the heirs of salvation was universally taught, but not all theologians were willing to commit themselves to a positive verdict that a special guardian angel is appointed to each believer.

Some of the early Reformers had a vivid conception of the presence and power of Satanic agency in the world. This was especially true of Luther. The world appeared to him like a battle-field, upon which Satan and his hosts were engaged in eager, yet ineffectual, conflict against the rule of God. Calvin also assigned a wide place to Satanic agency. At the same time, he strongly emphasized the idea that Satan is really, though unwillingly, an instrument in the hands of God. "It arises," he says, "from himself and his wickedness, that he opposes God with all his desires and purposes. This depravity stimulates him to attempt those things which he thinks the most opposed to God. But since God holds him tied and bound with the bridle of His power, he executes only those things which are divinely permitted; and thus, whether he will or not, he obeys his Creator, being constrained to fulfil any service to which He impels him." (Inst., I. 14.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — The Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Reformed communions were alike inclined to follow substantially the Augustinian view of the exalted estate and endowments of Adam in Paradise. The Socinians, on the other hand, affirmed but a moderate superiority in the first man above the average

of the race; and some of the Arminians discredited the idea, that, apart from perfect innocence and integrity of nature, he was distinguished by a high degree of perfection. Thus, Limborch affirms that Adam was evidently possessed of limited knowledge, and, while he does not say, with Socinus, that Adam at the start had no positive righteousness, and was just as free to the evil as to the good, he does maintain that he was not eminently strong in righteousness. We must not, he says, extol overmuch the gifts of Adam, — the extent of his knowledge, the righteousness of his will, the prompt inclination of his affections toward the good, — else we shall make it inconceivable how he could have fallen into sin. (Lib. II. cap. 24. Compare Curcelæus, Lib. III. cap. 14; Jeremy Taylor, Of Original Sin.)

While Romanists and the main body of Protestants agreed in ascribing exalted endowments to the unfallen Adam, they differed on the question whether his moral excellence is to be regarded as concreated and natural, or as supernatural, and added in the way of a special gift. Romish theologians, with few exceptions, took the latter position, and taught the doctrine of the *donum superadditum*. This doctrine is implied by the Trent Catechism, which, after speaking of the creation, by God, of the soul and its powers of free will and reason, says, "Then He added the admirable gift of original righteousness." (Pars I. cap. 2, § 19.) Sentences condemning the opposite view were issued by Pius V. and Gregory XIII. (Möhler, Symbolik.) This *donum superadditum*, while capable in theory of being viewed apart from the unfallen man, was regarded by many Romanists as bestowed at the first moment of man's existence. Such was the view preferred by Bellarmin, and (according to Guericke) the majority of modern theologians of his Church have followed him upon this point. In harmony with this distinction, Romanists were disposed to regard the two words *image* and *likeness* as having a different sense, the first denoting the faculties which per-

tain to man as man, the latter the virtues depending upon the *donum superadditum*. Lutheran and Reformed theologians, on the other hand, regarded the two words as essentially synonymous, and indicative in particular of original righteousness, which they declared was the principal part of the divine image in man. Original righteousness, as they taught, must be regarded as belonging to the divine idea of man, and as characterizing him from the very first. "We affirm," said Luther, "that it was truly natural, and pertained to the nature of Adam, to love God, to believe God, to know God." (In Genes., Cap. III.) "Original righteousness in the first man," writes Gerhard, "was not some supernatural gift, but an internal and concreated perfection of the whole man." (Confess. Cath. Compare Turretin, Locus V. quæst. 11.) The Socinians taught that the divine image in man consisted especially in his dominion over the world, or in the powers of his nature upon which that dominion depends. "It is most evident," says Wolzogen, referring to Gen. i. 26, "that the image of God, which is in man, is placed in the reason, so far as through it he is fitted to rule over the whole earth." (Compend. Relig. Chr.) The same view is found with Curcellæus and Limborch. (Lib. III. cap. 8; Lib. II. cap. 24.)

The question whether man is twofold or threefold in nature seems not to have been discussed to any great extent. It may be gathered, however, that the dichotomist theory was predominant. This theory appears to be assumed in the following language of the Second Helvetic Confession: "We say that man consists of two diverse substances, in one person, the immortal soul, and the mortal body." (Cap. VII.) Quenstedt declares very emphatically for the view that the essential constituents of man are simply the rational soul and the body, and adduces as advocates of the trichotomist theory no writers of greater weight in the period than Paracelsus, Schwenkfeld, Weigel, and the Calvinist J. A. Comenius. (Syst., De Hom., quæst. 2.)

It was the common belief that the soul is incorporeal. Some exception, however, was taken to this view. "The soul of man," says Curcellæus, "is spirit, as are the angels, but not pure spirit, or thoroughly incorporeal, for no created thing can be strictly incorporeal." (Inst., III. 7.) Henry More also asserted that certain corporeal characteristics pertain to the soul, that it has dimensions and a centre of its perceptive faculty, which is, so to speak, its eye. (Immortal. Animæ, Lib. III. cap. 2.)

The Socinians denied the natural immortality of man. By this denial, however, they only meant that the body of the first man was of such a constitution that, apart from special provision graciously made by God, it would have been subject to dissolution. That provision Adam, as they allowed, would have enjoyed, if he had not sinned. Those, therefore, who took issue with them on this point, differed from them in little else than phraseology. The only question was whether the term *natural* should be applied to an exemption from death that was dependent upon conditions which might or might not be continued. The natural immortality of the soul was frequently asserted; but evidently, upon the theory of the divine conservation which was largely current, this doctrine could signify only the unconditional purpose of God endlessly to preserve being to every soul that is once created.

In the sixteenth century, creationism, as opposed to traducianism, was the prevalent doctrine among Protestants and Romanists alike. The same doctrine is also contained in the Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church. (Quæst. XXVIII.) In the seventeenth century the Lutherans generally had come to adopt the traducian theory. Turretin says that in his time the Lutherans held the *ex traduce* theory, while nearly all of the orthodox, that is, the Calvinists, believed in creationism. (Locus V. quæst. 13.) The statement of Gerhard may be taken as representative of the former party. "We leave," he says, "to

the philosophers the inquiry after the mode of propagation, since we have not yet seen it explained in the Scriptures; meanwhile we hold tenaciously the theory of the propagation of souls, nor indeed is this theory to be denied because the mode of the propagation is not clearly revealed." (Locus VIII. § 117. Compare Quenstedt, Syst., De Hom., quæst. 3; Calov, Tom. III. Art. V. cap. 2, qu. 10; Hollaz, Pt. I. cap. 5, qu. 9.) In opposition both to creationism and traducianism, Henry More advocated the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence. (Immortal. Animæ, II. 12.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — We notice here the position taken by the different communions on the following topics: (*a.*) The relation of the divine decrees to the fall. (*b.*) The relation of human freedom to the fall. (*c.*) The nature of original sin in the posterity of Adam. (*d.*) The degree of moral ability in the fallen man.

(1.) *Roman Catholic Theories.* — Roman Catholic theologians generally denied that the fall of Adam took place in accordance with any positive decree of God. They maintained that the divine attitude toward the event was that of bare permission, and threw the responsibility wholly upon the human agent, on the ground that he was in every sense free from necessity in his transgression. To be sure, there was a party in the Romish Church which held views respecting the dependence of the unfallen man that might be regarded as throwing the responsibility for the fall upon God. Thomassin, writing in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, says that the Jacobin fathers (Dominicans) for a hundred years had believed that the grace predeterminant, which infallibly applies the will to the good, is necessary even to angels and to men in a state of innocence in order to the doing of good acts and persevering therein; and he adds, that on this view it seems necessary to assume that Adam fell because a grace was withheld which was indispensable to his perseverance. (Mémoires sur la Grace, I. 1.) But this is rather a logical

inference from the position of the Jacobins, than their own conclusion; and, moreover, this party did not represent the general sentiment of their Church upon this point.

The freedom which Roman Catholic writers attributed to man in his primal disobedience they regarded as including the power of alternative choice, or a power to refuse what is actually chosen, and *vice versa*. Indeed, they embraced this in their general definition of freedom, and taught that it is opposed, not only to compulsion, but also to necessity. There was not, to be sure, strict unanimity upon this point. Petavius says, that in his day a few who professed to be Catholics (*pauci quidem, qui se Catholicos profitentur*) taught that free will does not imply the power of alternative choice, or exemption from necessity, but only exemption from compulsion; that consequently a volition is free, though determined; and, in fine, that to will and to will freely are synonymous terms. (De Sex Dierum Opif., Lib. III. cap. 1.) This view he denounces as repugnant to piety, to the Scriptures, and to church authority, all of which require a power of alternative choice. In like manner Bellarmin says: "That freedom from necessity is altogether requisite to free will, nor is it sufficient that there be freedom from coaction, can be demonstrated from the testimony of Scripture, from the definition of the Church, from the tradition of the fathers, from the light of reason." (De Reparat. Grat., Lib. III. cap. 5.) "It is a certain dogma of the faith," says Suarez, "as we judge, that this freedom consists not merely in the faculty of acting voluntarily, or spontaneously, or with inclination, even if it takes place with the perfect knowledge and observation of reason, but that there is given besides in us and in our human acts that condition of freedom which includes the power of acting and not acting, which by theologians is commonly called dominion over one's own action, or indifference in acting." (Opuscula Theol., p. 2.) Petavius and Bellarmin maintain that their position is

involved in the decrees of the council of Trent. (Session VI. chap. 5.) They claim also that the opposite view was clearly condemned by Pius V. and Gregory XIII., when they passed censure upon such propositions as these: "What comes to pass voluntarily, even if it takes place necessarily, comes to pass freely" (taken from Baius); "Violence alone is antagonistic to the natural freedom of man." The three writers quoted above all belonged, it is true, to the order of the Jesuits, but there is no reason to doubt that on this point they represented by far the broader current of thought in the Romish Church in their age.

The Roman Catholic theology of the period acknowledged two elements in original sin as it pertains to the posterity of Adam. Pighius and Catharinus occupied an exceptional position in allowing but a single element, namely, the imputation of guilt. The language of the council of Trent, while not very explicit upon this subject, implies without doubt that there are two elements in original sin, on the one hand a corruption or destitution of nature, and on the other, guilt. "If any one," says the decree, "asserts that the prevarication of Adam injured himself alone, and not his posterity; and that the holiness and justice received of God, which he lost, he lost for himself alone, and not for us also; or that he, being defiled by the sin of disobedience, has only transfused death and pains of the body into the whole human race, but not sin also, which is the death of the soul,—let him be anathema;—whereas he contradicts the apostle who says, 'By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.'" (Session V.) There is not here, it is true, a specific mention of guilt, but in a subsequent paragraph it is mentioned, the anathema being pronounced against those who deny that "by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted."

The subject being thus left in outline by the council, theologians were not debarred from choosing, as respects details, from the various opinions of the scholastics. Bellarmin was inclined to follow the view advocated by Duns Scotus and some others, that original sin, so far as it pertains to the moral nature of the fallen man, consists simply in the lack of original righteousness, or of the supernatural gift that was bestowed upon Adam. "The state of man," he says, "after the fall of Adam, differs from the state of the same *in puris naturalibus*, no more than the despoiled differs from the naked; nor is human nature worse, if you except original guilt, nor does it labor under greater ignorance and infirmity, than it would labor under being created *in puris naturalibus*. Accordingly, corruption of nature has flowed, not from the lack of any natural gift, nor from the accession of any evil quality, but solely from the loss through the sin of Adam of the supernatural gift." (De Grat. Prim. Hom., Cap. V.) As respects the guilt of original sin, Bellarmin thought it serious enough to debar every infant dying without baptism from all chance of salvation. On the mode in which original sin is propagated, he preferred to follow Thomas Aquinas, who emphasized the idea that the sin of Adam as being the head of the race was the sin of the race. (De Amiss. Grat., Lib. IV. cap. 12.) Nicole suggested that the explanation of the transmission of original sin may be found in a divine regulation that the soul should have certain inclinations answering to the abnormal impressions of the body deranged by the fall. (Instruct. Theol. et Moral.)

It was the dominant teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, that, while the fall left man with certain remains of moral ability, it nevertheless so crippled him as to render him incapable, apart from grace, to make any real advance toward his own recovery. According to the council of Trent, the free will was not extinguished, but it was so weakened and perverted as by itself to be unable to

work effectually in the direction of salvation. In conformity with this position, the third canon on justification declares: "If any one saith, that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without His help, man can believe, hope, live, or be penitent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be bestowed upon him, let him be anathema." Bellarmin, while teaching that a man without grace may, under favorable circumstances, do a work morally good, a work not to be called sinful, maintains at the same time that he cannot do a meritorious work, or a work coming properly under the category of piety. He lays down these three propositions: "First, a man without the special grace of God cannot will or do aught in those things which pertain to piety and salvation. Second, a man by his own powers is not able to dispose himself to grace, or to do anything on account of which divine grace may be conferred upon him. Third, God cannot be loved by a man, even as the Author of nature and imperfectly, without the aid of grace." (*De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.*, Lib. VI. cap. 4.) Bellarmin, it is true, says, "A man, anterior to all grace, has free will, not only to natural and moral works, but also to works of piety and the supernatural" (*Ibid.*, cap. 15); but evidently he means here, whatever may be thought of the propriety of his language, the free will as a faculty, and does not design to deny that there are in fact such hindrances to the action of the faculty, in relation to things spiritual, as grace alone can overcome. "It is a leading maxim of our religion," says Bossuet, "that free will of itself, unaided by grace, and uninfluenced by the Holy Ghost, can do nothing that conducts to the purchase of eternal happiness." (*Exposition.*) "When the Semi-Pelagians," writes Thomassin, "say that man in his own strength can will and accomplish any beginning of good, and on the score of this attract the grace of God, they deceive themselves in many ways." (*Mémoires*, I. 5.) The above quotations may be

regarded as indicating the more general standpoint of the Romish Church. As original righteousness was regarded as a supernatural gift in Adam, so in the fallen man piety proper, or that which commends one to God as deserving of eternal life, was regarded as primarily dependent upon a supernatural bestowment. Prevenient grace was allowed to be its necessary and invariable condition. At the same time it was claimed that natural ability is adequate for the avoidance of particular sins, and for rendering an obedience to the commandments, which, though not positively meritorious, may be classed among works morally good.

But, as previously indicated, the Roman Catholic Church was not a unit upon this subject. There were those who diverged from the more common standpoint by disparaging in strong terms the natural ability of man. Michael Baius, for example, rivalled the most emphatic utterances of Augustine respecting human inability and corruption. "All the works of unbelievers," he said, "are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices. The free will without the assistance of divine grace, avails only for sinning." (Quoted by Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*.) The Jansenists were inclined to similar declarations. According to Jansenius, the natural man, even when resisting sin, acts under a wrong motive, and so opposes sin to sin. "Not only," he says, "has freedom for doing good perished, but even of abstaining from sin." (Augustinus.) "The will," writes Quesnel, "which is not aided by prevenient grace, has no light except for going astray, no ardor except for casting itself headlong, no strength except for wounding itself; it is capable of every evil, and powerless for every good." (*Reflexions Morales*.) On the other hand, there were those, especially among the Jesuits, who adopted substantially the Semi-Pelagian view of man's moral ability. This was the case with Molina, whatever pains he may have taken to disguise the fact. He says: "God and the free

will are related as two partial causes (*duæ causæ partiales*). . . . Man is able by the powers of nature with only the general co-operation of God (*concurso generali*), to assent to supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him, as revealed from God, by an act merely natural. . . . Man is able by the sole natural powers of free will and the general co-operation of God to call forth an absolute act purely natural of supreme love to God, which may in no wise suffice for justification, and in like manner an absolute purpose of pleasing God in all things." (Quoted by Gieseler.) The Molinist theories were largely controverted for the time being; but they were not officially condemned, and finally, in the Bull Unigenitus, obtained the next thing to an official approbation. The animus of that bull was decidedly anti-Augustinian. It condemned such propositions as these: "The grace of Jesus Christ, the efficacious principle of every kind of good, is necessary to every good work, and apart from it, not only does no good work take place, but none can." "In vain, O Lord, thou commandest, if thou dost not give that which thou commandest." "Faith is the primary grace, and the fountain of all others." "Without grace we can love nothing, except to our condemnation." These propositions were condemned as being, if not positively heretical in every instance, at least ill-sounding, scandalous, and akin to heresy. Evidently the moral effect of the Bull Unigenitus was in the direction of committing the Romish Church to a denial of the cardinal points of Augustinianism.

We may sum up on this subject, then, as follows. In the central current of Roman Catholic teaching, the need of prevenient grace was emphasized, but at the same time a wider scope was given to natural ability than was characteristic of the Augustinian theology. In one of the side-currents there was a close approximation to Augustinianism; in another, there was an approximation to Semi-Pelagianism, and to the latter a virtual commendation was

given in the last part of the period by the decisions of the Roman pontiff.

(2.) *Lutheran Theories.* — Luther and Melanchthon both in the earlier part of their theological career gave expression to some opinions which formed no permanent part of Lutheranism. Quite naturally, in the fervency of their protest against the Romish doctrine of merit, they were inclined to an exaggerated stress upon divine sovereignty, and indulged some statements which a maturer consideration might dispose them to modify. Melanchthon openly added the modification, and Luther, if he did not in express terms take away anything from his stronger utterances, did not add anything which forbids the conclusion that they reflect in a measure his native vehemence and love of paradox, as well as his sober convictions.

Neither Luther nor Melanchthon, so far as we are aware, said in so many words that the fall of Adam was positively decreed by God. But both used statements which seem necessarily to involve this conclusion. Luther, in his *De Servo Arbitrio*, affirms a relation between the creature and the Creator which leaves nothing whatever contingent upon human determination. "It is especially necessary and healthful," he says, "for the Christian to be aware that God foreknows nothing contingently, but that, with immutable and eternal and infallible will, He foresees, and proposes, and does all things. By this thunderbolt the free will is thrown down and ground to powder. . . . Immutable and infallible is the will of God which governs our mutable will. . . . Free will is plainly a divine name, nor does it befit anything except the Divine Majesty alone, which is able to do and does all things which it pleases, in heaven and in earth." In short, as a modern Lutheran remarks, "Luther undoubtedly, in this writing, teaches predestination under the veil of a conception of the world which brings down creatures to the rank of selfless objects of the unlimited and absolute power of God." (Kahnis,

Dogmatik.) A statement of Melanchthon, made in 1522, in his comments on the Epistle to the Romans, is scarcely less radical in its implications. "It is certain," he says, "that God does all things not permissively, but effectually (*potenter*), to use Augustine's term, so that the betrayal by Judas and the calling of Paul are equally His own work." But it was not long before Melanchthon retreated from this position. In his *Loci* he teaches that sin is contingent, does not occur necessarily, is abhorrent to the will of God, and flows from the wills of the devil and of men, which were so created as to be able not to sin. (*De Causa Peccati et de Conting.*) The same view was expressed by Chemnitz, and it may be stated as the proper Lutheran theory, that the attitude of God toward the fall was that of simple permission. "God did not," says Gerhard, "effect the fall of man in time, nor did He impel man to fall. Neither, therefore, did God from eternity decree the fall of man. God in time permitted man to fall. Therefore God decreed from eternity to permit or not to prevent the fall of man." (*Locus VI. § 51.*) "Let it therefore remain firmly established that God neither decreed nor willed the fall of the first parents, nor impelled them to sin, nor took pleasure in it." (*Locus IX. § 25.* Compare Hollaz, *Pars II. cap. 3.*)

Luther evidently from the standpoint described above logically could not assign to Adam or to any other creature freedom in any other sense than the possession of the simple power of volition. A freedom from positive determination, a power of alternative choice, appears on his premises to be out of the question. But Lutheran theologians in general asserted that freedom in this latter sense pertained to Adam before his transgression. They gave a place to *formal freedom*. At the same time, however, they were disposed, in their definition of the essence of freedom, or freedom in its ideal stage, to return to the Augustinian notion of *real freedom*, in which the liability to sin is excluded, not indeed by coercion, but by the strength of inward holiness. Thus

Gerhard says: "There is the greatest freedom in God, who nevertheless is not able to will evil. There is greater freedom in good angels than there was in man before the fall, while yet they have been confirmed in the good and are unable not to choose the good. The highest freedom consists in not being able to be miserable." (Locus XI. § 28.)

Lutheran theologians recognized two elements in original sin, namely, corruption of nature, and guilt. Calixtus deviated from the standard teaching in denying the latter. Both elements are implied in the statement of the Augsburg Confession: "All men begotten after the common course of nature are born in sin; that is, without the fear of God, without trust in Him, and with fleshly appetite; and this disease or original fault is truly sin, condemning and bringing eternal death now also upon all that are not born again by baptism and the Holy Spirit." (Art. II.) This statement does not make it clear whether the guilt is to be regarded as coming from the direct imputation of the act of Adam, or from the fact of being born with a corrupted nature; in other words, it does not decide between immediate and mediate imputation. Melancthon indicated a preference for mediate imputation, but at the same time was not strongly opposed to including also the immediate. Having defined original sin as a corruption of nature flowing from the transgression of Adam, he says: "On account of which corruption men are born guilty and children of wrath, that is, condemned by God, unless remission is obtained. If any one wishes to add, that men are born guilty by reason of Adam's fall, I do not object." (Loci, De Peccat. Orig.) Gerhard's statement favors mediate imputation; Quenstedt includes also the immediate, and, according to Baur, it was characteristic of the Lutheran theologians of the seventeenth century to teach the twofold imputation. (Dogmengeschichte.) As previously stated, Lutheran writers in this century held the traducian theory. In their view, one of the prime recommendations of that

theory is the explanation which it affords of the transmission of original sin. (Gerhard, Locus VIII. §§ 116, 128.)

Matthias Flacius has been referred to as teaching the theory that original sin is the very substance of the fallen man. But it is possible that he did not design just the sense which these words naturally convey to us. "His meaning," says Dorner, "is properly only the twofold idea, that holiness belongs to the very nature of man, that is, to his idea essentially and not merely accidentally, and therefore that sin is to be looked upon, not simply as a superficial power, but as one destructive of that ethical nature." (History of Protestant Theology.) The Formula of Concord condemned the phraseology of Flacius, and taught that, while original sin is infixed in the nature, it is to be called in the language of the schools *accidens* rather than *substantia*.

The Lutheran theology strongly emphasized the moral inability of the fallen man. Even Melancthon, while he taught that a man in connection with the action of divine grace may condition his salvation, was very emphatic in denying that apart from grace he can make the least advance toward his own recovery. He held indeed, as is stated in the Augsburg Confession, that the natural man can work out a sort of civil righteousness. But it was understood that this was not a real righteousness in the sight of God, and, in opposition to Roman Catholic writers, he taught that all works done without grace are sins; that is, as proceeding from wrong or defective motives, they cannot be approved by the divine judgment. "This is a false saying," he writes, "and derogatory to Christ, that men do not sin in doing the precepts of God without grace." (Apologia Confessionis.) Luther, it is needless to say, delighted in the use of the strongest terms in describing man's native corruption and helplessness in things spiritual. His essential teaching, however, judging it by its drift rather than by some extravagant sentences, was none other than that con-

tained in the following decisions of the Formula of Concord: "It is our faith, doctrine, and confession, that the understanding and reason of man in spiritual things are wholly blind, and can understand nothing by their proper powers. . . . We believe, teach, and confess, moreover, that the yet unregenerate will of man is not only averse from God, but has become even hostile to God, so that it only wishes and desires those things, and is delighted with them, which are evil and opposite to the divine will. . . . We believe that by how much it is impossible that a dead body should vivify itself and restore corporal life to itself, even so impossible is it that man, who by reason of sin is spiritually dead, should have any faculty of recalling himself into spiritual life." Strong as are these statements, they represented the central current of Lutheranism in that and in the succeeding era. The writings of Gerhard and Quenstedt contain equally emphatic declarations. The former says: "When the image of God was lost through sin, at the same time moreover that power of choosing the good [which was in the unfallen Adam] was lost, and because man was not only despoiled by sin, but also miserably corrupted, therefore in place of such a liberty there succeeded that unbridled impulse to evil, so that after the fall the will in corrupted and unrenewed men is free only to evil things, because such men, while still corrupted and unrenewed, can do nothing except sin." (Locus XI. § 23.)

(3.) *Reformed Theories.* — Among prominent Reformed theologians Zwingli went the farthest in emphasizing the agency of God in connection with the fall. In his treatise on divine providence he seems to assume that it took place in consequence of coercion, as well as of a positive decree. His teaching here, to use the summary given by Dr. Kahnis, is as follows: "God not only foresaw the first sin, but foreordained it, and not only this, but actually brought it to pass through man. God incited the first man to transgress the law. It is for God, who stands above man, no sin when

He makes the angel (Satan), as well as man, a transgressor. 'No law is imposed upon God; therefore He does not sin, while He works that very thing in man which to man is sin, to Himself indeed is not.' God made the first man a transgressor, in order to bring him through unrighteousness to a knowledge of righteousness." (Dogmatik, II. 6.) In thus assuming a causal efficiency in God over the fall, Zwingli occupied an exceptional position; but in assuming a positive decree he was not alone among Reformed theologians. Calvin did the same. Replying to those who taught that God left Adam to a free choice, and simply decreed to treat him according to his deserts, he asks: "If so weak a scheme as this be received, what will become of God's omnipotence, by which He governs all things according to His secret counsel, independent of every person or thing besides?" (Inst., III. 23.) Again he remarks: "It should not be thought absurd to affirm, that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of His will. . . . It is not probable that man procured his destruction by the mere permission, and without any appointment of God; as though God had not determined what He would choose to be the condition of the principal of His creatures." (Ibid.) Beza took the same position, teaching that the fall did not take place by the bare and inactive permission of God (*nuda et otiosa permissione*), "for since He ordained the end, it is also necessary that He should establish the causes leading to that end." (Sum. Tot. Christ., Cap. III.) "They go utterly wide of the truth," says Gomar, "who affirm simply an inactive permission; or, the governing of the result being conceded, exempt the beginning of sin from ordination." (Prov. Dei.) This statement, if not directly applied to the fall in the connection where it occurs, was evidently designed by Gomar to include that event, which indeed in his scheme of doctrine occupies a purely instrumental place in fulfilling an abso-

lute decree. The views of Twisse were identical with those of Gomar on this point. (*Vindiciæ Gratiae*.) Piscator in much the same terms as Calvin scouts the idea that the fall was exempted from the positive decree and dispensation of God. (*Tract. de Grat. Dei*.) There were others, however, among the Reformed theologians who preferred to speak simply of a permissive decree, or a decree to permit the fall. Bullinger appears to have been averse to going beyond this phraseology, and even used language which suggests that the fall in his view was utterly alien to the divine will and purpose. "What dullard," he says, "is so foolish as to think that that eternal light of God doth draw any brightness of glory at our darkness, or out of the stinking dungeon of our sin and wickedness?" (*Serm. X., Decade III.*) In the Second Helvetic Confession he expresses himself with more reserve, as the requirements of a public confession of faith naturally dictated. (*Cap. VIII.*) The Westminster Confession in the chapter on decrees says: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass." On the other hand, in the chapter on the fall it says of the disobedience of our first parents: "This their sin God was pleased, according to His wise and holy counsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to His own glory." The meaning evidently is, that God positively decreed that the fall should take place, but not that it should take place by any compulsive agency on His part. Such is the interpretation of a recent theologian, who wrote as a stanch apologist of the Calvinistic faith. "The compilers of our standards," says William Cunningham, "believed as the Reformers did, that God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, and that of course He had foreordained the fall of Adam, which thus consequently became in a certain sense necessary, — necessary by what is called the necessity of events, or the necessity of immutability. Still, they also believed that man fell *because* he

was left to the freedom of his own will, and because, having freedom, he freely willed to choose sin." (Historical Theology.)

The theory of Zwingli evidently left to Adam in his transgression freedom only in the sense of a faculty of willing, and did not so much as exempt the exercise of this faculty from a positive pressure at the hands of God. Reformed theologians generally, however, affirmed that Adam sinned freely. But it is to be observed that at least a large proportion of them did not include in their notion of freedom the power of alternative choice. Manifestly, this must have been the case with Calvin, Beza, and others, who said that, while Adam was free in his transgression, he fell in accordance with the positive and infallible decree of God. Grant that the decree brought no compulsion to bear, and was followed by no compulsion, it excluded, none the less, the alternative of not falling into sin. Adam in transgressing did the one thing that was possible to him, not indeed the one thing that was possible to his faculty of willing viewed by itself, but the one thing that was possible to it viewed as conditioned by the infallible decree of God. If, then, he was under no constraint, it was because he freely did that which alone was possible for him to do. This may be theoretically conceivable. A man may move freely between barriers which unknown to him shut him up to a particular course. He may of his own accord take precisely the track that is open to him. But even then the serious question remains as to how the honor and consistency of God can be maintained in so laying His decrees about a man as to exclude the alternative of perseverance in righteousness. And this is a question, too, which is pertinent to others than those who spoke in definite terms of a positive decree for the fall. It is pertinent to the Westminster divines. They say, indeed, that the liberty or contingency of second causes is not taken away by the divine decrees. But what is their definition of liberty or contingency? The power of willing,

exemption from compulsion, but not exemption from necessity, not the power equally to choose or to refuse in a given case. So Cunningham interprets, and so their statements when put together seem imperatively to require. Even when speaking of a permissive decree, writers of the Calvinistic school were inclined to mean a decree which fixes the event permitted, or is a ground of its certain occurrence. This is definitely stated by the Cambridge theologian, William Perkins, as follows: "Evil permitted must come to pass. For to permit evil is not to stir up the will, and not to bestow on him that is tempted the act of resisting, but to leave him as it were to himself; and he whose will is not stirred up by God, and on whom the act of resisting is not conferred, however he may have power to withstand, yet can he not actually will to withstand, nor persist forever in that uprightness in which he was created, God denying him strength." (Order of Predestination in the Mind of God. Compare Rivet, *Censura in Confess.*) We may add, that Perkins and many others in their formal definition of freedom opposed it not to necessity but to compulsion. The statement of Perkins is as follows: "Liberty and necessity do not mutually overcome each other, but liberty and compulsion. It is manifest, therefore, that God's decree causeth an immutability to all things, of which, notwithstanding, some in respect of the next causes are necessary, and others contingent." (Ibid. Compare Robert Barnes, *Treatise on Free-Will*; Twisse, *Vindiciæ Grat.*; John Owen, *Display of Arminianism*; Turretin, *Loci VI., X.*; Zanchi, *De Nat. Dei, Lib. III. cap. 2*; Coccejus, *Sum. Theol., Cap. XXVIII.*; Maccovius, *Loci, Cap. XLVI.*; Bucan, *Locus XIV.*)

On the subject of original sin Zwingli occupied wellnigh a solitary position in the Reformed Church, in excluding from it the element of guilt. Having defined sin proper as a transgression of the law, he says: "Whether we wish it or not, we are compelled to admit that original sin, as it

is in the descendants of Adam, is not properly sin, as has already been explained, for it is not a transgression of the law. It is therefore properly a disease and a condition," — *morbis igitur est proprie et conditio*. (Fidei Ratio.) Zwingli indeed does not shun to say that we are by nature children of wrath, but he means by this, not that we are actually adjudged guilty, but, as children of a man sentenced to death, we are naturally without the birthright to immortal life, just as the children of one who is made a slave inherit a condition of slavery. And even this state of deprivation he was disposed to regard as universally cancelled by the benefits of Christ's death. "It is certain," he says, "if in Christ, the second Adam, we are restored to life, as in the first Adam we were delivered to death, that rashly we condemn children born of Christian parents, yea also the children of the heathen." (Ibid.) Among English theologians a very similar view was held by Jeremy Taylor, except that he seems to have taken less account of inherited corruption. In his view, the chief result of Adam's trespass was to deprive the race of heirship to a supernatural destiny. "The sin of Adam," he says, "neither made us heirs of damnation, nor naturally and necessarily vicious. . . . All the economy of the divine goodness, and justice, and truth, is against the idea that infants dying in original sin are sent to hell. Is hell so easy a pain, or are the souls of children of so cheap, so contemptible a price, that God should so easily throw them into hell?" (Works, Vol. II. pp. 535, 536.)

Calvin and the great body of Reformed theologians distinctly included the element of guilt as well as of corruption in original sin. As to whether the guilt is by mediate or immediate imputation, little care was taken to discriminate in the earlier part of the period. Most of the confessions of the sixteenth century are not necessarily interpreted as teaching anything more than mediate imputation. The same may be said of the great majority of Calvin's refer-

ences to the subject, though it is not improbable, as Turretin argues, that he held also to immediate imputation. The following statement seems to imply the latter opinion: "If all men are justly accounted guilty of this rebellion [of Adam], let them not suppose themselves excused by necessity, in which very thing they have a most evident cause of their condemnation." (Inst., II. 5.) Among the creeds of the seventeenth century, the Canons of Dort, the Westminster Confession, and that of the Waldenses, imply the doctrine of immediate imputation. Special attention was called to the subject in the same century by the definite attack of Placæus upon this doctrine, and his decided advocacy of mediate imputation alone. One of the motives for publishing the Helvetic Consensus Formula was to enter a protest against the teaching of Placæus. The Formula inculcates both immediate and mediate imputation, teaching that, prior to any actual transgression, each descendant of Adam is guilty both as having sinned in the loins of Adam and as possessing innate corruption.

The virtual existence of the race in Adam, the legal headship of Adam, the possession of the result of his trespass in a corrupted nature, — these were the grounds which in one quarter or another were urged in explanation of the guilt in original sin. A very large proportion of theologians included the first two of these grounds in their theory. After the rise of the school of Coccejus, the federal notion became more prominent, but nevertheless did not supplant the other. As to the precise mode in which the corruption of nature is transmitted, Reformed theologians in general were not forward to speculate; but some specifications were made. "The cause of the contagion," says Calvin, "is not in the substance of the body or of the soul; but because it was ordained by God that the gifts which He conferred on the first man should by him be preserved or lost both for himself and for all his poster-

ity." (Inst. II. 1.) Voëtius argues that the corruption or defect of nature results because God, as agent or coagent, withholds at the time the soul is produced the gifts necessary to constitute man in his image. (Select. Disput., De Propagat. Peccat. Orig.) "The propagation of sin," says Perkins, "from the parents to the children, is either because the soul is infected by the contagion of the body, as a good ointment by a fustie vessel, or because God in the very moment of creation and infusion of souls into infants doth utterly forsake them." (The Order of the Causes of Salvation and Damnation, chap. 12.)

The standard teachings of the Reformed Church on the subject of man's spiritual inability were so nearly identical with those of the Formula of Concord, that there is very little need of adding anything here to a simple reference to that creed. "Our nature," says Calvin, "is not only destitute of all good, but is so fertile in all evils that it cannot remain inactive. . . . If we allow that men destitute of grace have some motions toward true goodness, though ever so feeble, what answer shall we give to the apostle, who denies that we are sufficient of ourselves to entertain even a good thought?" (Inst., II. 1, 2.) Archbishop Usher likens the natural man to a corpse festering in its corruption (Body of Divinity), and Bishop Beveridge says that it is a thousand times easier for a worm to understand the affairs of men than for the best of men in a natural state to apprehend the things of God. (Private Thoughts.) But no great account is to be taken of instances of rhetorical effervescence like these last. The essence of the Reformed teaching is contained in the statement, that, in consequence of the fall, man is destitute of the supernatural gifts of God, and so wounded in all his natural powers as to be incapable of any good in thought, word, or deed, without the assistance of divine grace.

It should be noticed that in the English Church from the time of James I. a very decided tendency was manifest

toward the Arminian standpoint, as respects the nature and operation of free will. At the close of the seventeenth century this tendency had become largely dominant.

(4.) *Arminian Theories.* — The Arminians taught that the fall was not necessitated or made certainly to occur by any divine decree, either positive or permissive. It was certain to the foreknowledge of God, but only because the divine foreknowledge is able to grasp the purely contingent. "Because God," says Arminius, "in His infinite wisdom, saw from eternity that man would fall at a certain time, that fall occurred infallibly only in respect to His prescience, not in respect to any act of the divine will, either affirmative or negative." (Discussion with Junius.) The idea that the fall might properly be termed necessary with regard to God, but contingent with respect to man, was emphatically repudiated. "The necessity or contingency of an event," says Arminius, "is to be estimated, not from one cause, but from all the causes united together." (Apology.) "They are deceived," writes Curcellæus, "who say that man in respect to himself fell freely and contingently, but necessarily and inevitably in respect to the foreknowledge and decree and co-working of God. For these are contradictories, such as cannot be reconciled by reference to diverse aspects." (Lib. III. cap. 14.)

In the Arminian definition of freedom it is opposed, not merely to compulsion, but also to necessity. It is distinguished furthermore from spontaneity. The desire of happiness, for example, is spontaneous, but it is not free. (Arminius, Examination of the Treatise of William Perkins; Curcellæus, Lib. IV. cap. 3.) The power of alternative choice is the grand essential of freedom. "If you affirm," says Arminius in reply to Perkins, "that the angels obey God freely, I shall say, with confidence, that it is possible that the angels should not obey God. If, on the other hand, you affirm that they cannot but obey God, I shall thence boldly infer that they do not obey God

freely. For necessity and freedom differ from each other in their entire essence, and in genus." Episcopius says: "It belongs to the perfect definition of freedom, that it be described as an active power, from its intrinsic force and nature so undetermined (*indifferens*), that, all things requisite for acting being at hand, it is able none the less to act or not to act, or to do this or that." (Lib. IV. Sect. III. cap. 6.) "Freedom," says Limborch, "denotes that a thing is able not to be; necessity, that a thing is not able not to be: but to be able not to be, and not to be able not to be, can in no respect be reconciled with each other, but the one being affirmed, the other is denied." (Lib. II. cap. 23.) Thus the Arminians seem to have regarded the power of alternative choice as essential to freedom, even when it is viewed without reference to the adjuncts probation and responsibility, and to have left *real freedom* in the Augustinian sense to be classed under the necessary or the spontaneous.

The Arminian conception of original sin was essentially the same as that of Zwingli. Arminius himself, so far as we are aware, never explicitly denied the element of guilt, and said at most that it is not easy to confute the arguments which oppose the conclusion that infants are under condemnation before committing actual sins. (Apology.) But his immediate followers denounced in strong terms the idea that any guilt pertains to the new-born child, regarding any theory of the imputation of Adam's trespass as unreasonable, incompatible with the moral character of God, more worthy of the caprice of a tyrant than of divine justice and benevolence. They allowed that the fall left man naturally destitute of the birthright to eternal life, and caused a transmission of corruption. But both of these they regarded as rather in the line of natural consequences than of penal inflictions, and as such having a universal remedy in the grace of God vouchsafed through Jesus Christ. Accordingly they taught that no

soul will ever be condemned by God on the simple ground of original sin. "The Remonstrants," writes Episcopius, "decide with confidence, that God neither will, nor justly can, destine to eternal torments any infants who die without actual and individual sins, upon the ground of a sin which is called original, which is said to be contracted by infants by no individual fault of theirs, but by the fault of another person, and which is believed to be theirs for no other reason than that God wills arbitrarily to impute it to them. This opinion is contrary to the divine benevolence, and to right reason; nay, it is uncertain which is greater, its absurdity or its cruelty." (Apology as quoted by Shedd. Compare Inst. Theol., Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 28, 30; Sect. V. cap. 1, 2; Curcellæus, Lib. III. cap. 15-17; Limborch, Lib. III. cap. 2, 3.)

Arminius held substantially the Calvinistic view of the inability of the fallen man in things spiritual, though differing widely on the universality of the divine purpose in providing a remedy for that inability. Speaking of man after the fall, he says: "In this state, the free will of man towards the true good is not only wounded, maimed, infirm, bent, and weakened, but it is also captive, destroyed, and lost. And its powers are not only debilitated and useless, unless they be assisted by grace, but it has no powers whatever except such as are excited by divine grace." (Disputation XI.) "In his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good." (Declaration of Sentiments.) Leading Arminians who followed were disinclined to use such strong expressions, but allowed that man's natural abilities can effect no positive result toward his moral recovery apart from prevenient and co-operating grace. (Episcopius, Apology; Curcellæus, Lib. VI. cap. 12; Limborch, Lib. III. cap. 2.) It may be observed in this connection, that the Quakers also, while recognizing transmitted corruption, denied that any guilt

attaches to a descendant of Adam prior to actual transgression. (Barclay's Propositions.)

(5.) *Socinian Theories*. — On the doctrine of the Socinians, that God does not foreknow a contingent event or decree a sinful act, the fall before its occurrence could have been in the divine mind only a matter of conjecture or probability. The freedom of Adam, in their view, involved the power of alternative choice, this being the proper characteristic of a free and responsible being.

The fall of Adam, according to the Socinians, brought guilt upon no one but himself. As respects corruption, it was only the first step toward the formation of an evil habit. It was far from radically depraving his own nature; and still farther from radically depraving the nature of his posterity. The principle of heredity is not indeed to be entirely discarded. We may grant that the majority of men are born with a proneness to evil, but we go beyond warrant when we say that this is the case with all. This proneness, too, is not to be specially connected with the fall of Adam, but is to be attributed to the continued transgressions of men, by which a habit of sinning has been formed and the nature impregnated with evil tendencies. The only evil necessarily flowing from the first transgression to all the race is the necessity of dying, which comes as a natural consequence from the condition of mortality in which Adam was left by his trespass. (Racovian Catechism, V. 10; Socinus, *Prælect. Theol.*, Cap. IV.) The similarity of the Socinian teaching to the Pelagian is too apparent to need comment.

The scholastic definition of sin as privation or defect, is found with Roman Catholic writers in this period. (Bellarmine, *De Amiss. Grat.*, V. 2; Petavius, *De Deo*, IV. 4; VI. 4.) The same definition appears also with some Protestant writers. (Zanchi, *De Operibus Dei*, Vol. II. Lib. I. cap. 2; Gerhard, *Locus X.* § 4; Norris, *Miscellanies*.) Turretin

says: "Sin, which has the character of a moral disease of the mind, is not only the negation of the good, but the presence of an evil disposition. As therefore, in so far as it is a lack of righteousness which ought to be within, it is properly called privation, so in so far as it infects and corrupts the soul, it is called an evil quality." (Locus IX. quæst. 1.) Limborch scouts the idea that sin is to be called a mere nothing, or a simple privation. "Not indeed a defect, but something positive, is the cause of sin." (Lib. II. cap. 29; Lib. V. cap. 4.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE principal developments in Christology in this period were within the bounds of Lutheranism, and concerned the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. This doctrine had its general starting-point in Luther's mystical bent, in accordance with which he held very positive views of the receptivity of the human for the divine. Its specific occasion, however, lay in his theory of the real bodily presence of Christ in the eucharist. Being under pressure to explain how the body of Christ could be at the right hand of God and at the same time in many places upon earth, he taught that the right hand of God implies, not definite locality, but a state of supreme majesty and power, and went on to assert the theory, that in virtue of the union of the two natures ubiquity is imparted to the body of Christ. This was comparatively a new theory. To be sure, a similar conception had been entertained by a few speculative writers, such as Gregory of Nyssa and Erigena, but in general the theory of the ubiquity of Christ's body had been foreign to Christian theology. Luther, as indicated, was in the first instance mainly interested in the bearing of his novel teaching upon the Lord's Supper. But naturally the subject was not allowed to rest there. Other properties besides that of ubiquity must needs come into the account. The extent and the manner of the interchange of the human and the divine characteristics must

needs be discussed. In short, a re-statement of the whole subject of Christology was involved.

Melanchthon rejected the *communicatio idiomatum* in the sense of Luther, that is, as an actual transference of properties from one nature to the other. But Luther's theory found zealous advocates. Brenz and the Swabian theologians carried it out in the most unqualified terms, that is, as respects the communication of divine properties; the communication of human properties to the divine was but little considered. According to Brenz, the incarnation of itself involved a full communication of the divine predicates, so that Christ as man was omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient from the first moment of His conception. Chemnitz, on the other hand, and the Saxon divines wished to modify the *communicatio* as far as this could be done in harmony with the demands of the bodily presence in the eucharist. They taught, accordingly, that no absolute possession of the divine properties pertains to the human nature, and that such properties are only temporarily superinduced by an act of the divine will. The Formula of Concord was designed to satisfy both of these parties, and so naturally did not fully satisfy either, and the controversy was continued. In the later stage of the discussion, the division was between the Tübingen and the Giessen theologians. Both of these schools followed Luther in assuming that the *kenosis*, or emptying of Himself, which is affirmed of Christ in the Scriptures, did not pertain to Him as the Son of God, but consisted rather in the renunciation of prerogatives which from the fact of the incarnation pertained to His human nature. Both said that to Christ as man belonged from the very first omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and the government of the universe. According to the Tübingen theologians, Christ made constantly a secret employment of these divine properties and powers, renouncing not the use, but only the manifest use of them. The Giessen theologians, on the

other hand, taught that Christ renounced the use of them, at least in large part, during the time of His earthly sojourn. The latter view, which seems to have commanded ultimately the larger patronage, was accepted by Gerhard. "The communication of divine properties," he says, "was made in the first moment of the incarnation, but Christ deferred the full use of them till He ascended into heaven and took His place at the right hand of God; thence proceeds the distinction between the state of inanition and exaltation." (Locus IV. § 293. Compare Quenstedt, *De Statibus Christi*, Quæst. I.; Hollaz, *Pars III.* sect. 1, cap. 3, qu. 54.)

Reformed theologians were content to remain on the basis of the Chalcedonian creed, only exhibiting a larger interest in the human nature of Christ than had been shown in general by the preceding expounders of that creed. Approving the maxim, *Finitum non est capax infiniti*, they emphatically repudiated the Lutheran doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. They decided also against the Lutheran view of the kenosis. "Unlike the Lutherans," says A. B. Bruce, "the Reformed theologians applied the category of exinanition to the divine nature of Christ. It was the Son of God who emptied Himself, and He did this in becoming man. The incarnation itself, in the actual form in which it took place, was a kenosis for Him who was in the form of God before He took the form of a servant. But the kenosis or exinanition was only *quasi*, an emptying as to use and manifestation, not as to possession, — a hiding of divine glory and of divine attributes, not a self-denudation with respect to these. The standing phrase for the kenosis was *occultatio*, and the favorite illustration the obscuration of the sun by a dense cloud." (The Humiliation of Christ.)

Roman Catholic theologians were likewise hostile to the Lutheran doctrine of communication. At the same time, leading representatives took the position that to the human

soul of Christ there was imparted the knowledge of all things past or to come, that is, of all in the range of the actual, the full knowledge of the possible being regarded as pertaining to the infinite mind alone. (Bellarmin, *De Christo*, Lib. IV. cap. 1; Petavius, *De Incar. Verbi*, Lib. XI. cap. 3.)

Among peculiar views we note the following:—1. Osiander's, that the Son was ideally man from eternity. 2. Schwenkfeld's, that the flesh of Christ was transformed into the divine substance. 3. Menno's, that the Son of God becoming man took no substance from the Virgin, Christ as Son of Man being simply the pre-existent Son of God made little and abased to a low estate. 4. Weigel's, that Christ besides the body from the Virgin Mary had an invisible and immortal body, derived from the Eternal Virgin, or the Divine Wisdom, through the Holy Spirit. 5. Barclay's, similar to Weigel's view, but set forth under a less mystical and fantastic guise, his idea being that the Son, prior to taking a body from the Virgin, had a spiritual body, which in all the ages of human history was a medium of divine revelation and fellowship. 6. Poiret's, that Christ drew a human nature from the primitive unfallen Adam, and that this human nature took on mortal flesh in Mary, as a white and shining garment takes the tincture of a dark liquid into which it is plunged. The addition of the mortal flesh did not involve an additional body. 7. The theory of Henry More and a number of English writers, such as Edward Fowler, Robert Fleming, J. Hussey, Francis Gastrell, Thomas Bennet, and Thomas Burnet, affirming the pre-existence of Christ's human soul. (Dorner, *Hist. of Doct. of Person of Christ.*)

SECTION II.—THE REDEMPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

1. ROMAN CATHOLIC THEORIES. — In the Roman Catholic Church the subject of the atonement was left in the same indeterminate state in which it had been inherited from the scholastic era. No new and precise definitions were included in the standards. Theologians were free to select their opinions from any of the great doctors in orthodox repute. It is probable, however, that there was a more general agreement with Thomas Aquinas than with any other single authority. Bellarmin taught in agreement with Aquinas, and in disagreement with the Scotist doctrine of acceptilation, that the sacrifice of Christ was in itself of infinite value. (De Christo, Lib. V. cap. 5.)

2. LUTHERAN AND REFORMED THEORIES. — The Lutherans generally approached the subject in the spirit of Anselm, and accepted his view of the serious demands of divine justice, the need and the fact of an infinite satisfaction. At the same time they differed from Anselm in at least two prominent respects: 1. They included Christ's obedience in life, as well as His voluntary death, in the redemptive price. 2. They gave Christ more distinctly and directly the character of a substitute for the sinner, representing Him as offsetting sin not merely by acquiring a merit capable of being imputed to the guilty, but by bearing penalty. Luther transcended all bounds of moderation in setting forth this latter phase, declaring that Christ came so fully into the sinner's place that, in the light of the sin imputed to Him, He might be regarded as the greatest of all criminals. "All the prophets," he says, "saw this in spirit, that Christ would be of all men the greatest robber, homicide, adulterer, thief, doer of sacrilege, blasphemer, etc., that ever was in the world, because, as a victim for the sins of the whole world, He is not now an innocent person and without sins." (Comm. in Epist. ad

Galat., Cap. III.) This was exceptional extravagance in terms, but the idea which Luther meant to inculcate, namely, that Christ stood in a most real sense in the sinner's place, was urged by others among the Lutherans. Gerhard says: "As sins were typically imputed to the victim which [in Old Testament times] was offered for sins, so our sins were imputed to Christ, and for them He offered Himself upon the altar of the cross. . . . Although He did not undergo eternal death, nevertheless He truly felt the pains of hell and the judgment of God angry with our sins, which were cast upon Him." (Locus XVI. §§ 43, 44. Compare Quenstedt, *De Statibus Christi*, quæst. 6; *De Redemptione*, *passim*; Hollaz, *Pars III. sect. 1, cap. 3, qu. 125.*)

Gerhard charges against the Reformed doctrine of absolute decrees, that it implies that God can remit sins by His simple will, and that consequently there is no strict need of satisfaction. (Locus XVI. § 36.) But as a matter of fact, the necessity of satisfaction was generally maintained by Reformed theologians. Only a few writers, such as Twisse and Rutherford, were disposed, from the standpoint of God's absolute decrees, to question the necessity of satisfaction. Zwingli has sometimes been reckoned in this category, but some of his statements bear in a different direction. (Compare Zeller, *Das. Theol. System Zwingli's*, and Ritschl, *Hist. of Doct. of Justif. and Reconcil.*) Musculus is quoted by Socinus on the side of the same opinion. (*De. Chr. Serv.*, *Pars III. cap. 1.*) Vossius, Whichcote, Tillotson, and William Sherlock were also opposed to the theory of strict necessity, but from a very different standpoint, since they were averse to the dogma of absolute predestination. Other exceptions might perhaps be discovered, but the general drift of teaching in the Reformed Church was in harmony with these statements of the Heidelberg Catechism: "God is indeed merciful, but He is likewise just; wherefore His justice requires that sin,

which is committed against the most high majesty of God, be also punished with extreme, that is, everlasting punishment, both of body and soul. . . . God wills that His justice be satisfied; therefore must we make full satisfaction to the same, either by ourselves or by another. . . . By reason of the justice and truth of God, satisfaction for our sins could be made no otherwise than by the death of the Son of God." Equivalent statements are contained in the Canons of the Synod of Dort. Turretin says, that, while some Reformed theologians, especially before the Socinians promulgated their views, followed Augustine in the opinion that satisfaction by the death of Christ was not strictly necessary, it is safer to affirm that God cannot, in harmony with His justice, forgive sins without satisfaction; and he adds, that this is the common view of the orthodox. (Locus XIV. quæst. 10.)

The same modifications of Anselm's theory were made by the Reformed as by the Lutherans. Piscator, indeed, denied that the active obedience of Christ, as well as His sufferings and death, had a redemptive or atoning value; but in this he was outside of the general current. Calvin was very pronounced for the theory in question, maintaining that the whole obedience of Christ entered into the redemptive price, and that even in respect to His death the most essential feature was the voluntary obedience by which it was consummated. "From the time," he says, "of His assuming the character of a servant, He began to pay the price of our deliverance in order to redeem us. . . . Indeed, His voluntary submission is the principal circumstance even in His death; because the sacrifice, unless freely offered, would have been unavailable to the acquisition of righteousness." (Inst. II. 16. Compare Zanchi, *De Relig. Christ. Fid.*; Gomar, *Disput. XIX.*; Coccejus, *De Fœd. et Test. Dei*, Cap. V.; Witsius, *De Œconom. Fœd. Dei cum Hom.*, Lib. II. cap. 5; Turretin, *Locus XIV. quæst. 13*; Perkins, *Comm. on the Epist. to the Galatians*,

Chap. II.; John Owen, *Doct. of Justif. by Faith.*) “The Spirit of God,” says the Helvetic Consensus Formula, “distinctly asserts that Christ by His most holy life satisfied the law and divine justice for us, and locates that price by which we are purchased unto God, not merely in His sufferings, but in His whole life conformed to the law.”

As respects Christ’s standing in the place of sinners, Dr. Crisp rivalled the extravagant language of Luther; but in this he is to be regarded as representing nobody except himself. Calvinistic writers, however, were generally inclined to a very positive doctrine of substitution, and did not shun to speak of sins being imputed to Christ, and of His enduring the wrath of God. The Heidelberg Catechism says of the Redeemer, “All the time He lived on earth, but especially at the end of His life, He bore in body and soul the wrath of God against the sin of the whole human race.” (Quæst. 37.) “He suffered,” says the Scotch Confession, “not only the cruel death of the cross, which was accursed by the sentence of God; but also He suffered for a season the wrath of His Father, which sinners had deserved.” (Art. IX.) “His death,” say the Canons of Dort, “was conjoined with a sense of the wrath and curse of God, which we had deserved by our sins.” Calvin writes: “That Christ might restore us again into the favor of the Father, it was meet our guiltiness were abolished by Him; which could not be unless He would suffer that punishment which we were not able to abide.” (Comm. on Epist. to Romans, Chap. IV.) “The punishment He suffered,” says Perkins, “was in value and measure answerable to all the sins of all the elect, past, present, and to come, the Godhead supporting the manhood, that it might be able to bear and overcome the whole burden of the wrath of God.” (Comm. on Epist. to Galatians, Chap. III.) “His death,” says John Bunyan, “was not a mere natural death, but a cursed death; even such a one as men do undergo from God for their sins, even such a death as to endure the very pains and torments

of hell." (The Doctrine of the Law and Grace Unfolded.) Archbishop Usher affirms that Christ suffered in His soul the "whole wrath of God due to the sin of man." (Body of Divinity.) "Those who believe," says John Owen, "the imputation of the righteousness of Christ unto believers, do also unanimously profess that the sins of all believers were imputed unto Christ." (Doctrine of Justification.) It should be observed that the more discriminating writers, who spoke of God's wrath being visited upon Christ, used this language with a qualification, not meaning to denote thereby the real attitude of God toward His well-beloved Son, but to denote rather that the Son endured such sufferings as are properly among the effects of the divine wrath against sin.

Among English writers Tillotson expressed himself very much after the style of Grotius. (Serm. XLVII.) There are also passages in the writings of Baxter that lean very distinctly toward the doctrine of Grotius.

3. THEORIES OF HUGO GROTIUS AND THE ARMINIANS.—Hugo Grotius, in his work entitled "Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ," made a significant departure from the standpoint of Anselm, as also from a leading principle of the Lutheran and the Reformed soteriology. His doctrine, known as the governmental theory, starts from the conception that the laws of God, at least many of them, are not an outcome of the divine nature, but rather effects of the divine will. From this it follows that they may be relaxed without contradiction to the divine nature. "Law is not," he says, "an internal something in God, or the very will of God, but a certain effect of His will. But it is most certain that effects of the divine will are mutable." Applying this idea to the punishment of sin, he maintains that, though it may be just to punish the guilty in proportion to their ill-desert, we are not to conclude that it is always unjust to remit punishment, any more than we would conclude that a man is illiberal be-

cause he does not give a thousand talents, though we should call him liberal if he did freely bestow this sum. The law that penalty be visited upon transgression is not strictly natural, but only agreeable to nature. "That every sinner," he says, "should be punished in proportion to his fault, is not strictly and universally necessary, nor properly natural, but quite agreeable to nature. Thence it follows that nothing prevents the law commanding this from being relaxable." God is not in the position of a judge, who is simply a minister of the law and is bound by its provisions. His position is rather that of a ruler of the moral universe, upon whom rests the office of conserving and promoting its best interests.

But while God as ruler may relax the law which affixes penalty to sin, His very position as a wise and perfect ruler is a bar against any relaxation which might imply a light estimate of the claims to obedience. It tends to break down the authority of law when its demands are not strictly asserted. Were God to proclaim a universal amnesty, and at the same time take no pains to declare His abhorrence of sin or His regard for righteousness, He would open the road to license, and endanger the security of moral government. A penal example must go along with the proclamation of amnesty. In the suffering Son of God the most effective example is provided. The sight of a Being of such incomparable dignity paying tribute to a broken law by His passion and death, warns men that the love which offers pardon for past sins in no wise excuses from obligation to future obedience. Thus, while the law is in a sense relaxed, a suitable compensation is secured.

The outcome of Grotius's teaching is evidently remote from the Anselmic doctrine. That emphasized the indispensable need of an atonement to cover past sins and to open up the possibility of any forgiveness, whereas the theory of Grotius made the design of Christ's work not so much the covering of past sins as the preventing of future license,

and contemplated it rather as a requirement of governmental prudence than as a demand of inflexible justice.

Other leading Arminians agreed essentially with Grotius in their conception of penal law as related to the divine nature. "The justice of God," says Episcopius, "does not require that God should wish to punish each and every sinner. But when He wishes to punish, the justice of God requires that He punish none but the deserving, and not beyond desert." (Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 29.) "Whatever," says Curcellæus, "God works exterior to Himself, He effects most freely in accordance with the good pleasure of His will, whether He bestows reward upon those who obey His laws, or decrees punishments against rebels. . . . It is to be concluded that neither the compassion by which God remits sins, nor the justice by which He punishes them, are essential properties of His, but only free effects which proceed from His natural goodness and holiness." (Lib. II. cap. 16; Lib. V. cap. 18.) "We confess," says Limborch, "that justice and compassion are essential to God, but contend that the acts and manifestations both of justice and compassion, such as are punishment and remission of sins, are free and subject to the divine choice." (Lib. II. cap. 12.)

At the same time, these writers gave a different turn to their exposition of Christ's redemptive work from that of Grotius, by representing Christ not so much as affording a penal example as making a sacrifice to God. In some of their statements, too, this sacrifice seems to be conceived as paying a tribute not merely to God's governmental prudence, but to His interior regard for justice. Thus Curcellæus writes: "It was not needful for our redemption that Christ should bear the same punishments which we had merited; but there was need only of a sacrifice by which He might render God placated toward us. Therefore He gave Himself to death for us, and this oblation was accepted by the Father, so that because of it He willed

to remit to us all our sins freely and without any payment, provided only we should renounce them for the future, and walk in newness of life." (Lib. V. cap. 9.) "The tempering of justice with compassion," Limborch teaches, "consisted in this, that God, seeing the human race fallen into sin and eternal death, willed to be placated with a propitiatory sacrifice, and apart from that not to receive sinners into favor." (Lib. III. cap. 10.) But the same theologians were careful to state that this sacrifice was not a complete satisfaction for sin, and that the acceptance of it involved a departure from the rigor of justice. God accepted the sacrifice, says Limborch, not because Christ rendered a full equivalent for the punishment due to sinners, but because "He satisfied the divine will, at once compassionate and just, paying all and bearing all which God required for the full expiation of sins." (Ibid.) Indeed the Arminian writers regarded the theory of a strict, plenary satisfaction as open to grave objections. Among other considerations Curcellæus urged against such a theory, that it is contradictory to fact, since Christ did not endure eternal death, which was the penalty due to sin, and that it is also inconsistent with the Scriptural representation of gratuitous remission, and the Scriptural requirement of faith and repentance as conditions of enjoying the purchased benefits. (Lib. V. cap. 19.)

4. SOCINIAN THEORIES.—The view of divine justice advocated by the Arminian writers who have been quoted above was anticipated by the Socinians. With great emphasis and in oft-repeated statements Socinus taught that God is equally free to forgive or to punish sins, and that no satisfaction is needed to facilitate the exercise of His pardoning power. Justice, he says, so far as related to the infliction of punishment upon transgressors, is no interior characteristic of God, and least of all such a characteristic as necessitates universally that penalty be exacted for sin. One might better argue that compassion is an interior char-

acteristic of God, and universally impels to the free remission of all sins. The truth is, that justice in the sense in question, as well as compassion, is no essential property of God, but only an effect of His will. "There is indeed in God a perpetual justice; but this is nothing else than equity and rectitude." God's justice is a bar to His doing any wrong, to His punishing the guiltless, or to His punishing beyond desert, but is no bar at all to His forgiving wherever men are in an attitude to appreciate forgiveness. (Prælect. Theol., Cap. XVI., XVII.; De Christo Servatore, Pars I. cap. 1.) The similarity of this exposition to that of some of the Arminians is quite apparent. But it should be noticed, that, while giving essentially the same definition of divine justice, the Arminians were not a little distinguished from the Socinians in the stress which they placed upon the objective worth of Christ's sufferings and death, or the actual display through them of the claims of God's holy laws.

In the Socinian scheme the principal part of Christ's work as a Saviour is located in two things: (1.) In His fulfilment on earth of the office of an inspired teacher; (2.) In His fulfilment in heaven of the office of the exalted King of men and the dispenser of all spiritual benefits. The death of Christ lying between these two has a significance mainly subordinate to them. (1.) It was a marked testimony to the truth of His teaching. (2.) It was an eminent and inspiring example of patience and fidelity. (3.) It serves by divine appointment as a kind of seal of the new covenant, an open pledge of God's willingness to forgive, and hence is a token of His benevolence, and a means of calling forth the confidence and the love of men. (4.) It was the necessary antecedent of Christ's resurrection and glorification, and so bridged the way to the crowning facts in the redemptive work. The contrast between Christ humiliated and dying, and Christ risen and triumphant, is the best possible means of inspiring salutary courage and hope in men struggling amid the miseries of this life. (Racov. Cat., V. 7, 8; Soci-

nus, Prælect. Theol., Cap. XIX.-XXIV.; De Chr. Serv., Pars I. cap. 2-5; Crell, De Causis Mortis Christi; Ad Lib. Grotii Respons.; Wolzogen, Compend. Relig. Christ.)

The Socinians, it is true, did not shun to speak of the death of Christ as an expiatory sacrifice, as appears from the Racovian Catechism and other writings. But evidently they used the term *expiation* in a different sense from that in which it was employed by the advocates of strict satisfaction, and attached an expiatory office to Christ's death only so far as it may be regarded as supplicating the divine clemency or acting as a positive antidote to sinfulness. Moreover, they taught that the death of Christ was but the commencement of the expiation which He continues to make in heaven as the High Priest of humanity. "The death of Christ," says the Catechism, "was not the whole of His expiatory sacrifice, but a certain commencement of it; for the sacrifice was then offered when Christ entered into heaven." (V. 8.) Socinus says: "The sacrifice and expiatory oblation of Christ for our sins, although it did not take place without the cross and the shedding of blood, was not nevertheless truly consummated in the cross or in shedding of blood, but afterwards in heaven, Christ having entered there." (Epist.) "Christ was not truly a priest, nor perfectly consecrated before He entered into heaven, not to say before He delivered Himself to death." (De Chr. Serv., Pars II. cap. 23.) Thus, according to the Socinian theory, Christ first after His ascension entered in the more emphatic sense upon His office as Saviour.

The objections of Socinus to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction are noteworthy, as being the most cogent considerations which hostile criticism has been able to urge. The more important of them are the following: (1.) The supposition of satisfaction is contrary to the Scriptural account of gratuitous remission, and trenches upon the liberality and compassion of God. (2.) Vicarious satisfaction is in the nature of the case impossible. One may indeed

pay a sum of money for another, for the ownership of money is transferable. But the punishment which God has connected with sin is not a pecuniary fine. It is rather a punishment which takes hold of the person, and is as little capable of being transferred, as personality itself is of being alienated. The law, too, is not that somebody must suffer in case of transgression, but that the identical person who sins must suffer. Moreover, God's Word expressly puts a veto upon transferring punishment of this kind, declaring that the child shall not be put to death for the offence of the father, or the father for the offence of the child. (3.) Christ as a matter of fact did not make a plenary satisfaction by His sufferings. There was no proportion between His pains and those denounced against sinners. He did not endure eternal death; and even if He had, and had been accepted as a substitute, He could have taken the place of only one sinner. This holds true even upon the supposition of His divinity, for only as man could He suffer and pay to God a debt of suffering. (4.) Vicarious obedience is quite as much out of question as vicarious suffering. Christ as man was subject to law and under obligation to obey for Himself, so that it was impossible for Him to acquire merit in behalf of others. As respects His divine nature, if such be imputed to Him, it is as improper to speak of that as obeying and acquiring merit, as it is to represent it as enduring sufferings. And there is besides this consideration, that satisfaction by suffering and imputation of obedience agree ill together, since the one makes the other superfluous. (5.) If satisfaction has been made, men are bound by no further claims. Their acquittal follows without conditions. Obligations to faith and obedience are relaxed. (See in particular *Prælect. Theol.*, Cap. XVII., XVIII.; *De Chr. Serv.*, Pars III. cap. 1-5, Pars IV. cap. 3, 4.)

Socinus evidently, in attacking the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, took the terms in the most literal and exact

sense. This fact must of course be brought into the account in the consideration of his objections. One may hold that the work of Christ had the value of a vicarious satisfaction, and was in effect such, without at the same time maintaining that it was such in all the particulars of a rigid and literal application of the terms. One may hold that He paid a real tribute to divine law, to the honor and security of divine government, to God's interior regard for righteousness, and that in a real sense He stood in the sinner's place, without thinking that guilt was in any wise transferred to Him, or that He was in strictness visited with any punishment. So far as the statements of Socinus bear against a vicarious satisfaction in this sense, the following considerations are pertinent, and have been urged by one writer or another. (1.) The satisfaction made by Christ holds an instrumental place. It was designed to prepare the way for the salvation of men. God was its primary originator. He originated it as the most fitting way of reaching an end dictated by pure benevolence and love. So far, therefore, from excluding grace and compassion, it testifies to them. Moreover, not only in the primary provision of the satisfaction, but in the application of its benefits to the individual, there is an exhibition of grace. The work of satisfaction was a condition of proclaiming a general amnesty, to be enjoyed upon the most indulgent terms that wisdom and righteousness could allow. Now while self-consistency in the Divine Ruler might require that every one meeting the conditions should have the benefits of the amnesty, no one can claim them as a matter of desert or as a right. In every case of their bestowment there is an exhibition of grace. (2.) Sin is indeed a personal matter, and no one but the doer of it can take its ill-desert, and the sufferings of no innocent person can be regarded as strictly cancelling that ill-desert. But this does not prove that one person may not suffer voluntarily for another, and suffer in such a way as to promote right-

eousness and render tribute to justice. The Scriptures do not hesitate to declare that Christ bore our sins in His own body on the tree. Human experience is full of illustrations of a vicarious principle. Universal history teaches that the pains and struggles of holy, self-sacrificing souls are ever being employed to lift the wicked to undeserved emancipation. No one can deny these facts. Everybody must allow that one person can suffer efficaciously for another. Every one also, who has a just view of the historical position of Christ, must allow that, above all beings that have appeared in this world, He was qualified to hold a vicarious or representative position in suffering. For He was not merely an individual among individuals; He was not merely a son of man, but the Son of Man, the head and centre of humanity. The only question then is, whether the suffering may be at the same time a tribute to justice, a homage to holy law, and so of the nature of a satisfaction. And who can refuse to answer this in the affirmative? Who can deny that he who obeys the law as the embodied will of the lawgiver, obeys it with a profound regard for the end contemplated by the lawgiver, and at the expense of extreme personal suffering, renders a great tribute to the law and to him whose mind it expresses? Who can deny, furthermore, that the grandest tribute of this kind which is conceivable is the fitting antecedent and condition of a proclamation of universal amnesty to a race of sinners? Now, just such a tribute was rendered by the obedient and suffering Christ, the divine-human Son of God. In one undivided view we have the spectacle of the sublimest homage to divine rule, the attestation of the ineffable sanctity of the holy laws of God, and the spectacle of the utmost grace to those who have transgressed those laws. The former was needed to go with the latter. In virtue of the work of Christ, God, in harmony with His position as fountain and guardian of the law, can consistently and safely remit sins. He is not left in the position

of an earthly magistrate, who must either execute the law with unsparing rigor, or use his prerogative to pardon in a partial way by showing clemency to only a few, or break down the law by too wide a show of indulgence. Bringing all alike into the presence of that incomparable tribute to righteousness and protest against sin which are seen in Jesus Christ, God is able to offer pardon to all upon equal terms, and to emphasize the claims of righteousness even in the act of indulgence. (3, 4.) In answer to the third and fourth objections of Socinus, we have the consideration that Christ in His life of suffering and obedience is to be viewed in the unity of His person. We are not to make a Nestorian division between the divine and the human. We are to view Him as the God-man. Regarding Him in this light, we cannot properly fail to be filled with a sense of the altogether exceptional worth of His work. The spectacle of a God-man treading the path of obedience and suffering in deference to holy law, and with the design of healing and conserving God's moral order, is more fitted to impress the minds of men and angels with the majestic claims of that law and that order, than the spectacle of a race suffering hopelessly the pains of damnation. The value of such a tribute is essentially independent of the question whether the rendering of it fell within the sphere of duty or not. It was valuable in itself. But as a matter of fact it lay beyond the sphere of personal obligation, in the sense that the incarnation by which it was initiated lay beyond that sphere. Work done in a sphere which is beyond one's obligations to enter may be called a work of extra merit. (5.) The last objection of Socinus has force only against the most crude and commercial theory of satisfaction. From the fact that Christ paid such a tribute as makes it allowable in the sight of wisdom and holiness to depart from the rigor of justice in dealing with past sins, it of course in no wise follows that conditions of faith and future obedience should not be imposed.

Among writers of the Calvinistic school of the period who attempted to answer the objections of Socinus, a foremost place is occupied by Turretin.

Roman Catholic theologians held the patristic and scholastic theory of a real descent of Christ into Hades. As to the effect of His mission there, Petavius says: "I assent to the opinion commonly received and confirmed by the testimony of a number; namely, that Christ in His descent to hell conferred salvation upon those alone who, by the merit of faith and righteousness while they were alive, showed themselves worthy of so great a benefit." (*De Incar. Verb.*, Lib. XIII. cap. 18.) The Lutherans were inclined to follow Luther in the doctrine of a real descent. The Formula of Concord, referring to a dispute which had arisen respecting the mode of the descent, teaches that the fact should be received without curious inquiries as to the mode. (Art. IX.) According to Gerhard, there was both a metaphorical and a real descent of Christ into hell, the one consisting in the pains of His passion and the other in a local appearing in the region of the dead. (*Confess. Cath.*) As respects the object of the descent, the Lutherans emphasized chiefly the general idea of a triumph over Satan and the power of death. Among Reformed theologians there was a tendency to affirm only the metaphorical descent, the language of the apostolic symbol being either understood, as by Zwingli, to be an emphatic assertion of the reality of Christ's death and burial; or, as by Calvin, to be descriptive of the agonies of the passion. (Calvin, *Inst.*, II. 16; Turretin, *Locus XIII.* quæst. 16; Maccovius, *Locus XXV.*; Wolleb, *Compend. Theol.*, Lib. I. cap. 18; Usher, *Body of Divinity*; Barrow, *Sermons on Creed*, XXVIII.) The Heidelberg Catechism, though not very explicit, favors the Calvinian interpretation. (Question 44.) The Thirty-nine Articles, on the other hand, were evidently designed to teach a real descent. (Art. III.)

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

In the early stages of the Reformation, there was naturally a tendency to revert to the Augustinian stand-point, and to reduce man's part in the appropriation of salvation to the vanishing point. In no way, as the Reformers conceived, could the foundation of the Romish system of legality, ceremonialism, and dependence upon the merit of works be so effectually swept away as by asserting man's natural helplessness and the omnipotence of grace in his moral recovery. In a part of the domain of Protestantism this primitive position was steadily maintained; but there were wide reactions from it in various quarters.

Among the topics falling under the section, the two principal are the divine predestination, as conditioning the appropriation of salvation, and the doctrine of justification. The question of the factors entering into conversion, or regeneration, may fitly be considered in connection with the former topic. In addition to these subjects, we have to consider that of assurance and of Christian perfection.

I. The Roman Catholic Church was far from being a unit upon the subject of predestination. According to Sarpi, very diverse opinions were expressed at the council of Trent, and, taking the period through, some three or four different types of opinion must be distinguished.

By the Jansenist school, or, at least, by some of its representatives, statements were indulged involving the full Augustinian doctrine, that predestination to life is unconditional, that the efficacy of Christ's death was not designed for all, and that there is in strictness no possibility of the salvation of the non-elect. These points are involved with sufficient clearness in such sentences from Quesnel as the following: "All whom God wills to save

through Jesus Christ are infallibly saved." "Grace is the operation of the hand of the omnipotent God, which nothing is able to impede or retard." "Grace is nothing else than the will of the omnipotent God commanding and doing what He commands." There were also outside of the Jansenist school some who made no material modification of the Augustinian teaching.

A second party taught, indeed, an unconditional predestination of some men to eternal life, but differed from the preceding in maintaining that a sufficient grace to secure salvation is given unto those not thus absolutely chosen. At the same time, however, they made the possibility of the salvation of the non-elect a purely theoretical one, since they taught that this *sufficient* grace never becomes actually *efficacious* grace, never brings into the possession of eternal life. Here belongs Pope Adrian VI. Thomasin describes his position as follows: "God does not now give to all the grace which will convert them, but that which is sufficient to convert them if they make their best efforts. He adds, that there is no one who makes always his best efforts, and consequently the grace simply sufficient is in the end always ineffectual, and the efficacious grace is that which is always superabundant." (Mémoire II.) Bellarmin's teaching harmonizes with Adrian's, and embraces the following points: (1.) There is an unconditional election of some to eternal life. "The Scripture teaches that some of the human race have been elected, and that they have been elected to the kingdom of heaven, and elected efficaciously, that they may infallibly attain to the kingdom; and, finally, that they have been elected gratuitously and before all foresight of their works." (2.) "Sufficient aid for salvation, respect being had to time and place, is given mediately or immediately to all." The clause respecting time and place is inserted to denote that there is at least some occasion where this aid is proffered, though it may not be always present. The proposition

thus understood, says Bellarmin, is advocated by nearly all Roman Catholic theologians. (3.) The sufficient grace fails in fact of the end for whose attainment it is sufficient. "All have, in consideration of place and time, aid sufficient to enable them to be converted and then to persevere if they will ; but in reality no one is converted and no one perseveres except him who has the special gift of repentance and perseverance, which is not given to all, but to those only to whom God has decided that it should be given." Here reference is made to a distinction previously laid down between *gratia sufficiens* and *gratia efficax*. (4.) "Reprobation comprises two acts, the one negative and the other positive, inasmuch as the reprobate are opposed to the elect both in the way of contradiction and of contrariety (*contradictorie et contrarie*). For in the first place God has not the will to save them ; and then He has the will to condemn them ; and, indeed, as respects the former act, there is no cause on the part of man, as there is none of predestination. But of the latter there is a cause, namely, the foresight of sin." (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., Lib. I. cap. 11-13 ; Lib. II. cap. 1-16.) Nicole and Thomassin occupied essentially the same ground.

According to a third view, while some are unconditionally elected to eternal life, there is not merely a theoretical possibility that some not thus elected may be saved, but a genuine probability that some of them will be saved. Such was the theory advocated by Catharinus at the council of Trent. As Sarpi represents, he taught that "God, of His goodness, hath elected some few, whom He will save absolutely, for whom He hath prepared most potent, effectual, and infallible means. The rest He desireth for His part to be saved, and, to that end, hath prepared sufficient means for all, leaving it to their choice to accept them and be saved, or to refuse them and be damned. Amongst these are some who receive them and are saved, though they be not of the number of the elect ; of which kind there are

very many. Others refusing to co-operate with God, who wisheth their salvation, are damned."

A fourth view opposed unconditional election, and made foreordination to eternal life dependent upon foresight of grace accepted and improved. Among the Jesuits, Less, Hamel, and the school of Molina, represented this view. As previously noted, a number of sentences from the writings of the first two were censured by the theological faculty of Louvain. The following were among them: "The opinion which says, that those who are saved are not efficaciously elected to glory before the foresight of good works or the application of merit against sin, seems in the highest degree probable. . . . The number of the predestinated is not certain from a foreordination which goes before all foreknowledge of works." (Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*.) Less is also quoted by Thomassin as maintaining, "Rightly does Molina say that it depends upon the free will whether grace is efficacious or inefficacious." (*Mémoire IV. chap. 86.*) Another statement of Molina, carrying the same implication, is as follows: "For men who have not yet reached the dignity of the sons of God, power to become the sons of God is provided, to this extent, that if they strive as far as in them lies, God will be present to them, that they may obtain faith and grace." (Gieseler.) In the principal work of Petavius there are likewise passages which speak with sufficient distinctness for a conditional election. "There is no place at all in Scripture," he says, "by which Augustine or the disciples of Augustine, prove that men are elected and predestinated to salvation and glory, absolutely and without any condition of merits, as a cause, which has not been explained in another sense by the more ancient fathers, or also by a majority of the later Greek and Latin fathers. So no divine authority compels us to accept that opinion; yea, rather it seems to warn away from it, as will be declared in the following chapter." (*De Deo, Lib. X. cap. 1.*) In

the chapter referred to, after citing the rule of Vincen-
tius, that, in things not clearly revealed in the Scriptures,
the general consensus of the fathers should be followed,
he says: "If we wish to observe this rule in the matter
under consideration, we doubt not but that is the truer
opinion, which assigns to each one his eternal lot in ac-
cordance with foresight of merits, so that God elects those
to salvation who He sees will persevere in grace and
righteousness received."

As respects official statements, none were made which
distinctly and directly renounced unconditional election,
but the moral effect of the papal condemnations of propo-
sitions from Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel was evidently
adverse to that doctrine. Some of the condemned propo-
sitions were genuinely Augustinian. The council of Trent
rendered no definite decision. It says, indeed, that Christ
died for all, but advocates of absolute predestination,
whether consistently or not, have said as much. How-
ever, its doctrine of the will in relation to man's moral
recovery, as being opposed to the monergistic operation
of grace, had more or less of an adverse bearing toward
the doctrine of unconditional predestination. In the fifth
chapter of the decree on justification it is said: "They who
by sins were alienated from God may be disposed, through
His quickening and assisting grace, to convert themselves
to their own justification, by freely assenting to and co-
operating with that said grace: in such sort that, while
God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the
Holy Ghost, neither is man himself utterly inactive while
he receives that inspiration, forasmuch as he is also able
to reject it; yet he is not able by his own free will, without
the grace of God, to move himself unto justice in His sight."

Among Roman Catholic theologians, who taught an un-
conditional predestination, various theories were enter-
tained as to the way in which the predestinating decree
is accomplished, or divine grace is made infallibly effica-

cious to secure its end. These are enumerated by Thomassin as follows: (1.) The theory based on the *scientia media*. God, inasmuch as He knows what would take place under all supposable conditions, knows to what means the human agent will give consent. He knows this, not because the means is in itself invincible, but because His prescience is infallible. Thus He is able without any violence to the human will to secure its consent to grace. (2.) The theory of physical predetermination, according to which God acts directly upon the will itself and determines it in a particular direction. The advocates of this view maintain that the will remains nevertheless free, for, while the divine action excludes a contrary choice, it does not exclude the power of a contrary choice. (3.) The theory that divine grace has at command an innumerable multitude and variety of expedients, and that, while the human will may reject the one or the other, it will be sure finally to yield freely to the continued pressure of such as are left in the inexhaustible list. (4.) The theory which affirms, in place of the multitude of means, predicated by the preceding statement, one single means, so absolutely suited to the case to which it is applied that it is certain to prevail over all opposing inclinations and to secure the free assent of the will. (Mémoire I. chap. 18.) Thomassin gives his preference to the third and fourth theories, and finds most fault with the second, which he says began to be prevalent among the Thomists after the council of Trent. Bellarmine condemns the same in strong terms, declaring that it seems to him identical with the error of Calvin, or differing little therefrom. (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., Lib. I. cap. 12.) Suarez also was opposed to the doctrine of physical determination. (Opuscula.) Bossuet, on the other hand, commented on it very favorably, and maintained that it was in harmony with the demands of free will. (Traité du Libre Arbitre.) Evidently on this whole subject the Roman Catholic Church was much afloat.

Luther, as previously stated, started out with a radical theory of predestination. This too he never modified, save as he gave more room to what might be regarded as opposing considerations, such as the universality of God's design in the atonement, and the possibility of apostasy. One of his statements on the former point is as follows: "That all do not receive Christ is their own fault, because they believe not and indulge their unbelief; meanwhile the sentence of God remains, and the universal promise that God wills all men to be saved." (Quoted by Köstlin.) Luther here speaks from the standpoint of the *revealed* will of God. Besides this, he recognized the existence of a *secret* will, infallibly securing the salvation of those selected from the general mass. These diverse wills he confessed himself unable to reconcile. But he was increasingly disposed to emphasize the revealed as compared with the secret will. The modifying aspects in connection with Luther's doctrine are thus stated by Dorner: "There may be noticed as characteristic features in Luther's doctrine of predestination, that it will not renounce the universality of the purpose of divine love, little as he is able to vindicate it, and that he also admits the possibility of apostasy on the part of those who have obtained grace. . . . It is not clear how complete apostasy is possible in case of one chosen to salvation, without the breaking up of Luther's conception of election, and the more logical development of this point is to be found in Calvin, who attributes to all the elect also the gift of perseverance." (Hist. of Prot. Theol.)

The Lutheran Church soon showed a marked tendency to depart from Luther's affirmation of unconditional predestination, and to adopt the position which was ultimately taken by Melancthon upon this subject. This is clearly apparent in the Formula of Concord. In the absence of any counter statements, such language as the following can only be understood as repudiating unconditional pre-

destination : “Christ calls all sinners to Him, and promises to give them rest. And He earnestly wishes that all men may come to Him, and suffer themselves to be cared for and succored. To these He offers Himself in the Word as a Redeemer, and wishes that the Word may be heard, and that their ears may not be hardened, nor the Word be neglected and contemned. And He promises that He will bestow the virtue and operation of the Holy Spirit and divine aid, to the end that we may abide steadfast in the faith and attain eternal life. . . . As to the declaration, ‘Many are called, but few are chosen,’ it is not to be so understood as if God were unwilling that all should be saved, but the cause of the damnation of the ungodly is that they either do not hear the Word of God at all, but contumaciously contemn it, stop their ears, and harden their hearts, and in this way foreclose to the Spirit of God His ordinary way, so that He cannot accomplish His work in them; or at least, when they have heard the Word, make it of no account, and cast it away.” (Art. XI.) In the Saxon Visitation Articles it is declared, that Christ died for all men; that God wills all men to be saved; that some perish by refusing to hear the Gospel, and some by falling from grace; “that all sinners who repent will be received into favor, and none will be excluded, though his sins be red as blood, since the mercy of God is greater than the sins of the whole world, and God hath mercy on all His works.”

In the seventeenth century leading Lutheran theologians declared very expressly for the universality of the offers of grace and the conditional character of predestination. “God wills,” says Gerhard, “and seriously wills the life of the sinner; yet He wills also the conversion of the sinner through the Holy Spirit and the Word; but if the sinner repels that Word and resists the Holy Spirit, and so is not converted, He wills the just damnation of the sinner. . . . For whom Christ shed His precious blood upon the altar of

the cross, they have not been rejected of God by any absolute decree; for these things directly contradict each other, as is apparent. Now in truth Christ upon the altar of the cross shed His precious blood for all men without exception. Therefore no one of them has been rejected of God by any absolute decree. . . . We say that God in view of the satisfaction offered by Christ and received through faith has made the decree of election. . . . We say that many have been reprobated from eternity, not however from any absolute hatred or decree of God, but because God foresaw that they would abide in their unbelief and impenitence." (Locus VII. §§ 95, 106, 148, 177.) As is indicated by the language of Gerhard, the Lutherans were careful to make the condition of the election to eternal life not the foresight of merit, but rather of faith as the instrument for appropriating unmerited grace. In conformity with this standpoint, Quenstedt lays down these propositions: (1.) "Our election was not made on account of the foreseen merits of men, or in view of our works and obedience, but from the mere grace of God." (2.) "We have been elected to eternal life in consideration of faith foreseen as finally apprehending the merit of Christ." (De Prædestinatione, quæst. 2, 4.) At this point the Lutheran phraseology stands in noticeable contrast with that of the Romanists who also advocated a conditional election.

Where unconditional election is renounced, a monergistic theory of conversion is naturally renounced also. But the Lutherans, while rejecting the former, retained, at least quite generally, the latter. The second article of the Formula of Concord distinctly teaches that man co-operates with God only after his conversion or regeneration has been effected, so that there are but two efficient causes of conversion, the Holy Spirit and the Word of God,—the human will, which Melancthon had included as a third cause, being ruled out. The responsibility for conversion, therefore, seems to be thrown wholly upon God. But this

is out of harmony with the statements of the eleventh article, which attributes the entire failure to receive saving benefits to the perversity of the individual. A modern Lutheran comments on this incongruity as follows: "The proposition that the rejection of salvation has its ground in man, neutralizes not only the conception of predestination, but also the conception of grace contained in the Formula of Concord. This proposition demands, according to invincible logic, that the man who can refuse salvation, be not passive (*willenlos*) in laying hold of the same. For he who can oppose and does not oppose, wills not to oppose. And he who wills not to oppose, just wills to receive." (Kahnis, Dogmatik, II. 7.)

As significant definitions of the terms which enter into an account of man's spiritual recovery, we subjoin the following from Hollaz: "Conversion, as transitive, in which the sinner is converted by God, taken in a general sense, includes in its scope illumination, aversion from sin, regeneration, justification, and renovation." Here we have a suggestion of an *ordo salutis* as it was apprehended by this writer. "Regeneration is the act of grace by which the Holy Spirit endows a sinful man with saving faith, in order that, his sins being remitted, he may be made a son of God and an heir of eternal life." (Pars III. sect. 1, cap. 6, 7.)

In the Reformed Church the doctrine of unconditional predestination was championed with an altogether exceptional vigor and interest. Theologians who followed in the trail of Calvin were disposed to make God's predestinating decrees the central sun in the system of Christian doctrine. No entire school besides has shown such an interest in this order of teaching as the school of Calvin.

While Zwingli taught a very radical theory of predestination, the standard was taken from Calvin rather than from him. The main differences were that Zwingli was less cautious in describing the relation of divine agency to sin, and gave a more liberal breadth to the electing

decree, not shunning to include the more virtuous heathen who had never heard the Gospel in this life.

Calvin went beyond Augustine in that he placed a positive decree of God back of the fall. He also gave a more positive cast to the reprobation of the wicked. But save as this latter phase is an outcome of the former, the difference on this point between Augustine and Calvin was not at all material. On the theory of the one as well as of the other, the non-elect are absolutely excluded from any possibility of salvation. The Augustinian scheme is only one degree less arbitrary than that of Calvin. If it does not represent God as foreordaining the fall, it does represent Him as foreordaining that the fall should involve, beyond every chance of rescue, the eternal ruin and damnation of the greater part of the race, who had no responsible part in the fall, except on a notion of responsibility infinitely far-fetched.

According to the teaching of Calvin, the inscrutable decree of God has fixed beyond all contingency the eternal fortune of every human being. Election to eternal life is wholly independent of foreseen merit, faith, or good works. In like manner the decree of reprobation is wholly independent of foreseen demerit, unbelief, or evil works. Everything good in the elect is to be reckoned in the effects, not in the causes of election. The evil in the reprobate, while a matter of guilt to them and a necessary antecedent to their punishment, is not the cause of their final condemnation, for God's irresistible grace, had He been so pleased, could have healed them as well as the elect. These points will be found for the most part in the following quotations from Calvin's Institutes: "Predestination we call the eternal decree of God, by which He has determined in Himself what He would have to become of every individual of mankind. For they are not all created with a similar destiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some and eternal damnation for others.

Every man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these ends, we say he is predestinated either to life or to death." (III. 21.) "In conformity to the clear doctrine of the Scripture, we assert that, by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once for all determined both whom He would admit to salvation and whom He would condemn to destruction. We affirm that this counsel, as far as concerns the elect, is founded on His gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human merit; but that to those whom He devotes to condemnation, the gate of life is closed by a just and irreprehensible, but incomprehensible judgment." (Ibid.) "When God is said to harden or show mercy to whom He pleases, men are taught by this declaration to seek no cause beside His will." (III. 22.) "Whom God passes by He reprobates, and from no other cause than His determination to exclude from the inheritance which He predestines for His children." (III. 23). "That the reprobate obey not the word of God, when made known to them, is justly imputed to the wickedness and depravity of their hearts, provided it be at the same time stated that they are abandoned to this depravity because they have been raised up, by a just and inscrutable judgment of God, to display His glory in their condemnation." (III. 24.)

Equivalent statements might be quoted from Beza. On the subject of reprobation he says: "We ought to distinguish between the purpose of reprobating and the reprobation itself. For God willed that the mystery of the former should be hidden from us, but of the latter and the destruction which depends upon it we have the causes expressed in the Word of God, namely, the corruption, infidelity, and iniquity of the vessels made unto dishonor." (Sum. Tot. Christ.) In other words, while the primary cause of reprobation is God's inscrutable decree, the proximate causes, or the conditions of the execution of the reprobating decree, are the unbelief and wickedness of

the vessels of wrath. As Turretin represents, sin appears rather as the *sine qua non* than as the cause of reprobation. (Locus IV. quæst. 14.) "If sins were the cause of reprobation," says Bucan, "no one would have been elected, since God foresaw that all men are sinners." (Locus XXXVI. Compare Gomar, Disput. de Div. Hom. Prædest.; Zanchi, De Nat. Dei, Lib. V. cap. 2; Piscator, Tract. de Grat. Dei.)

Among Calvinistic creeds the Canons of the Synod of Dort and the Westminster Confession are specially explicit upon the subject of predestination. Both declare that election to life is in no wise based upon foreseen faith, or works, or any good in the creature, and is to be referred solely to the good pleasure of God. The general statement of the subject by the Westminster Confession is as follows: "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished." Statements quite as strong are contained in the Lambeth and the Irish Articles; but neither of these creeds had anything like the same historical importance as the foregoing.

On the Calvinistic theory it follows inevitably that Christ died only for the elect, so far as regards an actual purchase of eternal life or of an opportunity to gain the same. This conclusion was commonly acknowledged. It is clearly implied in this statement of the Westminster Confession: "To all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption He doth certainly and effectually apply and communicate the same." (Chap. VIII.) The Canons of Dort say: "God willed that Christ through the blood of the cross should efficaciously redeem all those, and those alone, who were elected from eternity to salvation." Gomar writes: "Those for

whom Christ died obtain eternal life. But the elect alone, not the reprobate, obtain eternal life. Therefore Christ died for the elect alone, but not for the reprobate." (Explicat. Epist. ad Galat. Compare Turretin, Locus XIV. quæst. 14; Perkins, Order of Predest. in Mind of God; Witsius, De Œconom. Fœd., Lib. II. cap. 9.) There were, however, a few Calvinistic writers who endeavored to unite a theory of universal atonement with their doctrine of specific election. Conspicuous among these was the French theologian Amyraut. He taught that in virtue of Christ's sacrifice salvation is offered to all; but at the same time he held that it is efficaciously applied only to the elect, and is not appropriated by any save the elect. So his distinctions turn out to be of no special worth, except as they indicate an inner ferment and revolt against the rigors of Calvinism. The universal offer of salvation of which he speaks is as remote from accomplishing anything as the *gratia sufficiens* of Adrian VI. and Bellarmin. Richard Baxter held essentially the same theory as Amyraut. Even so strong a Calvinist as Archbishop Usher contended that Christ died for all, His death being of the nature of a general satisfaction by which men are put into a possibility of salvation. But he robs his statement of all practical bearing by teaching that, while Christ died for all, He does not intercede for all, nor intend to apply the benefits of His death effectually to any but the elect. (Judgment of the true Intent and Extent of Christ's Death and Satisfaction upon the Cross. Compare Davenant, Dissertat. de Morte Christi.)

In the early part of the seventeenth century a measure of prominence was given to the question of the proper order of the predestinating decrees. One party, the supralapsarian, made the manifestation of the divine glory by the exercise of compassion and justice (that is, severity) the primal decree, and assigned the connected decrees respecting creation, the fall, the redemption of the vessels of mercy, and the reprobation of the vessels of wrath, to the

rank of means for executing the first decree. The general tenor of Calvin's teaching favored this theory. Beza is reckoned as an undoubted advocate of the same, as also Gomar and Twisse. But the opposing or infra-lapsarian theory claimed the larger patronage in the seventeenth century. This, as represented by Turretin, gives the decrees in the following order: (1.) The decree to create man. (2.) The decree to permit his fall and the ruin thereby of his posterity. (3.) The decree to elect some of the fallen race to salvation, and to leave others in their native corruption and misery. (4.) The decree to send Christ to be the mediator and surety of the elect, and to obtain for them full salvation. (5.) The decree respecting the efficacious calling, endowing with faith, justification, sanctification, and glorification of the elect. (Locus IV. quæst. 18.)

In harmony with their theory of predestination, Calvinists taught a monergistic theory of conversion. Calvin was very emphatic in declaring that what the human will needs is not assistance, but complete transformation. "The will," he says, "is so bound by the slavery of sin, that it cannot excite itself, much less devote itself to anything good; for such a disposition is the beginning of a conversion to God, which in the Scriptures is attributed solely to divine grace. . . . We rob the Lord, if we arrogate anything to ourselves either in volition or in execution. If God were said to assist the infirmity of our will, then there would be something left to us; but since He is said to produce the will, all the good that is in it is placed without us." (Inst., II. 3.) The Canons of Dort describe regeneration as a radical change which God works in us without any contribution on our part. According to the Westminster Confession, the will in those who receive the effectual calling is determined to the good by the omnipotence of God, and they are entirely passive in relation to the work of grace until quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit. Witsius remarks that some among the Reformed theolo-

gians of his time spoke of preparations for regeneration, such as the breaking up of man's natural contumacy, serious consideration of the law, reflection on one's own sins, and a legal fear of punishments. For his own part, however, he says that he considers that those better meet the demands of accurate thinking who include all such exercises among the fruits of regeneration, rather than among preparations for the same. (*De Œconom. Fœd.*, Lib. III. cap. 6.)

The most fruitful reaction against Calvinistic predestinarianism was that initiated by Arminianism in Holland. Whatever other departures from the current theology of the Reformed Church the Arminians may have made, the starting-point of their divergence was a denial of the doctrine of unconditional predestination. They emphasized in common the following points: (1.) Christ died for all, in the sense that by His death all are placed in a possibility of salvation. (2.) The decrees of election and reprobation are conditioned upon God's foreknowledge of the use which men make of the opportunities of salvation. (3.) Grace, while indispensable to man's moral recovery, is not irresistible in its mode. (4.) Saving grace after once being received may be lost. Upon the last point the Arminians for an interval were undecided, but it became soon a recognized part of their theological system.

An absolute decree of reprobation was regarded by the Arminians as at war with every perfection of God, with His holiness, His justice, His sincerity, His wisdom, and His love. They allowed, indeed, that as a matter of fact there are very great diversities in the moral opportunities of men, but denied that this is indicative of an unconditional predestination, or that any are purposely left without sufficient means to secure their salvation. "Upon none," says Curcellæus, "does God bestow these means with so sparing a hand, but that they can if they use them well attain to salvation." (*Lib. VI. cap. 1.*)

Arminianism exercised an important modifying influence upon the theology of the English Church. Primarily that was, no doubt, of the Calvinistic type. Cranmer and Ridley may have been somewhat reserved upon the subject, but they probably took no exception to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. Latimer in his sermons, it must be allowed, seems to speak from the platform of universal redemption. But down to the time of James I. the great body of English theologians were committed to the Calvinistic system. During his reign the tide began to turn in favor of the Arminian type. Distinguished representatives of the Calvinistic bias still appeared, but the preponderance was speedily on the other side, as may be judged from such names as Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, William Sherlock, Bull, Tillotson, Barrow, Cudworth, etc. How little reverence Cudworth entertained for the imposing doctrine of predestination is apparent from the following: "As for those among Christians, who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind for no other end or design but only this, that He might recreate and delight Himself in their eternal torments, these do but transcribe a copy of their own ill-nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring, on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless, these very persons in the mean time dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves." (*Intellect. Syst.*, Chap. V.) An advocate of universal redemption will not deny that Cudworth had some ground for the indignation which is here expressed, but at the same time he must allow in candor that he was far from justice and truth in respect to the motive which he specified as lying back of the predestinarian scheme in the minds of its upholders.

Among English sects, the Quakers were very pronounced in advocating the universality of God's love and gracious provision. They excelled the general body of the Armin-

ians in the distinctness with which they asserted the possible salvation of those to whom the outward call of the Gospel does not come. In Barclay's sixth proposition we have the statement: "‘Christ has tasted death for every man’: not only for all kinds of men, as some vainly talk, but for every one, of all kinds; the benefit of whose offering is not only extended to such who have the distinct outward knowledge of His death and sufferings, as the same is declared in the Scriptures, but even unto those who are necessarily excluded from the benefit of this knowledge by some inevitable accident."

II. Quite an adequate view of the standard Roman Catholic doctrine of justification may be obtained by consulting simply the council of Trent and Bellarmin; only it must be held in mind that the traditional spirit is a powerful factor in determining whether a better or worse construction is put on ingenious statements of theory, and that formal declarations of doctrine are not the whole of Romanism.

The decisions of the council of Trent upon this subject reveal a polemic intent at every turn. They are exceedingly tortuous. Even were one confident of understanding them in all their bearings, many specifications must be omitted in a brief statement. The following, as we think, are the more essential points: (1.) Justification is not simply absolution, not simply God's act of pardoning or declaring just. It is also the making just by the inner work of grace. It includes both pardon and sanctification. In the language of the council, it "is not remission of sins merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man, through the voluntary reception of the grace and the gifts, whereby man of unjust becomes just, and of an enemy a friend." (2.) Justification is accomplished on the part of God by justice or charity infused and made inherent. This is the formal cause of justification, the meritorious cause being Jesus Christ in His work of atone-

ment, and the instrumental cause being the sacrament of baptism. (3.) Among the virtues connected with justification, an eminent place belongs to faith. But it is not to be assigned an exclusive place. The statement that we are justified by faith must be understood in the sense of the Catholic Church, "to wit, that we are therefore said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification." And even upon this language a qualification must be put, for faith is not an independent foundation or root of justification. Apart from hope and charity it has no justifying efficacy. It always requires something that may co-operate with itself. "If any one saith, that by faith alone the impious is justified, in such wise as to mean that nothing else is required to co-operate in order to the obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is not in any way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the movement of his own will, let him be anathema." (4.) Justification is a process. It receives, indeed, a very definite initiation when the sinner is pardoned and ingrafted into Christ, but it is capable from that point of being progressively increased. (5.) Good works are means of increasing justification, and are not merely fruits and signs of justification already obtained. "If any saith that the justice received is not preserved and also increased before God through good works; but that the said works are merely the fruits and signs of justification obtained, but not a cause of the increase thereof; let him be anathema." (6.) The good works of one who is a member of Jesus Christ are not only *instrumental in obtaining* an increase of justification, but they *merit* the highest benefits, and even eternal life.

Thus in the total representation of the council of Trent a conspicuous place is given to man's part, and much is said that leans to the notion that justification is rather something to be earned than a gratuitous gift. To be sure, its beginning is imputed to the prevenient grace of God,

and it is taught that one must be already a member of Christ before his works are properly meritorious. But even the beginning is described as mainly dependent upon a ceremonial act, namely, baptism, and for the increase one is directed in emphatic terms to his own works. Doubtless, one is at liberty to add that every good work must be wrought in a spirit of utter dependence upon divine grace, and with a sense of its worthlessness save as it is accepted through the divine condescension. But this is an addition which is not naturally dictated by the language of the Trent decrees and canons. No more is it dictated by the traditional spirit of Romanism, which directs rather to man's works of ceremonial observance and ecclesiastical obedience, to an unquestioning fulfilment of the Church *régime*, than to any profound reliance in heart upon divine grace. Moreover, it is to be noticed that the council of Trent cumbered the subject with the same adjuncts which were patronized by the mediæval Church. Instead of directing the attention solely to God as revealed in Jesus Christ, it pointed to the veneration of saints, relics, and images, and to the use of indulgences, as channels through which great benefits might appropriately be expected. At the same time it was compelled, in the face of the enormous scandals which had arisen, to utter some warnings against abuse in these things.

Bellarmin's exposition of the subject of justification is essentially an expansion of that given by the council of Trent. Among noteworthy points is the way in which he subordinates faith to the sacraments. "The Catholic faith," he says, "does not allow the grace of justification to be immediately apprehended by faith alone and applied to men, but wills that the sacraments also be necessarily required to this end, so that if faith exists in any one, though it be of the highest degree, it will not nevertheless justify, unless the sacrament is received in fact or in desire; yea, the sacrament is more requisite than faith. For without the

sacrament in fact or in desire, no one is justified, neither child nor adult; but without faith some are justified, as children, who have no faith of their own by which they may receive justification, and yet they are justified through the sacrament of faith." (De Sacramentis, Lib. I. cap. 22.)

As respects the nature of faith, Bellarmin contends that it is not to be confounded with confidence or trust; that it does not necessarily involve love and other virtues, though it cannot justify apart from them; that it is not conditioned upon knowledge; that it is simply assent of mind to whatever God proposes to us as an object of belief, whether it is understood by us or not. Upon this last phase he remarks: "We assent to God, although He proposes things to our faith which we do not understand. . . . We believe the mysteries of faith which surpass reason; we believe, not understand, and through this faith is contradistinguished from definite knowledge, and is better defined by ignorance than by knowledge." (De Justificatione, Lib. I. cap. 5, 7.) It is hardly necessary to add, that faith, as defined by Bellarmin, falls far short of that fruitful principle which the Reformers had in mind.

Bellarmin maintains that good works are necessary to salvation, not merely as a natural and inevitable concomitant of saving grace, but as a cause of salvation, — "*necessaria non solum ratione præsentiæ, sed etiam ratione efficientiæ, quoniam efficiunt salutem, et sine ipsis sola fides non efficit salutem.*" (De Justif., Lib. IV. cap. 7.) Good works, as he represents, accomplish the second justification, that is, what the council of Trent calls an increase of justification. By the first justification a man is made just from unjust; by the second, he is made more just.

Good works, Bellarmin says, merit eternal life, though it is not to be overlooked that back of the human merit, as the ground of its possibility, lies the merit of Christ. As respects trusting in one's merits, he remarks: "The Catholic Church pursues the middle way, which teaches indeed

that the principal hope and faith ought to be placed in God; nevertheless, that some can be placed in merits." (De Justif., Lib. V. cap. 7.) A little farther on, however, he says, in striking contrast with this: "On account of the uncertainty of one's own righteousness and the hazard of vainglory, it is most safe to repose the entire confidence in the sole compassion and kindness of God." (Ibid.) A most just sentiment! But why struggle so laboriously to find a place for merits in which, after all, one had better decline to take any stock whatever?

In the introduction to the period it was shown how commanding a position the doctrine of justification by faith occupied in the religious and theological development of Luther. It is not necessary to repeat here what was then said, but only to look more narrowly into his conception of that doctrine.

With Luther the doctrine of justification by faith was the watchword of a revolt against the monastic element in Romanism, against its legality, against the painful but superficial method of seeking salvation by bearing the yoke of heaped-up human prescriptions. It was an appeal to the generosity of God in Jesus Christ. It emphasized God's readiness for fellowship, and taught that the soul is to gain its Redeemer by a personal affiance with Him in an act of supreme trust, and not by courtly attitudes and addresses or by the servile performances of one laboring for hire. Luther accordingly was naturally more concerned to attack the Romish theory of the method of justification, than the Romish conception of justification itself. The thesis which he was continually advocating was, not that justification consists merely in gratuitous pardon, but that justification is by faith alone. In fact, Luther was apparently disposed to include more than pardon or judicial absolution in his definition of justification. In the Smalcald Articles, for example, he makes it embrace regeneration as well as remission of sins.

The faith which justifies was in the view of Luther vastly more than giving credence to facts of history. He regarded it as emanating from the inmost spring of man's spiritual being, a matter of the heart as well as of the intellect. He emphasized also its personal bearing. It is faith in a living Redeemer, "a certain confidence which apprehends Christ," — *certa fiducia quæ apprehendit Christum*. (Comm. in Epist. ad Galat., Cap. III.) It unites the soul with Christ as the bride with the bridegroom, and transfers to the one the riches of the other. "Christ is full of grace, life, and salvation; the soul is full of sin, death, and damnation. Now let faith intervene, and it will come to pass that sins, death, and hell are Christ's, but grace, life, and salvation belong to the soul." (*De Libertate Christ.*) Faith moreover is such an active principle that it cannot remain idle. It is not itself properly included in the category of works, but it is the vital principle of works, — "*fides non est opus, sed magistra et vita operum.*" (*De Captiv. Bab.*) Love is sure to follow where faith is found, and love does every kind of good work. (*Ibid.*)

Some of Luther's strong expressions read almost like wholesale disparagements of good works. However, it is perfectly clear that what he wished to oppose was, not a high estimate of good works, but trust in them as a ground of justification. The idea he wished to inculcate was, that in the act of seeking grace from God we are not to carry our works into His presence or take any thought about them. Works are not for grace but from grace. They are not a price paid to God, but a free-will offering, given as a spontaneous testimonial of our love to God and our neighbor. When thus relegated to their proper sphere and office, they are valuable beyond estimate. "Apart from the cause of justification, no one can commend good works prescribed by God in a sufficiently lofty strain. Who indeed can proclaim sufficiently the utility and fruit of one work which a Christian does from faith and in

faith? It is more precious than heaven and earth." (Comm. in Epist. ad Galat., Cap. III.)

Protestantism accepted the general theory of justification as outlined by Luther. At the same time, it gave more precise limits to the significance of the term. The more current theory embraced the following points: (1.) Justification is the act of God in pardoning a sinner and receiving him into favor. It is what God does for a man, not what He works in him. It may indeed be regarded as including several aspects, such as the non-imputation of sin, the imputation of righteousness, and adoption. So some writers specified. But in all of its aspects it is a judicial act of God, and is to be distinguished from the work of renovation or sanctification which is wrought in the individual. Sanctification, at least in its initial stage, always goes with justification, but in nature it is a distinct thing. Among Lutheran confessions the Formula of Concord declares that the term justification should be used in this forensic sense. It is used in the same sense by various Reformed confessions, such as the Second Helvetic and the Westminster. Calvin says of justification, "It consists in the remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ." (Inst., III. 11.) Turretin remarks, that imputation of righteousness is the foundation and meritorious cause of justification, while absolution and adoption, derived from this imputation, are the two inseparable parts of justification. (Locus XVI. quæst. 4.) John Owen in his treatise on justification says, "It comprises both the non-imputation of sin and the imputation of righteousness, with the privilege of adoption and right unto the heavenly inheritance which are inseparable from it." (2.) Justification is by faith alone. Works are entirely excluded from the ground of justification, and are included only among its fruits and evidences. But while faith alone justifies, the faith which justifies is not alone. It is not a principle which admits of being isolated. The various Christian graces

must coexist with it, and it must serve as a fountain of good works. "After that man is justified by faith," says the Formula of Concord, "then that true and living faith works by love, and good works always follow justifying faith, and are most certainly found together with it, provided only it be a true and living faith. For true faith is never alone, but has always charity and hope in its train." Equivalent statements appear in the Westminster and other confessions. (3.) The office of faith in justification is purely instrumental. It is the instrument by which, according to divine appointment, Christ is apprehended as the soul's righteousness. "We do not mean," says the Belgic Confession, "that faith itself justifies us, for it is only an instrument with which we embrace Christ, our Righteousness." (4.) While the general object of faith is all that is contained in the Word of God, the specific object is the promise of grace through Jesus Christ. Trust in that promise is indeed the characteristic feature of justifying faith. (5.) Blind assent is no part of justifying faith. It is akin to knowledge rather than to ignorance. Where God works faith, He also works enlightenment. Luther may have said some things counter to this specification, but it was distinctly affirmed by Calvin, Turretin, Gerhard, and others.

Outside of this main current of Protestantism there were some deviating opinions which may receive a brief attention. Osiander taught that in justification the sinner is made just by an infusion of the divine nature of Christ, this infusion taking place in a single act, without merit on the part of the recipient, and on the simple ground of his faith. (Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. I.)

Some of the Arminians, instead of making faith the instrument for grasping the righteousness of Christ, said that our faith is graciously and for Christ's sake imputed to us for righteousness. (Limborch, *Lib. VI. cap. 4.*) This, however, was not altogether an innovation. Notwithstanding the trend of teaching among the Lutherans

and the Reformed, some of their early writers had used language affiliating with the same conception. (See Richard Watson, *Institutes*, Pt. II. chap. 23.) Richard Baxter seems to have held the same view. It also appears in the Scripture Catechism of John Biddle.

A number of Anglican theologians near the close of the period showed a disinclination to allow that works are nothing more than fruits and evidences of justifying faith. Prominent among these was Bishop Bull. While he discountenanced trust in the merit of works, he held that good works proceeding from faith enter into the conditions of the new covenant. They are a part of the Gospel requirement, and contribute to the justification of him who performs them. As naturally follows from these premises, Bishop Bull maintained that justification is continuous, and not fully consummated till the end of life. (*Harmonia Apostolica*, etc.) Jeremy Taylor departed no less from the common representation, maintaining that charity and obedience are as truly as faith among the conditions of justification.

In the theory of the Quakers, justification was identified with sanctification, or the inward birth in the heart. "It is this inward birth," says Barclay, "bringing forth righteousness and holiness in us, that doth justify us. . . . Justification is both more properly and frequently in Scripture taken in its proper signification, for making one just, and not merely reputed one such, and is all one with sanctification." (*Apology*.) Good works as necessarily flowing from the new birth may be styled the *sine qua non* of justification, though they are not the cause of its bestowment. The Mennonites also included sanctification in their definition of justification.

III. The Roman Catholic Church remained by the position that assurance of being in a state of grace is an exceptional gift, the great majority of believers being obliged to be satisfied with a simple probability on this subject. (Council

of Trent, Decree on Justification, Chap. IX.; Bellarmin, *De Justif.*, Lib. III. cap. 3.) The Reformers, on the other hand, took strong ground as respects the common privilege of believers to be certified of their salvation. Luther denounced the theory of the Romish Church as one of the principal robberies which had been committed against Christians. "The Pope," he says, "by this infamous dogma, by which he has commanded men to doubt respecting the favor of God toward themselves, has banished God and all the promises from the Church, overthrown the benefits of Christ, and abolished the entire Gospel. Such unwholesome results necessarily follow, because men depend not upon the promising God, but upon their own works and merits." (*Comm. in Epist. ad Galat.*, Cap. IV.) According to Luther, the evidence of our sonship is given in such a way as to effect in us "the consciousness that what our heart testifies is the result of the testimony of the Spirit, and not the imagination of the flesh." (*Dorner, Hist. of Prot. Theol.*) Calvin also taught that the believer has a veritable assurance, and is not left simply to a moral conjecture respecting his salvation. Commenting on Romans viii. 16, he says, "This certainty proceedeth not from man's brain, but is the testimony of the Spirit of God." (*Compare Turretin, Locus IV. quæst. 14.*)

It would appear that in the earlier stages of Protestantism theologians were inclined to regard assurance as necessarily implied in justifying faith. "The Reformers," says Cunningham, speaking of assurance, "in general maintained its necessity, and in order, as it were, to secure it in the speediest and most effectual way, usually represented it as necessarily involved in the very nature of the first completed act of saving faith." (*Historical Theology*, Vol. II.) Many of the later writers renounced this position. Such was the case with the Westminster divines. They contended, indeed, that believers may attain unto "an infallible assurance of faith, founded upon the divine truth of the

promises of salvation, the inward evidences of those graces unto which these promises are made, the testimony of the Spirit of adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God." But they added: "This infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence of faith but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties before he be a partaker of it." (Chap. XVIII.) Other instances of a relaxation of the primitive Protestant doctrine might be cited. Bishop Joseph Hall, for example, writes: "It is not for every man to mount up this steep hill of assurance; every soul must breathe and pant towards it as he may, even as we would and must to perfection: he is as rare as happy that attains it." (Works, Vol. VI. p. 356.) The Bishop here speaks indeed of the assurance of eternal salvation; but it was the common verdict of Protestants holding, as he did, to an absolute election, that assurance of present involves assurance of eternal salvation. Bishop Bull, while not in favor of an absolute predestination, agreed with Bishop Hall in making assurance an exceptional experience. "A full assurance of salvation," he says, "is that which few of the best of Christians can boast of." (Discourse III., Vol. II.)

IV. It was the common and oft-repeated assertion of Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians, that no one can expect to keep perfectly the law of God in this life, or to be entirely free from inbred sin. This was the dominant theory of Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There was, however, a measure of exception. Arminius regarded the common theory as at least open to question. In his Declaration before the States of Holland he says: "While I never asserted that a believer could perfectly keep the precepts of Christ in this life, I never denied it, but always left it as a matter which has still to be decided." His followers were more decided, and advocated the positive position that it is possible for the Christian in this life to advance to such spiritual maturity as to

be able perfectly to keep the law of God. At the same time they were not concerned to maintain that this standard has often been realized. They held it up as an attainable, though very difficult ideal. (Episcopus, *Responsio ad Quæstiones*, XIX.; Curcellæus, *Lib. VII. cap. 1, 2*; Limborch, *Lib. V. cap. 15*.) The Quakers, on the other hand, not only affirmed the possibility of this perfection, but commended it as an object of practical interest by representing that it often has been attained. "This perfection or freedom from sin," says Barclay, "is possible, because many have attained it, according to the express testimony of Scripture." (Apology.) The same writer affirms that it is probable that one in this life may reach a state where he is free, not only from the act of sinning, but also from the liability. He says, "I will not deny but there may be a state attainable in this life, in which to do righteousness may become so natural to the regenerate soul that in the stability of this condition they cannot sin." (Ibid.)

The Roman Catholic theory of saintship and of superabundant merit implies of course the possibility of an entire freedom from sin. It should be noticed, however, that the Roman Catholic definition of sin was not equally comprehensive with that of Lutherans and Calvinists. The latter maintained that concupiscence in the regenerate, even when not actually yielded to, is of the nature of sin. The former denied this conclusion.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

IN the Roman Catholic communion, the mediæval view of the Church as a definite organism, bound together by a connected hierarchy culminating in the Pope, was everywhere maintained. Membership in the Church thus defined was regarded, to the same extent as in the mediæval theory, necessary to salvation. The Church, or the ecclesiastical state, was looked upon as precisely analogous to the civil state. This appears clearly in the very exact description of Bellarmin. "Our opinion is," he says, "that there is only one Church, not two, and that that one and true Church is a company of men bound together by the profession of the same Christian faith and by communion of the same sacraments, under the government of legitimate pastors, and especially of the Roman pontiff, Christ's only vicar upon earth. From which definition it can easily be inferred what men belong to the Church, and who indeed do not belong to it; for there are three parts of this definition, profession of the true faith, communion of sacraments, and subjection to the legitimate pastor, the Roman pontiff. By reason of the first part, all unbelievers are excluded, both those who never were in the Church, as Jews, Turks, Pagans, and those who have been, but have departed, as heretics and apostates; by reason of the second part, catechumens and the excommunicated are excluded, since the former have not been admitted to the

communion of the sacraments, and the latter have been dismissed therefrom; by reason of the third part, schismatics are excluded, who have faith and sacraments, but are not in subjection to the legitimate pastor, and therefore profess faith and receive sacraments without. But included are all others, though they are reprobate, criminal, and impious. And there is this difference between our opinion and all others, that all others require interior virtues for constituting any one within the Church, and moreover make the true Church invisible: but even if we believe that all virtues are found in the Church, faith, hope, charity, and the rest, nevertheless we do not think that, in order that any one may be called absolutely a part of the true Church concerning which the Scriptures speak, any interior virtue is required, but only an external profession of faith, and a communion of the sacraments, which is perceived by the sense itself. For the Church is a company of men, just as visible and palpable as is the company of the Roman people, or the kingdom of France, or the republic of the Venetians." (De Concil. et Eccl. Militante, Lib. III. cap. 3.)

Along with this resemblance to the civil state, the Church has, according to Bellarmin, full prerogatives over the bodies of men. To be sure, it may not act as the immediate instrument in the infliction of corporal punishments; but it has authority to deliver men over to the civil arm for the express purpose of being corporally punished, and has authority over princes to compel them, under penalty of dethronement, to do what the interests of the Church demand. (De Sum. Pontif., Lib. V. cap. 6.) These two things put together evidently amount to an authority theoretically unrestricted in the visitation of corporal punishments for offences against the Church. As respects the penalties suitable for the incorrigible heretic, Bellarmin contends that it is the common opinion of Catholics that death by burning is entirely legitimate, and that the Church as a matter of fact has burned her-

etics in innumerable instances. (De Membris Eccl. Mil., Lib. III. cap. 21, 22.) Among the prime duties of the State in its relation to the Church, he specifies the obligation to curb liberty of belief. "This liberty," he says, "is ruinous to the Church, for the bond of the Church is the confession of one faith, and therefore dissension in faith is the dissolution of the Church." He adds: "Liberty of belief is most pernicious to those very persons to whom it is granted; for liberty of belief is nothing else than liberty to err, and to err in a matter the most perilous of all." (Ibid., III. 18.)

After the council of Trent there was an increasing tendency to the Ultramontane theory, as opposed to the Gallican which won the ascendancy at the council of Constance. Bellarmin may be taken as a representative of this tendency, to which indeed his order as a whole made important contributions. The only right which he really leaves to the Church over against the Pope is a kind of revolutionary right, to which resort may be made in case of an extreme exigency. He says, that if the Roman pontiff should be suspected of heresy, or should appear to be an incorrigible tyrant, a general council should be assembled, for deposing him if he is found to be an heretic, or for admonishing him if he seems to be incorrigible in his behavior. (De Concil. et Eccl. Mil., Lib. I. cap. 9.) But, on the other hand, he says: "The supreme pontiff is simply and absolutely above the Universal Church, and above the general council, so that he recognizes no judgment in the earth above himself. This is almost a matter of faith. . . . It is certain that the shepherd is so placed over the sheep that in no way can he be judged by them. . . . The supreme pontiff cannot commit either to a council or to any man a coactive judgment over himself, but only an advisory one," — *sed tantum discretivum*. (Ibid., II. 17, 18.) If these statements are to stand, it clearly follows, as was stated above, that only by a kind of violence to the constitution of the

Church, or a revolutionary proceeding, can a pope be judged and deposed from office.

On the infallibility of the Pope, Bellarmin makes the following statements, in which, it will be seen, he anticipated the decisions of the last Vatican council: "The supreme pontiff, when he teaches the whole Church in these matters which pertain to faith, can in no case err. . . . Not only in decrees of faith is the supreme pontiff incapable of erring, but also in precepts of morals which he prescribes to the whole Church, and which are concerned with things necessary to salvation, or with those which are good *per se* or evil *per se*. . . . The Catholic faith teaches, that every virtue is good and every vice is evil; but if the Pope might err in prescribing vices, or in prohibiting virtues, the Church would be bound to believe that vices are good and virtues evil, unless it should be willing to sin against conscience; for in doubtful matters the Church is bound to acquiesce in the judgment of the supreme pontiff, and to do what he prescribes, and to forbear to do what he prohibits. And that it may not perchance sin against conscience, it is bound to believe that to be good which he prescribes, that to be evil which he prohibits. . . . It is probable, and can be piously believed, that the supreme pontiff, not only as pontiff cannot err, but also as a particular person cannot be a heretic by pertinaciously believing contrary to the faith any false thing." (De Summo Pontif., Lib. IV. cap. 3-6.) Among expressions of the opposing or Gallican theory of the papacy, perhaps the most important in this period was that put forth by an assembly of French clergy in 1682, to the effect that the Pope's authority lies under restrictions, and is subordinate to that of a general council. Bossuet was conspicuous in defending this view, and devoted an elaborate work to the purpose. (*Defensio Declarationis Cleri Gallicani de Ecclesiastica Potestate.*)

The Augsburg Confession gave the essentials of the standard Protestant definition of the Church. "The Church," it

says, "is the congregation of saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments rightly administered." The same definition, with some limiting clauses, appears in the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. Article XIX. says: "The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached, and the sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's ordinance, in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same." Luther seems to have been well satisfied with this order of definition. He remarks: "Where the Word and the sacraments remain as to substance, there is the holy Church, notwithstanding Antichrist may reign there." (Comm. in Epist. ad Galat. Cap. I.) "Wherever," says Calvin, "we find the Word of God purely preached and heard, and the sacraments administered according to the institution of Christ, there, it is not to be doubted, is a church of God." (Inst., IV. 1.) In some instances, besides the two marks of the Church specified in the preceding statements, a third was included, namely, a proper maintenance of discipline. Thus the Belgic Confession says: "The marks by which the true Church is known are these: if the pure doctrine of the Gospel is preached therein; if she maintains the pure administration of the sacraments as instituted by Christ; if church discipline is exercised in punishing sin."

The above are definitions of the visible Church. But Protestants were by no means disposed strictly to identify the Church, even upon earth, with any definite visible organism, and so laid much stress upon the invisible Church. This they regarded as being in the truest sense the Catholic Church, and included in it all true believers, the whole body of the elect of God. "The Catholic or Universal Church," says the Westminster Confession, "which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fulness,

of Him that filleth all in all." (Compare Irish Articles; Scotch Confession; Baptist Confession of 1688; Confession of the Waldenses.) According to the prevailing Protestant conception, large portions of the visible Church might be outside of the invisible, but few indeed were the representatives of the invisible Church that could be found outside of the visible, or at least among those who had not been specifically instructed in the truths of the Christian religion. The Quakers, it is true, maintained that, in virtue of the inner light some growing up in heathenism might be within the pale of the true Church. But probably Melancthon did not give much narrower bounds to the invisible Church than were assigned to it by the main current of Protestant sentiment in his own and the following age, when he wrote: "As often as we think of the Church, let us direct our attention to the company of the called which is the visible Church, nor let us dream that there are any elect elsewhere than in this visible company. For God neither wishes to be invoked nor to be acknowledged otherwise than He has revealed Himself. Nor has He revealed Himself elsewhere than in the visible Church, in which alone sounds the voice of the Gospel." (*Loci, De Ecclesia*. Compare Quenstedt, *De Eccl.*, quæst. 2.)

Possibly a somewhat more liberal position might have been taken, had it not been forestalled almost at the beginning of the Reformation by the enthusiasts and agitators who appealed to the direct illumination of the Holy Spirit. Such manifestations naturally led to increased stress upon regularly constituted ecclesiastical authorities as channels of instruction and guidance. The same cause served also as an incentive to a rigorous theory and practice in dealing with heresy, though the principal cause here may well be sought in the natural impulse of men, who have once embraced and established a scheme, to look upon everything opposed thereto as savoring of sacrilegious license. Religious liberty, save as it may receive unusual support from

generous and gifted natures or from favoring circumstances, is not likely to be securely established in a community apart from a long and painful tuition. As previously stated, the logical outcome of the principles of the Reformation was religious tolerance. Some of the early Reformers, too, were at least opposed to punishing heresy with the extreme penalty. "Luther again and again expressed himself very emphatically against visiting the death penalty upon teachers of false doctrine." (Köstlin.) Bellarmin grants that this was his position; at least he blames him for agreeing with the assertion of Huss, that it is not lawful to deliver the incorrigible heretic over to the secular arm, and to allow him to be burned. (De Memb. Eccl. Mil., Lib. III. cap. 21.) In the view of Zwingli, "the magistrate ought only then to use force, when heresy overcome by the Word contends against the truth in a tumultuous way." (Zeller.) But some took more radical ground. The dealing of Calvin with Servetus, and his advice to the Earl of Somerset to repress the Papists and the fanatical sect of Gospellers, indicate at least that he was disposed to place some classes of religionists beyond the pale of tolerance. Beza argued, in the most express terms, that no class of men ought to be visited with heavier punishments than heretics, false prophets, and blasphemers. (Confessio, cap. 5; De Hæreticis a Civili Magistratu Puniendis.) According to Turretin, the most pestilent heretics, such as resist all means of amendment and disturb both Church and State, may be capitally punished. His words are: "Factitious heresiarchs and incorrigible blasphemers, ceasing not to scatter their poison, against prohibitions frequently repeated, and faith given, and disturbing the republic and the Church, we judge can be punished with death." (Locus XVIII. quæst. 34.) Perkins taught that atheists ought to be punished with death, and declared that the greatest tortures which the wit of man can devise are too good for them. (Cases of Conscience, Bk. II. chap. 2.) He says

also, that recusants may properly be compelled to the exercises of religion, and a certain Mr. Cudworth, who completed his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, makes the kindred statement: "The magistrate may and ought to compel obstinate recusants to profess the true religion." The Westminster divines declared, indeed, that God alone is Lord of the conscience; but they understood at the same time that God's Word binds the conscience, and that this Word makes many things concerning faith and worship, as well as general conduct, so clearly known, that he who contradicts them is justly subject to correction by the civil magistrate. (Chap. XX., XXIII.) However, there was another current within the bounds of Protestantism. The number of those who inclined to the liberal maxims which the Prince of Orange advocated and exemplified in the sixteenth century, greatly increased during the seventeenth century. Among the various parties who were friendly to tolerance, whether Arminians, Independents, or the more liberal wing of the Established Church of England, none excelled the Quakers in the definiteness and emphasis with which they advocated religious freedom. In their Confession it is said that "all killing, banishing, fining, imprisoning, and other such things, which men are afflicted with for the alone exercise of their conscience, or difference in worship or opinion, proceedeth from the spirit of Cain, the murderer, and is contrary to the truth." Roger Williams and his Baptist followers were also very pronounced advocates of tolerance.

In its view of the Christian priesthood, Protestantism departed widely from Romanism. Instead of making the congregation an attachment to the hierarchy, a company absolutely reduced to the position of subjects, it declared that all are by right priests, and that he who for the sake of necessary order and convenience is specially commissioned to conduct worship and exercise pastoral care is the servant and representative of the congregation. Luther

early declared very emphatically for this universal priesthood. At the same time he said: "Even if it is true that we are all equally priests, we are not all able, neither ought if we were able, publicly to serve and to teach. . . . What belongs in common to all, no one is able to arrogate particularly to himself, until he is called." (De Lib. Christ.; De Captiv. Bab.) The same idea was brought out by the Second Helvetic Confession in the distinction made between *sacerdotium* and *ministerium*, of which the former alone pertains to all believers.

As respects Church government Protestants generally regarded its form as largely optional. Even in the Church of England, where the hierarchical constitution was retained, such constitution was not regarded as of the essence of the Church. Men like Cranmer, Hooker, and even Whitgift, did not consider episcopacy to be of divine right. The first of the English prelates to advocate such right is said to have been Bancroft. In 1588, as an offset to the Puritan doctrine maintained by Thomas Cartwright and others, that the presbyterian form is prescribed in the New Testament, he set up the claim that episcopacy is the form divinely sanctioned and prescribed. This theory, once started, rapidly won ground, though there were eminent Episcopalians in the next century, such as Usher and Stillingfleet, who adhered to the primitive and more liberal standpoint.

In their sharp antagonism to Romanism, Protestants for the most part denied to the Roman Catholic communion the character of a true Church. They regarded Romanism as the great apostasy, and freely styled the Pope Antichrist. So he is called even in some of the confessions. The weak points in the theory of the primacy were ably exposed by various writers. Some cogent strictures were made by Calvin. He says, for example, supposing a primacy was given to Peter, "how will they prove that its seat was fixed at Rome, so that whoever is bishop of that city must preside over the whole world? By what right do they restrict to

one place this dignity, which was conferred without the mention of any place? Peter, they say, lived and died at Rome. What shall we say of Christ Himself? Was it not at Jerusalem that He exercised the office of a bishop while he lived, and fulfilled the priestly office by His death? The Prince of pastors, the supreme Bishop, the Head of the Church, could not obtain this honor for the place where He lived and died; could then Peter, who was far inferior to Him?" (Inst., IV. 6.)

SECTION II. — THE SACRAMENTS.

1. GENERAL THEORY OF THE SACRAMENTS. — The more important specifications of the council of Trent upon the sacraments in general were the following: (1.) They are seven in number. (2.) They are necessary to justification, so that they must be received, or at least desired. (3.) They contain the grace which they signify, and confer this *ex opere operato*, or through the act performed, upon one not presenting an obstacle. (4.) The intention on the part of the priest of really executing the sacrament is essential to its validity. (5.) The three sacraments, baptism, confirmation, and order, impress an indelible character or sign upon the soul of the recipient. The fourth specification is in these words: "If any one saith, that, in ministers, when they effect and confer the sacraments, there is not required the intention at least of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema." An additional statement bearing on the same point is given by the council in connection with the sacrament of penance, where it is said: "The penitent ought not so to confide in his own personal faith as to think that — even though there be no contrition on his part, or no intention on the part of the priest of acting seriously and absolving truly — he is nevertheless truly and in God's sight absolved, on account of his faith alone. For neither

would faith without penance bestow any remission of sins, nor would he be otherwise than most careless of his own salvation, who, knowing that a priest absolved him but in jest, should not carefully seek for another who would act in earnest." It is to be noticed here, that "acting seriously" and "acting in earnest" are used in describing the proper intention on the part of the priest.

Bellarmin interprets the statement that sacraments are effective *ex opere operato*. This phrase, he says, does not denote that certain subjective states are not essential in adults, but that the efficacy of the sacraments is not due to these states, and that they are involved in the fact that the individual does not interpose obstacles. He states the matter in this wise: "Will, faith, and penitence are necessarily required in the adult candidate, as dispositions on the part of the subject, not as active causes: for faith and penitence do not effect the sacramental grace, nor do they give the efficacy of the sacrament, but they merely remove obstacles, which hinder the sacraments from being able to exercise their own efficacy." (De Sacramentis, Lib. II. cap. 1.) "He cannot properly be said not to present an obstacle who comes to the sacrament without the necessary disposition; otherwise, not only without detestation of sin, but also without faith one could be justified through baptism." (De Pœnitentia, Lib. II. cap. 9.) This must be classed among the more moderate of Roman Catholic views of the subject. In practical as well as theoretical stress upon the right subjective conditions, as affecting the efficacy of the sacraments, the Jansenists were distinguished above all other Romanists.

As respects the intention of the ministering priest, Bellarmin teaches in the most unmistakable terms that it is necessary. The kind of intention that is requisite he describes as the *intentio virtualis*. The *intentio actualis* is not strictly necessary, the *intentio habitualis* does not suffice. The *intentio virtualis* has place where an operation

is continued in virtue of an actual intention which was at one time present but is so no longer. In answer to the objection of Calvin, that dependence upon the intention of the minister destroys certitude, Bellarmin says: "I reply, a man ought not in this world to seek an infallible certitude concerning his own salvation or justification. . . . But a human and moral certitude, in which a man may properly rest, we have from the sacraments, even if they depend upon the intention of another. For since it is most easy to have the intention, there is no cause to doubt that the minister has the intention, unless he reveals its absence by some exterior sign." (De Sacramentis, Lib. I. cap. 27, 28.) It is to be noticed, that Bellarmin does not say that the design to go through the bare externals of the sacramental rite is essential, or all that is essential, to a proper intention. That he included more than this in such an intention is evident from the way in which he replies to Calvin. Nicole, who puts the construction in question upon the Trent canon, (Instructions sur les Sacraments,) contradicts the history of the tenet, as well as the rational demands of the case. A priest can intend to go through the exact formula of a sacrament as a jest or pantomime, whereas to intend to do what the Church does he must seriously design that the sacrament should be a means of grace. The language of the council of Trent about *acting seriously* and *in earnest* cannot properly be regarded as meaning less than this. But while one cannot agree with Nicole's construction of the dogma, he can understand his uneasiness over the same. It is a dogma at once abhorrent in the dependence in which it places souls upon human caprice, and perilous to the Romish fabric, inasmuch as it puts in question the validity of holy orders. Some of the fathers at Trent were not wholly blind to the former phase. One of the bishops argued against the necessity of the inward intention, and pointed his argument by supposing a case where a priest, who, being an infidel and a

formal hypocrite, might despoil a whole congregation of the sacraments, and cause the perdition of children from lack of valid baptism. "The divines," says Sarpi, "did not approve this doctrine, yet were troubled, and knew not how to resolve the reason. But they still maintained that the true intention of the minister was necessary, either actual or virtual, and that without it the sacrament was not of force, notwithstanding any external demonstration." These words show how far was Sarpi's understanding of the dogma, as well as that of the Trent fathers, from Nicole's interpretation.

In place of the seven sacraments of Romanism, Protestantism affirmed but two, though not universally in the first stage of its history. Luther sometimes spoke of three sacraments, baptism, eucharist, and absolution. Melancthon gave the same list, and said that, for his part, he should be pleased to include ministerial ordination. (*Loci, De Sacramentis.*) The Lutherans, however, though continuing to lay considerable stress upon the rite of confession and absolution, did not make it properly a sacrament. "Absolution," says Chemnitz, "is not truly and properly a sacrament in the same way as are baptism and the Lord's supper." (*Examen Decret. Concil. Tridentini, Pars II.*) Gerhard and other distinguished Lutheran writers took the same ground.

Different degrees of stress were laid by different parties upon the necessity of the sacraments; but no Protestant communion went quite as far as the Roman Catholic upon this point, as none expressly excluded all infants dying without baptism from salvation.

With the exception of the Lutherans, Protestants commonly defined sacraments as signs and seals of divine grace. The following statement of the Heidelberg Catechism is representative: "The sacraments are visible holy signs and seals, appointed of God to this end, that by the use thereof He may the more fully declare and seal to us

the promise of the Gospel." By Zwingli the symbolical import of the sacraments, and their use as a common means of confessing discipleship, were emphasized. The Arminians also laid the chief stress upon this order of considerations. Calvin made prominent, in addition, the idea that the sacraments are means of presenting or exhibiting divine benefits and occasions of the invisible operation of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers. At the same time, he denied that they confer grace in their own virtue. We are not, he says, to be led by the extravagant language of the fathers to suppose "there is some secret power annexed and attached to the sacraments, so that they communicate the grace of the Holy Spirit, just as wine is given in the cup; whereas the only office assigned to them by God is to testify and confirm His benevolence toward us; nor do they impart any benefit, unless they are accompanied by the Holy Spirit to open our minds and hearts and render us capable of receiving this testimony." (Inst., IV. 14.) The Westminster Confession asserts the same view in these words: "The grace which is exhibited in or by the sacraments, rightly used, is not conferred by any power in them." (Chap. XXVII.) In the Lutheran theory, on the other hand, a sacrament was regarded as something more than a sign, a seal, or an occasion of grace, and was termed an *instrumental cause* or *efficacious medium* of grace. This was quite in harmony with the Lutheran ideas that the Word has intrinsic power, and that the Word is the principal factor in a sacrament. Gerhard accordingly expressly condemns the Calvinian theory as assigning too little efficacy to the sacraments themselves. (Locus XVIII. § 56.) As thus defined, the Lutheran view appears to be not a little in affinity with the Roman Catholic doctrine that the sacrament works *ex opere operato*. But this doctrine was repudiated by Lutherans, as well as by other Protestants. However, the main difference between the Roman Catholic theory, as expounded

by Bellarmin, and the Lutheran, is that the one requires faith, because the lack of it would be an obstacle to the grace of the sacrament, and the other requires faith as the necessary organ or instrument for grasping the offered grace. In addition to this, account must of course be taken of the fact that Bellarmin gives the least ultra of Roman Catholic theories on the subject, and still more of the fact that faith, in the Lutheran sense, is a much profounder principle than it is in the definition of Bellarmin and other Romanists. As respects the requirement of intention in the administrator, the Romish theory was universally repudiated by Protestants.

2. BAPTISM. — The mediæval view of the effect and the necessity of baptism, as defined by leading scholastics, remained in the Romish Church unchanged. It was regarded as cancelling guilt, ameliorating corruption, and, according to the specification of Bellarmin, it supplies the perfect faith in place of the imperfect which may exist prior to its administration. Bellarmin decides that an unbaptized catechumen can be saved in virtue of his purpose to be baptized when the opportunity is offered. But he makes such purpose indispensable. "Whoever is not baptized," he says, "or at least does not desire baptism, is not saved, although it happens from ignorance or impotence." (*De Sacramentis*, Lib. I. cap. 22.) This of course leaves to the unbaptized dying in infancy no opportunity whatever to be saved. This conclusion Bellarmin draws in all its rigor. "The Church," he says, "has always believed that infants perish if they depart from this life without baptism." The ground of their condemnation he states thus: "Although it is no fault of children that they are not baptized, they do not perish nevertheless without fault of their own, for they have original sin." (*De Baptismo*, cap. 4.) Nicole and Bossuet declare, in equally unequivocal terms, that unbaptized infants cannot be saved. The Trent Catechism plainly implies the same conclusion. Thus, according to

the standard Roman Catholic teaching, a large portion of the race are shut out from all possibility of salvation by a decree as arbitrary as the decree of reprobation advocated by ultra predestinarians.

The Lutherans approximated to the Roman Catholics in their stress upon the necessity and the efficacy of baptism. They differed, however, in a measure, upon the former point, since they allowed that unbaptized children of Christian parents might, by the extraordinary grace of God, be saved. To be sure, the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord condemn the Anabaptist theory, that infants should not receive baptism, and are saved without it. But so far as these condemnatory sentences bore upon the latter item, they were taken with a qualification. Representative Lutheran theologians, however reserved they may have been on the fate of heathen children, taught distinctly enough, that children of Christian parents departing without baptism are not necessarily deprived of salvation. (Gerhard, *Confess. Cath.*; *Locus XX.* §§ 237-242; Quenstedt, *De Baptismo*, quæst. 10.) At the same time, they strongly emphasized the duty of parents to make sure of the baptism of their children, and, like the Roman Catholics, authorized its performance by the hands of a layman in case of necessity.

In accordance with their general theory of the efficacy of the sacraments, the Lutherans taught that baptism is an efficacious medium of spiritual benefits. To be sure, in some instances, the gifts of which it is the channel may have been in large part already grasped by the faith of the candidate; but in any case in which it is properly received it is a medium of grace, and seals and confirms whatever may have been conferred previously. To the believing candidate it secures remission of all sins, adoption, and inward renovation. This last, however, is not complete, and is to be carried forward from day to day toward perfection.

Infant children, as well as adults, according to the Lu-

theran theory, receive the spiritual benefits of baptism. This conclusion involved a measure of difficulty for its advocates. The general Lutheran theory strongly emphasized the need of faith as the instrument by which spiritual benefits are received. But can infants exercise faith? Luther showed a certain disposition to answer this question in the affirmative, and sometimes spoke of faith as an actual endowment of the infant. However, in his final view he was inclined to leave this point to the doctors, and to affirm that baptism is efficacious in the case of infants, on the simple ground that God has ordained it for them. (Dorner.) The Lutheran doctors, as it seems, came to the conclusion that there is a real faith in infants in connection with the act of baptism. Quenstedt, for example, says: "Through baptism and in baptism the Holy Spirit awakens in infants a true, saving, living, and actual faith." (De Baptismo, Sect. II. quæst. 8.) "We affirm," says Gerhard, "that the Holy Spirit, in the performance of baptism, by His grace and efficacy works faith, which is not inactive or a naked habit, but by some act, whose mode is inexplicable to us, it puts on Christ, and is made participant of regeneration and salvation." (Confess. Cath., p. 1116. Compare Locus XX. §§ 218-232; Hollaz, Pars III. sect. 2, cap. 3, qu. 17.) It will be observed that the passages quoted speak of faith as wrought in and by baptism, rather than as antecedent to the same. This was characteristic of the thought of the time. Speaking of infant subjects, Dorner says: "The Lutheran theology of the seventeenth century abandoned the standpoint, that faith must be required *before* baptism, considering it rather, in opposition to Baptist teaching, as the effect of baptism, like regeneration." (System of Christ. Doct., § 139.)

In the Reformed Church less stress was in general laid upon the necessity of baptism than in the Lutheran. A token of this appears in the fact that the former discouraged the practice of resorting to lay baptism in case of

emergency, maintaining that the omission of the sacrament in such a case cannot be a source of injury. "If the omission of the sign," says Calvin, "be not occasioned by indolence, or contempt, or negligence, we are safe from all danger. It is far more consistent with piety to show this reverence to the institution of God, not to receive the sacraments from any other hands than those to which the Lord has committed them. When it is impossible to receive them from the Church, the grace of God is not so attached to them but that we may obtain it by faith from the Word of the Lord." (Inst., IV. 15.) "That the contempt of baptism damneth," says Bishop Hall, "is past all doubt; but that the constrained absence thereof should send infants to hell, is a cruel rashness." (Works, Vol. VI. p. 248.)

Those inclined to the Zwinglian conception of the sacraments laid but moderate stress upon the efficacy of baptism, as respects any direct communication of grace, and regarded it as designed rather to testify to existing faith, than to effect an increase. But a more emphatic view prevailed quite generally in the Reformed Church. This appears in some of the creeds. In the Scotch Confession it is said: "We assuredly believe that by baptism we are engrafted into Christ Jesus, to be made partakers of His justice, by which our sins are covered and remitted." In the Thirty-nine Articles baptism is styled a sign of regeneration, an instrument for grafting into the Church, a means of sealing the promises of forgiveness and adoption, of confirming faith and increasing grace by the virtue of prayer unto God. The French Confession says: "Baptism is given as a pledge of our adoption; for by it we are grafted into the body of Christ, so as to be washed and cleansed by His blood, and then renewed in purity of life by His Holy Spirit." In the Confession of the Waldenses an equally strong statement is used: "We believe that Christ has instituted the sacrament of baptism to be a testimony of our adoption, and that therein we are cleansed from our sins

by the blood of Jesus Christ, and renewed in holiness of life." Such statements are to be understood in accordance with the general theory of the Reformed Church, that no sacrament confers grace in its own virtue. It should be noticed, also, that important confessions, like the Zurich Consensus and the Westminster Confession, state that the grace which is properly connected with baptism is not necessarily bestowed at the time of its administration, but may be deferred to a subsequent period (or be withheld altogether, in case the candidate is not among the elect, as is taught by the Zurich Consensus). It was also a part of the Reformed doctrine, that the spiritual benefits which the proper candidate may receive in baptism are not so tied to the sacrament but that they may be obtained prior to its administration.

As respects the baptism of infants, the Reformed theory differed from the Lutheran in two respects: (1.) By the former it was regarded as a right and a privilege; by the latter, as rather a necessity. The Lutherans taught that children of believers should be baptized in order to bring them into the covenant of grace. The Reformed said that children of believers are entitled to baptism as a sign of the covenant, because they are already included in the covenant and are members of Christ's body. "The children of believers," Calvin remarks, "are not baptized, that they may thereby be made the children of God, as if they had before been strangers to the Church; but on the contrary they are received into the Church by a solemn sign, because they already belonged to the body of Christ by virtue of the promise." (Inst., IV. 15.) The Heidelberg Catechism contains an equivalent statement. (2.) The Reformed denied that infants exercise in baptism an actual faith. They allowed however, at least in many cases, an operation of the Holy Spirit in the soul of the infant, and as a fruit of this a seminal faith, or ground of future actual faith. (Beza, Confessio, Cap. IV.; Vossius, Disput. de Sac-

rament. *Natura*; Turretin, *Locus XV. quæst. 14.*) The principle referred to above, that the proper grace of baptism may be given at a date subsequent to the administration of the rite, was naturally applied quite largely to the case of infants. There was not, however, a strict unanimity on this point. Archbishop Usher was of the opinion that elect infants who are appointed soon to die are regenerated in baptism, whereas for the rest we cannot be sure of their actual regeneration till they actually believe. Hammond, Tillotson, and some others, took a view of baptismal regeneration which had little to do with inward transformation. (Hunt.) But there were those who used language implying that infants in general are truly regenerated in baptism. Witsius considered it probable that elect infants are ordinarily regenerated before baptism. (*Series Exercitationum, XIX.*) Henry Dodwell held the eccentric notion that, inasmuch as the soul is naturally mortal, all unchristened infants cease at death to exist, and all adults not baptized by one who has been ordained by a bishop share the same fate; unless perchance they are preserved for the sake of being punished.

The Lutherans and Reformed were agreed in teaching that the efficacy of baptism lasts through life, or is intrinsically suited to this permanence. Instead of affirming, like the Romanists, that, in consequence of its benefits being impaired or lost by sins, resort must be had to other sacraments, especially that of penance, they maintained that by inward repentance one steps back upon the platform of the baptismal grace, so that the efficacy of baptism is made continuously to avail. "Penitence," says Chemnitz, "is nothing else than a return to the promise of grace belonging to baptism." (*Examen, Pars II.*) "Whenever we have fallen," says Calvin, "we must recur to the remembrance of baptism, and arm our minds with the consideration of it, that we may be always certified and assured of the remission of sins." (*Inst., IV. 15.*) In the French

Confession it is said: "We hold that, although we are baptized only once, yet the gain that it symbolizes to us reaches over our whole lives and to our death, so that we have a lasting witness that Jesus Christ will always be our justification and sanctification." (Art. XXXV.)

The Socinians made little account of baptism. Socinus denied that it was designed to be of perpetual obligation, and that it is appropriate to one brought up in the Christian faith, though it might be used not inaptly to initiate into Christianity converts from other religions. The Socinians, however, were not inclined to follow him to this extreme of radicalism. In the revised edition of the Racovian Catechism it is said: "The external religious acts, or sacred rites always observed in the Church of Christ, are baptism and the breaking of the sacred bread." (V. 3.) Of the current custom of infant baptism the Catechism speaks in very disparaging terms, but at the same time allows that it is something which charity may tolerate. In the same connection, it is said that immersion is essential to baptism. The common view of the Lutherans and the Reformed, on the other hand, was that immersion is not of the essence of baptism. (Gerhard, *Locus XX*. §§ 94-96; Turretin, *Locus XIX*. quæst. 11; Westminster Confession, Chap. XXVIII.)

The Quakers took the ground that the "one baptism" of the Christian dispensation is purely spiritual, and that water baptism has properly no longer any place in the Church. (Proposition XII.)

In the Baptist Confession of 1688 the following maxims, among others, are laid down: "Those who do actually profess repentance towards God, faith in and obedience to our Lord Jesus, are the only proper subjects of this ordinance." "Immersion, or dipping of the person in water, is necessary to the due administration of this ordinance." It is to be noticed, however, that in the Mennonites we have an example of Baptists, the main body of whom did not insist upon or even practise immersion.

3. THE EUCHARIST.—In the Reformation era scarcely another topic caused so much controversy. To multitudes the denial of transubstantiation was an occasion of imprisonment, tortures, and death. Even under the anti-papal rule of Henry VIII. in England, to deny this doctrine was made the greatest in the catalogue of crimes, and was punishable with death by burning. Protestants began early a series of bitter controversies among themselves on the interpretation of the Eucharist, and as wearisome a theological literature as the earth ever groaned under was called forth.

The council of Trent gave an authoritative sanction to the scholastic doctrine of the eucharist, not only as respects its general outline, but also as respects many of its details. It declared that immediately after the consecration the veritable body of our Lord and His veritable blood, together with His soul and divinity, are under the species of bread and wine; that by force of the words of consecration, the body is under the species of bread, and the blood under the species of wine, but by reason of concomitance each is under both species; that Christ whole and entire is under any part of either species; that the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the substance of body and blood; that the worship of *latria* which is due to the true God is properly rendered to the holy sacrament, and the same is fitly honored by being borne in public processions; that although the use of both species has not been unfrequent from the beginning of the Christian religion, the Church has suitable reasons for approving the custom of communicating under one species; that in the mass, which is a truly propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead, the same victim is offered which was offered on the cross, only in a different manner; that masses in which the priest alone communicates are legitimate.

The best discretion would teach the Romanist to rest the dogma of transubstantiation simply upon the fiat of church

authority. Reasons and explanations never appear here to good advantage. The elaborate exposition and defence, therefore, of Bellarmin, are very little to his credit. The following are some of his statements: "We say most truly that in the sacrament is body, flesh, and blood, and that that flesh is body, not spirit." (De Sac. Eucharist., Lib. I. cap. 2.) "Christ does not have in the eucharist the mode of existence of bodies, but rather of spirits, since He is entire in any part." (Ibid.) "Rightly we shall say, The body of Christ is, is contained, remains, is found, is taken, is received in the eucharist; but not rightly should we say, The body of Christ in the eucharist is extended, occupies place, etc." (Ibid.) "Imagination is not able to conceive of one body in different places, but reason is able to judge, nevertheless, if it is sound, that the imagination is deceived." (Lib. III. cap. 4.) "It is the common opinion of the scholastics and the Church, that the entire Christ exists in the eucharist, with magnitude, and all the accidents, relation to the celestial place excepted, which it has in heaven; . . . and moreover, that the parts and members of the body of Christ do not penetrate each other, but are so distinguished and disposed among themselves that they have both the figure and order suitable to the human body." (III. 5.) "It is not the essence of magnitude to occupy place." (III. 6.) "We do not say that the body of Christ in the eucharist lacks dimensions or form," — *dimensionibus aut facie*. (III. 7.) "Truly if God should remove all the air from this entire hall in which we now are, and should allow no more to enter, we should all retain our dimensions and forms, and nevertheless we should neither continue in space, nor would any one see the form of another." (III. 7.) "It is false that it pertains to the essence of an accident to inhere in a subject." (III. 24.) Thus, according to Bellarmin, that which has magnitude, arrangement of parts, dimensions, and form may, despite the imagination, be thought of as being at the same time

in many different places, though it is not to be said to occupy place.

The standards of the Greek Church in this period affirmed in relation to the eucharist the doctrines of transubstantiation and propitiatory sacrifice. (Orthodox Confession, Quæst. LVI., CVII.; Confession of Dositheus, Decretum XVII.)

Luther, though not without some inclination previously to a different theory, early came to the fixed conclusion that the words of institution must be taken literally, and that accordingly a real bodily presence of Christ in the eucharist must be affirmed. At the same time he repudiated the doctrine of transubstantiation. From these premises was derived the Lutheran tenet which has sometimes been described by the term *consubstantiation*. This tenet, while agreeing with the Roman Catholic teaching respecting the real presence of the body and blood, and the actual receiving of them by all communicants, worthy or unworthy, denied that the essence of the bread and wine is changed. The body and blood, it was taught, are in, with, and under the elements, not substituted for their substance. The Lutheran theory was also distinguished from the Roman Catholic by associating the bodily presence with the actual administration of the rite, as opposed to the idea that it may properly be regarded as continuing as long as one is pleased to preserve the consecrated elements or their species. The Lutherans, moreover, in common with all Protestants, rejected the Romish doctrine of the mass, or propitiatory sacrifice, and condemned as sacrilege the withholding of the cup from the laity.

Luther associated the theory of the Lord's supper with the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body. The right hand of God, it was maintained, is everywhere. The ascension of Christ, therefore, to the right hand of God, in no wise prevents His presence in this world. Even in respect of His humanity he is universally present, and so of course

can be present in the eucharist. His being everywhere, however, does not interfere with the divine appointment that His presence should be specially apprehended in the eucharist. Moreover, Christ's body is present in the eucharist in a special manner. We have here to do neither with a local presence (circumscriptive), as of a body whose place is defined by its relation to other bodies, nor with a presence of that highest order by virtue of which God is in all places without limitation to any (repletive), but rather with a presence like that of a spirit in a place (definitive). The body of Christ is indeed present everywhere in the second sense, but it is besides in the eucharist in the third sense. (Köstlin.)

The Lutheran Confessions in general do not refine upon distinctions like the above. In the Formula of Concord, however, the statement is made that it is not after the ordinary mode of a physical presence that the body of Christ is in the eucharist. Uniting this idea with the doctrine of a real partaking of the body, the Formula uses the rather contradictory representation, that the body is truly received by the mouth, but in a spiritual and heavenly manner. It says: "We believe, teach, and confess that the body and blood of Christ are taken with the bread and wine, not only spiritually through faith, but also by the mouth, nevertheless not Capernaïtically, but after a spiritual and heavenly manner, by reason of the sacramental union."

In the Reformed Church three different types of teaching had a place, (1.) the Zwinglian, (2.) the Calvinian, (3.) the intermediate, or the modified Calvinian.

Zwingli maintained, in opposition to Luther, that the words of institution are to be taken figuratively. Placing the trope in the copula, he said that Christ's declaration, "This is my body," means simply, This signifies or represents my body. Œcolampadius, who otherwise agreed essentially with Zwingli, placed the trope in the word *body*.

The elements, according to Zwingli, are related to the body and blood of Christ only as symbols. In the eucharistic rite the believer presents a confession of discipleship and loyalty, and receives a token of love and fellowship. He may be said indeed spiritually to eat Christ's body, but "spiritually to eat Christ's body is nothing else than with the spirit and mind to rely upon the compassion and goodness of God through Christ." (*Expositio Chr. Fidei.*) This view was approved by the Arminians and the Socinians. Limborch is very emphatic in asserting the superiority of the Zwinglian to the Calvinian theory. (*Lib. V. cap. 71.*)

Calvin, coming upon the stage after the controversy between the Lutherans and the Swiss had been started, devised a theory in a measure suited to mediate between the two parties. It enabled him to use language nearly as strong as the Lutheran respecting the real presence of Christ in the eucharist, and at the same time agreed with the Swiss tenets that the body of Christ remains in heaven and is not actually in this world at all. His theory in brief was, that the glorified humanity of Christ is a fountain of spiritual virtue or efficacy; that this efficacy is mediated by the Holy Spirit to the believing recipient of the eucharistic elements; that accordingly the body of Christ is present in the eucharist in respect of virtue or efficacy; that the eating of Christ's body is entirely spiritual, by means of faith, the unbelieving having no part in it, and an oral manducation being out of question. The following quotations will serve to illustrate Calvin's position: "The flesh of Christ is like a rich, an inexhaustible fountain, which receives the life flowing from the divinity and conveys it to us. . . . Though it appears incredible for the flesh of Christ, from such an immense local distance, to reach us, so as to become our food, we should remember how much the secret power of the Holy Spirit transcends all our senses, and what folly it is to apply any measure of ours to His immensity. Let our faith receive, therefore, what our understanding is not

able to comprehend, that the Spirit really unites things which are separated by local distance. . . . In the mystery of the supper, under the symbols of bread and wine, Christ is truly exhibited to us, even His body and blood. And the design of this exhibition is, first, that we may be united into one body with Him, and, secondly, that being made partakers of His substance, we may experience His power in the communication of all blessings. . . . Body must be body, spirit must be spirit. . . . They are exceedingly deceived who cannot conceive of any presence of the flesh of Christ in the supper, except it be attached to the bread. For on this principle they leave nothing to the secret operation of the Spirit, which unites us to Christ. They suppose Christ not to be present unless He descends to us; as though we cannot equally enjoy His presence, if He elevates us to Himself." (Inst., IV. 17.)

The view which we have characterized as intermediate between the Zwinglian and the Calvinian differs from the latter by a more moderate or less mystical phraseology, and by less positively associating the spiritual grace which is received in the use of the sacrament with the glorified body of Christ. Among Reformed Confessions, the Heidelberg Catechism, and the French, the Belgic, and the Scotch Confessions, scarcely fall short of the full Calvinian view. The Thirty-nine Articles do not, in explicit terms, come up to the Calvinian theory; they admit of being interpreted in a sense less remote from the Zwinglian doctrine. However, it may be judged from the language of representative theologians, like Hooker, that the Calvinian theory was largely received in the early English Church. Hooker's statements correspond very exactly to those of Calvin. (Eccl. Polity, Bk. V. sect. 67.) There are expressions also in the writings of Cranmer and Jewell which affiliate with the Calvinian phraseology. The Second Helvetic and the Westminster Confessions are rather favorable than otherwise to the intermediate theory or the modified Calvinian. The drift in

the Reformed Church was probably toward the standpoint represented by these Confessions.

4. PENANCE. — The sacrament of penance was also one of the subjects which the council of Trent treated at length, and with minute conformity to the scholastic doctrine. It decreed that this sacrament is, for those who have fallen after baptism, necessary to salvation, and serves them as a second plank after shipwreck; that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are required of the penitent, the last for the purpose of cancelling the temporal penalty which is left after the eternal has been remitted; that venial sins, while they may profitably be confessed, may be omitted without guilt, but each and every mortal sin, together with any circumstances which affect its nature, must be confessed; that bishops and priests alone can absolve; that the sacramental absolution of the priest, given in the terms, *I absolve thee*, is a judicial act, and not a bare ministry of declaring sins to be forgiven to him who confesses; that we can make satisfaction to God by punishments voluntarily undertaken, or by those imposed at the discretion of the priest, or by patient endurance of providential scourgings; that he deserves the anathema who says that the best penance is merely a new life. This last specification is explained by the inveterate bent of the council to condemn as nearly as possible the exact language of the Reformers, and especially of Luther. In many cases some extravagant rhetorical statement, which the great body of Protestants never received without qualification, was seized upon for censure. But occasionally, as in this instance, a poor use was made of the genius for anathematizing.

The complete sacrament of penance, as interpreted by Romanists, was far from being accepted by any party of Protestants. Whatever place Luther gave to confession and absolution, he was remote from the Romish standpoint; for he regarded confession to an ordained minister as rather a matter of propriety than of necessity, and main-

tained that it is by no means required to give a full catalogue of sins, it being sufficient to mention those which specially burden the conscience and respecting which advice is desired. The absolving sentence, spoken in private, he looked upon as essentially the same as that given in the public proclamation of the Gospel, but he considered it of great advantage that an individual application should be given to the promise of remission. The final verdict of the Lutherans, as previously stated, was against styling absolution a sacrament, but it gave nevertheless to the rite essentially the same place as that claimed for it by Luther.

The Reformed Church in general was much less favorable than the Lutheran to private or auricular confession, and was disposed to substitute for it, except in a case calling for a special act of discipline, simply the confession of sins to God in private or in the congregation. "We believe," says the Second Helvetic Confession, "this ingenuous confession, which is made to God alone, either privately between God and the sinner, or openly in the sanctuary, where that general confession of sins is recited, suffices, nor is it necessary to obtaining remission of sins that any one should confess his sins to a priest, by whispering in his ears, that in turn with the imposition of his hands he may hear from him the absolution; for of this thing neither any precept nor example is found in the Holy Scriptures." (Cap. XIV.) The French Confession numbers auricular confession among the devices of Satan. Calvin declares it a pestilent thing. (Inst., III. 4.) Bullinger in his sermons says: "It is enough for us to confess our sins to God, who, because He seeth our hearts, ought therefore most rightly to hear our confessions." Some of the Anglican divines gave a certain place to private confession and absolution, making it, however, a matter of choice. Latimer says, if one cannot be satisfied with the general absolution given in the place of worship,

he is privileged to go to the minister in private. (Serm. XXII.) Hooker remarks of private absolution, that it is no more than a declaration of what God hath done. As respects the practice of private confession, he says that it is neither enforced nor forbidden by the Church of England. (Eccl. Polity, Bk. VI. sect. 4.) Bishop Joseph Hall says: "That there is a lawful, commendable, beneficial use of confession was never denied by us, but to set men upon the rack, and to strain their souls up to a double pin of absolute necessity — both *præcepti et medii* — and of strict particularity, and that by a screw of *Jus Divinum*, is so mere a Roman novelty, that many ingenuous authors of their own have willingly confessed it." (Works, Vol. IX. p. 360.) From the general standpoint of the Reformed Church, the power of the keys was naturally regarded as denoting either the efficacy of the Gospel message in binding and loosing, or the prerogatives of the Church in the administration of discipline.

5. MARRIAGE. — Among the decisions of the council of Trent upon this subject, the more noteworthy were, that, while separation as respects cohabitation may take place for various causes, for no cause, not even that of adultery, can the marriage bond be dissolved; that clerics in sacred orders and regulars, who have solemnly professed chastity, cannot contract a valid marriage; that it is better and more blessed to remain in virginity than to enter into matrimony. These points, if not positively asserted, were sanctioned by pronouncing the anathema against those denying them.

Protestants were content to receive the Romish anathema upon each of these specifications. The equal honor of the married with the celibate state, and the privilege of ministers to live in wedlock, were common maxims among them, and were asserted in some of the Confessions. It was also commonly taught by Protestant writers, that, for the cause of adultery, a divorce as to bond, as well as

to bed, *quoad vinculum* as well as *quoad thorum*, may be granted, so that no impediment shall stand in the way of the innocent party remarrying. (Luther, *De Captiv. Bab.*; Chemnitz, *Examen*, Pars II.; Gerhard, *Confess. Cath.*; Beza, *Confessio*, Cap. V.; Limborch, *Lib. V. cap. 60*; Westminster Confession, Chap. XXIV.)

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. **CHILIASM.** — By all the larger communions chiliasm or millenarianism was decidedly repudiated. It had, however, considerable currency among the Anabaptists. Some of the mystical writers taught kindred views. The English Mede and the French Calvinist, Jurieu, held the early patristic theory. In the days of the Rebellion and the Commonwealth, quite a number of the sectaries were millenarians. Such was the party designated as Fifth Monarchy Men. John Milton believed in a future visible appearing and reign of Christ upon earth, — a reign of a thousand years. Near the close of the period, William Petersen attracted attention as an enthusiastic advocate of the same doctrine. At the same time, a departure from the interpretation of Augustine began to be made by some who, like him, did not believe in the visible reign of Christ on earth. Instead of placing the beginning of the millennium in the past, they located it in the future. Whitby and Vitranga were prominent representatives of this view. (Compare the opinion of the German minister, Schindler, as quoted by Calov, Tom. XII. art. 4, cap. 3, qu. 3.)

2. **CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.** — The Protestants repudiated the doctrine of Purgatory, though it was more than a decade after his appearance as a reformer before Luther renounced it altogether. For the most part, also, they made no further account of an intermediate state than is necessarily involved in the idea of a general resurrection, or investing of souls with bodies at

the end of the world. Those dying in the Lord were commonly described as passing at once to God, to Christ, to the bliss of heaven, and the wicked were described as descending into hell. Speaking of the change which takes place at death, the Westminster Confession says: "The souls of the righteous being then made perfect in holiness are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies; and the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day." (Chap. XXXII.) There were some, however, who acknowledged a state in a fuller sense intermediate. Limborch, for example, says that the souls of the righteous, although in a state of bliss, do not fully triumph in heaven, or enjoy the vision of God, nor do the wicked undergo the proper pains of hell-fire, before the final judgment. (Lib. VI. cap. 10.)

Some of the Anabaptists held the doctrine of the sleep of the soul between death and the resurrection. The same view had considerable currency among the Socinians. The remarks of Crell on the opening of the fifth chapter of Second Corinthians imply an unconscious state of the departed till the day of the resurrection; for he says they have no sense of the lapse of time, and when raised up it seems to them as if they had but just fallen asleep. The same theory is attributed by Coccejus to Schlichtingius. (De Fœd. et Test. Dei, Cap. XVI.) The Racovian Catechism, in opposing the invocation of saints, says: "It is sufficiently evident, both from reason and the sacred Scriptures, that the dead, while they remain dead, cannot actually live; and therefore can neither know anything, nor hold any charge, nor supplicate anything of God." (V. 1.) Hobbes was also an advocate of the theory of unconsciousness.

As respects the doctrine of Purgatory, the Greek Church differed from the Romish in being less definite. It was

not so positive respecting the geography of Purgatory, and was also unwilling to assert that material fire is used there as an agent of purification. As to the fact, however, that there is a purgatorial period for those who die in sin but not without hope, and that this period may be shortened by the prayers and sacrifices of the Church, the Greek Church, at least as represented by the creeds of the period, was no less positive than the Latin. (Orthodox Confession, Quæst. LXIV.—LXVI.; Confession of Dositheus, Decretum XVIII.) Bellarmin gives quite an elaborate exposition of the Romish theory of Purgatory. As the Scriptural warrant for the doctrine, he quotes 2 Maccabees, xii.; Matt. v. 22, 25, 26; Luke xii. 58, 59, xvi. 9, xxiii. 42; Acts ii. 24 (Vulgate); 1 Cor. iii. 15, xv. 29; Phil. ii. 10. He teaches that Purgatory is in all probability a subterranean region, and says that, although the nature of its fire has not been authoritatively defined by the Church, it is the common opinion that it is material fire.

3. THE RESURRECTION AND FINAL AWARDS. — Nothing worthy of note was brought forward on the subject of the resurrection. A very literal view was commonly entertained. Cudworth was of the opinion that souls have some kind of a body between death and the resurrection, (Intellect. System, Chap. V.,) and Henry More decided that this body is commonly an aerial one, only the most worthy souls being allowed to pass at once into a celestial body. (Immortal. Animæ, Lib. II. cap. 14; Lib. III. cap. 1.)

Exceptions to the doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked were very rare. Some of the Anabaptists, as may be judged from the condemnatory sentence of the Augsburg Confession, taught restorationism, and William Petersen joined it with his millenarianism. The doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked is said to have had some place among the Socinians. None of their writers appear to have been advocates of restorationism. Wissowatius says: "That those who disobey the commands of God and Christ,

after being raised at the last judgment, will be doomed to punishment, and cast into the fire prepared for the devil and his angels, has always been the opinion of this Church." (Note in Racovian Catechism.) Hobbes held the theory of temporary tortures by fire, and final annihilation. At the same time he gave vent to the altogether peculiar conceit, that it is not unlikely that victims for the flames will forever be at hand, since nothing forbids the supposition that the wicked will continue to propagate after the resurrection. (Leviathan.)

As appears from the statements of Bellarmin and Petavius, Roman Catholic theologians held that material fire will be one factor in the endless punishments of hell. (De Sac. Eucharist., Lib. III. cap. 6; De Angelis, Lib. III. cap. 5.) According to Bellarmin, the punishment of unbaptized infants is not simply a painless deprivation, since they have a consciousness of their lack, and suffer somewhat from regrets. (De Amiss. Grat., Lib. VI. cap. 6.) The view of Petavius seems, to say the least, to have been no more lenient to the hapless innocents. (De Deo, Lib. IX. cap. 10.)

Some of the Protestant theologians were of opinion that material fire has a place in the endless punishments of hell. This evidently was the case with John Bunyan; and Turretin and Limborch declare that they find no adequate reason for ruling out the notion of material fire. (Locus XX. quæst. 7; Lib. VI. cap. 13.) Hollaz makes this statement: "Corpora cruciabuntur igni materiali quidem, sed singulari." (Pars III. sect. 1, cap. 12, qu. 27.) Maccovius decided against the theory of literal fire. (Loci, Cap. LXXXIX.) Calvin says: "As no description can equal the severity of the divine vengeance on the reprobate, their anguish and torment are figuratively represented to us under corporeal images; as darkness, weeping, and gnashing of teeth, unextinguishable fire, a worm incessantly gnawing at the heart." (Inst., III. 25.) With equal or still greater

clearness he indicates in his exposition of Matt. xxv. 41, that the fire of future punishment is to be taken in a metaphorical sense. (Comm. in Harmon. Evang.) A large proportion of Protestant writers were non-committal on the subject. We may presume, however, that there were a number who leaned to the view expressed by these words of Whichcote: "Hell's fuel is the guilt of a man's conscience." (Serm. III.) In justification of eternal punishment, we have this from William Sherlock: "We must not ask how long punishment a short sin deserves, but how long the sinner deserves to be punished. And the answer to this is easy, As long as he is a sinner; and therefore an immortal sinner, who can never die and will never cease to be wicked, must always be miserable." (Divine Providence.) As respects the reward of the blessed, much account was still made of the Augustinian conception.

Fifth Period.

1720-1905.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS period has been characterized as the period of strife and attempted reconciliation. That it should possess these characteristics cannot be regarded as accidental. The modern era dawned with an unaccomplished task upon its hands, the task of fundamental criticism. The early Christians were indeed ready to give a reason for their faith, but they were not in the best condition for comprehensive and searching criticism, and ere long the practice of deciding doctrinal matters by authority came in to obstruct free investigation. In the mediæval period, while there was much acute reasoning, it was mainly within the bounds of the traditional theology. Scarce a thought was entertained of fundamental Biblical or historical criticism. In the Reformation era the task of criticism was but partially accomplished; dogmatic fixity came too soon for its satisfactory fulfilment. At the same time, the principles of the Reformation were intrinsically too favorable to private judgment and free thought to allow of their being long restrained within narrow bounds. The unfulfilled task of thorough-going criticism must needs be taken up, and the structure of Christian doctrine be tested at every point. Conspiring with this demand for a fuller realization of what was implicitly contained in the Reformation basis, philosophy and science have exercised a quickening and wide-spread influence upon theological thinking by their

extraordinary achievements. In part hostile and in part friendly to the Bible and to the standard creeds, they have ministered at once to activity in attack and to activity in defence. So has resulted the age of criticism and apology, of attack and defence, of strife and attempted reconciliation.

As to the result, we apprehend that it will be agreeable to all fervent and intelligent friendship for Christianity. Those whose faith rests in technicalities may suffer loss; but those who take the larger view, who do not cling so closely to the mole-hill as to lose sight of the mountain, will be likely to be strengthened in the conviction that the grand trend of Biblical truth can never be successfully assailed.

Fifth Period.

1720-1905.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

No era in the whole extent of history has been more fruitful in philosophical thinking than that which is included in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Both as respects depth and variety, the speculations of this era will easily stand comparison with those of any preceding age. The result to theology must evidently be important. Such an energetic canvassing of the profoundest problems of the universe must bring new elements into the sphere of doctrinal thought, in the way either of modification or confirmation, or both. As to the fact of influence, there can be no doubt. However, owing to the great complexity of the philosophical movement, it is no easy task to specify with exactness the results of the influence. An attempt at such specification may properly be deferred till after a glance at the different philosophies. In accordance with our plan, we pass in review only the more significant systems, and notice these only so far as is necessary to gain a fair understanding of their spirit and their theological bearings. We begin with the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ (1646-1716), the founder of modern German philosophy, reveals the bent to ideal-

ism so largely characteristic of German speculation. His thinking is everywhere grounded upon the conviction that mind must be regarded as the fundamental verity. In virtue of this general standpoint he was of course opposed to such declarations of Locke as appeared to affiliate with a materialistic sensationalism. He discountenanced the maxim, "There is nothing in the mind which was not previously in the senses"; at least, he essentially modified it by the addition, "except the mind itself." The mind, as he maintained, is not to be likened to a sheet of blank paper. It has a positive constitution, fixed laws of thought. On these laws rests the element of certainty and necessity in our convictions and conclusions. This cannot come from the senses, for they inform only of what is in particular cases, not of what is universally or necessarily. The native constitution of mind, while it does not evolve necessary truths prior to experience of sensations, is yet the real fountain-head of such truths. Among fundamental truths or axioms, that of the "sufficient reason" was especially emphasized by Leibnitz. This implies that back of the existence of any phenomenon, or the validity of any judgment, there must be a sufficient reason why it is so rather than otherwise.

Leibnitz was also dissatisfied with the Cartesian philosophy, and especially with the results to which it had been carried forward by Spinoza. The all-embracing substance and mechanical necessity predicated by the Jewish speculator, left little place for individuality, and no place at all for design. Leibnitz was concerned to give due recognition to both of these principles. In pursuance of this end, he brought out the most distinctive feature of his philosophy, the doctrine of monads. A monad, as he teaches, is a simple substance, without parts, without figure, extension, or divisibility. (*La Monadologie.*) It is the true atom of nature, not an inert or senseless point of matter, but a metaphysical point, a force, a life, a perceptive power.

As monads make up the sum of being, it follows of course that there is nothing lifeless in nature, nothing characterized by that total passivity which Descartes ascribed to matter. The differences found in the different ranks of being are due, not to different kinds of elements, but to different stages of development in the same kind of elements. The monads are the same in essence, but some are much more developed than others. Those which may properly be called souls, have clear perceptions, accompanied with memory. Below these, ranging down through animal life to inorganic nature, are monads whose condition may be likened to one in a state of confusion, — to one in dreamless sleep, or lost to consciousness in a swoon. In the hierarchy of created monads, there is no wide chasm. The ascent from the lowest to the highest is through imperceptible gradations, — an anticipation of the principle of continuity which holds so prominent a place in modern evolutionism. The relation of this system of monads to space is indicated by the fact that space is purely relative; it denotes an order of coexistence, as time denotes an order of succession. Apart from creatures, space and time would exist only in the ideas of God. (*Lettres entre Leibniz et Clarke.*)

As respects each other, monads are independent, or only ideally related in God. There is no interaction. Each develops from within. What then explains their adjustment? How does it come about that perception and motion correspond? The explanation is not a continuous miracle, such as is affirmed by the doctrine of occasionalism, but a primitive miracle, the pre-established harmony by which God, the supreme Monad, has provided for an orderly universe. In virtue of this pre-established harmony, the body, which indeed is but an aggregate of monads, is kept in correspondence with a central monad which may be termed the soul, and all monads are made to work together for the accomplishment of the designs of infinite wisdom. From

these premises there follows evidently the doctrine of philosophical necessity. All events, the volitions of men included, are provided for in the pre-established harmony. Human choices indeed are not mechanically determined; but at the same time they are not left properly contingent; they are always so conditioned by their antecedents as to secure their direction to a given result. As all things are thus constrained to fulfil the divine plan, and as the perfect wisdom and goodness of God are not to be called into question, it is clear that optimism is in the right. Reason must put a veto upon the impressions naturally arising from our view of apparent evils and imperfections, and pronounce the actual world the best possible.

The attitude of Leibnitz toward Christian theology was on the whole decidedly friendly. He accepted the facts and the truths of revelation. In opposition to Bayle he maintained the harmony between reason and faith, and left open a place for mysteries by holding to the validity of the distinction between things above reason and things contrary to reason. (*Essais de Théodicée.*)

CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679-1754) performed the task of methodizing the philosophical ideas of Leibnitz, which had been given forth, for the most part, in detached treatises. He had a genius for form, as Leibnitz had a genius for ideas. The opinions of his predecessors were in large part retained, but some modifications were made. For example, Wolff declined to speak of all monads as having a perceptive power (*Vorstellungskraft*), considering such a power as pertaining only to souls proper. Body and soul he regarded as different substances, and so infringed upon Leibnitz's view of a graduated development through all nature. But this modification of particular items involved less of a transformation, than the change which was made in the spirit of the Leibnitzian philosophy by putting it under the bonds of an elaborate formalism. Wolff had an ambition to reduce everything to geometrical precision. Under his lead a taste

was begotten for formal demonstrations, a taste which evidently might easily serve as a patron of rationalism.

Germany produced no rival of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy till the latter part of the eighteenth century. The grand development which then was commenced received an initial incentive from certain phases of philosophical thinking which had appeared in Great Britain. Our attention must therefore be turned in that direction before we continue our account of the German systems.

BISHOP GEORGE BERKELEY (1684-1753) brought a new factor into English philosophy by his idealistic theories; but at the same time he was not untrue to the empirical bent of that philosophy, inasmuch as he maintained that we must look to experience and not depend upon *a priori* reasoning. Adopting the view of Locke, that the immediate and proper objects of mind are ideas, he declared it a useless and unwarranted supposition that there are any extended material things corresponding to the ideas. It is useless, because it explains nothing; for no one can tell how matter acts on mind. And it is unwarranted, because it is unintelligible. Everything ascribed to bodies — light, color, heat, cold, extension, figure — cannot even in thought be separated from the perceiving mind. It is an obvious truth, says Berkeley, “that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth — in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world — have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit; it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.” (Principles of Human Knowledge, § 6.) This theory, according to Berkeley, does not imply that we are the victims of delusion. We have to

deal with realities on the idealistic theory, with nature and laws of nature; only, the realities are spiritual, not material or corporeal substances; nature is the complex of ideas or impressions produced by God upon created minds, and the laws of nature are the maxims by which He is guided in producing those impressions. "There is a Mind," he writes, "which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. And from the variety, order and manner of these, I conclude the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension." (Dialogues between Hylas and Philonus, II.) Berkeley regarded his peculiar teaching as in no wise ministering to scepticism. On the contrary, he maintained that scepticism finds one of its main pillars in the doctrine of matter.

In DAVID HUME (1711-1776) a radical empiricism was joined with an extreme scepticism. He describes ideas as the fainter copies of impressions, under which he includes sensations, passions, and emotions as they originally appear in the mind. Any philosophical term, he teaches, which cannot be referred to a distinct impression, is to be regarded as without foundation.

The scepticism of Hume may be summarized as follows:
(1.) He cast doubt upon the existence of an external world. Only perceptions, he said, are present to the mind. We may observe relations among perceptions, but never between perceptions and objects. "It is impossible, therefore, that from the existence of any of the qualities of the former we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular." (Treatise of Human Nature.) As respects the idea of material *substance*, what ought to be said is, that there is no such idea; the expression is meaningless.
(2.) He questioned the substantial existence of mind. "What we call mind," he says, "is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endued

with a perfect simplicity and identity." The category of substance is no less out of place in connection with mind than in connection with matter. "The question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible." (3.) He attacked the validity of the category of causation. Efficiency, he maintained, is something entirely beyond our knowledge; we know nothing about efficiency in connection with the rise of any given event. All we know is, that one thing is after another, or contiguous to another. (*Treatise of Human Nature*, and also *Philosophical Essays*.) Our disposition to predicate the relation of cause and effect is an uncritical bent, due to continued associations. Having many times seen one object connected with another, we find it difficult or impossible to think of it out of relation to that object. (4.) He denied the adequacy of testimony to establish the fact of miracles, mainly on the ground, that, the improbability of a departure from the laws of nature being greater than the improbability of human testimony being false, the latter improbability cannot cancel the former.

From the above it would seem that the attitude of Hume toward religion must have been purely destructive. Yet it was not formally such. Even in his attack on miracles, he assumes to reserve a place for Christian miracles. "The Christian religion," he says, "not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity. And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." Here, to be sure, though his language does not differ very widely from that of some of the extravagant champions of orthodoxy, the concession does not wear the appearance of honest intent. The apology is as bad as the attack,—

appears indeed to have been designed to be a covert attack. But we find other concessions to religious ideas which have more of the appearance of candor. Such are the following respecting an intelligent Author of the world: "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent Author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion. . . . A purpose, an intention, a design, is evident in everything; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent Cause or Author." (The Natural History of Religion.)

The scepticism of Hume served as a stimulus to the rise of the opposing Scottish school, whose teaching was at first denominated the Philosophy of Common Sense. THOMAS REID (1710-1796), the founder of this school, laid much stress upon intuitive or necessary beliefs, including here such truths as causation, personal identity, existence of an external world, etc. Such truths, he maintained, while they may not be capable of demonstration, do not need it. They are self-evident, and command the assent of every man of sound understanding who attends to them without prejudice. DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828) accepted in the main the principles of Reid. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON (1788-1856) may be reckoned in the same school, though making some rather important modifications or additions. Of the characteristics of this school Hamilton says: "The Scottish school of philosophy is distinctively characterized by its opposition to all the destructive schemes of speculation; — in particular, to scepticism, or the uncertainty of knowledge; to idealism, or the non-existence of the material world; to fatalism, or the denial of the moral universe." As the last specification of Hamilton indicates, this school has been distinguished by its emphatic advocacy of human freedom. Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton all

contended for freedom in the sense of real self-determination, or a power of alternative choice. Hamilton, it is true, regarded such a power as inexplicable; but none the less he asserted its reality. The friendly alliance of Scotch philosophy with theistic and Christian belief in general, is too well known to require illustration.

Alongside these developments in the philosophy of Great Britain, there was a very pronounced tendency on the part of a few thinkers toward materialism. Hartley, in explaining psychological facts, made much account of nerve vibrations and the laws of association, but seems not definitely to have asserted man's complete materiality. This, however, was done by his admirer, Joseph Priestley, in unmistakable terms. Priestley questioned only man's spirituality, not that of God. Dr. Darwin is credited with denying both. Condillac in France, and the Genevan Bonnet, occupied about the same position as Hartley, while the more extreme phases of materialism were represented by Diderot, La Mettrie, Baron d'Holbach, and Cabanis. In opposition to this development, considerable currency was given in France to the views of the Scotch school, the teachings of Reid and Stewart being disseminated by Royer-Collard and Jouffroy. Cousin also, in his eclectic system, took account of the Scotch philosophy, and sought to unite it with factors drawn from the speculations of Germany.

IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804), incited in particular by Hume's denial of causation, undertook a thorough investigation of the human mind. He wished to determine what conditions and factors enter into knowledge, and how far knowledge in our present estate may extend. The result of his examination appeared in the "Critique of Pure Reason." This was his main work, though other treatises, such as the "Critique of Practical Reason," and the "Critique of the Judgment," enter essentially into a complete view of his system. These works have been fruitful to an extraordinary degree; in fact, a large proportion of all subse-

quent philosophical thinking is a comment on the powerful influence of Kant in the modern intellectual world.

Kant's scrutiny of the instrument of knowledge led him to place very decided limitations both upon empiricism and dogmatism,—both upon the scheme which would derive all the elements of knowledge from experience, and that which would draw out a system of truth from the innate resources of the mind. He emphasized the fact that knowledge is not to be explained by reference merely to sensations, or what is given to our sensibility. Sensations without arrangement are only a confused manifold. Now it cannot be supposed that sensation is that by which sensations are arranged. There must be, therefore, already in the mind means of arrangement, or *a priori forms*. Space is such a mental form. "Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. . . . External phenomena become possible only by means of the representation of space." The same is true of time. "Time is not an empirical concept deduced from any experience, for neither coexistence nor succession would enter into our perception, if the representation of time were not given *a priori*." (Transcendental Aesthetic.) Space and time, then, are the two *a priori* forms of intuition. They condition all experience of phenomena. They are subjective, ideal. To say that they are conditions of the existence of things in themselves, is to go entirely beyond warrant. Besides these forms of intuition, there are certain *a priori* concepts or forms of thought, termed categories. Kant enumerates twelve of these, such as unity, plurality, causality, etc. In order that the elements or materials presented to the mind should be truly connected, or become objects of experience, they must come under these forms of thought. So Kant made room for *a priori* factors, as opposed to a wholesale empiricism.

But he was quite as averse to a wholesale dogmatism which cuts loose from experience. While he maintained

that the mind has shaping faculties, he equally maintained that it must have something to shape in order to reach any positive results. The mind must meet objects supplied from without, in order to progress in knowledge of the real, just as the wings of the bird must meet the resistance of the air in order to progress in flight. Reason apart from objects thus supplied may indeed weave together its concepts, but the fabric which is woven can have no claim to the stamp of actuality.

Now there is just one class of objects that are presented to the human mind, namely, phenomena. Of noumena, or things in themselves, of the background behind appearances, if there be any such background, it has no immediate knowledge. And not only has it no immediate knowledge; it finds also no certain ground of inference, at least in the domain of pure reason, the domain of thought and its forms, as distinguished from that of conduct and its laws. The mind here cannot get beyond the ideal or hypothetical. It cannot establish, for example, the substantial and permanent subsistence of the soul, or the existence of God as a necessary and perfect being. This speculative use of reason, however, is not to be regarded as fruitless, even in connection with such truths as those just named. If it cannot prove the objective validity of the notions which it sets forth, it can make them consistent with themselves; it can bring out an ideal that is without a flaw, and which will teach us how to think of the corresponding object, if it should be concluded from other sources that such object exists. Moreover, this speculative use of reason is of utility in assuring us that, if such momentous truths as those referred to cannot be proved in this way, no more can they be disproved. Expressing this conclusion under the guise of his own personal conviction, Kant says: "Whenever I hear that some uncommon genius has demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of a future life, or the existence of God, I am always desirous to read

his book, for I expect that his talent will help me to improve my own insight into these problems. Of one thing I feel quite certain, even without having seen his book, that he has not disproved any single one of those doctrines; not because I imagine that I am myself in possession of irrefragable proofs of them, but because the transcendental critique, by revealing to me the whole apparatus of our pure reason, has completely convinced me that, as reason is insufficient to establish affirmative propositions in this sphere of thought, it is equally, nay, even more powerless to establish the negative on any of these points." (Method of Transcendentalism, Müller's translation.)

To find a true offset to these agnostic conclusions, we must proceed, according to Kant, into the ethical domain, the domain of practical reason, the sphere of conduct and its laws. As we look into our moral nature, we find that it asserts one great all-comprehending law of duty, the formula of which is as follows: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." This law is no mere inference from experience. It is given *a priori*. It has its seat in the commonest reason, as well as in the most speculative. It may not, indeed, be always formulated in the terms given, but it is none the less acknowledged. Through the moral law we are certified of the most important truths. (1.) We are certified of our freedom. "The moral law, which itself does not require justification, proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law as binding on themselves." (2.) We are certified of our immortality. The moral law sets before us a perfect standard, the attainment of which is a condition of the realization of the highest good. This standard we never reach in this life, and can only meet the obligation which it indicates in an endless progress. As conscious, therefore, of that obligation, we must infer an endless life. (3.) We

are certified of the existence of God. Desert is measured by approximation to the standard of the moral law, and impartial reason requires that happiness should be in proportion to desert. Only a Supreme Being who governs by intelligence and will can meet this requirement.

These three postulates of the practical reason are objects of knowledge only in the sense of being practically necessary. They are of the nature of faith, but a faith that is at the same time reason, a thoroughly rational and warranted faith. (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, and Critique of Practical Reason*, translated by T. K. Abbot.)

As respects the religious bearings of Kant's philosophy, it is evident, that, taken in its entirety, it is favorable to theism. It goes to show that speculative reason can in no wise disprove the main truths of theism, while the practical reason demands them. To Christianity as a system of revealed truth, its relation was not so positively friendly. Kant admitted the possibility of revelation, and was profoundly convinced of the need of regeneration. But his appreciation of the Bible was largely confined to its moral code. He commented adversely upon miracles, disparaged the importance of the historical element, and maintained that the true interpretation of Scripture must use it as a means of edification, and draw out, not the sense which is most agreeable to the text, but which is most agreeable to the practical reason. Christ, as he considered, is the moral ideal, and believing on Christ denotes the inner appreciation and choice of this ideal. As respects the work of regeneration, and the formation of a holy character, Kant did not exclude divine assistance therefrom, but his representations direct rather to personal endeavor than to conscious dependence upon divine grace. God is not brought near in his system of thought. He appears mainly as a means of future rewards. Scarce a ray of that ineffable sunlight of divine sympathy and fellowship which shines forth from

the Gospel is reflected from the philosophy of Kant. The principal merit of the great metaphysician in the religious field is the grandeur with which he invests the conception of the moral law.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762-1814), starting from Kant's philosophy, endeavored to make improvements in the interests of unity. He wished to show how the categories might be derived from a single starting-point, and also to overcome the dualism between subject and object which was contained, or supposed to be contained, in Kant's mysterious *things in themselves* (*Dinge an sich*), which were spoken of as a kind of background of phenomena. Fichte assumed as a starting-point an act, action in his view serving as the ground of being. The primitive act from which all development proceeds is that by which the ego posits itself. Next the ego posits a non-ego. This second act explains the impression of an external world. Not an impact from without, not bounds imposed *ab extra*, but bounds imposed by the ego upon itself, give rise to the impression. This act of the ego takes place through the medium of the productive imagination. The unavoidable appearance of externality is accounted for by the fact that the act of self-limitation is one which does not come into consciousness. Thus, while the non-ego is really due to the ego, in consciousness they are related as mutually limiting factors. The positing of bounds is to be regarded as a means to an end; it serves the purpose of development. The proper or ultimate end of the ego is independence of all bounds, an end, however, which it can never fully reach, though it may continually approach thereto.

To understand the full import of this line of thought, it is necessary to determine what Fichte meant by the ego. By the ego whose vocation is to become absolute, but which never completely fulfils this vocation, which is developed through limitation by a non-ego, he evidently meant the empirical ego, or what we understand by our finite person-

ality. But what did he mean by the ego which serves as the starting-point? Did he mean an absolute ego, and regard the empirical ego as the same, only under the form of self-limitation? Did he hold in consequence the pantheistic view that all finite personalities are simply development-forms of the Absolute? According to his own declarations, this would seem to have been his idea from the outset. In his earlier philosophy, however, this point was not particularly dwelt upon. His later philosophy, if not changed as to theoretical basis, did wear a changed aspect, because of the shifting of emphasis from one quarter to another. While in the earlier stage the subordination of the world to the (empirical) ego was the point of principal emphasis, in the later stage there was an increasing emphasis upon the subordination of the individual ego to the Absolute, which now was regarded as the substantial unit of which all individuals are but special manifestations.

It must be allowed that Fichte, especially in his later writings, showed a decided appreciation of the religious element. He rebuked religious indifference in the most emphatic terms. "All irreligion," he says, "remains upon the surface of things and imprisoned in the empty appearance, and just on this account presupposes a lack of power and energy of spirit, and so necessarily betrays a weakness of the head as well as of character; and, on the other hand, religion, as rising above the appearance and pressing into the essence of things, necessarily discloses the happiest use of the powers of the spirit, the greatest profundity and discernment, and, as inseparable therefrom, the greatest strength of character." (*Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben*.) Fichte also decidedly opposed the rationalism which had been the fashion in Germany for a considerable time. In his opinion, by trying to bring everything down to the plane of common sense, by forcing everything into the moulds of a narrow understanding, it had disfigured and

dwarfed the truth. In contrast with the bare morality of Kant, he gave a place to mystical devotion. He appropriated in particular the Johannine standpoint, speaking of John's Gospel as the purest and most genuine record of Christian doctrine, and defining religion as love,—a love of the divine and eternal which induces a radical renunciation of the selfish, the individual, the earthly. Respecting Christ, he maintained that He occupied an entirely exceptional position as a revealer of truth, and that in consequence all ages that are able to understand Him will confess that He is the only-begotten and first-born Son of God, and all men of understanding will continue to bow low before His peculiar glory. (*Anweisung.*) As in the teaching of Kant, so in that of Fichte, the doctrine of immortality received emphatic recognition.

But, on the other hand, there were points in the philosophy of Fichte which were remote from Christian theology, at least in its more catholic phases,—that is, those approved by the great body of Christians, whether Greek, Roman, or Protestant. His teaching was not theistic in the Christian sense; for, while he strongly asserted the necessity of believing in the existence of God, he defined God as simply the moral order of the universe. (*Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens; Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus.*) It is true that his later works may have involved somewhat of a modification of this definition, but he seems never to have changed it to the extent of ascribing personality to God. In his "*Bestimmung des Menschen*," he says: "In the idea of personality is included limitation, and I cannot ascribe to Thee one without the other. I will not attempt what is impossible to my finite nature; I will not seek to understand Thy nature in itself." As the whole trend of his philosophy prescribed, Fichte was vigorously opposed to the common doctrine of creation. (*Anweisung.*) His view of Christ was scarcely less remote from the Catholic teaching; for

the exceptional eminence which he ascribed to Christ is found to be only an eminence in historical position, due to the fact that He was fully cognizant of a truth which no mortal had understood before Him, and which all who come after Him receive, as a matter of fact, from Him, whether it be supposed that any of them might be competent to discover it for themselves or not; this was the truth of man's essential unity with God. Christ had a peculiarly clear consciousness of this unity; however, He was not otherwise one with God than it is possible for any pious man to become. (Anweisung.) An atonement in the sense of a satisfaction for sin and a clearing of the way for man's union with God, Fichte regarded as altogether out of the question. As he expresses himself in one place, there is no need of an atonement, since diremption from God is a mere illusion. "Man can never disunite himself from the Godhead; and, in so far as he imagines himself disunited, he is nothing, which therefore cannot sin, but around whose brow there lies merely the oppressive illusion of sin in order to lead him to the true God." (Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters.)

Fichte was a man of intense personality. A reflex of his spirit, and in some measure of his ideas, may be seen in Thomas Carlyle.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING (1775-1854) varied so largely from himself in the course of his philosophical development, that a correct exposition of his teaching must take account of different eras in his life. At least three different stages in his speculations must be distinguished, two of which fell within his early manhood. In the first, while showing some tendencies toward his later standpoint, he agreed in the main with Fichte. In the second, he produced what may be regarded as distinctively his own system of philosophy. Opposing here the subjective idealism of Fichte which made self the only reality, he declared for the equal reality of the not-self, or, in other

words, for making nature co-ordinate with mind. The distinction, as he taught, is in grade rather than in essence. Mind is the same thing as nature, only raised to a higher power. Nature might be called visible spirit, and spirit invisible nature. Monism is the true theory. All things are but manifestations of one essence or reason, forms of the self-revelation of the Absolute. Traced to their ground they are brought to unity. In the Absolute all distinctions are resolved; mind and nature, ideal and real, subject and object, are identical. The task of philosophy is to rise to this undistinguished identity, and to trace the process by which it is differentiated into the actual universe. To accomplish this task one must be in possession of a peculiar gift. As only the man who has a genius for art can be a true artist, so only the man who has a genius for philosophy, who possesses the faculty of "intellectual intuition," can rise to a knowledge of the Absolute. In his final stage, Schelling felt it necessary to substitute the idea of a personal God for the pantheistic conception of an indeterminate Absolute, and also to lift man above the plane of co-ordination with nature. (Watson, Schelling's Transcendental Idealism.) At the same time, however, he gave increasing scope to his bent to mysticism. His thinking at this era was so mixed with theosophic dreams, after the example of such mystics as Jacob Boehme, as seriously to impair its claim to the character of philosophy. The system representing the intermediate stage of his development, his objective pantheism, Philosophy of Identity, or by whatever name it be called, was by far the more significant in point of influence.

Schelling commended his philosophy by a certain wealth of imagination and enthusiasm of feeling. His system had strong poetic affinities. It easily made alliance with the Romantic School in poetry, and was quite congenial to such a high priest of nature as Goethe. By this feature it was fitted to render a service to religion. It inculcated

that truth which belongs to all poetic contemplation of the world, — the truth that nature must be viewed as closely linked with spirit. It called attention to the divine immanence, and presented an offset to those ways of thinking which separate too widely between God and His workmanship. Nevertheless, the Philosophy of Identity, as worked out by Schelling, must be regarded as largely alien from Christian thought. It went far astray from the Christian standard in its fundamental tenet. Its doctrine of God runs into the unhealthy maze characteristic of all pantheistic speculation. "It is the doctrine of the All-One, which is now conceived as God and now as the world, and therefore does not lead to any true worship of God, but passes off into that poetical enthusiasm for nature which constitutes the foundation of heathen worship." (Hagenbach.) In its interpretation of the incarnation it deviates equally with Fichte from the Catholic theory. While allowing to Christ a unique historical position in the illustration of man's unity with God, it denies to Him any transcendent eminence as respects the fact of such unity. "The incarnation of God," says Schelling, "is an incarnation from eternity. The man Christ is in manifestation only the culmination, and in so far also again the beginning of the same, for from Him it is to progress in virtue of the fact that all of His disciples shall be members of one and the same body of which He is the head." (Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums, IX.) In his later teaching Schelling gives a different exposition of the subject. He there asserts that Christ must be regarded, not merely as the teacher or founder of Christianity, but as the content of Christianity, and that any one having the least acquaintance with the New Testament declarations must assign to Him an importance far transcending anything human or earthly. In His pre-incarnate history He was primarily a divine potency in the Father, which first at the end of creation appeared as a Divine Person. (Philo-

sophie der Offenbarung.) In his dislike of the rationalism of the times, the so-called Illuminism, Schelling was from the first at one with Fichte.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-1831), after working for an interval in harmony with Schelling, proceeded to develop an independent system of philosophy. The ground of his exception to Schelling was not at all in his general conception of the problem to be solved. No less than his ambitious contemporary, Hegel made philosophy to deal with the Absolute, with God. Its task is nothing less than to rise to a knowledge of being at its source, and to trace it in its outgoings, its development into the organism which makes the universe. Thus, in striking contrast with Kant's denial of a metaphysic of the Absolute, he held that it may be thoroughly known. "Philosophy," he says, "has the purpose to know the truth, to know God, for He is the absolute truth, in so far that nothing else, in comparison with God and His explication, is worth one's pains." (*Philosophie der Religion*, Theil III.) So far from withdrawing from knowledge, it is the very nature of God to reveal Himself. "All that God is, He imparts and reveals." (*Logik*, Cap. VIII., translation by Wallace.) He does this of necessity as spirit. "A spirit that is not revealed is not spirit," — ein Geist der nicht offenbar ist, ist nicht Geist. (*Phil. der Relig.*) Spirit is not a blank undistinguished unity; it is a unity of opposed elements; it involves necessarily a process, an unfoldment, a self-revelation, so that the act of self-revelation enters into the very definition of God as spirit. Nor is this self-revelation to be regarded as outside the circle in which human faculties move. It is a revelation to man. To plead man's finitude is illegitimate, for it is not the so-called reason of man in its limitations that knows God, "but the Spirit of God in man; it is, to use the speculative expression which has been employed, the self-consciousness of God which knows itself in man's knowing." (*Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes.*)

What Hegel did object to in Schelling was (1.) his too easy assumption of his starting-point, and (2) his failure to explain all the steps in the unfoldment from that starting-point. The starting-point is indeed pure and absolute being, but this needs to be justified by showing that the mind in its regress from the particular and the phenomenal cannot stop short of that ultimate goal which is found in the most indeterminate and universal idea. This preliminary investigation being completed, philosophy is prepared to construct its system, or, in other words, to show how the whole system of things, whether in the realm of mind or of nature, is evolved from the Absolute, which is viewed in the first instance as subsisting in utter indeterminateness. In accomplishing this task, the philosopher is not to resort to any mystical principle of intuition. He must depend rather upon patient, consistent reasoning. Thought, when it runs a complete and normal course, is a reflex of the process by which the universe was constituted. Indeed, the universe is but evolved thought. Being and thought are identical. "Everything is in its own self the same as it is in thought." (*Logik.*) A thinker is only a thought conceived as a subject. The great requisite, therefore, for progress to a complete grasp of the truth, is to keep thought pure, unmixed with ingredients of appetite, will, or egoistic opinions. "When we think, we renounce our selfish and particular being, sink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its course, and if we add anything of our own we think ill." (*Logik.*)

According to Hegel, if we are to think things as they are, we must comprehend in our thoughts a plurality of elements. To isolate an element is to make it abstract or unreal. The concrete alone is real, and the concrete is a unity of contraries. So thought which reflects the nature and order of being must move through a succession of triads, a process of conjoining two opposite notions and uniting them in a third or larger notion, of which they constitute the moments.

As in the Absolute thought and actuality, the ideal and the real, are identical, we have only to follow out the natural order of the evolution of thought to get the whole system of truth or reality. Styling the Absolute, thus conceived, the Idea, Hegel assigns its exposition to three different branches, which together make up philosophy. The three branches, corresponding to the three grand stages in the movement of thought, are (1.) Logic, the science of the Idea in itself; (2.) Philosophy of Nature, the science of the Idea in the reflection of itself; (3.) Philosophy of Mind, the science of the Idea in its return to itself from its self-estrangement in nature.

In the Logic Hegel lays down the starting-point. "Mere being," he says, "makes the beginning," — that is, being which is not specialized by any characteristics, not mediated by any other notion; for, if that were the case, it would not be the beginning. Mere being, having no attribute by which it is set off, is undistinguished from not-being. One may say, that, inasmuch as there is no definite or specified difference between them, they are identical. But, on the other hand, he is equally justified in saying that they are different. The proper conclusion is, that they are but moments in a third notion, becoming, which is the first concrete thought. In like manner, by the successive presentation of contraries and their reconciliation, the evolution of thought is carried forward. More and more definite results are reached. The hierarchy, or ideal world, of thought is completed, and the second grand stage, in which thought is externalized in nature, is entered upon. Nature, passing through its triads of properties, forms, and structures, reaches its culmination in the physical organization of man. From this point begins the return movement, which completes the circle, in that thought comes back to a recognition of its source in the Absolute.

The real bearing of Hegel's philosophy upon Christian theology is not easily defined. Its formal attitude was no

doubt friendly. It assumed, indeed, to give a philosophical statement of the leading truths of the Christian system, to substitute exact terms for the popular and more or less symbolical phraseology in use in the Church. Some of the very dogmas most offensive to rationalism were taken under its special patronage. In his general doctrine of God, Hegel uses some expressions which savor of the ordinary theistic conception, and some which appear decidedly adverse to that conception. He has no objection to speaking of the personality of God. "The Christian God," he says, "is God not known merely, but also self-knowing; He is a personality not merely figured in our minds, but rather absolutely actual." Referring to Spinoza's doctrine, he says: "Though an essential stage in the evolution of the idea, substance is not the same with absolute idea, but the idea under the still limited form of necessity. It is true that God is necessity, or as we may put it, that He is the absolute thing or fact: He is, however, no less the absolute Person. That He is the absolute Person, however, is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never perceived; and on that side, it falls short of the true notion of God, which forms the content of the religious consciousness in Christianity." (Logik, Cap. VIII.) To have completed his view, Spinoza should have added to the Oriental view of the unity of substance the Occidental principle of individuality. But, on the other hand, Hegel indulges representations that accord rather with a pantheistic than with a theistic theory, representations which seem to extinguish all definite bounds between God and the creature. He says, "Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea," that is, of universal Reason or God. (Logik, Cap. IX.) He also remarks, "The truth [made manifest in the incarnation] is, that there is only one Reason, one Spirit, that the spirit as finite has not true existence." (Phil. der Relig.) Such expressions as these, as well as his general theory of evolution, seem to reduce all finite things to moments in the

process of the Absolute by which it comes to a full self-realization.

The doctrine of the Trinity, Hegel maintains, is fundamental to a true theology or philosophy, and he stigmatizes its opponents as being only *die sinnlichen und die Verstandes-Menschen*. In his view, the very conception of God as Spirit involves a trinitarian distinction. For, God is spirit only as He is the totality of a process, and three stages enter essentially into the completion of the process. "Spirit," he says, "is the divine history, the process of distinguishing and separating self and receiving this back again into self. . . . As totality is God the Spirit, God as merely the Father is not yet the true. He is rather beginning and end. . . . He is the eternal process. . . . He is this life-process (*Lebensverlauf*), the Trinity, wherein the Universal places itself over against itself, and therein remains identical with itself." (Phil. der Relig.) In other words, thought objectifies itself, the Father becomes object to Himself in the Son. In the Spirit, which is love, or consciousness of self in another, the divine subject and object find their unity.

As respects the person of Christ, it of course occasioned no difficulty to Hegel to conceive of a union of the divine and the human in Him. It was a favorite tenet of his, that finite and infinite are not to be set over against each other as mutually exclusive. The infinite includes the finite. To exclude the latter from the former is to limit the former and reduce it to a finite. "The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of the finite into itself." As this view applies to the finite in general, it does not necessarily imply any special pre-eminence of the historical Christ. But Hegel, as a matter of fact, declares for such a pre-eminence. In Christ, he says, is brought to view the absolute transfiguration of the finite. No man standing on the ground of the true religion can call Him simply a teacher of man-

kind and a martyr of the truth. He was conscious of His identity with God, and spoke with the inimitable majesty belonging to such a consciousness. Herein he fully realized what other men have only striven after. This is the supreme evidence in his behalf. The spiritual man needs nothing more. He does not require miracles, though it is nothing incredible that spirit, which is itself the great miracle, should be able to reveal a mastery over the forces of nature, and the modern unbelief in miracles rests on a superstitious estimate of the might of nature as opposed to the independence of the spirit. In the death of Christ, God is seen to share the extreme lot of man's finitude. His death is therefore a manifestation of infinite love, an image of the eternal process in which God imparts Himself, as the resurrection is an image of the return to Himself.

Hegel speaks in terms of profound admiration of the Bible, and declares that the familiarity with it characteristic of Protestant lands gives them an unmeasured advantage over Roman Catholic countries. "In the former," he says, "the Bible is the safeguard against all slavery of the spirit," — *das Rettungsmittel gegen alle Knechtschaft des Geistes*. (Phil. der Relig.) But on the other hand, like Kant, he lays little stress upon the historical element in the Bible, and maintains that it should be interpreted in the interests of edification, — in other words, as suggestive or symbolical of philosophical truths. "The true Christian content of faith," he says, "is to be justified through philosophy, not through history."

On the whole, the bearing of Hegel's philosophy upon Christian theology, notwithstanding its general tone of appreciation and its points of affinity, is rather ambiguous. It appears as a doubtful ally, whether judged by its principles or by its results. It may be, as some have supposed, that if a longer period had been granted to Hegel to perfect his views, he would have brought his philosophy at various

points more definitely into line with Christian truth. As it was, it served naturally as the basis of a mixed development. While some sought to interpret it in harmony with the leading truths of Christian theology, others, the so-called left wing of the Hegelians, regarded it as a chosen instrument for vaporizing that theology out of existence. The names of Strauss, Bruno Bauer, and Feuerbach, indicate to what extremes results were carried on this side.

Alongside the idealistic systems which began with Kant, and culminated in Hegel, a different philosophical development had place, one in which the intellectual element was less dominant. Here belongs the teaching of FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI (1743-1819), and also that of Schleiermacher. Jacobi's system has sometimes been called the *faith philosophy*. An enemy to all dogmatic systems, like that of Spinoza, having no confidence in formal demonstrations to get at the truth, he maintained that faith, or intuitive belief, is the ground of certitude. The spontaneous conviction of the reality of an external world, which is inseparable from our sense-perceptions, approves the existence of that world to us in the most satisfactory way possible. In like manner we are assured of supersensible realities, of the existence of God. As nature testifies to itself by pressing into our experience, so does God testify to Himself. We have, so to speak, an experience of God, that is, experiences from which rises immediately the conviction of God's being and perfection. To Jacobi the pantheistic conception was exceedingly distasteful. He believed in a God who has intelligence and will, a personal God, who is above men as well as in men. In these points consisted the affinity of his teaching for Christian theology. Toward Christianity as an historical and revealed system he occupied a rather negative position.

FRIEDRICH ERNST DANIEL SCHLEIERMACHER (1768-1834) in his general philosophy modified the teachings of Kant with the intent to do full justice to the realistic as well as

to the idealistic elements in the same. "With him space, time, and causality are not merely forms of a phenomenal world, existing solely in the consciousness of the percipient subject, but are also forms of the objective real world which confronts him and conditions his knowledge." (Ueberweg.) His conception of the nature of God and of his relation to the world leaned toward a pantheistic theory. In his ethics he sought to give proper scope to the element of individuality, and thus to modify or supplement the uniform code which Kant prescribes for all moral agents. In his religious philosophy he appears in part akin and in part supplementary to Jacobi. Like the latter, he placed much stress upon the religious consciousness, upon the profounder feelings in the soul. The feeling of dependence upon God he regarded in particular as the foundation of all religion. At the same time, he included important factors which Jacobi failed to appropriate, inasmuch as he had a much larger appreciation of the historical element in Christianity, believed that religious life can be properly realized only in fellowship, or through the offices of the Church, and attached immense importance to the person of Christ as the one centre and the perfect bond of that fellowship. As Schleiermacher was still more eminent as a theologian than as a philosopher, we may fittingly reserve his specific views for a mention under the various topics of theology.

A passing reference may be made to the systems of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860) and EDUARD VON HARTMANN (1842-), though not because of any affinity between their spirit and leading tenets with Christian thought. Both are systems of atheistic monism and pessimism. According to Schopenhauer, the one substantial and fundamental reality is will. Intellect is only an adjunct which will creates for its own purpose. In general, will is unconscious force, but in man it rises to consciousness. The essence of conscious will is unsatisfied striving or misery. The actual world is the worst possible. Lapse into nothing-

ness is the proper goal of human desire, for it is the only cure for unceasing pain. Hartmann in his "Philosophy of the Unconscious" departs from Schopenhauer, by making intellect co-ordinate with will. In the Unconscious, which is the ground of all existence, the two are inseparably conjoined. In man, however, a severance has taken place; opposition to the will is realized, and so consciousness is produced. The struggle between consciousness and will is a source of continual misery. Relief will come only when the race of conscious beings has been so far educated, that by common consent it will elect extinction. (See Francis Bowen, *Modern Philosophy*.)

Among the more recent German philosophies, those of JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART (1776-1841) and RUDOLPH HERMANN LOTZE (1817-1882) claim a prominent place. Herbart regarded Kant as more than any other his philosophical master. He shows also considerable affinity with Leibnitz. As opposed to Fichte and Schelling, he sought to sustain the claims of realism, — this term being used here, of course, not in the scholastic, but the current modern sense. The proper materials of philosophy, as he maintained, are given in experience. As thus given, however, they are not satisfactory to reason, inasmuch as they involve contradictory conceptions. The proper task of philosophical thinking is to resolve these contradictions, and in this way to bring settled conviction into the place of scepticism. As respects religion, Herbart regarded it as based mainly upon faith, or the practical reason. While he averred that the design exhibited in nature implies a divine intelligence, he held with Kant that a proper metaphysic of Deity is beyond man's capabilities.

Lotze shows a measure of affinity with Herbart, and a still greater with Leibnitz. Appearing at an era when the idealistic and dogmatic philosophy represented by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had reached its culmination, and at the same time prominent tendencies to materialism had

appeared in scientific circles, his system presents an offset to both phases. As opposed to dogmatic idealism, Lotze asserts a wide place for the empirical method, the process of patient and searching examination into the facts of experience. He maintains that the dictum set forth by Fichte, and followed by others, — namely, that philosophy must first lay hold upon some single principle, and then draw out everything from that, — has been productive of great mischief. Such a dictum would indeed be in place if a man could transfer himself to the centre of the universe, and view everything as it appears to perfect insight from that standpoint. But no man can do this. The feasibility of the attempt is refuted by its representatives. Hegelians disprove the Hegelian method by their radical differences among themselves. The sweeping assumption at the basis of Hegelianism, respecting the identity of being and thought, is untenable. Philosophy, by proceeding with less assumption and more modesty, will reach more trustworthy results.

At the same time Lotze was strongly opposed to materialism, and worked zealously and ably in refutation of the theories of Büchner, Moleschott, and others. Indeed, his opposition to the preceding idealistic philosophies was not so much an opposition to their idealism, as to their dogmatism and one-sidedness. Materialism, he claims, is incompatible with facts. It cannot be harmonized with our unity of consciousness, without which the totality of our inner states would never become an object of our observation. Unity of consciousness requires the affirmation of an immaterial supersensible essence, or soul. (*Mikrokosmos*, Buch II.) In truth souls, or spirits, make up the sum of substantial beings. All the attributes ascribed to matter may be explained by the relations of simple unextended beings.

According to Lotze, all things find their bond of union in God, who is the necessary pre-supposition of a cosmos.

The nature of God, as he asserts very emphatically, includes the feature of personality. God's infinitude, so far from excluding personality, is just the reason why he has personality in the utmost perfection. Self-consciousness is perfect in Him, as He is fully revealed to Himself, whereas in a man there is much that is not revealed to himself. God needs no non-ego to be set over against Him in order to arrive at self-consciousness. In His perfection He has an immediate grasp of Himself. To begin thus with a personal or self-conscious God involves no peculiar difficulties. "When we characterize," says Lotze, "the inner life of the personal God, the stream of His thoughts, His feelings, His will, as eternal and beginningless, as never having been in rest and impelled out of no still-stand into motion, we exact of the imagination no greater task than is required of it by every materialistic or pantheistic view." For every such view must assume an uncaused motion of the substance of the world, or an absolute beginning of motion which seizes hold of a previously existing and inert substance, and the latter view cannot stand any close inspection. (*Mikrokosmos*, Buch IX. cap. 4.)

A philosophy kindred with that of Lotze in its antagonism to materialism and its emphasis upon the idea of a personal God, and set forth in language of marked clearness and terseness, has recently been presented to the public in the works of Professor BORDEN P. BOWNE.

In both France and England the succession in the line of the sensational philosophy has been pretty well kept up down to the present. In France AUGUSTE COMTE has appeared as a zealous advocate. His fundamental thesis is, that human thinking in all the varied branches of inquiry runs through three stages: the theological, which explains the world and the events in the world by reference to supernatural beings; the metaphysical, which resorts to metaphysical entities or abstractions; the positive, which, recognizing the vanity of seeking any ultimate ground of

things, attempts only to discover their relations of succession and similitude, and in this way to grasp particulars under more general points of view. Positivism, which thus rejects all *a priori* elements, is the perfection of philosophy. It includes six different branches,—mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. The last, which treats of man and society, is not to be understood to include psychology, for this as ordinarily understood is a bogus science, resting on the fiction that the mind has power to observe its own operations.

Comte's scheme of religion is something extraordinary. In the place of God he puts, as the supreme object of public worship, collective humanity, the race of the past, the present, and the future. Even animals, like the faithful dog, to which duties are owed, are included in the aggregate object of devotion. In painting and sculpture the symbol of this supreme being is always to be a woman of the age of thirty with a child in her arms. Private devotion is properly addressed simply to the idea of some woman living or dead. Among historical religions, fetishism claims a large place in Comte's appreciation; he even speaks of the earth as *le Grand Fétiche*. In his scheme, supervision of morals and religion, and education in general, are assigned to the Positivist clergy, over whom presides with unlimited authority the supreme pontiff, who has his residence at Paris. Commenting on this part of the scheme of Comte, J. S. Mill has characterized it as "the completest system of spiritual and temporal despotism which ever yet emanated from a human brain, unless possibly that of Ignatius Loyola." (Autobiography.) Professor Huxley has not inaptly described Comte's religion as "Romanism with Christianity left out." (See Catechism of Positive Religion; also J. S. Mill, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*.)

Among English representatives of sensationalism in the present century a prominent place is occupied by JAMES

MILL, JOHN STUART MILL, ALEXANDER BAIN, and HERBERT SPENCER. While differing on various points, these writers have shown a decided bias toward such characteristic tenets of sensationalism as the following: (1.) Sensation supplies the entire material of knowledge. (2.) Our necessary or intuitive beliefs are explained by the principle of the association of ideas. Much stress is laid upon this point. Hence the name Associational School, which has been applied to this class of writers. (3.) There is no immediate consciousness of self, but only of particular feelings or exercises. We have no authority to affirm that the mind is anything more than a succession of psychical states. (4.) Acts of the will, no less than other events, come under the category of cause and effect; necessitarianism is the true theory. As respects the third of these points, it should be noticed that John Stuart Mill allows that it involves a very considerable paradox. "If we speak of the mind," he says, "as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." (Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.)

Herbert Spencer is distinguished in particular by his combination of the sensational philosophy with a thoroughgoing theory of evolution. He accepts as a necessary postulate the existence of a certain primordial being or force lying back of all phenomena. From the evolution of this, or its progress from homogeneity to heterogeneity, result all varieties physical and mental, all specific forms of existence in the universe. Our necessary beliefs are products of evolution. They have arisen, not merely through such associations of ideas as we personally have formed, but also

through such as our ancestors have made, and the effect of which they have transmitted with cumulative force. Slowly formed and continuously transmitted nervous modifications are the explanation of our moral, as of our other necessary beliefs. Mr. Spencer writes: "Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals, who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organizations, so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become to us certain faculties of moral intuition." (Letter to Mill, quoted in the *Data of Ethics*.) As in this passage the nerves are made the efficient antecedents of beliefs, so generally, in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, matter is made the antecedent of mind. This gives his system a decided cast of materialism. He says, to be sure, that the controversy between materialism and spiritualism is only a war of words, since we know nothing about the nature of the essence lying back of phenomena. But which, it is to be asked, is first,—which has the primacy, the physical or the mental? According to the whole tenor of Mr. Spencer's teaching, mind stands second, and in a relation of dependence. It is the physical force existing as motion, heat, or light, that gives rise to a feeling, or becomes changed in some inexplicable way into a fact of consciousness. Now, as we are not allowed to postulate a divine intelligence as the antecedent and designing cause of physical properties and laws, physical force is put decidedly into the foreground; mind appears, not co-ordinate, but secondary and resultant; and what is this but the most positive materialism that can well be conceived?

In these later phases of sensational philosophy religion holds a place by sufferance. It has no rights based upon

positive and known truths. Its right is scarcely more than that of conjecture and hope with respect to the unknown. The attitude of John Stuart Mill toward religion was mostly negative. But in some of his later writings he gave attention to the subject, and made some approaches to positive opinions. In his essay on Theism he says: "I think it must be allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence." He allows the reality of the historical Christ, on the ground that, without the pattern before them, the disciples could never have drawn the picture contained in the New Testament, and says that religion cannot be regarded as having made a bad choice in fixing upon Christ "as the ideal representative and guide of humanity." As respects immortality, he claims that science has no proof against it, and that as a matter of hope it is legitimate and philosophically defensible. "The beneficial effect of such a hope," he says, "is far from trifling. It makes life and human nature a far greater thing to the feelings, and gives greater strength, as well as greater solemnity, to all the sentiments which are awakened in us by our fellow-creatures and by mankind at large." But, on the other hand, he maintains that intelligent thought cannot accept an Author of nature who is at once omnipotent and good, and that accordingly some form of the dualistic theory is best suited to the religious understanding. The supernatural in general he relegates to the region of hypothesis or hope, such hope at most being admitted as a supplement to the religion of humanity, — by which he means, not the worship of humanity, but the sympathetic dedication of one's self to its welfare.

According to Herbert Spencer, the object of religion is the unknown God, that perfectly inscrutable power which lies back of the phenomenal world. Its field is that vast region of nescience which borders the known. In the recognition of this its proper province lies its reconcilia-

tion with science. "If religion and science," he says, "are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts,—that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." In past history the religious mind has not been content to leave this region of nescience a blank, but has peopled it with various creations of its own. However, it is not to be blamed on this account. Being unable to rise to the true conception, it pursued the course best adapted to progress in satisfying the imagination with various orders of concrete forms. Thus the historical religions have served a useful purpose. Indeed, it is not certain that the impulse to give definiteness of character to the unknown will ever be outgrown. "Very likely there will ever remain a need to give shape to that indefinite sense of an ultimate existence, which forms the basis of our intelligence. We shall always be under the necessity of contemplating it as *some* mode of being; that is, of representing it to ourselves in *some* form of thought, however vague. And we shall not err in doing this so long as we treat every notion we thus frame as merely a symbol, utterly without resemblance to that for which it stands." (First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.)

This certainly is imposing no small trial upon the religious sentiment. Tantalus was not more unfortunate. The mind must needs draw its outline or diagram of the unknown, but it is in duty bound to erase it at once, or at least to write across it the declaration that it represents nothing. How long the religious sentiment could stand this process rigorously carried out, is a question which may well be submitted to serious consideration.

Having now gone over the philosophical development in its main phases, we are prepared to ask about its general result upon theology. This much at least is clear, that it leaves an open field to Christian theism. Only those who confine their view to a fraction of the development, and

imagine that the whole stream of modern thought has gone, or is destined to go, into the channel of their particular anti-theistic philosophy, can adopt a different verdict. The whole stream of modern thought has not gone into any such channel, nor is there the slightest prospect that it will. To say nothing about the impulses and demands of practical religious life, the opposing factors from the domain of philosophy are altogether too strong to be borne in that direction. If some philosophies have been opposed to the theory of a personal God, others (which in rigor and majesty of thought approach nearest to the great theistic systems of the ancient world represented by Plato and Aristotle) insist upon a personal God as the only adequate explanation of known facts. If some of the modern systems have assumed a radically agnostic position, others have assumed the opposite position, that philosophy is a genuine explication of the Absolute, while others still have taken the intermediate ground, that our conceptions of God are of the nature of a rational and warranted faith. The resultant upon this point would seem to be the conclusion, that we are authorized to assume the existence of a personal God, and have the means of a trustworthy, though by no means exhaustive, knowledge of Him. Here the outcome is thoroughly agreeable to Catholic theology. As respects Catholic trinitarianism and Christology, modern philosophy has exhibited a less definite, and perhaps on the whole less friendly attitude. Still some of the most noteworthy philosophies have regarded these orders of doctrines as at least symbolical, if not accurately expressive, of the most important truths, while others have left an open place for them by distinguishing between things above reason and things contrary to reason, of which the former are capable of being approved by revelation. It is worthy of notice, too, how nearly unanimous are the philosophies which have any depth of moral tone in allowing that Christ may properly be taken as the moral ideal.

A specific affiliation between each of the more noted philosophies and contemporary theology is clearly manifest. The system of Wolff exercised a dominant influence upon the dogmatics of Germany in the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century. S. J. Baumgarten appears as a distinguished representative of theological Wolffianism. With him may be associated Carпов, Reinbeck, Reusch, Schubert, and others. The philosophy of Kant, being speedily followed by powerful rivals, did not have an opportunity to maintain an exclusive dominion; but it was influential from the first both with rationalists and moderate supernaturalists, and has not ceased to be a noteworthy factor in theological thinking. Among the earlier representatives of Kant's influence we may mention Tieftrunk, Ammon, J. W. Schmid, Stäudlin, and Bretschneider. Conspicuous among the more recent representatives is Albrecht Ritschl. The philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, especially the last two, claimed disciples who believed that they had found in them means of a more adequate interpretation of religious truth than the world had seen before. For a time Hegelianism threatened to sweep the whole field; but it divided into different schools, and by the middle of the century was numbered with the waning philosophies. Some of the representatives of the more sceptical school have already been mentioned. Among the more orthodox, a leading place is properly assigned to Marheinecke. Jacobi found appreciation with a considerable class of theologians, and was especially valued by the æsthetic school. The wide influence of Schleiermacher is matter of common consent, though, as already stated, much more is to be credited to his theology than to his philosophy proper. In England the system of Locke was the leading philosophical ally of theology throughout the eighteenth century. In the present century Coleridge led the way to a more appreciative consideration of the German systems. A number

of recent writers in England, Scotland, and America have attached quite a high theological value to the philosophy of Hegel. New England transcendentalism was influenced by Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Schelling. Much of the incentive, however, came indirectly. "It was through the literature of Germany," says O. B. Frothingham, "that the transcendental philosophy chiefly communicated itself. Goethe, Richter, and Novalis were more persuasive teachers than Kant, Jacobi, or Fichte. To those who could not read German these authors were interpreted by Thomas Carlyle, who took up the cause of German philosophy and literature, and wrote about them with passionate power in the English reviews." (Transcendentalism in New England.)

Though long retaining its preference for mediævalism, the Roman Catholic Church has not escaped the influence of the modern philosophies. Since the time of Kant, the writings of some of her most distinguished authors in Germany, such as Hermes, Günther, Klee, Staudenmaier, and Drey, though asserting more or less of opposition to the philosophical current, have been not a little affected by it. The opinions of the first two in this list fell under ecclesiastical censure.

As in all previous periods, so in this, a uniform estimate of the worth of philosophy in the religious sphere cannot be affirmed. The tendency on the whole has been toward the middle course between extreme valuation and extreme depreciation. Probably the theological world of the present subscribes more generally and intelligently than ever before to the verdict that philosophy and revelation, reason and faith, have harmonious, though different, offices to perform. The following sentences of F. H. Hedge are largely representative: "The cause of reason is the cause of faith. Each is the other's complement. Reason requires the nutriment and impulse furnished by faith. Faith requires the discreet elaboration of reason." (Reason in Religion.)

SECTION II.—COMMUNIONS, CREEDS, AND AUTHORS.

1. NEW COMMUNIONS.—A proper regard for brevity will preclude the mention of all, or even of a majority, of the new communions which have been organized since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Only those made noteworthy by peculiarities or extent of influence command our notice.

Moravians.—While the Moravians who settled on the estates of Count Zinzendorf in Lusatia formed the nucleus of the society which bears their name, it was soon recruited from a great variety of sources. In harmony with this heterogeneous composition little stress was laid upon doctrinal unity. Religious life was exalted above dogma, and the prevailing conception of religious life included a positive and conscious experience of the redeeming power of Christ.

The acceptance of the Augsburg Confession in 1749 was not followed by any close adhesion to the traditional sense of that standard. From the first, Christ crucified was made the centre of Moravian theology. Indeed, the criticism most frequently urged is, that the person of Christ and the office which He fulfilled upon the cross were too exclusively emphasized.

After Zinzendorf, Spangenberg was the most distinguished leader and theologian of the Moravians. His culture and wisdom were employed to good effect in modifying some of the more questionable features which had place under his predecessor.

Moravianism was officially recognized by the government of Saxony in 1749, and in the same year the societies which had been formed in England received the recognition of the English Parliament. It won early an exceptional distinction by zeal and self-sacrifice in mission work.

Methodists.—In its primary Oxford stage Methodism was a form of earnest, ascetic, ritualistic piety. In the period of

transition from this stage, it appeared almost as an offshoot of Moravianism. It was under Moravian tuition that its most distinguished founder, John Wesley, reached a satisfactory religious experience (in 1738); and from the same source he derived some of the outlines of the great work of evangelization which he afterwards undertook. But the period of direct and intimate connection with Moravianism did not much exceed two years. By 1740 Methodism had started upon its course as an independent movement, though not yet as a separate communion, and had given exhibition of most of its characteristic features, doctrinal and practical. Though their work was generally frowned upon by the Established Church, the leaders regarded themselves as loyal servants of that Church, and their efforts at religious reform as within its bounds and for its benefit. But the hindrances that were thrown in their way, and their unwillingness to be impeded in what they considered their providential vocation, naturally worked toward a separation. This first occurred in 1779, in the Calvinistic branch, which was associated with Whitefield, and was under the special patronage of Lady Huntingdon. Of the societies under Wesley, those in the United States of America acquired the status and organization of an independent communion in 1784; those in England, in the course of the twenty years or thereabouts which followed the conference of 1795, at which authority was given the societies, under certain conditions, to administer their own sacraments.

On its theological side, Methodism appears, on the whole, as the advocate and propagandist of Arminianism. To be sure, it had, almost from the very start, its exponents of Calvinistic doctrine; it contributed permanent benefits in the way of religious impulse to various Calvinistic bodies; and it is still represented (most largely in Wales) by distinct communions of the Calvinistic type. But still the Arminian stream, from the standpoint of the present, is to all appearance so much broader, that Methodism wears

mainly the cast of an Arminian movement. It should be noticed, however, that the term Arminian needs to be qualified if it is to stand for Methodist theology. Its sense must not be taken from the latitudinarian Arminians of the English Church at the end of the seventeenth or beginning of the eighteenth century, or from the later Arminians of Holland, or even from the second generation of that school; it must be taken rather from the founder, James Arminius. The spirit and intent of Methodist theology, if not all of its details, find in him a pretty fair exponent. Its aim was to escape the harsher peculiarities of Calvinism, while yet a strong doctrine of grace was maintained. It was shaped by a warm, evangelical piety, and bears the impress at once of a deep sense of dependence upon God, and of an earnest, practical regard for human freedom and responsibility. It embraced very little that was strictly of the nature of a novelty. The fervor of its advocacy gave indeed a new prominence to such doctrines as those of assurance and Christian perfection; but essentially the same doctrines had been taught before, and have found place in other communions since. The doctrinal significance of Methodism lies principally in the fact, that, avoiding both the Pelagian and the Calvinistic extreme, it has fixed upon a practical working theology, exemplified the same on a broad scale, and spread the leaven of its influence through a large part of the theological world.

While Methodism had its early formative stage, in its after history it has been free from what may be called a doctrinal crisis. It has had its stirring episodes, its seasons of spirited polemics, but no era of marked theological transitions. Among the more memorable of its polemical seasons was that inaugurated by the anti-Calvinistic minutes of the conference of 1770. In the ensuing controversy the principal disputants on the Calvinistic side were Richard Hill, Rowland Hill, and Augustus Toplady; on the Arminian side, Walter Sellon, Thomas Olivers, and

John Fletcher. Most of the products of this theological war proved to be of transient import. The writings of Fletcher alone have claimed anything like a classic rank. In his "Checks to Antinomianism" the Biblical and practical supports of the Arminian doctrines of grace are presented with a good degree of skill and cogency.

The "Book of Discipline," embodying the twenty-five articles abridged from the thirty-nine of the Church of England, and in addition some incidental statements of doctrine, is the only doctrinal standard claiming formal authority in the main body of American Methodists. There are catechisms which are recommended for the instruction of the young, but they are not made binding on the individual conscience. In the English or Wesleyan communion, the Sermons of Wesley and his Notes on the New Testament have legally the force of a standard; but with American Methodists, these writings take rank as standards only in a secondary sense. Among formal systems of theology, Watson's Institutes have long been regarded as a compendium of Methodist teaching. Recently a new era of productiveness in Methodist theological literature has been inaugurated. The works of W. B. Pope, M. Raymond, and D. D. Whedon have been introduced to the public; also, more recently, those of John Miley, T. O. Summers, R. S. Foster, Milton S. Terry, O. A. Curtis, J. A. Beet, J. S. Lidgett, W. F. Tillett, J. J. Tigert, and N. Burwash.

The Freewill Baptists, organized under the leadership of Benjamin Randall about 1780, have entertained theological beliefs quite similar to those of the Methodists. (See Statement of 1834, prepared under the direction of the General Conference.)

Swedenborgians. — Emanuel Swedenborg was born at Stockholm in 1688. After a life of nearly sixty years devoted to the natural sciences, he believed himself called to the office of giving, if not a new revelation, at least a new exposition of revelation, by which its hidden signifi-

cance should be brought to light, and a new dispensation of Christianity inaugurated. He also believed that he was prepared for this task by disclosures of the other world, and by conversations with angels, or translated saints. By such means the inner sense of Scripture was unveiled to him, and he was led to a knowledge of those spiritual verities of which all things outward and sensible are but copies or images.

The blended science and mysticism of Swedenborg's system have naturally commended it to only a limited class of minds. The New Church has not gathered numerous societies. It is probably true, however, as has been claimed, that the influence of its teachings is much wider than the bounds of its communion. The relation of this Church to Swedenborg may be gathered from the following statement of the Rev. James Reed: "The New Church as an outward organization may be defined as a body which believes in a definite spiritual sense within the letter of the Bible, and in a system of doctrine which that higher sense discloses,—Emanuel Swedenborg being its exponent and interpreter." (Swedenborg and the New Church.)

Unitarians. — In England Unitarianism first acquired in the eighteenth century the dimensions and consistency of a religious communion. Anti-trinitarianism, which in the earlier part of the century took the form of Arianism, advanced at the close of the century to the theory of the simple humanity of Christ, and furthermore took issue with the old Socinian theory of the propriety of worshipping Christ under divine titles. At this stage, Unitarianism was prosaic in spirit, with a leaning to materialism and necessitarianism. Its leading exponents were Joseph Priestley, Theophilus Lindsey, and Thomas Belsham. Among the later representatives of English Unitarianism an eminent place is occupied by James Martineau. In him, as in the majority of recent adherents, a more spiritual and ideal

philosophy is apparent than that which was prevalent in Unitarian circles in the age of Priestley.

By far the most conspicuous and noteworthy growth of Unitarianism in this period is that which has taken place in New England. Though the distinct outcropping of this growth did not occur till the present century, its antecedents may be traced back into the two preceding centuries. First came, in the Congregational societies of New England, a relaxation in the terms of church communion. By the action of the Synod of 1662, baptized persons of respectable life and orthodox belief, though not offering special evidence of regeneration, were allowed to have their children baptized, and to enjoy all church privileges except participation in the Lord's supper, — the so-called Half-way Covenant. Later, quite a proportion of the churches removed this exception, and so opened wide the doors to all persons of moral habits. A corrective for these lax principles of administration came with the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century. At the same time there was a revival of dogmatic fervor, and the great themes of grace and retribution claimed a prominent place in pulpit discourses. Naturally those who did not catch the enthusiasms of the awakening were thrown more than ever out of sympathy with the type of religion and theology which it represented. Foreign literature affiliating with their bias was imported.

So a divergence, prophetic of schism, began. "The first stage of the Liberal movement showed Calvinism giving way to Arminianism. In the second, the Calvinism vanished, the doctrines of the Trinity and vicarious atonement slowly followed, reason grew bolder and bolder, and at last the Liberals became Unitarians, and organized themselves as a new sect. They were still sincere Bible men. Reason and Revelation were their equal watchwords. The worth of the Bible to them, it is true, lay largely in its vagueness, its multiplicity of meaning, the room they

thereby got for thinking far and freely without fear. It lay much more largely in this vagueness than they knew." (Wm. C. Gannett, *Life of Ezra S. Gannett*.) As in England, defection from Trinitarianism ran first into Arianism. But the Arian stage was soon outgrown by the great majority. "Probably few who were forty years old at the time of the disclosure in 1815 died other than Arians. Probably there were few under forty then, who did not at least grow doubtful, if not certain, the other way." (Wm. C. Gannett.)

The first church in New England to make an open declaration of Unitarianism was King's Chapel in Boston. This was founded as an Episcopalian church. Previous to the ordination of Mr. Freeman, in 1787, it had so revised the Prayer-Book as to eliminate the doctrine of the Trinity. At the same time Unitarianism, in a more disguised form, was gaining a majority in most of the Congregational churches of Boston, and in other places, particularly of Eastern Massachusetts, was making a rapid advance. In consequence of the statements of Belsham, attention was called to the strength of Unitarianism, and in 1815 the controversy between Channing and Samuel Worcester initiated the movement to a separation from the Congregational body.

In the first stage of American Unitarianism, William Ellery Channing was the most representative leader, and the movement reflected largely his appreciation of the New Testament as the oracles of a supernatural religion, and his generous faith in the nobility and perfectibility of human nature. Among others of this era who held similar views, we may mention E. S. Gannett, the two Henry Wares (father and son), and Andrews Norton.

A second stage in American Unitarianism was introduced by the rise of Transcendentalism. As to the nature of this *ism*, "the easiest way of describing it is as the sentimental, mystical, and poetic side of the liberal move-

ment." (J. H. Allen, "Our Liberal Movement in Theology.") It gave a wide province to intuition, and made the inner spiritual sense the chief oracle of religious truth. Ralph Waldo Emerson, A. B. Alcott, and George Ripley were of the Transcendentalist school. In Theodore Parker the principles of the same school were combined with the temper of an iconoclast. "At bottom his system was dogmatism, resting on sentiment." (Allen.) He was a radical in thought, and an extremist in language, and so provoked the criticism, not merely of outsiders, but also of the great majority of contemporary Unitarian theologians. In his representations Christianity appears, not as the perfect or absolute religion, but simply as the best phase which the race has evolved in its progress toward the absolute religion.

Since the rise of Parkerism, Unitarianism on one side has exhibited a growing approximation to extreme rationalism. On another side, if it has lost some of the old points of affinity with evangelical theology, it has gained in respect of others. Among writers most evangelical in tone, we may mention H. W. Bellows and F. H. Hedge. The latter in particular is a thoughtful and quickening writer. A prominent place is also accorded to James Freeman Clarke among the more recent Unitarian authors.

Some others of the recently organized denominations might be ranked as Unitarian in respect to their attitude toward the doctrine of the Trinity, but they differ sufficiently to warrant their distinct name and standing. Here belong the Universalists. E. H. Capen, it is true, represents the Universalists as believing that Christ has the same nature with God, and that He was literally God manifest in the flesh. (Article on Universalism in Schaff-Herzog.) But it is understood that Hosea Ballou came ultimately to entertain the simple humanitarian conception of Christ, and that many of his contemporaries and successors embraced the same. Of those who represented the

rise of the denomination (in the last quarter of the eighteenth century), John Murray was a Sabellian, and Elhanan Winchester a Trinitarian. The earlier Universalists were quite distinguished from the Unitarians, too, in their affiliation with Calvinistic ideas of original sin and the atonement. The "Christians," combined near the beginning of the present century from O'Kelly Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists, and starting out with the design of making the Bible the sole standard, as opposed to man-made creeds, have been, at least in part, averse to the doctrine of the Trinity. At the same time, they have not been Socinians or humanitarians. "Their prevailing belief is that Jesus Christ existed with the Father before all worlds." (David Millard, in Rupp's Hist. of Relig. Denominations.) The Campbellites, or Disciples, discard rather the name of the Trinity than the doctrine.

We omit under the present topic such important denominations in this country as the Presbyterians, the Protestant Episcopalians, the Dutch Reformed, the German Reformed, and the Lutherans, inasmuch as they appear less as new communions than as branches of old communions transplanted to a new soil. As for the Mormons, they hardly come within the scope of these volumes at all. Their crude materialism, their polytheism, and their polygamy, with its attendant theories about woman's place, would seem to relegate their system to the history of heathen rather than of Christian doctrine.

2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OLDER COMMUNIONS. — The general cast of these developments has already been indicated by the Introduction. They are well described in the characterization of the period as the age of criticism and apology, of attack and defence, of strife and attempted reconciliation.

Lutherans. — The genuine religious inspiration which lay at the basis of Pietism, and which wrought with good effect at the beginning of the eighteenth century, did not ade-

quately pervade the life, or blend with the dogmatic thinking, of the Lutheran Church. On the contrary, Pietism itself suffered a loss of vitality and breadth. So no adequate barriers were offered to formalism and indifference, and the usual resultant of these, unbelief. The products of English deism were imported; French infidelity, under the patronage of Frederick the Great, made its inroads; the rage for exact demonstration, fostered by the Wolffian philosophy, threw probable evidences unduly into the shade; the rising zest for criticism, in its reaction from the wholesale assumption and dogmatism of the preceding age, tended to excess. Such factors co-working upon the prepared soil originated German rationalism.

Only in cases exceptionally extreme, such as those of Bahrddt and Edelmann, did German rationalism run into irreligion, or a tone of scornful opposition to the Bible. Its object was not to overthrow Christianity, but to interpret it in harmony with a more or less radical bias against the supernatural. The more moderate rationalists were content with abridging the supernatural elements in the Christian oracles and religion; the more radical sought to bring everything down to the plane of naturalism.

J. D. Michaelis and J. A. Ernesti are associated with the transition to rationalism, not because, in their own beliefs, they deviated to any considerable extent from orthodoxy, but because their new departure in the use of critical methods was utilized by disciples who were largely given to free-thinking. The man who more than any other may be regarded as the founder of German rationalism was J. S. Semler, Professor in Halle from 1752 to 1791. Before the end of the eighteenth century, a large proportion of Lutheran theologians had reached or passed beyond his standpoint, and in the beginning of the present century the rationalistic school was still dominant. Among representatives of the more radical type are numbered H. E. G. Paulus, H. P. C. Henke, J. F. Röhr, J. C. R. Eckermann,

J. Schulthess, and J. A. L. Wegscheider. Examples of the more moderate class are A. H. Niemeyer and C. G. Bretschneider. C. F. von Ammon may be placed with either class, according to the period of his life which is under consideration. The aversion of J. G. Eichhorn to the supernatural elements in the Biblical narratives would seem to assign him to the more radical class, though in important respects his views of the Bible were quite conservative.

Before the close of the first quarter of the present century, a movement counteractive of the current rationalism had been set on foot. Various factors were united in this. The idealistic philosophies, however questionable their attitude toward orthodox Lutheranism may have been, were certainly on the whole no friends of the common rationalism. The philosophy of Kant, to be sure, was in some respects an ally, but it had also its opposing phases, while in the writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel there was open and repeated denunciation of rationalistic barrenness and superficiality. The profound impulse which the German mind and heart received in connection with the wars of independence served as a practical basis for more thorough and evangelical ways of thinking. Finally, a new leaven was brought into the sphere of theology by the labors of Schleiermacher. In opposition to the rationalistic endeavor to satisfy merely the understanding, he called attention to the basis which religion has in the feelings, and to the paramount importance which must be attached to the person of the Redeemer in satisfying this side of man's nature. His system of doctrine (*Der Christliche Glaube*), published in 1821, marks a new era in modern theology. Rationalism, it is true, was not driven from the field; but thenceforth it held but a portion of the land; it was compelled to face a strong and confident rival, and found occasion to manifest itself under new forms. So, in place of the old type, we have such theories as those of David Strauss and F. C. Baur.

In the list of Lutheran theologians reputed orthodox, or relatively so, we have, for the early part of the period, Francis Buddeus, Lorenz von Mosheim, J. A. Bengel, S. J. Baumgarten, J. G. Carpzov, J. G. Walch, J. G. Reinbeck, J. Carpov, and C. M. Pfaff; for the middle part of the period, S. F. N. Morus, J. C. Doederlein, G. F. Seiler, G. C. Storr, G. C. Knapp, F. V. Reinhard, G. J. Planck, and F. C. Oetinger (who, however, mixed some theosophic peculiarities with the orthodox ingredients of his faith); for the closing part of the period, A. Hahn, H. Olshausen, J. A. C. Hävernicks, F. Lücke, August Neander, C. J. Nitzsch, J. Müller, A. Tholuck, C. Ullmann, A. D. C. Twessten, J. A. Dorner, T. A. Liebner, H. Martensen, R. Rothe, J. T. Beck, K. A. Auberlen, H. A. W. Meyer, C. F. Schmid, E. W. C. Sartorius, E. W. Hengstenberg, H. E. F. Guericke, G. Thomasius, J. C. K. von Hofmann, F. Delitzsch, C. E. Luthardt, K. F. A. Kahnis, K. F. Keil, G. F. Oehler, F. A. Philippi, T. Christlieb, Fr. H. R. Frank, and Bernhard Weiss. The fact that these writers are enumerated in a common class will not of course preclude the judgment that they differed to a very noticeable degree from each other. It is no small interval, for example, which lies between the systems of Rothe and Weiss, on the one hand, and those of Guericke and Philippi, on the other. Among the writers named, Dorner, Martensen, and Rothe represented the "Mediation School," Luthardt and Frank the later "Confessional School." Less closely allied than either group with Lutheran orthodoxy is the School of Ritschl, represented by Herrmann, Kaftan, Reischle, and Harnack (see Appendix VIII.).

Among the outward events of the Lutheran Church, the union effort claims a foremost place in importance. "In 1817, at the third centenary celebration of the Reformation, the king of Prussia, Frederick William III., united the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches in his kingdom under one government and worship, and gave them the name of the Evangelical Church. This example was followed by

most of the countries where the two denominations were represented; viz. Nassau, Bavaria on the Rhine, Baden, Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, Saxe-Weimar and Hildburghausen, and Wurtemberg. But Bavaria proper, Austria, and the kingdoms of Saxony and Hanover, never introduced the union." (Schaff, "Germany, its Universities, Theology, and Religion.") Moreover, in some of the countries where the union was introduced there has been a reaction in favor of strict denominational lines.

In the United States the Lutheran Church has been less subject to theological transitions than in the mother country. It has not been, however, entirely free from them. In the first half of the century a rather loose adhesion was given in general to the Augsburg Confession, and dissent from some of the characteristic tenets of Lutheranism was freely expressed. Recently there has been an extensive movement in favor of a strict adherence to the old Lutheran standards. A prominent representative of the former phase was S. S. Schmucker; of the latter, a leading champion was Chas. P. Krauth.

Reformed Church on the Continent. — The present period has been relatively an era of less productiveness in the Reformed than in the Lutheran Church. In the different countries of the Continent it has experienced similar vicissitudes. Generally there has been a departure from the rigor of earlier standards, and in many instances rationalism has disputed or commanded the field. Among the more extreme developments in this direction is the movement in Holland represented by Kuenen and others. At the same time, there has been an able representation of evangelical tendencies. In Switzerland and Germany we have such names as J. H. A. Ebrard, A. Schweizer, M. Schneckenburger, K. B. Hundeshagen, K. H. Sack, J. P. Lange, and K. R. Hagenbach. In France evangelical Protestantism has found efficient servants in Edmond de Pressensé, and the distinguished layman Guizot. In Hol-

land, La Saussaye and Van Oosterzee hold eminent rank among writers of orthodox tendencies.

In the United States the affiliated branches, the Dutch Reformed and the German Reformed, have been much less invaded by radical notions in theology than the corresponding communions in the mother country. They have adhered quite generally to the early standards, though not without manifestations of a disposition to abate their rigor in some points. The former numbers among its writers Geo. W. Bethune and Tayler Lewis; the latter, John W. Nevin and Philip Schaff.

The Church of England and the Protestant Episcopal Church.—In the first half of the eighteenth century the most noteworthy event in English ecclesiastical history, apart from the initiation of the Methodist revival, was the deistic controversy. The writings of such deists as Collins, Woolston, Chubb, Tindal, Morgan, and Bolingbroke called forth a host of replies. Apologetic treatises became the order of the day, and apparently they accomplished their purpose. Either in virtue of the offset which they presented, or by reason of other forces, such as the religious awakening, deism declined on English soil, so that soon after the middle of the century its writings were generally neglected. It has recently become the fashion to disparage these anti-deistical apologies of the eighteenth century. No doubt, they are defective from the standpoint of the highest theological culture of the present. But this does not prove that they were not able attempts to meet the then existing crisis, or that they are destitute of valid and useful supports of Christian faith. Among the more eminent authors (including some from the Dissenters) who conducted the war against deism were Nathaniel Lardner, Richard Bentley, Edward Chandler, Samuel Chandler, Thomas Sherlock, Zachary Pearce, Richard Smalbrooke, William Law, James Foster, John Conybeare, Bishop Butler, John Chapman, William Warburton, and John Leland.

In the present century, the two opposing movements, the Tractarian or Ritualistic, and the Broad Church, are the most significant events. The former began at Oxford in 1833, under the lead of J. H. Newman, R. H. Froude, Keble, and Pusey. It was of the nature of a reaction, provoked, on the one hand, by the action of the government in throwing open the doors of Parliament to Dissenters and Romanists, and on the other, by the rationalizing or liberal tendencies manifested within the Church. Starting with a special emphasis upon patristic authority, apostolical succession, and the virtue of the sacraments, the Ritualistic movement advanced from one stage to another, until at length many of its adherents declared openly their hatred of Protestantism, their preference for Romish ritual, and for a number of Romish dogmas. As a natural accompaniment of this inner approximation to Rome, a considerable number passed into the Romish communion, including such leading spirits as Newman, Simeon, Wilberforce, Manning, and Faber.

The Broad Church is the extreme opposite of the Ritualists. It repudiates the fundamental basis of the High Church theory, denies the necessity of apostolical succession, narrows the distinction between the ecclesiastical and the secular, exalts the authority of reason at the expense of traditionary standards, and is more or less inclined to abridge the significance of the external evidences of revealed religion. It has numbered such adherents as Coleridge, Thomas Arnold, F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, Benjamin Jowett, A. P. Stanley, and Matthew Arnold.

The Episcopal Church in the United States settled its constitution in 1789. In 1801, it adopted with few changes the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. At the outset Low Church tendencies were apparently in the ascendant. Bishop White, a leader in the era of organization, was decidedly remote from the High Church temper and standpoint. In its later history the Episcopal Church

in this country has reflected more or less the movements in the Church of England. The Tractarian wave reached her borders, as has also the Broad Church movement. Recently the High Church party has shown aggressive energy and has scored some victories,—a fact which explains the appearance of a Reformed Episcopal Church among the heirs of apostolic prerogatives.

Presbyterians.—A conservative spirit has in general distinguished the Presbyterian Church in Scotland. In the eighteenth century there was a slight outcropping of free-thinking, in which Professor Simson of Glasgow bore a conspicuous part. Also among the so-called Moderates, under the lead of William Robertson, there was a relaxation of dogmatic zeal. The sermons of this party revealed more interest in ethics than in theological beliefs. However, they took no open exception to the Church standard, the Westminster Confession. The schisms which occurred in this century had their origin principally in different views of polity, and flowed from that bitter fountain in the Scottish Church, the vexing question of patronage. The same is true of the disruption which, in 1843, gave origin to the Free Church. The most influential leader in the disruption, and the most efficient organizer of the Free Church, bore the celebrated name of Thomas Chalmers. Recently in both the Established Church and the Free Church of Scotland, considerable theological activity has been manifested, and works deserving of attention have been given to the public. We may instance, among others, such writers as William Cunningham, Alexander B. Bruce, John Tulloch, and Henry Calderwood.

In the United States, also, the main body of the Presbyterians has exhibited a good degree of dogmatic steadiness. However, there has been sufficient divergence in belief to occasion a notable disruption. One party, known as the Old School, being devoted to the Calvinism of the Westminster divines, and another party, called the New School,

being inclined to the modified Calvinism of the New England theology, a division took place between them in 1837. A reunion was consummated in 1869. Since 1890 there has been considerable agitation over creed revision and Biblical criticism. The revision, as accomplished in 1903, adds ameliorating interpretations to the doctrine of divine decrees. Among writers of the Old School and the New School respectively, Charles Hodge and Henry B. Smith have enjoyed a high reputation.

Congregationalists. — New England has been the principal arena of theological activity in the Congregational body of the present period. In England there has been little of the nature of a doctrinal crisis. Though not bound by any definite standard, the English Congregationalists of the eighteenth century adhered very generally to the principles of their earlier history. Their most noted representatives at that time were Bradbury, Watts, and Doddridge. The latest general declaration of their faith is that of 1833, which, however, was understood not to be authoritative, but simply a *résumé* of beliefs commonly held among them. Recently there has been something of a drift from the old moorings, especially on the subject of eschatology.

With Jonathan Edwards began one of the most noteworthy developments which has taken place in recent times within Calvinistic communions. Whatever may be thought of the soundness of his views, the greatness of his personality is evinced by the energy and persistence with which his mental impress has transmitted itself. Some of the points in which Edwards or his immediate successors are claimed to have made improvements on the older theology are the following: defining of virtue as benevolence, distinguishing between natural and moral necessity, identifying the terms *free* and *voluntary*, asserting that the essence of virtue and vice is independent of their cause, and that freedom is not interfered with by determination *ab extra*, discarding of the debt theory of the atonement in favor

of the governmental view, modification or rejection of the imputation of Adam's sin, and purifying of the conception of regeneration. (See Jonathan Edwards, Jr., *Remarks on the Improvements of Theology by his Father*.) This system of modified Calvinism has received the designation of the New England Theology,—a term of rather indefinite breadth, covering different schools and parties. Some of the representatives of the New England theology have rivalled the extremest of the old Calvinistic dogmatists in certain of their views, while others have approached pretty near the borders of Arminianism. These diversities, however, may be considered more appropriately under the topics to which they relate. Among the distinguished names on the roll of the New England theology are Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins, Jonathan Edwards, Jr., West of Stockbridge, John Smalley, Samuel Spring, Nathanael Emmons, E. D. Griffin, Timothy Dwight, Leonard Woods, N. W. Taylor, Enoch Pond, and E. A. Park.

One of the great events in the history of New England Congregationalism in the present century has already been sketched in the account given of the rise of Unitarianism. A second event of some note is embodied in what is currently termed the New Theology or Progressive Orthodoxy. This development represents the conviction that the old speculative theology has made its outlines too rigid and definite on various points, that a larger margin must be assigned to the merely probable, that theology should be more Christo-centric, and that some concessions must be made to recent Biblical criticism, and some weight attached to the advancing Christian consciousness, as opposed to an exclusive appeal to the letter of revelation. The point in the departure which perhaps has attracted most attention lies in the field of eschatology. While the adherents of the movement are not restorationists, they are disposed to predicate for certain classes opportunities of probation between death and the final judgment. A creed quite accept-

able in its spirit to the New Theology, if not specifically corroborative of the same, has been issued (1884) by the commission appointed under the direction of the National Council of Congregational Churches. It embodies the main points of catholic evangelical belief, is wholly free from the special tenets of Calvinism, at least from any positive and explicit statement of them, and could be subscribed by an Arminian with entire good faith. The peculiarities of Calvinism have indeed still a place among Congregationalists, but, in harmony with the contents of the creed, they are not reckoned among the essentials.

Baptists. — In consequence of the inroads of Arianism, a division occurred among the General or Arminian Baptists of England in the eighteenth century. The orthodox party withdrew in 1770, and formed the New Connection of General Baptists. The Particular or Calvinistic Baptists of the same date were characterized in general by extra rigidity of belief instead of laxity, being under such leaders as John Gill and John Brine, who held to Calvinism in its supralapsarian phase. At the close of the century (the era of William Carey and Robert Hall) the denomination took a new start in religious activity, and in the present century, both in England and in this country, it has advanced rapidly in numbers, influence, and extent of wholesome Christian work. Though not bound by authoritative standards, the Baptists of this order have been quite homogeneous in faith. Taking the period through, they have held in general quite strictly to the Calvinistic system; but, at the same time, it can hardly be denied that in the last few years they have shared more or less in that practical revolt against the sterner features of Calvinism which has spread over so large a portion of the theological world. Among statements of doctrine, the Philadelphia Confession (same as the English Confession of 1688), adopted in 1742, and the New Hampshire Confession, prepared about 1833, have been widely regarded as representative of Baptist beliefs. In the list of

Baptist writers of the period we have, besides those mentioned above, Andrew Fuller, T. J. Conant, H. B. Hackett, A. C. Kendrick, J. A. Broadus, Alvah Hovey, A. H. Strong, J. L. Dagg, and J. M. Pendleton.

Roman Catholics.—While different schools of theological thought have continued to exist in the Romish Church, on the whole they have been less distinctly and sharply arrayed against each other in the present than in the preceding period. The general tendency has been to unite in emphasizing points decided by councils and popes, and on points not definitely decided to allow that different views may be held without prejudice to the faith. Some outcroppings of liberalism have appeared, as, for example, in the so-called Austrian Aufklärung under Joseph II.; but every such manifestation has been offset by a reactionary movement, and the outcome, as it appears in the Vatican Council of 1869–70, is the triumph of the Romish over the Catholic element, the enthronement of Ultramontanism. To be sure, the Vatican decrees represented a partisan victory, and their enactment was secured at the expense of an extra amount of management. But once enacted they have commanded the acquiescence, however reluctant, of the great majority of those who were opposed to their adoption. The Old Catholic movement, in which the opposition culminated, and which acquired in 1873 a regular organization, though commanding the adhesion of such eminent men as Döllinger and Reinkens, has not yet secured very extensive suffrage. As their name indicates, the Old Catholics endeavor to go back to the more primitive standpoint of the Church. In the decisions and practice of the Church of the first six centuries they find the norm of doctrine and discipline. Their theology, apart from their attitude toward papal claims, is essentially Roman Catholic, but it is hardly presumption to prophesy that their release from pontifical sovereignty will eventuate in some further modifications of the Romish features of their faith.

Besides the Decrees of the Vatican Council, the present period has added to the confessional documents of the Romish Church the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus*, by Pius IX., issued in 1854 as an authoritative promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, and the Syllabus of 1864, from the same pontiff. The latter is a specification of eighty errors of the present age.

Among eminent Roman Catholic authors we have the names of Eusebius Amort, Michael Sailer, and Martin Gerbert in the eighteenth century, and J. Perrone, J. A. Möhler, F. A. Staudenmaier, H. Klee, Seb. von Drey, J. X. Dieringer, and J. N. Oischinger in the present century. Prior to the Vatican Council, Döllinger was reckoned as one of the great lights of Roman Catholic literature. His labors, however, were more in the historical than in the dogmatic field. In the same field a high distinction has been won by K. J. Hefele.

Greek Church. — Few noteworthy points in the dogmatic history of the Greek Church are on record for the last two centuries. The conservative temper so long characteristic of this communion has continued to dominate her faith and practice. The most important confessional documents which have been added to her list in this era are the Russian Catechisms of Platon and Philaret. That of the latter is described by Schaff as "the most authoritative doctrinal standard of the orthodox Græco-Russian Church." (Creeds of Christendom.)

SECTION III. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. THE RELATION BETWEEN SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION. — The same general contrast between Romanism and Protestantism which subsisted in the Reformation era upon this theme has continued down to the present. Only to a moderate extent and within a limited circle has the con-

trast been modified. This limited approximation of views is discernible in the fact, that, on the one hand, some Roman Catholic theologians have identified tradition on its subjective side with the consciousness of the Church, and, on the other hand, some Protestant theologians have made the growing Christian consciousness in a measure supplementary to Scripture. Setting forth this subjective side of tradition Möhler defines it as the collective understanding or consciousness of the Church. (Symbolik, § 38.) Staudenmaier speaks of it as the divinely wrought consciousness of the Church. (Dogmatik, Introd.) Newman's theory of development proceeds largely from the same conception, assuming that all conclusions which are reached by the unfolding mind or consciousness of the Church come with authoritative sanctions, however indistinct the datum may have been from which the unfoldment started. Evidently there is somewhat in such a notion of tradition that is akin to the view of those Protestant theologians who go farthest in their stress upon the Christian consciousness as progressively developed in the course of history. Care, nevertheless, should be taken not to predicate too much of a kinship. The Protestant who makes the most of the Christian consciousness does not allow that any one has the office infallibly to interpret and formulate the same. He is also free to affirm that the written Word is the incomparable factor in developing a *normal* Christian consciousness; whereas, the Romanist holds that formal statements of the Church consciousness are binding upon the individual conscience, and, moreover, is free to make the unwritten word the rival of Scripture, tradition in the objective sense the main ground of tradition in the subjective sense. Indeed, the writers Möhler and Staudenmaier, whom we have quoted as defining tradition on its subjective side, lay no small stress upon the objective tradition, or oral teaching, as supplying the content of the former. They could not fail to do this and yet remain in harmony

with the standards of their Church. The decisions of the Vatican Council (1869-70), no less than those of Trent, assume that valid traditions must have their ultimate basis in utterances which have come from the mouth of Christ, or from the apostles by the dictation of the Holy Spirit, and "have been transmitted, as it were, from hand to hand." (Chap. II.)

It should be stated that Newman in his doctrine of development has gone farther than is agreeable to many expositors of Roman Catholic doctrine. In opposition to his picture of change and growth, there are those who prefer, in the spirit of Bossuet, to represent the Church as always teaching the same things, and not merely as containing some obscure substratum of their future production. Such, for example, is the import of Dr. Wiseman's statement: "We believe that no new doctrine can be introduced into the Church, but that every doctrine which we hold has existed and been taught in it, ever since the time of the apostles." (See other quotations in J. B. Mozley's criticism of Newman's *Essay on Development*.) Newman's theory, however, is suited to render good service to Romish apologetics. It meets the case of those who have not the hardihood to overlook or to deny the appearance of a vast change in the teachings of the Church since the first centuries. It ought to appear especially useful to Romanists since the promulgation of the dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin and the infallibility of the Pope.

A movement on Protestant soil, which, however, cannot be characterized as a Protestant movement, has made a close approach to the Romish doctrine of tradition. In the scheme of the English Ritualists, tradition is assigned the rank of an authoritative interpreter of Scripture.* In one of his earlier works Pusey remarks: "We would take not our own private and individual judgments, but that of the Universal Church, as attested by the Catholic fathers

and ancient bishops." (Letter to the Bishop of Oxford.) In a later work he writes to Newman: "I meant to maintain that the Church of England does hold a divine authority in the Church, to be exercised a certain way, deriving the truth from Holy Scripture, following apostolical tradition, under the guidance of God the Holy Ghost. I fully believe that there is no difference between us in this. The *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*, which our own divines have so often inculcated, contains, I believe, the self-same doctrine as laid down in the council of Trent upon tradition." (Eirenicon.)

2. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION. — We consider under this topic only the views of those who acknowledge in general the authority of the Bible, leaving the more negative theories for a subsequent discussion.

The theory of strict verbal inspiration which was dominant in the seventeenth century has had its advocates throughout the present period. This theory implies that the Bible is inspired in its every word and infallible in its every statement, except possibly in some instances in which the text has been corrupted by copyists. Substantially this view still appears in the Lutheran dogmatics of S. J. Baumgarten, with a token, however, of departure from the same, since he maintained that, while it is not necessary to concede that there are in fact any mistakes, it would not materially affect the authority of the Bible if it were found to contain some errors in chronological, geographical, or historical minutiae. (Glaubenslehre, 1764, Vol. III. pp. 32-38.) Strict verbal inspiration was asserted by the learned Baptist theologian of the eighteenth century, John Gill. The New England divine, Nathanael Emmons, taught it in these unmistakable terms: "Every sentence and every word in such a book as this was of too much importance to be written by an unassisted pen. Hence it is natural to conclude the Holy Ghost suggested every thought and word to the sacred penmen, all the while they were writ-

ing the Holy Scriptures." Difference of style he explains as resulting from a divine accommodation to the peculiar genius and education of the sacred penmen, such as a parent might employ in dictating a letter for a child. (Systematic Theology, Serm. VII.) The teaching of Leonard Woods, if not so distinctly committed to the same theory, bears in its direction. (Theological Lectures, XIII.) Among recent advocates of plenary verbal inspiration, the Genevan divine, L. Gaussen, has written with most force and vivacity. He says of the Bible, that it contains no error, that all its parts are equally inspired, that its words are in every case what they ought to be. "It is not, as some will have it, a book which God employed men, whom He had previously enlightened, to write under His auspices. No, it is a book which He dictated to them; it is the Word of God; the Spirit of the Lord spake by its authors, and his words were upon their tongues." (Theopneustia, translation by D. D. Scott.) Statements nearly as sweeping are employed by Charles Hodge, who likewise maintains that all the books of Scripture are equally inspired, that inspiration extends to all the contents of these books, and to the words as well as to the general subject matter. (Systematic Theology, Introd., Chap. VI. Compare Prof. Atwater in Bib. Sac., Jan., 1864; Enoch Pond, Lectures on Christian Theology, X.)

The Swedenborgian view also comes under the category of strict verbal inspiration, at least so far as those books are concerned which are properly the Word of the Lord, or contain the spiritual sense. "These," says Edwin Gould, "we believe to be plenary inspired, every word and syllable contained in them, in the original tongues, having been dictated *viva voce* to the different penmen by whom they were committed to writing, from the mouth of God Himself." (Swedenborg and Modern Biblical Criticism.) The other books (including in the Old Testament Ruth, 1 and 2 Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Proverbs, Ecclesi-

astes, the Song of Solomon, and Job, and in the New Testament the Book of Acts and the Epistles) were written "by a lower and mediate inspiration, or a divine direction and superintendence." (Ibid.)

A second theory, which has had much currency through the period, while claiming that the Bible as originally given was free from error, affirms that inspiration was not equal in all parts,—that at least in case of the historical books it did not determine the exact language. This may be regarded as the standard Roman Catholic theory of more recent times. It is advocated by Perrone among others. While rejecting the theory of Hamel and Less, he is also averse to the view that all of the Scriptures were dictated to the sacred penmen. Biblical inspiration, as he teaches, included the following elements: "(1.) Incitement or impulse to writing; (2.) illumination of the mind and movement of the will, so that not only does no error proceed from the sacred writer; but (3.) moreover, there is found in him such a choice of the things to be written that he omits nothing, adds nothing to that which God wished to be written by him; (4.) constant and singular assistance in accomplishing the work." (*Prælect. Theol., De Sacra Script., Cap. II.* Compare Klee, *Dogmatik*, 1844, Vol. I. pp. 261, 262.) The same theory has been held by various Protestant writers, such as Philip Doddridge, Daniel Wilson, and E. Henderson.

A third theory differs from the foregoing in allowing a somewhat wider scope to human agency. While maintaining that the Bible, taken in its entirety, is a complete ethical and religious standard, it admits that it may contain errors in subsidiary and unimportant matters. This theory has commanded a growing patronage since the middle of the last century, and is now largely prevalent among Protestant theologians. It has been very commonly held by the supernaturalist school of Germany, since the latter part of the eighteenth century, being more than once

implied, where not definitely advocated, by the addition to the assertion of Biblical infallibility of the qualifying clause, *in matters of doctrine*, or *in what concerns religious faith*. It has been favored by Tholuck, Lange, Martensen, Hofmann, and Van Oosterzee; by Warburton and Lowth; by Coleridge, Thomas Arnold, and Alford. It is not to be understood that all included under this specification have held the same total view of the Scriptures. In fact, the elements of this theory have been associated with somewhat diverse conceptions of the co-working of divine and human agency in preparing the sacred oracles. A relatively larger place has been assigned to human agency by some of these writers than by others. Some, as Van Oosterzee, have taught that inspiration extends to the language of Scripture. This, however, by no means identifies their theory with the first in our list. Their idea was, that whatever affects thought must affect more or less the language in which it is clothed. At the same time, they made the person of the writer a co-agent both in the thought and the language, and to such an extent as to condition the result, and blend with it some traces of human fallibility. "Errors and inaccuracies," says Van Oosterzee, "in matters of subordinate importance, are undoubtedly to be found in the Bible." (Christian Dogmatics, Vol. I. sect. 39.) Naturally, a large proportion of those holding the general theory described in this paragraph lay much stress upon the idea that inspiration is dynamical as opposed to mechanical, — that, instead of taking the place of the human faculties, it imparts an extraordinary activity to both mind and heart.

The attitude of the earlier Unitarians of New England toward the Bible, as also of the more conservative of their successors, may be included within the limits of the theory under consideration. They conceded to the Biblical writers, at least those of the New Testament, quite a positive inspiration, and a full doctrinal authority. "We regard the

Scriptures," says Channing, "as the records of God's successive revelations to mankind, and particularly of the last and most perfect revelation of his will by Jesus Christ. Whatever doctrines seem to us to be clearly taught in the Scriptures, we receive without reserve or exception. We do not, however, attach equal importance to all the books in this collection. Our religion, we believe, lies chiefly in the New Testament. The dispensation of Moses, compared with that of Jesus, we consider as adapted to the childhood of the human race, a preparation for a nobler system, and chiefly useful now as serving to confirm and illustrate the Christian Scriptures. Jesus Christ is the only master of Christians, and whatever he taught, either during his personal ministry or by his inspired apostles, we regard as of divine authority, and profess to make the rule of our lives." (Works, Vol. III. pp. 60, 61.) E. S. Gannett writes : " We believe in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as containing the authentic records of God's wonderful and gracious ways ; and to these Scriptures we appeal as the decisive authority upon questions of faith and duty. . . . We take our faith from the Bible. Unitarian Christianity is the Christianity of the New Testament." (Discourse at Montreal.) Says Orville Dewey : " The matter is divine, the doctrines true, the history authentic, the miracles real. . . . The seal of a divine and miraculous communication is set upon that Holy Book." This miraculous communication, however, as he elsewhere specifies, applies to the substance rather than to the form of the Scriptures. A distinction is to be made between revelation and the record of revelation. " The thought came pure from the all-revealing Mind ; but when it entered the mind of a prophet or apostle, it became a human conception. It could be nothing else, unless the mind, by being inspired, became superhuman. The inspired truth became the subject of human perception, feeling, and imagination ; and when it was communicated to the world,

it was clothed with human language; and that perception, feeling, imagination, lent its aid to this communication, as truly as to any writings that were ever penned." (Works, Vol. III.) As regards the Unitarianism generally of the present, or of the immediate past, its views range from a close approximation to the above down to those characteristic of extreme rationalism. Bellows, were it not that his general representation is modified by an occasional dash of bolder criticism, might be placed alongside of those whom we have quoted. "The Bible," he says, "is the Word of God, as the conscience is the voice of God; but the words of the Bible are not the words of God, any more than the decisions of the conscience are the decisions of God. The mind, the will, the spirit of God, whose inspiration informed our consciences without making them infallible, has produced the Bible without making it perfect. He who studies the Holy Book in all its parts will discern a divine communication, a sacred teaching, an unmistakable guidance, running through and shining out of its complete tenor, as a river runs through a broken country, or as an expression of benignity, of law and order, of justice and mercy, runs through the diverse and often contrasted and puzzling effects of external nature." (Restatements of Christian Doctrine, Serm. VI.) He claims for inspiration a supernatural cast. Combating the idea that it is to be identified with genius, he says: "The ordinary popular view of religious inspiration, which makes man the mere tool or pipe of the Almighty, with all its mechanical defects, is truer to the reality of the case than the so-called advanced view, which confounds inspiration with the possession of superior natural insight and purer gifts of mind and heart." (Ibid., Serm. VII.)

A fourth theory may be characterized as the intuitional. This had its principal starting-point in the theology of Schleiermacher. Its distinguishing feature is, that it emphasizes, not the communication of a message to the sacred

writer, but such an education and development of his religious consciousness as prepares him to apprehend and to teach divine truth. Inspiration is thus not so much an extraordinary afflatus as a moulding process, by which its subject is prepared for insight into spiritual verities. Prophets and apostles were men who were qualified by special depth and fulness of religious life for special insight into the mind of the Spirit. Their inspiration differed in degree rather than in quality from that of all true believers. Among those affiliating more or less distinctly with this view we may mention Nitzsch, Twesten, Elwert, Marheinecke, Rothe, and Morell. Inspiration, according to Twesten, differs in grade rather than in species from that spiritual enlightening which is bestowed upon Christians generally. It might be defined as a higher grade of enlightening, — *höher Grad der Erleuchtung*. (Vorlesungen über Dogmatik.) Marheinecke says: "Inspiration is and can be nothing else than the elevation of the self-consciousness to the purest and clearest God-consciousness." (System der Christlichen Dogmatik, Theil III.) This has an Hegelian sound, but it might have come also from a disciple of Schleiermacher. Rothe manifests special anxiety to exclude everything bearing the semblance of magic from the divine working, and insists that revelation must be regarded as mediated by moral instrumentality, — *moralische vermittelte*. "The essence," he says, "of divine revelation consists in a purifying, supernaturally wrought by God, as well as an energizing of the God-consciousness in man." (Zur Dogmatik, 1863, pp. 60–64.) While in terms a definition of revelation, this may serve also to indicate Rothe's idea of inspiration; for he makes inspiration the subjective side of revelation. Manifestation and inspiration inseparably united and mediated by an historical process constitute revelation. "Inspiration," says Morell, "does not imply anything generically new in the actual processes of the human mind; it does not involve any form

of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity peculiar to the individuals thus highly favored of God. . . . Inspiration as an internal phenomenon is perfectly consistent with the natural laws of the human mind,—it is a higher potency of a certain form of consciousness, which every man to some degree possesses.” (Philosophy of Religion.) Many writers, who do not adopt the intuitional theory as an adequate account of the subject, still regard it as an important factor in the proper total view.

Morell makes a distinction between revelation and inspiration that is quite in line with the intuitional theory. Revelation, in the narrower sense, denotes the presentation of an intelligible object, and inspiration refers to the reciprocity of the subject, the higher potency of the religious consciousness. W. E. Atwell, while laying more stress than Morell upon the objective element, adopts a similar view of the relation of revelation and inspiration. The latter he confines to the subjective effects of the Spirit's influence, and regards it as a preparation for the former. (The Pauline Theory of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture.) Ladd introduces the same idea, but is careful to note, that, while logically distinguished, inspiration and revelation must be viewed as in fact coexistent and most intimately connected. As respects revelation, he emphasizes strongly the idea that it is mediated through an historical process centring in the manifested Son of God. (The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture.) Hodge, on the other hand, recurs to the old distinction, set forth by Quenstedt among others, and makes revelation to denote the supernatural communication of truth to the mind, and inspiration the supernatural control of the mind in the act of writing, by means of which the truth is imparted unmixed with error to others. Supposing the materials already at hand, as was largely the

case with the writers of the historical books of the Old Testament, only the gift of inspiration was necessary. (Introduction, Chap. VI.)

On the whole, there has been a decided movement in the scholarly world toward a modified view of the Bible. The most prominent changes may be summarized as follows: (1.) The theory of strict verbal inspiration has held a waning place. More and more the conviction has entered into Christian scholarship that it is untenable. In extensive fields it is substantially obsolete. Kahnis stands as an exponent, not of the scepticism, but of the evangelical sentiment of Germany, when he says: "The old theory of inspiration has now scarcely a representative left. It has fallen, and with right." (Dogmatik, Vol. III. § 6.) But, as he adds, this in no wise indicates that the inspiration itself of the Scriptures can or ought to be surrendered. (2.) In harmony with the above development, the present tendency is to take more account of the personality of the writer than was allowed by the older and stricter theory, more account of his historical environment, more account of his relative place in the organism of revelation. In other words, the present tendency is to take more account of those natural factors by which the supernatural elements in revelation have been conditioned. (3.) The present tendency is to rely less upon detached portions of the Bible, to view it less as a collection of oracles, to look more to the general scope of its teaching, to give a larger recognition to its historical cast, to acknowledge more fully that revelation has been progressive and educative, and consequently is not in all respects an absolute standard save as it comes to its goal and completion in Jesus Christ. (4.) As respects the grounds by which the divine authority of the Bible is approved, the present tendency is to lay great stress upon the cogency with which its ethical standard, taken as a whole, commends itself to the moral consciousness, and upon the firm conviction which springs up

in the hearts of the regenerate, that the way of salvation through Jesus Christ, revealed in its pages, is from God. The evidence of miracle and prophecy, though much assailed in certain quarters, is by no means discarded; but it occupies relatively less place than was accorded to it in the eighteenth century. The broadest theologians of the age still indeed attach a very high importance to miracles. But instead of treating them as mere credentials of a book, they emphasize the fact that they are an integral part of revelation itself, great ethical deeds of God, illustrating His supremacy over nature and especially His bearing towards men. We may say, in general, respecting the tests of the divinity of Scripture, that the present gives fuller heed than did the eighteenth century to the inner tribunal. Amid endless details of criticism, the devout disciple of Christ finds in the effectual manner in which the Scriptures address his moral and spiritual consciousness, and satisfy his religious needs, an invincible pledge of their divinity. This is the new and better version of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* so commonly advocated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The fault of the older dogmatics was, that it attached to this testimonium a too technical sense, made it too largely an address to man from without. It is indeed the testimony of the Divine Spirit which gives the pledge; but it is at the same time the testimony of the human spirit. It is the voice of man's clarified reason, conscience, and affection. The Divine Spirit speaks in and through these. Their existence denotes His presence; the pious mind cannot forbear to acknowledge in them tokens of His gracious working.

3. RADICAL CRITICISM. — A statement of all the shades and varieties of this criticism would be a wearisome and unprofitable task. Only a brief notice of the leading types will engage our attention.

English Deism in the Eighteenth Century. — Natural religion was the shibboleth of this form of scepticism. The

Bible, as the Deists considered, is comparatively useless so far as it agrees with natural religion, and so far as it disagrees it is false and injurious. Different writers of the school went to very different lengths in manifesting their hostility, but in their animus generally there was an unmistakable vein of depreciation and dislike of the Scriptures.

In critical importance the attack of Collins upon prophecy was among the most significant of the deistical works. Woolston's attack upon the New Testament miracles was too manifestly extravagant and fanatical to be of any permanent account. Morgan dealt with the Old Testament in a spirit of great bitterness, as did also Bolingbroke. Chubb and Bolingbroke, who agreed in denying special providence, agreed likewise in regarding much of the New Testament as of the nature of corrupting additions to the simple ethical teaching of Christ. Tindal, in his work, "Christianity as Old as the Creation," labored to show that the common theory of a special positive revelation, contained in the Bible, is contradictory to the divine perfections.

French infidelity in the eighteenth century, as represented by Voltaire, borrowed its premises from English deism. What it added was an excess of wit and irreverence. Voltaire was in no wise distinguished by thoroughness of criticism, and the same may be said of the other French sceptics of the era.

The Beginnings of German Rationalism. — Whether Töllner himself is to be classified as a rationalist or not, the work on inspiration which he published in 1772 no doubt helped on the tendency to break away from old views. He asserted different degrees of inspiration, and gave prominence to the idea that the Bible *contains* rather than *is* the Word of God. His contemporary, Semler, went much farther in the direction of innovation, and fairly inaugurated the rationalistic dealing with the Bible. He excluded from the class of inspired writings Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Ruth, Canticles, and various por-

tions of other Old Testament books ; also the Gospel of Mark, the Epistle to Philemon, and the Apocalypse. Moreover, by the scope which he gave to the theory of accommodation, — the theory that Christ and the apostles, using the expedients of popular address, spoke often from the standpoint of current conceptions, — he abridged materially the dogmatic authority of those portions of the Bible to which he attached most weight. Chronologically, Lessing belongs, with Semler, to the beginnings of German rationalism. Whether he belongs there also in respect of belief, is a question not altogether easy to decide. As Dorner remarks, opinion is still divided as to the degree of his alienation from positive Christianity. He was evidently remote from the old Lutheran theory of the Bible. He was interested in the sacred volume chiefly as a compendium of ethics and literature ; but, at the same time, he cannot be said to have committed himself definitely to the scheme of simple naturalism. It must also be allowed that he rendered a real service to Biblical science by calling attention to the conception of revelation as a progressive education of the race, though he may be thought to have carried this beyond just bounds.

German Rationalism developed into Naturalism. — Here belong such writers as Paulus, Röhr, and Wegscheider. They start with the presupposition that everything must be explained on the basis of natural law. Paulus goes over the list of the New Testament miracles, and endeavors to show how they may be accounted for without any appeal to the supernatural, and also without any impeachment of the honesty of the writers. The angelic appearances to the shepherds he explains as meteoric phenomena. The healing of the possessed was the natural effect of such an eminent person as Christ engaging the hearty confidence of such patients as the demoniacs. The five thousand were fed, because those who were provided with food were constrained by the example of Christ and His disciples to

share their store with the destitute. Lazarus came forth from the tomb because the loud voice of Jesus roused him from his stupor. The resurrection of Christ also was not a resurrection of the really dead. We cannot tell how much was done toward reviving him by the cool air of the grotto, and by the spices, and how much by the electric currents that accompanied the storm or earthquake. (Das Leben Jesu.) But after all Paulus is not far from recognizing in the New Testament the account of a genuine miracle. The personality of Christ, he allows, appears as something quite unique and unparalleled in history. Wegscheider makes a sweeping denial of miracles, declares the doctrine of immediate supernatural revelation unworthy of God, and reduces the divine agency in man's religious history to the category of providence. (Inst. Theol., §§ 12, 42, 44, 49.)

The School of Æsthetic Rationalism. — The naturalism, or "vulgar rationalism," just described, diluted the religion of the Bible almost into complete insipidity. In the school led by De Wette, the sentimental had a much larger place. These writers addressed themselves to the Scriptures mainly in the character of literary critics; they were interested in them as the classics of religious literature. They were not much more tolerant of the supernatural than the vulgar rationalists, but, in place of detailed and labored attempts to explain everything by natural causes, they made a liberal use of the supposition of legends and myths. In a primitive people, as they held, the poetizing faculty freely and spontaneously exercises itself. There is an irrepressible tendency to clothe doctrines with a symbolical form. Imagination has full play. Hence, much finds place in the oracles of religion that cannot be taken literally. At the same time, this element is not without a rich significance; it is a manifestation of the feeling (unformulated and incapable of complete formulation) in which lies the essence of religion, and it ministers to the spiritual

edification of those who receive it in the right spirit. In the writings of Matthew Arnold there are prominent points of affinity with this school.

The Mythical Hypothesis of Strauss. — De Wette started from the philosophy of Fries, — a peculiar elaboration from the systems of Kant and Jacobi. Strauss, proceeding from an Hegelian basis, modified and extended, in accordance with its bias, the results of De Wette's criticism. The myth, to which De Wette had allowed a considerable place, he makes the determining factor of the Gospel history in the form in which it has come to us. All accounts of miracles he assigns to the category of pure myths; also in many other narratives the mythic element is, as he concludes, predominant. By a myth is to be understood not so much the intentional fabrication of an individual as the spontaneous expression of what is matter of common consciousness. The individual who first propounds the myth but voices a conviction that has been stirring in the breasts of a people or a society of kindred spirits. The grand occasion of the New Testament myths was the Messianic expectations which had grown from the soil of the Old Testament dispensation. The ideal was in the minds of the early disciples, and the creative working of their thoughts ere long made out a history conformed to the ideal. In the earlier *Leben Jesu* (1835), Strauss made little account of the element of intentional fabrication; in his later work, addressed to the German people (1864), while holding essentially his former position, he felt constrained to give more scope to the idea of an intentional coloring of the facts by some of the authors of the Gospel narratives. In his latest work, "The Old Faith in a New Light," Strauss figures as the exponent of an unbelief which surrenders the name of Christian, and invites mortals hopeless of immortality to worship, as the only object of worship, an impersonal cosmos, that has no hearing for prayer or sympathy for suffering.

The Development Theory of Baur.—In place of a founder of Christianity Baur postulates a struggle of different tendencies. At least, he allows the person of Christ to retreat into the background, and brings into the foreground, as the agencies by which Christianity was developed into its New Testament phase, the opposing schools of Peter and Paul. The legalism of Peter would make of Christianity only a purer Judaism. The broader and more speculative temper of Paul would make of it a new religious philosophy transcending national bounds. Here were antagonisms that needed to be reconciled. The agents of this reconciling work were not wanting. Some of the principal books of the New Testament, such as the Book of Acts, the Epistles ascribed to Peter, and the later of the Epistles bearing the name of Paul, were the products of their efforts. Most of the New Testament writings are to be characterized as *Tendenz-Schriften*; they give a colored representation in the interest either of the Petrine or of the Pauline party, or with the design of covering up their differences. They belong not to the age of the apostles, but are to be assigned to the second century.

Criticism of the Old Testament by Kuenen and Wellhausen.—Their conception of the Old Testament greatly abridges, if it does not cancel, the element of the supernatural, and curtails very decidedly the historical basis of the earlier books. According to Wellhausen, criticism reaches these conclusions: (1.) The patriarchal age lies beyond the domain of history. (2.) In the Mosaic era, notwithstanding a mass of the legendary, we gain a little contact with actual occurrences. Certain general outlines in which events are enclosed were not purely matters of imagination. (3.) Moses could not have given the elaborate priestly and ceremonial system of the Pentateuch. The freedom with which cardinal requirements of that system were ignored even by the most pious and intelligent, the age-long lack of consciousness as to the imperative demand for unity of sanctuary,

and the generally subordinate and dependent position of the priesthood make it impossible to suppose that any considerable part of the so-called legislation of Moses was known till long after his death. (4.) It is not disputed that sacrifices were early offered in Israel, or that with the advancing centuries there was an accretion of ritualistic traditions. What is denied is, that ritual had, till a late period, that fixity, definiteness, centralization, and association with priestly supremacy which appear in the code as it now stands before us. We see here the product of the scholastic exilian, or post-exilian, era. (5.) Several documents may be detected in the first six books of the Old Testament. The oldest of these is the Jehovist, consisting largely of narrative, but having also legislative sections, as is seen in the decalogue, the book of the covenant, and the law of the two tables (ex. xx., xxi.-xxiii., xxxiv.). The second document in order was Deuteronomy, which was composed on the eve of Josiah's reformation. The third important contribution of law matter was the priest code, elaborated between the time of Ezekiel and that of Ezra, and incorporated into the middle books of the Pentateuch. To these writings, representing the main stages in the legislation, two others must be added. Alongside the Jehovist account of the primitive history was the Elohist. There was also another document, the one with which the late-appearing priest code was united. The blending of the Jehovist with the Elohist document, the conjunction of Deuteronomy with this composite production, and, finally, the addition of the priest code, with its associate document, completed the Hexateuch. (Compare the author's sketch in the *Methodist Review*, Nashville, March, 1896.)

The older types of this radical criticism have been in no inconsiderable part discredited. If we interpret aright the signs in the theological world, the more recent types also will not be able to maintain themselves in all their length and breadth.

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I. — EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES
OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE. — The ontological argument as put either by Anselm or Descartes has claimed but little following in the present period. Those who have given it a place have generally modified or supported it by added considerations. Such was the case with Leibnitz. Anselm's argument, says Leibnitz, omitted an important point, the proof of the *possibility* of the perfect Being. This being once established, as it may be, the demonstration is complete. Among celebrated thinkers Hegel perhaps found as little fault with Anselm as any. He declares the ontological the one conclusive proof, and objects to Anselm's way of presenting it, rather than to the essential content of his argument.

On the other hand, Kant repudiated the ontological argument as entirely inconclusive. The idea of a perfect Being, he maintained, in no wise carries with it a positive guaranty of His real existence. The idea is equally complete whether real existence be affirmed or denied, for existence is not an attribute, — does not increase the intention of the term to which it is applied. The concept of a triangle is not changed or improved by saying the triangle is or exists. The ontological argument makes an unwarranted spring from the subjective to the objective, from the ideal to the real. Lotze, equally with Kant, was of the

opinion that this argument in its scholastic form is invalid. "That the idea," he says, "of the most perfect Being includes also real existence as one of His attributes, that consequently the most perfect Being is necessary, is so evidently bad logic, that, after Kant's incisive refutation, any attempt at defence would be useless." (*Mikrokosmus*, IX. 4.) At the same time, Lotze contends that the idea of a perfect Being involves evidence of His existence. The evidence, however, lies not in a logical deduction, but in the immediate feeling, accompanying the idea, that such an ideal must have reality. "Not out of the perfection of the Perfect as a logical consequence is His real existence inferred, but without the circumlocution of a deduction the impossibility of His non-existence is immediately felt." (*Ibid.*)

In theological circles in recent times but little favor has been accorded to the ontological argument, at least in its historic sense. Dr. Shedd's comments on Anselm's reasoning are quite outside the main current. (*Hist. of Doct.*, Bk. III. chap. 1.) The tendency among theologians is to pass much the same verdict as that of Lotze; namely, that, while invalid in form, it points to a truth of much force,—the truth that the idea of God in man's religious consciousness is accompanied with a spontaneous and immediate conviction of His reality. The comments of Staudenmaier, for example, reach substantially this result. (*Dogmatik*, Vol. II.) Evidently also we may properly include here all those writers who lay the principal stress upon the idea of God as native to the mind, or manifestly provided for in its essential constitution, but at the same time enter into no such attempts at formal demonstration as did Anselm and Descartes. For all such, without doubt, give a place to the immediate impression of an objective reality which goes with the idea of God. (See F. H. Hedge, *Ways of the Spirit*, Essay VI.; Rothe, *Dogmatik*, I. § 4; Twisten, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II. pp. 19-21; Klee, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II. p. 7;

Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, Vol. I. sect. 44; H. Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, 1872, pp. 51-54.)

Kant criticised the cosmological and teleological arguments, as well as the ontological. The cosmological, or that which from limited and contingent existence infers the unconditioned, the necessary first cause, he regarded as cumbered with unproved assumptions; such as the impossibility of an infinite series of contingent causes, the imperative requirement to assume such a series if a necessary first cause is denied, and the perfection of the first cause, supposing the existence of such to be granted. The teleological or design argument he criticised as proving at most a world-fashioner of indefinite greatness, not a creator of the material of the world, not an infinite being, since the world as known to us is finite, and we are only authorized to assume a proportionate cause.

That these criticisms of Kant have had an influence in the theological world cannot be denied. One token of this influence is seen in that class of theologians who have made little account of proofs from external nature, and have appealed to man's consciousness as a moral and religious being. Still, it cannot be said that the lines of proof criticised have been surrendered. The great mass of theologians have continued to attach a high value to them. Nor is this wholly counter to the authority of Kant himself. Whatever speculative defects he apprehended in them, he attached to them, at least to one of them, the teleological, a high practical value. "This proof," he says, "will always deserve to be treated with respect. It is the oldest, clearest, and most in conformity with human reason. . . . It reveals aims and intention, where our own observation would not by itself have discovered them, and enlarges our knowledge of nature by leading us toward that peculiar unity the principle of which exists outside of nature. This knowledge reacts again upon its cause, namely, the transcendental idea, and thus increases the belief in a Supreme Author to an

irresistible conviction." (Transcendental Dialectic.) What the argument fails of, according to Kant, is apodictic certainty. In fact, little more could be asked of the argument than Kant concedes. Suppose it only legitimates the assumption of a personal Author of cosmic arrangements, and does not in strictness prove His infinity; in connection with the modern idea of the vastness of the universe, its practical result must be to substantiate the conception of an all-sufficient and infinite Being. He who believes in a personal Author and Ruler of nature will not be likely to be troubled with questionings about His proper infinity.

The moral argument, as presented by Kant, and upon which he placed the chief stress, has already been sufficiently characterized in the section on philosophy. The substance of this argument, it is needless to say, is universally recognized in theological thought.

A review of the topic can hardly fail to leave one with the impression that the proofs lying nearest to hand, and most commonly recognized in Christian thought from the first, are still most efficient to work conviction, and are most likely to hold their ground in the future. On the other hand, the more subtle arguments, in whose discovery some adventurous pioneer of speculative thought has taken special delight, are found to accomplish much less than they promise, and, whatever element of truth they may contain, to need extensive modification in order to escape the charge of bad logic. It is an item, too, in favor of the common proofs, such as the teleological, the moral, and the testimony of consciousness, that they look toward the living God, a free, self-conscious, divine Person, and not merely toward some undefined substratum or background of contingent existence. (An appreciative discussion of the evidences from external nature, as well as of that which is supplied by human consciousness, may be found in Ulrici's work entitled "*Gott und die Natur.*")

2. **ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES.**—On the question whether a proper knowledge of God as to His essential nature is attainable, the period has witnessed the advocacy of two opposite extremes on the part of individuals, and a general union upon a medium view on the part of the great body of theistic writers. The agnostic extreme had a starting-point in Kant's philosophy. The justice of styling Kant a radical agnostic may be called in question. While one side of his philosophy bears in that direction, another side leads up to the conclusion, that our knowledge of God as personal and moral, if not knowledge in the strictest sense, is at least a rational and warranted faith. Now assuredly a *rational faith* is a *long distance* from mere imagination, as well as from downright nescience. Kant stood upon a different plane from that of Herbert Spencer, with his picture of the religious man chalking out an outline of Deity, and then immediately erasing it as the phantom of his vain imagination. (See the section on Philosophy.) Still, the Kantian criticism naturally was utilized in favor of agnostic views. The other extreme found, not a starting-point only, but its culmination, in the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel, with whom it was a fundamental thesis that man is capable of comprehending the Absolute, and that this order of knowledge is the indispensable condition of philosophy. Cousin was drawing from this source when he taught that the human mind, in virtue of the fact that reason in it is the divine reason, has an immediate cognition of the Infinite.

Partly through the influence of Kant, but more largely by way of reaction from the philosophies of the Absolute, with their daring assumptions to have found out God to perfection, Sir William Hamilton and H. L. Mansel were led to advocate theories savoring of radical agnosticism. With some difference in the choice of terms, the two presented essentially the same views. Both start from a special definition of God. "To conceive the Deity as He is,"

says Mansel, "we must conceive Him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation,—that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity." (The Limits of Religious Thought, Lecture II.) Having thus set forth the philosophical conception of God, Mansel proceeds to enumerate the difficulties which it involves. The Absolute and the Infinite, he says, cannot as such be a cause. For the cause exists only in relation to the effect. But the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. If it be said that the Absolute was first alone and afterwards became a cause, this contradicts the idea of the Infinite, as implying that God was not from the first all that it was possible for Him to be. Again, the Absolute as cause cannot be necessitated, for this implies relation; neither can it be voluntary, for this implies consciousness, which is only conceivable as a relation. From these considerations it follows necessarily that the ideas of creation and personality are inconsistent with that of the Absolute and Infinite.

This seems to leave the field to scepticism. But no, says Mansel; the lesson is not scepticism, but humility and faith. We are taught not to attempt a speculative knowledge of God as He is in Himself, and to be "content with those regulative ideas of the Deity which are sufficient to guide our practice; which tell us not what God is in Himself, but how He wills that we should think of Him." We must locate the difficulty, not in the divine object of our thought, but in the imperfection of our faculties. "It is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot

reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own minds." Mansel concedes a bare possibility that there may be some correspondence between our thought of God and His actual nature. "We cannot say that our conception of the divine nature exactly resembles that nature in its absolute existence; for we know not what that absolute existence is. But, for the same reason, we are equally unable to say that it does not resemble it; for if we know not the Absolute and Infinite at all, we cannot say how far it is or is not capable of likeness or unlikeness to the relative and finite [a point that Herbert Spencer should have recognized more consistently]. We must remain content with the belief that we have that knowledge of God which is best adapted to our wants and training. How far that knowledge represents God as He is, we know not, and we have no need to know."

Hamilton also draws from his criticism a lesson respecting the weakness (not the deceitfulness) of human reason and the necessity of supplementing its office by another principle. "We are thus taught," he says, "the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to think aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned, beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." (Philosophy of the Conditioned.)

Though offered in the interest of Christian apology, the reasoning of Mansel and Hamilton has generally been regarded as more like a foe than a friend in the camp. The criticism most commonly and justly passed upon it is, that

it sets up a gratuitous and mistaken definition of God. The proper definition of God as the Absolute and Infinite does not make Him a Being who is apart from all relations and limitations, but one who is subject only to such as are imposed by His will or by His essential perfection. (See Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, *passim*; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Pt. I. chap. 4, § 3. Compare J. S. Mill, *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*.)

In opposition to agnosticism in its various phases there has been a very general agreement among theologians in more recent times in asserting a real, though limited, knowledge of God. (Staudenmaier, II. 150, 174; Klee, I. 23, II. 30-35; Dieringer, § 14; Twesten, II. 4; Dorner, § 16; Martensen, § 45; Rothe, I. § 7; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 4, § 1; Hedge, *Reason in Religion*.) Expressing this conclusion under a figure, Klee pithily remarks, "As infinite, God is seen and not seen by us, as we see and do not see the ocean and the heavens."

In harmony with this position, there has been a tendency to modify the extreme doctrine so largely current in the preceding periods respecting the simplicity of the divine essence. It has been recognized that to make the divine attributes, as did Schleiermacher, simply designations of our subjective modifications, to deny that they have any foundation in interior distinctions of the Godhead, is equivalent to denying a proper knowledge of God. Accordingly, we find such writers as Dorner, Rothe, Kahnis, and Hodge expressly charging the older dogmatics with having pressed the notion of the divine simplicity too far, and many others in their discussion of the attributes implying the same standpoint. While it is taught that the material notion of composition must be kept far from our thought of God, it is equally taught that God is no blank identity, and that such a conception is remote from the true idea of spirit. "The attributes," says H. B. Smith,

“express real distinctions in God so far as this: that no one of them can be resolved into any other, and also so far as this, that all of them cannot be resolved into one idea or one fact about God, except the fact or idea that God is the most perfect Being.” (System of Theol., Divis. I. chap. 2.) “We teach,” says Martensen, “that the attributes are objective determinations in the revelation of God, and also have their root in the interior of His essence.” (Dogmatik, § 46. Compare Van Oosterzee, Vol. I. sect. 47.)

Respecting individual attributes, there are not many changes of view that need to be noted. The theory that God in His own proper mode of subsistence is above the category of time, has generally maintained its place. Richard Watson, indeed, was inclined to make the divine eternity equivalent to time without beginning or end. But Methodist theologians have not generally followed him in this, preferring the theory of John Wesley respecting the timelessness of God. The period, however, has brought its modification, even if the old view has not been dislodged. Various theologians have apprehended the necessity of bringing temporal events under a truer recognition of God than seems to have been secured by the earlier dogmatics. They have argued that events gain actuality in succession, and accordingly, if God knows them as they are, He must recognize the fact of succession, the fact that one is before another in temporal order, that one has already transpired and another has not. This is not contrary to the proper notion of His absoluteness; it is no limitation pertaining to the essential mode of His subsistence. He was free to create or not to create a temporal order, but having created it, He must recognize His own work. “If a world exists,” says Dorner, “a positive relation of God to space and time is given with logical necessity. If time and growth are not to be semblance, there must be a difference really, and therefore also as regards God, between what is now past and what is present, between the present and

the future. God can, for example, no more regard the past of the converted sinner as present, than He can look upon the future of the unconverted man who is about to return to Him as present. If God merely saw the past and the future altogether as present, the immediate consequence would be that God would not see everything as it is; and therefore not truly, for neither the past nor the future is present. . . . There must belong to that divine knowledge which alike eternally comprises everything necessary and possible, and which will be at any time existent, a knowledge also relative to time and the present constitution of the world individually and collectively." (System of Christian Doctrine, §§ 19, 27. Compare Kahnis, Dogmatik, III. § 7; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 5, § 6; Pond, Lecture III.; M. Raymond, Systematic Theology, Vol. I. pp. 316, 317.)

Instances of a denial that God's foreknowledge includes the free acts of men have been exceptional. The peculiar view of Adam Clarke, that God *can* know all future events, but does not *choose* to, has been almost universally repudiated in his own communion, as well as in others. Rothe and L. D. McCabe have reasserted the Socinian theory, that the contingent is in the nature of things unknowable, and consequently that it is no disparagement to the divine omniscience to exclude the same from its compass. Martensen also rules out proper foreknowledge of the contingent. (Dogmatik, § 116.) Of Calvinistic theologians, it is in general characteristic to exclude contingency in the sense of strict alternativity, and to make God's foreknowledge of the acts of free agents dependent upon His decrees, which are the ground of their certain futurity. (Edwards, Freedom of Will, Pt. II. sect. 11, 12, Pt. IV. sect. 14; Hopkins, System of Doctrines, Pt. I. chap. 4; L. Woods, Lecture XXXVIII.; Emmons, Systematic Theol., Sermon XXII.; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 5, § 8; Cunningham, Hist. Theol., 1870, Vol. II. p. 443; H. B. Smith, System of

Christ. Theol., Pt. II. chap. 6.) Schleiermacher, with his determinism, is naturally found agreeing here with the Calvinistic school. On the other hand, non-Calvinists deny that foreknowledge of the acts of free agents is based upon foreordination. As to the mode of this foreknowledge, they allow that the subject involves profound mystery. The fact is to be accepted as resting on Scriptural data, and clear, practical demands. These require both foreknowledge and proper contingency. Accordingly, whatever difficulty it may involve, the foreknowledge of God must be regarded as intuitive, as independent of a chain of foregoing causes or necessary antecedents, as grasping the remotest event as immediately as the nearest. In this way alone is an open field left to responsible agency. (See Julius Müller's discussion, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Bk. III. Pt. II. chap. 2; Whedon, *The Freedom of the Will*, Pt. II. sect. 3.)

The doctrine of the *scientia media* has been a less prominent subject of debate in the present than in the preceding period. According to the testimony of Perrone, it is commonly accepted among recent Roman Catholic theologians. (*Prælect. Theol., De Deo.*) It accords with the traditions of Calvinists to reject it, and it is repudiated by Dr. Hodge. Van Oosterzee takes exception not so much to the theory as to the place assigned it in Jesuitical theology. It is approved by Dorner, and reckoned by Pope as a part of the creed of anti-predestinarians in general.

The relation of the will of God to the moral standard is a question affording little ground of dispute in more recent times. Those who make that will the highest norm understand at the same time that it must be regarded as expressing the nature of God. Thus Hodge states, "The common doctrine of Christians is, that the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation to all rational creatures"; but he adds, that this will of God is the expression of His infinite perfection, "so that the ultimate

foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God." (Pt. I. chap. 5, § 9.) This form of statement evidently concedes the idea of those who have been averse to making the mere will of God the foundation of right and wrong.

SECTION II. — THE TRINITY.

THE doctrine of the Trinity has by no means been dislodged from the faith and appreciation of the Church by the movement of free thought in the last two centuries. Confidence may have been weakened on the part of not a few as to the legitimacy of some long-standing speculations or definitions; but as to the great fact of a threefold distinction in the Godhead, the original and abiding ground of the threefold revelation in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the mind of the Church is as tenacious as it ever has been. The statement also is warranted, that there is a very extensive concurrence in the Catholic doctrine as outlined in the Nicene creed.

As to the proper grounds of trinitarian belief, some writers emphasize mainly the Scriptural data; others, in addition to the facts of revelation, give a prominent place to the demands of philosophic thought. The latter procedure has been characteristic of the more orthodox Hegelians. "Another God than the triune," says Marheinecke, "neither the Christian nor the theologian can have. . . . The Church doctrine is that of reason and truth itself, and justifies itself as such in every truly scientific understanding of this dogma." (*Dogmatik*, 1847, pp. 26, 128.) "The doctrine of the Trinity," says John Caird, "is no unintelligible combination of symbols, but a doctrine which may be shown to be the central truth, not only of Christian faith, but of Christian philosophy." (*Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, 1880, p. 75.) Many not of the Hegelian school also regard the trinitarian doctrine as entering

essentially into the philosophical idea of God, an indispensable factor in a well-rounded, stable theistic conception, — the conception of God as personal and creative intelligence and will. “The idea of the essential Trinity,” says Martensen, “is one with the idea of the divine personality, and to think the essential Trinity ontologically means accordingly to think the fundamental form necessary to the personal life of God, means to think those moments in the essence of God without which personality and self-consciousness are unthinkable.” That is to say, personality and self-consciousness require the objectification of self, and again the uniting of self as object with self as subject, and this is nothing less than the trinitarian process. (Dogmatik, § 55.) On like grounds Dorner says: “The absolute divine self-consciousness can only be thought in a trinitarian manner. . . . God is to be thought conscious and personal in the eternal activity of the reproduction of His personality. He is personal in the three Hypostases, as He is personal by their means.” (System of Christian Doctrine, §§ 31 b, 32.) The trinitarian view, he further remarks, supplies the proper safeguard against both the deistic and the pantheistic conception of God’s relation to the world. Equivalent statements are found with Staudenmaier. The advantage derived from the trinitarian standpoint in conceiving God’s relation to the world this author expresses as follows: “The possibility that there should be a world outside of God lies in the trinitarian life of the Godhead, and in truth is grounded in it alone. For only through this, that God as the triune forms for Himself a perfect world (*κόσμος τέλειος*), can He, without Himself becoming world, posit a creation outside of Himself, and stand over this creation, high and exalted, as its Lord, Leader, Conductor, and source of blessing. The divine love, already satisfied in the interior of the Godhead through the trinitarian life, proceeds outward [in creation], not of necessity, but with absolute freedom.” (Dog-

matik, 1844, Vol. III. p. 8.) The relation of the divine love to the demand for a trinitarian life, as suggested in the above, has received emphatic notice from other eminent dogmatists, such as Sartorius, Liebner, and Julius Müller.

The preceding paragraph has already indicated the most current of the philosophical expositions of the trinitarian idea, namely, that which conceives of the trinitarian process as a process of self-objectification and of reunion with self, the first stage expressing the begetting of the Son, the second the procession of the Spirit. (Compare with those cited Twesten, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II. p. 205; Klee, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II. pp. 102-115.)

A measure of dissent from the Catholic doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son has appeared among those holding firmly to the doctrine of the Trinity as expressive of an essential mode of the divine existence. Adam Clarke was a representative of this dissent. Some of the New England divines have also criticised the theory of eternal generation. Samuel Hopkins, while favoring the theory himself, indicates that there were those in his day who opposed it, and who regarded the term Son as being applied to the Saviour with reference to His incarnate state. "This opinion," he says, "seems to be rather gaining ground and spreading of late." (*System of Doctrines*, Pt. II. chap. 2.) Emmons, in opposition to Hopkins, stigmatized eternal generation as eternal nonsense. Moses Stuart declared the expression a palpable contradiction of language, and said of the doctrine that it was widely disowned in New England. "Nearly all the ministers," he writes, "in New England, since I have been upon the stage, have, so far as I know their sentiments, united in rejecting it, or at least in regarding it as unimportant. Our most distinguished theologians, for forty years past, have openly declared against it." Stuart disliked the doctrine as being contrary, in his estimate, to the proper

equality of the Second with the First Person. The apparent support of the doctrine in Scripture, he said, was due to the fact that Scriptural language proceeds from the standpoint of divine manifestation. The following sentence, though introduced in the connection hypothetically, doubtless expressed his view. "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are words which designate the distinctions of the Godhead as manifested to us in the economy of redemption, and are not intended to mark the eternal relations of the Godhead, *as they are in themselves*." (Letters to Samuel Miller.)

A few theologians of recent times have laid much stress upon the subordination of the Second and Third Persons. Kahnis has equalled in this respect the Arminians Episcopius, Curcellæus, and Limborch. While he holds that the Son and Spirit are Divine Persons, he maintains that their dependence upon the Father necessarily implies a lower rank. In opposition to the Augustinian view, he reckons among false theories, besides Unitarianism, Arianism, modalism, etc., also *co-ordinationism*. (Dogmatik, III. § 8.)

The theory of Schleiermacher was a species of modalism. Naturally, from his agnostic position with respect to the nature of God, he could recognize no other than an economic Trinity. As he taught, God in Himself is the Father, God in the Redeemer the Son, God in the Church the Holy Spirit. In his scheme the fact of absorbing interest in Christ, the fact especially declarative of His pre-eminence, was His God-consciousness. While our God-consciousness is unclear and feeble, Christ's was absolutely clear, constant, and strong. This involved the true being of God in Him, — *ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm*. "To attribute an absolutely strong God-consciousness to Christ, and to affirm a being of God in Him, are one and the same thing." In the sinless humanity of Christ the divine life found a suitable organism by which it might

be received and manifested in personal form. (*Der Christliche Glaube*, §§ 93-96.)

Swedenborgianism also assumes diversities of manifestation or operation, rather than distinctions pertaining to the Godhead as such. There was no Trinity, it teaches, before God appeared in the flesh. The divine by itself, the divine in union with the flesh, and the divine regarded as operative, — these are the three aspects which make up the proper trinitarian view. Commenting on the Athanasian creed, Swedenborg points out how its upholders might have escaped contradiction. "If they had said, that the Father hath the divine essence, the Son the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit the divine essence, but that there are not three divine essences, but that the divine essence is one and indivisible, then that mystery would be explicable; as when by the Father is understood the Divine from which [are all things], by the Son the Divine Human thence, and by the Holy Spirit the proceeding Divine, which three are of one God; or if by the Father the like is understood as by the soul with man, by the Divine Human the like as by the body of that soul, and by the Holy Spirit the like as by the operation which proceeds from both, then are understood three essences, which are of one and the same person, and thus they together make one and an indivisible essence." (*True Christian Religion*, § 172.)

German rationalism in its earlier stages favored the Sabellian or the Arian hypothesis as a substitute for the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Later it gravitated toward the theory of the simple humanity of Christ. (See Wegscheider, *Inst. Theol.*, §§ 92, 93.)

As already indicated, English and American Unitarianism started out on the Arian basis, but ere long tended toward the humanitarian platform. Many of the American Unitarians had come to this point before the death of Channing. Whether the views of Channing finally took the same direction, is a question which has not been very

decisively answered. He used much reserve on the subject. We find him, however, in 1831 writing thus: "I am not shocked, as many are, by the humanitarian system, still it seems to me to labor under serious objections; nor am I at all influenced by the argument which its disciples insist upon so earnestly, that it brings Jesus nearer to us. His moral perfection seems to me his great peculiarity and separation from all human beings, and this remains the same on all systems, and is more inexplicable on the humanitarian system than on any other." The verdict of his colleague, E. S. Gannett, was that he always believed in the pre-existence of Christ. Some, however, of his later friends suspected the contrary. (Wm. Gannett's *Life of E. S. Gannett*.) The Arian view continued to lose favor, and in the last few decades has had an inconsiderable following.

While the more radical wing of recent Unitarianism hardly concedes to Christ the character even of the typical man and teacher, there are those who not only concede to Him this character, but bring His manhood into as near a union with proper divinity as can be done without accepting the trinitarian standpoint. This class starts from a point of view quite remote from the deistic, and affiliating to a noticeable degree with that conception of the relation between the divine and the human which has been set forth in the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Here belongs F. H. Hedge. He declares the doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit to be the distinguishing feature of Christianity, "indispensable to any right and worthy conception of Deity." (*Unitarian Affirmations*.) Commending the work of the council of Nicæa, he says: "We cannot be too thankful that the Athanasian view in this council prevailed against the Arian, which recognizes no divinity in man." (*Reason in Religion*.) Again he remarks, relative to the same subject: "The superficial mind is apt to regard these questions, which then agitated the Church and the

world, as simply abstractions, senseless quibbles. But the union of God with man is no quibble; it is a truth of profound significance; and the council of Nicæa, which declared it, is one of the most important assemblies that was ever convened on this earth; it dates a new era in the history of human thought." (Ways of the Spirit, and other Essays.) All this implies evidently that the union of the divine and the human in Christ is a truth of momentous importance, fundamental to a proper conception of Christianity. Still it is not the Catholic doctrine that we have here, but rather such an idea of Christ's person as was advocated by Fichte and by Schelling in his earlier philosophy. The incarnation of God is conceived as a process running through the course of man's religious history. Christ is but the higher instance of that union with God which enters into the proper destiny of man as man. Not as different from man, not as more than man, but as the typical man, with the full-rounded capacity for the divine which belongs to such a man, is He peculiarly the Son of God. His eminence is a relative one. He stands among brethren. "Humanity is the son of God, humanity *in esse* or *in posse*. This is the truth which Jesus represents, which he illustrates by a supreme instance." (Unitarian Affirmations.) James Freeman Clarke likewise commends the early Church for rejecting the Arian doctrine. He also uses strong terms respecting the union of the divine and the human in Christ. Indeed, one of his charges against the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is, that it fails to assign enough of divinity to Christ, since, in virtue of its doctrine of eternal generation, it predicates of Him only a communicated or subordinate divinity, instead of the underrived divinity of the Father. (Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors, Appendix.) He also does not hesitate to speak of Christ as "the God-man, in whom the Divine Spirit and human soul became one in a perfect union." (Ibid., Chap. VIII.) But, notwithstanding such terms, the humanita-

rian standpoint is not essentially transcended. We have here only the most appreciative estimate of Christ of which it is capable. His exaltation above men is due rather to His position and the unique perfection of His human nature than to any transcendence in essence. "The person of Christ is human, but is intimately united and in perfect union with the indwelling God." (Ibid.) It is in virtue of this vital connection with God that Jesus truly manifests Him, so that in His words and acts we contemplate, as it were, God speaking and acting. Substantially the same view is represented by James Martineau. He says: "Christ standing in solitary greatness, and invested with unapproachable sanctity, opens at once the eye of conscience to perceive and know the pure and holy God, the Father that dwelt in Him and made Him so full of truth and grace. Him that rules in heaven we can in no wise believe to be *less perfect* than that which is most divine on earth; of anything *more perfect* than the meek yet majestic Jesus, no heart can ever dream. And, accordingly, ever since He visited our earth with blessing, the soul of Christendom has worshipped a God resembling Him." (Studies of Christianity. See also tributes to Christ by other Unitarian writers, in Daniel Dorchester's "Concessions of Liberalism to Orthodoxy.")

The Holy Spirit is defined by Channing as a "moral, illuminating, and persuasive influence." (Works, Vol. III. p. 94.) Hedge says: "The Holy Spirit is that particular agency of God, direct or indirect, which concerns itself with the moral and religious education of mankind. It is God acting in this particular way, as distinguished from God in nature." (Ways of the Spirit.) Again, in language savoring of Hegelian terminology, he speaks of the Holy Spirit as the ever-proceeding, self-imparting, flowing personality, Godhead in flux. (Unitarian Affirmations.)

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

PHILOSOPHIES which have lost the theistic conception have of course failed to find a place for the idea of creation. Materialism, hylozoism, and pantheism must predicate development rather than absolute origination.

In some instances writers understood to represent theism have been disposed to modify the Catholic declaration that the creation of the world was *ex nihilo*. In this category belongs Sir William Hamilton. He contends that we are unable to conceive of the sum total of existence being either increased or diminished; that accordingly creation must be thought as the evolution of divine power, while its opposite, annihilation, would be the return of this power to its original unevolved state. "Creation," he says, "is the existing subsequently in act of what previously existed in power; annihilation, on the contrary, is the subsequent existence in power of what previously existed in act." (Lectures on Metaphysics.) F. H. Hedge indulges a bolder departure from the current representation. "Shall we say," he asks, "that God Himself is the substance of which the worlds are formed? This in some sense I am driven to admit." Instead of representing creation as out of nothing, he would prefer to represent it as out of spirit, the product of God's going forth of Himself. (Ways of the Spirit, Essay VII.) At the same time he repudiates Spinozism, and pantheism generally so far as it obscures the personality and moral

rule of God, and admits it only as affirming a divine life throughout nature. In this sense he indulges the remark, "To pantheism belongs the world of nature; to theism the world of spirits." (Ibid., Essay X.) Martensen, rather explaining than denying the Catholic doctrine, says: "The nothing out of which God creates the world are the eternal possibilities of His will, these sources of all the realities of the world." (Dogmatik, § 61.) The exposition of Samuel Harris amounts to the same thing; but in place of an eternal possibility of will, he speaks of a power eternally potential in the divine plenitude. He says: "Creation is not originating something out of nothing. On the contrary, in creating, the Absolute Being calls into action power eternally potential in His infinite plenitude: and this power, energizing under the limits of space and time, and thus individuating and revealing itself, becomes cognizable as a finite reality or being." (The Philosophical Basis of Theism, 1883, p. 515.) The step from mere potentiality to individuated power surely implies all that was ever meant in any intelligent use of the formula of creation *ex nihilo*.

There have also been some who have been disposed to modify the Catholic theory that creation was the free act of God, an exercise of His absolute sovereignty. Thus Leibnitz in his Theodicy took the ground that God was under necessity to create,—not indeed a metaphysical necessity, but a moral necessity, obliging Him to choose the best among conceivable ends. Rothe maintained that the very conception of God involves that of creation. "God must necessarily create the world because He is essentially love." He taught also that creation must be viewed as a process without beginning or end, notwithstanding the world and everything in it had a beginning. (Dogmatik, I. §§ 37–39.) Hedge says: "Creation must be regarded as a necessary manifestation of the divine nature." The ground of this necessity he finds in the Hegelian conception that the crea-

tive process enters essentially into the self-realization of God as spirit. (Ways of the Spirit, Essay VII.)

The breadth of the distinction allowed between creation and preservation depends largely upon the scope assigned to second causes in nature. While a large proportion of theologians maintain that creation gave a kind of substantial existence to nature, there seems to be an increasing number who favor the theory, that nature but expresses the immediate agency of God,—that it has no sort of independence, and is only the power of God directed according to established rules, according to the comprehensive plan of the cosmos. This view is put by Professor Bowne as follows: “Matter and material things have no ontological, but only a phenomenal existence. Their necessary dependence and lack of all subjectivity make it impossible to view them as capable of other than phenomenal existence. The world view, then, contains the following factors: (1.) The Infinite energizes under the forms of space and time; (2.) the system of energizing according to certain laws and principles, which system appears in thought as the external universe; and (3.) finite spirits, who are in relation to this system, and in whose intuition the system takes on the forms of perception.” (Metaphysics, 1882, p. 466.)

The advance of scientific research has involved of necessity a changed conception of the Mosaic account of creation. The literal view began to meet with opposition before the close of the eighteenth century. Among the theories which have been broached are the following: (1.) The Mosaic account is a philosophical myth. Here belong such rationalists as Eichhorn, Henke, Gabler, and Paulus. (2.) The Mosaic account is an allegory, a view advanced by Herder. As quoted by Van Oosterzee, he calls the first chapter of Genesis a hieroglyph of creation, an optical representation of the beginning of all things, derived from that which is still seen to take place every morning at sunrise. (3.) The

Mosaic account is in essence a history. This is a specification of wide extent, including many varieties of opinion. Some make more account of the rhetorical cast of the mosaic narrative than others. Knapp speaks of it as a series of six pictures, which, like the performance of the painter, have truth for their foundation, but are not to be regarded as exact in all particulars. (Lectures on Christian Theology.) Alexander Winchell says, that, while it is no aimless reverie and conforms admirably to the indications of science, the interpreter must recognize the fact that it comes to us in the style and structure of Oriental poetry. (Reconciliation of Science and Religion.) Newman Smythe discerns in it a mnemonic purpose, indications that "it was arranged on purpose to be remembered." (Old Faiths in New Light.) Tayler Lewis favors the theory that it is the record of a vision, and calls it "an apocalypse of the great past, even as the revelation to John in Patmos is an apocalypse of the great future." (Introduction to Gen. i. in Lange's Comm. Compare Kurtz, *Geschichte des alten Bundes*; also *Bibel und Astronomie*; Dawson, *Archaica*.) In the interpretation of the Mosaic description, some of the writers who belong here resort to the so-called restitution hypothesis. As they teach, only the first verse of Genesis refers to the original creation; the following description applies to the work of restoration, accomplished in six literal days, after an era of disruption; the great geological ages intervening between the original creation and the disruption are passed by as not being relevant to the purpose of the author. This was the theory of Thomas Chalmers. (Nat. Theol., Vol. I. Bk. II. chap. 2. Compare William Buckland, *Geology and Mineralogy*; L. T. Townsend, *Credo*; Enoch Pond, *Lectures on Theol.*) It should be noticed, that some expositors who suppose a chasm between the first and second verses do not decide that the days of the creative week were literal days. Some also connect the primitive disruption with the fall of angels.

Delitzsch entertains this supposition, and sets it forth with theosophic adjuncts. (Bib. Psychol., II. 1.) In any form, the restitution hypothesis is the hypothesis of a minority. A much larger class, if we mistake not, regard the first verse as a general preamble to the following account, and the Mosaic days as indicative of periods of indefinite length. (4.) The account in Genesis represents ancient thought on the subject of creation purified and ennobled by revision from the standpoint of revelation.

On the subject of the age of the human race, many theologians are willing to enlarge the traditional estimate by a few thousand years, but desire further proof before accepting the immense period sometimes assumed in the name of science.

SECTION II. — ANGELS.

ROMAN Catholic writers, following the conclusion implied in the decisions of the Fourth Lateran Council, agree in maintaining that angels are pure spirits *omnis corporis expertes*. So Perrone, Staudenmaier, Klee, and Dieringer. Protestant writers render a divided verdict. Some remark, like Kahnis, Van Oosterzee, and Pond, that there is no adequate ground for decision. Others coincide with Martensen, Hofmann, and Hodge in the theory that angels have no bodies. Others, as Ebrard, Kurtz, Delitzsch, Hahn, Emmons, and R. S. Foster, think it probable that they possess ethereal bodies.

According to the Swedenborgian system, angels, whether good or evil, were previously men. "There is not an angel," says Swedenborg, "who had not previously been a man." (True Christian Religion, § 121.)

At the height of German rationalism a very negative position was taken toward the doctrine of angels, especially that of evil angels. The apparent support given by the

New Testament to the notion of demoniacal possession was explained by the theory of accommodation. Some still are inclined to treat the doctrine of a personal devil as a matter for ridicule. But there is a strong counter current in the theological thinking of Germany, as is indicated by the following from Dorner: "Nitzsch, Twesten, Rothe, Julius Müller, Tholuck, Lange, Martensen, as well as Thomasius, Hofmann, Kahnis, Philippi, and Luthardt, avow, not merely that sin is found in humanity, but that a kingdom of evil spirits with a head over them is also to be inculcated. Romang rightly satirizes the fond enlightenment which takes credit to itself for being above this representation." (System of Christian Doctrine, § 85.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — While recent theology has by no means accepted the theory of scientific dogmatism, that the primitive man was a savage of low order and the kin of the brute, it has retrenched somewhat the older theory of Adamic perfection. A tone of greater reserve and moderation in the treatment of this subject is unmistakably apparent on the part of those who have written in the last few decades.

The contrast between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant theory of original righteousness, so sharply drawn in the preceding period, has been in large part retained. Some Protestant writers, however, even among those not inclined to Pelagianism, have manifested the conviction that the Reformation theory of a concreated righteousness or holiness took too little account of the demand for personal agency in the realization of holy character. Such a criticism is involved in the following statement of Martensen: "The true relation to God on the part of the first man could not have been a state of perfection, or, on the

other hand, a mere aptitude; it was rather a living commencement, which included in itself the possibility of an advancing development, and the attainment of man's proper distinction. It is the one-sidedness of the Augustinian dogmatics, that it confounds the ideas of innocence and holiness, attributes to the first man a purity of will and a clearness of knowledge which can be thought only as the goal of a free development." (Dogmatik, § 78. Compare Dorner, System of Christ. Doct., § 41.)

The writers mentioned under a preceding section, as admitting the element of legend or myth into the Bible, find of course that element in the description of Paradise and the life therein. But some who would rule out such an ingredient are also averse to regarding the description as an exact record of veritable history, and consider it rather an allegorical expression of the essential content of the first stage of man's religious history. The large class of writers who hold that the account is literal, allow quite generally that it is adapted to figure more than it states; in other words, that it is history with a symbolical import. Swedenborg regarded it as pure symbolism. In the first ten and a half chapters of Genesis, as he taught, the spiritual sense alone is to be sought, the historical being wanting.

The Roman Catholic Church, abiding by the verdict of scholasticism, holds to the twofold division of human nature. A large proportion of Protestant writers adopt the same view. (See Hodge, Pt. II. chap. 2, § 2; H. B. Smith, Div. I. Pt. III. chap. 1; Pope, Vol. I. p. 423; C. M. Mead, *The Soul Here and Hereafter*.) Soul and spirit, they maintain, are not substantially distinct. "They are one and the same substance under different aspects or relations." But trichotomy also has its advocates, such as Delitzsch, Van Oosterzee, and H. M. Goodwin. The last two of these hold substantially the same theory, the more common form of trichotomy, according to which the soul is the principle of

animal life, the spirit the higher rational and moral principle. Goodwin, however, has this item of advantage, that he brings to notice the fact that the connection of the soul with the spirit gives to the former in man a character distinguishing it from the life-principle in the brute. He defines as follows: "The spirit in man is that part of our nature which corresponds to the Infinite Father of spirits. It is the ego, the personality, the man within the man, from which, as the inmost fountain or heart of our being, thought, affection, volition, and character proceed. It is the seat of moral responsibility, the organ of faith and love, and so of religion or communion with God. It is the highest and divinest part of our nature, the very image of God in which we are created. The soul, or psyche, is that which gives life to the body, as its indwelling or animating principle. It is not a free and self-acting power, like the pneuma, not visible and material, like the body, not a self-conscious intelligence enlightened from within or above, but derives all its knowledge from the senses, and its humanity, by which it is differenced from other animal souls, from the spirit. It is thus a connecting and mediating link between body and spirit, bringing down the spiritual into the sphere and life of the body, and elevating the physical to be the instrument and organ of the spirit." (Christ and Humanity, 1875.) According to Delitzsch, "the soul stands to the spirit in the relation of emanation." It is of the same nature with it, but not of identical substance. The spirit being described as the candle of the Lord, the divine light in man, the soul is denoted by the radiance of that light. (Biblical Psychology, II. sect. 4.) From his standpoint Delitzsch criticises the theory of Göschel, that the soul proceeds from both body and spirit, as assigning a false independence to the body over against the spirit, and as implying such a mixed nature as is quite inconceivable. That modified species of trichotomy, found in the early Church with Tatian and Irenæus, which makes the

Divine Spirit the third element, has also its modern representatives. Thus Schöberlein is quoted by Delitzsch as saying: "The Spirit may be reckoned in man among the actual elements of his being; whereas of natural beings, because the Spirit forms a power which only rules in them, but is incomprehensible to them themselves, it would be said that they only consist of body and soul." (Ibid.)

Exceptions to belief in the soul's incorporeal nature and natural immortality (that is, unconditional destination to endless existence) have still continued to be sporadic. One of the earlier examples of the former among modern theologians was Joseph Priestley. In outspoken terms he advocated the theory that man is purely a material being. More recently, somewhat of the materialistic leaven of the sensational school of scientists has crossed the theological border. But naturally a factor so alien to the drift of Catholic thought has rarely touched any except those already estranged from the heart of Christianity. Advocates of materialism, who are disposed at the same time to retain the doctrine of immortality, find a refuge for the latter, either in the Swedenborgian notion of an ethereal body already existing within our gross and visible organism, or in the less consistent notion of a restoration of personality and identity through a resurrection of the dissolved body. As respects the evidences of immortality, while the various arguments of former times are still employed, there has been a tendency to lay the principal stress upon the attestation of the Christian consciousness. The beginning of a life that is worth being continued, it is contended, carries with itself the most convincing tokens that it will be continued. The true believer, coming in some measure to realize for himself the great fact presented objectively in the person of Christ, namely, the union of man and God, can but feel that his life, like its source, must be eternal. Evidently this is a better argument for the immortality of those who rise into spiritual affinity with God, whose lives

are hid with Christ in God, than it is for that of men universally. So it is not out of accord with this development, if not in consequence of it, that a number make immortality conditioned upon the reception and cultivation of the principle of religious life. Conspicuous examples are Rothe, Weisse, and Edward White. (See Dorner, *System of Christ. Doct.*, §§ 42, 151.) A place is also given, among proofs of immortality, to the Kantian argument, to the consideration of man's perfectibility, and to his instinctive longings. The simplicity of the soul, upon which the adherents of the Wolffian philosophy in the eighteenth century laid much stress, is less valued of late, it being recognized that what has beginning may have an end, and accordingly that simplicity is only so far a proof as it is an indication of the Creator's purpose.

In the Roman Catholic Church creationism holds a well-established place. Dieringer speaks of it as wellnigh a dogma, — "ein dem Dogma nahe stehender Lehrsatz." (*Dogmatik*, § 40.) It is a token, therefore, of considerable courage of opinion, that Klee argued in favor of traducianism, or generationism as he preferred to call it. Among Protestants both creationism and traducianism have continued to hold a place. Emmons was a zealous creationist, and declared the opposing theory "as contrary to philosophy as to Scripture." (*Systematic Theol.*, *Serm. XXXIX.*) Hodge says that creationism has ever been the doctrine of the Reformed theologians, and in his discussion of the subject on the whole approves their verdict. (*Pt. II. chap. 3, § 3.*) On the other hand, traducianism has continued to claim the support of the larger proportion of Lutheran writers, and has found many advocates in other communions. It was favored by Edwards, and apparently also by Hopkins. It was advocated by Wesley and Watson, and more recently has been commended by Raymond and Pope. The last writer, however, gives a place also to creationism. In this he is in accord with a manifest bent of the more re-

cent theology. Such advocates of traducianism as Kahnis, Thomasius, and H. B. Smith admit that creationism points to a truth that must be recognized, — that divine agency, if not of the strictly creative order, must be regarded as a coefficient in the origin of the individual soul. In the representations of Martensen, Dorner, and Rothe, creationism and traducianism appear as mutually complementary theories.

The theory of pre-existence has been advocated by Julius Müller. He utilizes it in the solution of the problem of original sin, arguing that an inborn sinfulness which makes every one guilty can be rationally accounted for only by tracing it back to an actual sin, and hence to a wrong personal self-decision lying beyond our individual existence in time. (Christ. Doct. of Sin, Bk. IV. chap. 4.) Edward Beecher has made a like use of the theory. (Conflict of Ages.) A preference for the doctrine of pre-existence has also been expressed by F. H. Hedge, though under the impulse of no such practical interest as actuated Müller and Beecher. (Ways of the Spirit, Essay XIV.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — According to the general verdict of non-Calvinists, God's will and agency had no further connection with the fall than is manifest in providing its possibility by creating free moral agents. The possibility of sin, as they maintain, as well as the possibility of developing a holy character, necessarily goes with finite free agency, at least in its initial stages. What God willed was, not the actualizing of the possibility of sin, but that of the counter possibility, the development of holy character. Exceptions to this general position of non-Calvinists are found chiefly among those who maintain, for the most part in connection with a scheme of restorationism, that a temporary experience of sin is an essential part of the discipline which leads to permanent holiness.

Among Calvinists the attitude of God toward the fall is somewhat diversely represented in the different schools.

The supra-lapsarian school, which makes the fall a means of fulfilling a prior decree, has had but few adherents in the present period. The great body of recent Calvinists have been infra-lapsarians. But, as was seen in the previous period, infra-lapsarianism does not exclude a very positive relation of the divine will to the fall. The members of this school generally subscribe to the formula that God decrees whatsoever comes to pass, and teach that His decrees are the ground of the certain futurity of all events. Accordingly, when they speak of a permissive decree as governing the fall, they do not mean a decree which left the event properly contingent, or liable not to occur under the given circumstances, as well as to occur; on the contrary, they mean a decree *securing* the certainty of the fall as it actually occurred. The qualifying term, "permissive," points therefore simply to the fact that the decree is supposed to have been fulfilled without the positive exercise of divine efficiency. It in no wise limits the bearing of the decree on the certain futurity of the act of apostasy. That the term "permissive" includes at least no larger meaning than this, a number of writers make plain by the declaration, that it lies in the power of God to prevent all sin, without at the same time doing any violence to free moral agency. (Woods, Letters to Dr. Taylor; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 5, § 13; Pond, Lect. on Theol.)

Edwards himself ruled out the category of efficiency from God's connection with the fall. But one class of his successors, transcending the ordinary Calvinistic phraseology, has taught or implied that God was the efficient cause of Adam's sin. Hopkins was not far from asserting this conclusion. Referring to certain texts, he says: "It appears from these passages of Scripture, that God has foreordained all the moral evil which does take place; and is in such a sense, and so far, the origin and cause of it, that He is said to bring it to pass, by His own agency." Again he makes the significant remark: "The attempt to distinguish

between the sinful volitions or actions of men, as natural and moral actions, and making God the author and cause of them, considered as natural actions, and men the cause and authors of the depravity and sin which is in them, is, it is believed, unintelligible, and has no consistent or real meaning, and gives no satisfaction to the inquiring mind; unless by making this distinction it be meant, that in every sinful action God is not the sinful cause of it, but all He determines and does respecting these is the exercise of holiness." (System of Doctrines, Pt. I. chap. 4.) Emmons, who represents the extreme of Hopkinsianism, used still more explicit language. Discarding various methods of explaining Adam's fall, he says: "As these and all other methods to account for the fall of Adam by the instrumentality of second causes are insufficient to remove the difficulty, it seems necessary to have recourse to the divine agency, and to suppose that God wrought in Adam both to will and to do in his first transgression." (Systematic Theol., Sermon. XXIX.) An equal place for divine efficiency in the first transgression is implied in the following sweeping statement as to the origin of evil: "There is but one true and satisfactory answer to be given to the question which has been agitated for ages, Whence came evil?—and that is, *it came from the great First Cause of all things.*" (Sermon. XLV.) Emmons indeed speaks of the fall as the free act of Adam, but in his terminology "free" means only voluntary, and the human will stands to the divine agency or efficiency in a purely instrumental relation.

Among the critics of the efficiency scheme was the New Haven divine, Timothy Dwight. His view of its tendencies is thus expressed: "The theology of a part of this country appears to me to be verging, insensibly perhaps, to those who are chiefly concerned, but with no very gradual step, towards a pantheism, differing materially in one particular only from that of Spinoza"; that is, it leaves an infinite agent while denying finite agents. (Sermon. XV.)

The opposition of Dwight foreshadowed in a measure the standpoint which has been characteristic of the New Haven school. With this school it became a leading interest to reduce the divine connection with sin to the lowest point consistent with any hold upon the general Calvinistic theory of an all-inclusive providence. Its drift relative to the subject in hand is indicated by such sentences as the following from N. W. Taylor: "It may be true, that it is impossible that God should adopt the best moral system and prevent the perversion of moral agency in any greater degree than He does prevent it; it may be better, that moral agency should in every instance be rightly used, rather than perverted, under the present system; and of course it may be true that the Creator, notwithstanding the actual perversion of moral agency, prefers that every human being should act morally right rather than morally wrong. . . . There is not a word in the language which expresses or implies, or in the remotest manner intimates, that God prefers disobedience to His law to obedience, or sin to holiness, *all things considered*. . . . It cannot be proved that God could give existence to free moral agents and prevent all sin." (Lectures on the Moral Government of God.) Van Oosterzee seems to have written from the same standpoint. He says: "Sin is as little called into being by a divine causality, as it is originally teleologically willed and ordained by God. . . . It is *only* the possibility of sin, and not its reality, which must be regarded as the fruit of God's ordinance. . . . What He has originally willed, and aimed at, was a world not with, but without, sin. Sin is not an inevitable element of the perfected world, but is for that very reason opposed by God, in order that the world should become perfect." (Dogmatics, Sect. LXXI.)

From what has already been said, it is evident that the common declaration of all theological parties, that Adam in his transgression was free and responsible, does not imply

a uniform doctrine. The essentials to freedom and responsibility are differently understood. Non-Calvinists (and opponents of philosophical necessitarianism) agree that freedom, or at least that freedom *conjoined with responsibility*, implies a power under given conditions to vary the result, — the capacity of alternativity, or the power of contrary choice, as it is frequently called. A being who is free and responsible cannot, as they teach, be determined from the start, beyond all proper contingency, to one definite course. It matters not whether the determination is inward or outward; if it excludes alternatives, it excludes the notion of a free and responsible being. Supposing inward determination brought about by the prevailing force of a specific character to be *in itself* consistent with freedom, it still denies the proper notion of a free being, and especially of a responsible being, *unless* the character having this determining force is formed by the person himself in the use of a power of electing between alternatives. While some non-Calvinists admit the supposition in question, others disallow it, and hold that freedom and the power of contrary choice are inseparable ideas. To the former class we may reckon Julius Müller. He distinguishes between formal and real freedom. "What properly constitutes formal freedom," he says, "is the power of resolving and acting otherwise. If the will ultimately possesses the power or ability of determining in a way different from that in which it does determine, the person who thus wills is free." On the other hand, real freedom is identical with a holy necessity. "Man is not really free if his will be turned away from God, and if he be attracted and influenced by evil — which is alien to his nature — as well as by good. He is not really free, indeed, if his will be still undecided, morally indifferent, and unbiased either way. Then only is he in the highest sense free when without hesitation *he wills only what is good*, and carries out in action that inner necessity of his nature which excludes even the

thought of the possibility of evil." As to the relation between formal and real freedom, the one is to be viewed as the necessary antecedent of the other. "Real freedom — the clear decision of man for good, which excludes the possibility of evil — could not be conceived of, at least not as freedom, not as the completest self-assertion and self-realization of man, if it did not spring from formal freedom; this is its essential presupposition and condition. But formal freedom has, in the sphere of morals, no other destination save to pass over into real freedom; the former is the *means* to the realization of the latter as the *end*. . . . When the will has fully and truly chosen, the power of acting otherwise may still be said to exist in a metaphysical sense; but morally, i. e. with reference to the contrast of good and evil, it is entirely done away." (Christian Doctrine of Sin, Bk. III. Pt. I. chap. 1.) On the other hand, Whedon teaches that what Müller terms formal freedom ought not to be regarded as a vanishing factor in freedom, but an essential characteristic always and everywhere. Accordingly, apart from omniscience or revelations thereby, persistence in holy choices on the part of any moral agents is simply a matter of probability, though the probability may be such that faith can rest in it without any real disturbance from doubt.

Among philosophical writers Reid is very pronounced in his emphasis upon the power of contrary choice as entering into freedom. He says: "By the liberty of a moral agent I understand a power over the determinations of his own will." Liberty, as he maintains, is cancelled in any act which is the necessary consequence of something involuntary, whether that something be a state of mind or external circumstances. Respecting the force of motives he says: "I grant that all rational beings are influenced, and ought to be influenced, by motives. But the influence of motives is of a very different nature from that of efficient causes. They are neither causes nor agents. They suppose an effi-

cient cause, and can do nothing without it." (On the Active Powers.) Dugald Stewart contends for self-determination in like manner with Reid. He styles motives the occasions or reasons for acting, as distinguished from the efficient causes of action, and implies that the mind in volition acts creatively. "The argument for necessity," he says, "derives all its force from the maxim, *that every change requires a cause*. But this maxim, although true with respect to inanimate matter, does not apply to intelligent agents, which cannot be conceived without the power of self-determination." (Works, Vol. VI., Appendix.) Sir William Hamilton, in accordance with his agnostic proclivities, declares both freedom and necessity inconceivable. But while the speculative difficulties are in his view about equal on either side, he accepts freedom on the testimony of the moral consciousness, and seems to approve the definition of it given by Reid and Stewart. (Lectures on Metaphysics, Appendix; Philosophy of the Conditioned.) Kant's treatment of the subject is peculiar, but unmistakably evinces that he conceived of freedom as the most positive self-determination. He says, that if our freedom were no other than that of Leibnitz's *automaton spirituale*, — that is, psychological and comparative, not also transcendental and absolute, — "then it would at bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, accomplishes its motions of itself." But while Kant took high ground on the nature of freedom, he felt obliged also to ascend to high ground, even to a point outside the phenomenal or empirical, in order to find a theatre for its exercise. Everything phenomenal or empirical, coming under the category of time, of before and after, and holding a place in a connected chain, is subject to the law of cause and effect. Only in the sphere of the noumenal or intelligible, where the category of time no longer applies, is that law transcended. Hence, to secure freedom to man, we must predicate this double character of him,

and regard his empirical self and its manifestations as the product of the free determination of the intelligible self. (See both Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason.)

According to a large proportion of modern Calvinists, the free is simply the voluntary, and the power of contrary choice is a figment of the imagination. This was plainly the position of Edwards. In his definition freedom is nothing more than immunity from mechanical constraint. It leaves a man, amid a complex of motives and forces which are independent of any conscious agency or instrumentality of his, to one sole course, without the prerogative to turn aside a hair's breadth. Any specific volition is a link in a chain, and is as absolutely determined by its antecedents, if not in the same way, as is any event in nature. Calling the antecedents motives, this reduces to the statement that the will is and must be always as the strongest motive. That such is the teaching of Edwards will be made obvious by the following extracts from his work on the Freedom of the Will: "Things that are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves by a necessity of consequence. . . . That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive. . . . That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its own acts but by first acting, or be a determining cause of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes of one and sometimes of another, any other way than in consequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this: that if so, then the *same* cause, the *same* causal influence, *without variation in any respect*, would produce different effects at different times. . . . It is perfectly demonstrable, that, if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is *necessary*; or, in other words, that it is *impossible* but the event should

come to pass. That no future event can be certainly fore-known, whose existence is contingent and without all necessity, may be proved thus: It is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without *evidence*. To suppose otherwise implies a contradiction; because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be *evident* to that understanding: and for a thing to be *evident* to any understanding is the same thing as for that understanding to *see evidence* of it; but no understanding, created or uncreated, can *see evidence* where there is none." The causal nexus, as Edwards implies, must be present to the divine mind. The fact of the foreknowledge of any particular act proves a chain of causes necessitating the occurrence of that act.

In arguing against the self-determination of the will, Edwards makes much account of a supposed *reductio ad absurdum*. If, says he, the will freely determines itself to a particular act, it must be by a choice. But this choice is an act, and the self-determination of the will to this act must also be by a choice, and so on to infinity. This reasoning evidently discards the idea that the creature, not to say God Himself, can act creatively. A volition, it is assumed, must have a determining antecedent which is either voluntary or involuntary. But given such a function as volition, and such an activity as creation, the union of the two gives the creative will or the full power of self-determination. Accordingly, anti-necessitarians present, as the short answer to the difficulty interposed by Edwards, the declaration that a free agent, in willing, acts creatively. The will, as Whedon expresses it, is a complete cause, a pluripotent cause, able under proper conditions to initiate either of several volitions. To ask after something else which may absolutely explain why the will elects in every case as it does, is to deny that it is or can be a complete cause.

The younger Edwards went at least as far as his father in the direction of necessitarianism. He excluded the

power of contrary choice, and asserted a causal relation between motives and volitions. Interpreting his father's position, he says: "President Edwards does not hold that we are mere passive beings, unless this expression mean, that our volitions are the effects of some cause extrinsic to our wills. If this be the meaning of it, he does hold it." To the same effect he remarks: "To say, that we are self-determined or self-moved, because we ourselves determine and move, is as improper and groundless, as to say, that a body is self-moved and self-determined in its motion, because the body itself moves. Extrinsic causality is no more excluded in the one case than in the other." (Dissertation concerning Liberty and Necessity, Chap. II.) To be sure Edwards junior says: "Antecedent certainty of moral actions is all that we mean by moral necessity." (Ibid., Chap. VI.) But by certainty so used he meant something more than the same term denotes with anti-necessitarians. President Day was aware of this. "The younger Edwards," he says, "though he frequently asserts that by moral necessity he means nothing different from the certainty of moral actions, yet shows abundantly that by certainty, as used in this explanation, he intends not merely certainty of knowledge, but a certainty in things themselves, and in their relations. . . . The certainty which he calls moral certainty is, according to him, 'the real and certain *connection* between some moral action and its cause'; not the certain foreknowledge of an action which is, in the absolute sense, contingent. It is *objective*, and not merely subjective certainty." (Examination of Pres. Edwards's Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will, Sect. VIII.) Hopkins says, "What is voluntary is free." The power of contrary choice he repudiated as absurd. Emmons, in maintaining the same position, ruled out the category of permission from God's relation to the creature. "God cannot," he says, "exercise permission towards his rational creatures, because they cannot act without his work-

ing in them both to will and to do. The Deity, therefore, is so far from permitting moral agents to act independently of Himself, that, on the other hand, He puts forth a positive influence to make them act, in every instance of their conduct, just as He pleases. He bends all the moral, as well as all the natural world, to His own views; and makes all His creatures, as well as all His works, answer the ends for which they were created." (Systematic Theol., Serm. XXIX.) E. D. Griffin, in opposition to the doctrine of self-determining power, says: "We must believe the will is absolutely determined by motives." (Lectures, VIII.) Woods gives full scope to the same conclusion. (Lect. LII., LIV.) E. A. Lawrence of East Windsor and L. H. Atwater of Princeton represent their respective schools as denying the power of contrary choice. (Bib. Sac., Apr., 1863, Jan., 1864. Compare Hodge, Pt. II. chap. 9, § 3.)

On the subject of responsibility these writers generally apply the Edwardean maxim that the states and exercises of the moral agent are good or bad, praiseworthy or blameworthy, in their nature, and irrespective of their cause. Hodge defends this maxim. The opinion of Müller, that a man is only responsible for his acts and their subjective effects in the formation of character, so that acts determined by a character that is not self-formed are out of the range of responsibility, he expressly controverts. Indeed, the discussion of Hodge implies that a rational being absolutely determined to evil by his nature would be fully responsible for his acts, though that evil nature were concreated, innate, acquired, or infused. (Pt. II. chap. 9, § 3.)

Among the later New England theologians there has been a tendency, to a considerable extent, to modify the Edwardean system on the subject of freedom and responsibility. A revised phraseology has been brought in, and much account made of the distinction between certainty and necessity. Dr. Taylor of New Haven taught

that the power of contrary choice must be predicated of a free and responsible being. (See articles by Geo. P. Fisher, *New-Englander*, April and Oct., 1868.) Lyman Beecher advocated the same view. He says: "Choice, without the possibility of other or contrary choice, is the immemorial doctrine of fatalism." (*Views in Theology*.) C. G. Finney of Oberlin criticised the Edwardean theory as denying proper free agency to man and asserted the power of contrary choice in these terms: "I am as conscious of the affirmation that I could will differently from what I do in every instance of moral obligation, as I am of the affirmation that I cannot affirm, in regard to truths of intuition, otherwise than I do." (*Lectures on Systematic Theology*.) Such statements seem to concede all that the zealous Arminian could ask for. But when he is told by the same class of writers, (as he assuredly is by some of its leading representatives,) that it is certain that given antecedents will be followed by given actions as their consequents, that the power to vary the result is a power that is never used, and that divine foreknowledge is dependent upon this invariable but non-necessitated succession of consequents from antecedents, he sees that there is work still to be done to bring them over to his standpoint.

The result of Adam's misuse of freedom, or original sin, follows next in the order of consideration. Roman Catholic theology holds, of course, in accordance with the implication of the Trent decisions, that original sin includes guilt, as well as corruption or lack in the moral nature of Adam's descendants. Accordingly, it was one of the grounds of censure in the theological system of Hermes, that he excluded the element of guilt, and made original sin to consist solely in inborn depravity or concupiscence. (*Werner, Geschichte der katholischen Theologie*.) The stricter Lutherans have also continued to include the element of guilt as well as of depravity. Thomasius, for example,

teaches that, as the guilt of Adam was the guilt of the race, so to be a member of the race is to be a participant of the guilt. (Dogmatik, § 28.) But there have been many exceptions to this theory, in favor of the view that guilt first arises when the individual by a free and conscious act of will adopts the inherited evil bent. Thomasius speaks of this as a very common view since the time of Döderlein. One wing of Calvinism is very tenacious of the doctrine that original sin includes guilt as well as corruption. Another wing holds that the corruption alone is matter of inheritance, or the immediate consequence of Adamic connections, guilt first arising with the sinful choice which that corruption insures, but does not necessitate. "The universality of sin, not necessitated, but made certain, notwithstanding a power to the contrary, is the formula of the creed." (Fisher, *New-Englander*, Aug., 1860.) This is the theory of E. A. Park and many other New England theologians of the present century, and has also found favor with the New School among Presbyterians. Van Oosterzee is very definitely committed to this theory, at least so far as excluding guilt is concerned. Hereditary taint, he says, is something quite distinct from hereditary guilt. The former is to be admitted, the latter denied. (Dogmatics, Sect. LXXV.) Among English Methodists the theory of hereditary guilt has commonly been recognized, as may be judged from the writings of Wesley, Watson, Pope, and Rigg. They give it, however, only a theoretical place, since they regard it as cancelled by the unconditional benefits of the atonement. American Methodists, on the other hand, very generally regard the theory of hereditary guilt in any shape as a factor essentially alien to their system of theology, and lay the whole stress upon the single element of hereditary corruption. Unitarians, and rationalists in other communions, have no interest in the specific questions relating to original sin, since they reduce it to the common notion of heredity, the doctrine

that ancestry is a factor in determining the bent of the individual.

Those who include the element of guilt are not agreed as to the ground on which it is attributable to Adam's posterity. The principal theories are the realistic theory, the theory of federal headship and immediate imputation, the theory of natural headship and mediate imputation, the theory of federal and natural headship and both immediate and mediate imputation. It is not to be understood, of course, that those who hold the second theory deny the natural headship, but only that on this topic the prominent point with them is the federal headship. The first theory has found a staunch advocate in William G. T. Shedd. He argues that it is a well-approved fact that the deepest action of the will lies below consciousness. Having thus got beneath consciousness, and clear of any opposition which it may have to offer, he runs the line back to the primal apostasy as something in which the will of every individual may be supposed to have been deeply implicated. What he considers the true doctrine he thus outlines: "Every child of Adam fell from God in Adam, and together with Adam, and therefore is justly chargeable with all that Adam is chargeable with, and precisely on the same ground, viz. on the ground that his fall was not necessitated, but self-determined. For the will of Adam was not the will of a single isolated individual merely: it was also, and besides this, the will of the human species,—the human will generically." (Theological Essays.) Edwards also advocated a realistic theory, founding it upon the metaphysical notion that in the range of created things identity or oneness depends entirely upon God's sovereign constitution. As He was pleased to constitute Adam and his posterity one, they are in truth one. In the view of Edwards, transgression and depravity precede the imputation of guilt, and are its ground. The theory of immediate imputation, on the ground of the federal headship of

Adam, has been advocated by recent Scotch theologians, and by the Princeton school in this country. (See Chalmers, *Institutes of Theology*; Hodge, Pt. II. chap. 8, §§ 9-13; Atwater, *Bib. Sac.*, Jan., 1864.) Mediate imputation, on the ground of depravity coming through natural connection with Adam, has been favored by individuals in various communions,—by Woods and Tyler among New England theologians, by Hovey among Baptists, by H. B. Smith among Presbyterians, by Vanema and Stapfer among the Reformed on the Continent. According to Thomasius, mediate and immediate imputation mutually conditioning each other supply the best theory. (*Dogmatik*, § 28.)

As respects the mode in which the corruption of nature is transmitted, no essential advance has been made on the theories of the preceding period. Traducianists affirm the law of descent. Creationists leave the subject a mystery, or affirm a divine constitution that like shall be born of like,—that the primary state of the soul shall be as if it came into being by descent. Emmons, conjoining this notion with his exercise scheme and his doctrine of divine efficiency, brings forward the novel theory that the transmission of moral depravity is explained by the fact that God takes pains to create sinful exercises in the newly born. He says: “In consequence of Adam’s first transgression, God now brings his posterity into the world in a state of moral depravity. But how? The answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants, He forms them with moral powers and makes them men in miniature; He works in them as He does in other men, both to will and to do of His good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists. Moral depravity can take place nowhere but in moral agents; and moral agents can never act but only as they are acted upon by a divine operation. It is just as easy, therefore, to account for moral depravity in infancy, as in any other period of life.” (*Systematic Theol.*, Sermon XXIX.)

As to the degree of moral ability which pertains to man in the estate of original sin, the answer rendered by different schools has already been suggested by the preceding paragraphs. Only the strictest of the Lutherans hold on this subject the Augustinian extreme characteristic of the Lutheran theology in the preceding period. Kahnis declares that extreme untenable. (Dogmatik, III. § 10.) The position of Old School Calvinism is in general the position asserted by the Reformed Confessions of the preceding period. Among the representatives of the New England Theology there has been a very general departure from the older phraseology. An ability to keep the law of God is freely asserted even of the fallen man. This, however, is but one side of the case. The ability which is affirmed is described as a *natural ability*, over against which stands a *moral inability*. The natural ability is the possession of the powers of reason, will, etc., which enter into obedience to divine commands; the moral inability is the disinclination of the natural man to render such obedience. The one makes it proper to say of a man that he *can*; the other makes it certain that left to himself he *will not*. The one is the measure of obligation; the other declares the imperative need of grace. Methodist theologians prefer to speak simply of an inability of men in their natural state to keep the law of God. In their system, however, a natural state is only a theoretical fiction, since they teach that the Divine Spirit meets every man on the threshold of moral agency with a measure of assistance.

The principal theories respecting the nature and origin of sin which have recently been advocated are the following:—(1.) Sin has a positive as well as a negative side, is predicable not merely of acts, but of the nature lying back of the acts,—at least when the corruption of that nature has been induced in the use of personal autonomy,—and it had its origin in the free choice of the creature. This free

choice, according to the non-Calvinist, was properly contingent; according to the Calvinist, its certain futurity was secured by a divine decree. Among those holding this general definition, there is a difference on the question, whether all varieties of sin can be reduced to the single principle of selfishness. Julius Müller answered in the affirmative. Many New England theologians, starting from the Edwardian definition of virtue as benevolence, or love to being in general, have also answered in the affirmative. Hodge, on the other hand, has answered in the negative. So also has Dorner. Pope says that selfishness is rather the first manifestation than the essence of sin. (2.) A theory claiming somewhat of a following in New England differs from the above in confining sin altogether to voluntary exercises. Emmons was a zealous champion of this theory. It was given a place also in the Oberlin theology as represented by Dr. Finney. With Emmons, as has been observed, the conception of sin was further modified by his peculiar theory of divine efficiency. (3.) Sin, according to another theory, is simply negation or privation, and has the ground of its occurrence in the original limitations or imperfection of the creature. Leibnitz held this theory. Moral evil, as he taught, is privation, like darkness or cold. It needs no *causa efficiens*, but only a *causa deficiens*. The free will may indeed be termed the proximate cause of sin, but the primary cause was the imperfection of the creature. God could not bestow all perfections upon the creature without making him God. The creature is necessarily limited, imperfect in knowledge and moral energy, so that sin is made inevitable, if not necessary. (Théodicée.) Hedge agrees with Leibnitz in the negative definition of sin, as well as in the optimism which affirms, not that the world is the best conceivable, but the best possible. The effects of sin, he allows, are positive enough, but claims that this does not disprove the negative character of their source. (Reason in Religion, Bk. I. Essay VII.) "What

causes transgression," he says, "is not a positive, but a negative condition; it is not any one affection of the soul, in itself considered, but the absence of that restraining principle and power without which any affection of the soul may lead to sin. . . . Let the soul receive freely into her dark mansion the sunshine of the Spirit, and sin, which is nothingness and shadow, will flee away." (4.) The teaching of Rothe and some others locates the nature and origin of sin in sensuousness. Man starts with a sensuous nature, which it is his proper vocation to spiritualize. The tendency of the sensuous nature being contrary to this goal, sin becomes an inevitable incident in the process. Schleiermacher's teaching affiliates with this view. He locates sin in the opposition of the lower powers to the God-consciousness. (5.) In the representations of some recent writers, much account is made of the idea that antagonisms and contrasts are essential to development, and that sin therefore is a necessary factor in a progressive moral world. According to this theory, there is no excellence without manifoldness. As in art there must be both light and shade, as in nature both attracting and repelling forces, so in the moral sphere there must be the contrast of good and evil. Human life without such contrasts would be like a Chinese picture or a stagnant pool. Hegel's doctrine of sin may be regarded as a form of this theory. According to Hegel, moral evil is not so much what ought not to be, as what ought not to remain. The human spirit should overcome evil, but it needs for its proper development the trial which evil imposes. (See Julius Müller's criticism of this and other theories, in his *Christian Doctrine of Sin*.)

The relation of sin to the possible aggregate of good is, of course, estimated by theistic writers very much in accordance with their view of the relation of the divine will to the occurrence of sin. Those holding the radical theories of Hopkinsianism will not hesitate to say that whatever

sin exists is a means of the greatest good. Others, occupying a position somewhat less radical respecting the relation of God to the occurrence of sin, will say that it is a *sine qua non* of the greatest good. Others will not say either that sin is a means or a *sine qua non* of the greatest good, but simply that its possibility is unavoidable in the system which aims at the greatest good. Each of these theories has been advocated. The second is still extensively advocated ; but, as a relative decline of Calvinism implies, a relative advance of the third may be regarded as characteristic of the age.

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I. — THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE views entertained of Christ outside the current of Catholic Christianity have been intimated in large part in the preceding sections. In the section on Philosophy it was remarked that to Kant Christ was pre-eminently the moral ideal, while in the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel He is portrayed as the highest historical realization of the essential union of God and man. To Schleiermacher He was the transcendent example of a perfect God-consciousness, the impersonated divine life, the bond and centre of spiritual fellowship. The older rationalism judged of His human perfection in the spirit of a cold aversion to everything mystical, and of deistic severance between the divine and the human. Recent Unitarianism in one of its manifold phases, affiliating more or less with transcendentalism in its general standpoint, has represented the manhood of Christ so intimately linked with divinity that their union only fails of being a personal one. Among the noted biographers of Christ, Strauss spent most of his effort in proving that we have no real history of Him, and drew the conclusion that we should be less interested in His person than in the ideal of humanity, which he more indeed than any other single individual, but yet only partially, exemplified. Renan, in the least creditable work upon the subject, whether it be considered critically or morally, that ever was issued by a man of learning and reputation, min-

gled unstinted praises of Christ with statements grossly disparaging both to His intellectual and ethical superiority. Schenkel touched the subject with a more reverent hand than either Strauss or Renan. He saw in Christ a pattern of sinless humanity, a pure mirror in which divine verities found a true reflection. But he shared the old rationalistic dread of miracles, and ended much like the old rationalism in presenting to us God's legate, instead of the Word made flesh, the perfect union of the divine and the human. The general view of Keim was similar to that of Schenkel.

In the Church at large, the present period has witnessed an intensified interest in the subject of Christ's person. One manifestation of this drift is seen in the demand, by a considerable class of theologians, that the subject matter of theology should be treated after the Christo-centric plan. Whatever the result of christological investigation in other respects may have been, a real advance has no doubt been made in the treatment of Christ's human nature. No previous age has equalled the present in an appreciative consideration of Christ's human perfection, or wrought out so rich a literature in behalf of its illustration.

In the endeavor to secure a more satisfactory view of the union of the human and the divine in Christ than was attained by the older dogmatics, much attention has been bestowed of late upon the doctrine of the *kenosis*. Among those who have used the doctrine, in its most radical form, to solve the problem of Christ's person, are Thomasius, Gess, and Ebrard.

Thomasius teaches that without a self-limitation of the divine no true union with the human is possible. The divine self-consciousness is an infinitely larger circle than the human, and their co-existence implies a dualism destructive to personal unity. To gain a basis for unity, there must be a depotentiation of the divine. Such in fact occurred when the Word became flesh. The eternal Logos emptied Himself, not indeed of what is strictly essential to

God, but of the divine mode of being. He put aside the divine glory, the divine self-consciousness, the divine attributes connected with the dominion of the world, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, renouncing not merely their use, but their possession as well. He came entirely within the limits of a human earthly life. "In the totality of His being He became a man." The essential holiness and truth of the divine nature assumed in Him the form of human volition and thought, the absolute love and freedom, the form of human feeling and self-determination. There was no distinction between a divine and a human consciousness in Him, but only a distinction of moments in a single self-consciousness, somewhat as in the regenerate the undivided self-consciousness includes the two moments of the divine and the natural life. Having descended from the divine to the human rank, he returns after the analogy of a human development toward the divine, and in the glorification rises completely to its plane, appearing thenceforth as the omnipotent, omniscient God-man. (Dogmatik, §§ 38-45.)

In the scheme of Thomasius, with its humanized Logos, there seems to be little need of an extra human soul. So Gess inferred. As he represents (in his *Lehre von der Person Christi*), the Logos became the human soul that dwelt in the body derived from the Virgin. Apollinaris was right in refusing to conjoin the Logos with a human soul; but he was radically in error in making the incarnated Logos immutable. He was every way man, with the characteristic mutability of man, able to sin, though in fact sinless. Such a theory seems to involve the conclusion that one of the Divine Persons disappeared for a time from the Trinity. Gess admits this in the fullest terms. The depotentiation of the Logos, as he teaches, affected the life of the Godhead in a fourfold manner: (1.) The Father suspended the communication of divine life to the Son. (2.) The Son ceased to be a joint source for the procession of the

Spirit. (3.) The Son ceased to be the upholding and conserving principle of the world. (4.) In reassuming His glory, the Son entered as man into the Trinity.

This evidently involved nothing less than the overthrow of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. To avert such a result, Ebrard, Schöberlein, and some other advocates of the kenosis, have brought forward the theory of a double life of the Logos. On the one hand, as they teach, the Logos becomes the man Jesus, emptied of His divine glory, and possessed of a purely human consciousness and will; on the other hand, He retains without interruption His existence and activity in the Trinity. The same ego subsists at once in the eternal and the temporal mode, as infinite and as confined by the narrow bounds of man's estate.

Delitzsch carries the depotentialisation of the Logos as far as Thomasius. (Bib. Psych., V. sect. 1.) A quite emphatic view of the kenosis appears also with Martensen. He teaches that the Logos in Christ must be viewed as limited, as subject to the law of development, so that "as the human nature grows and develops, in the same measure the divine in Him grows, and in the same measure as He becomes aware with His advancing development of His historical significance, He is reminded of His eternal pre-existence and of His going-forth from the Father." (Dogmatik, § 136.)

Dorner criticises the kenotic theories, and in their place advances the idea of a progressive union consummated by an enlarging impartation from the Logos to a growing receptivity in the human nature. (System of Christ. Doct., § 104.) He considers it of importance to regard the union as ethically mediated, the divine indeed taking the initiative, but the human not occupying an attitude of simple passivity. (Compare Rothe, Dogmatik, II. 1, §§ 22, 23.) A theory of Christ's person essentially identical with that of Gess has been advocated in this country. A very clear and pronounced expression of this is found in the treatise of Henry M. Goodwin, entitled "Christ and Humanity." He

affirms that the true doctrine of the incarnation rests upon three postulates: (1.) the essential unity of the divine and the human; (2.) the divine and heavenly humanity of Christ, the truth that the Logos is essentially the archetype of man; (3.) the kenosis, or the self-limitation of the Logos. His view of the kenosis is sufficiently indicated by this comment on the theory of Apollinaris: "The real defect was not in denying a human soul, — which was not needed if it did not act, and, if it did, would destroy or impair the unity of His person; but the radical defect of his system was in allowing the Logos only a partial, and not a perfect humanification, i. e. a real subjection to all the conditions and limitations of our finite humanity." Horace Bushnell contended for substantially the same result, namely, a divine-human Christ endowed with a single rational principle, but expressed himself as comparatively indifferent about the theoretical path to this result.

The doctrine of the kenosis in its radical form evidently implies an extensive modification of the old Lutheran Christology. It is directly counter to the earlier theory, which meant by the kenosis, not a depotentiation of the Logos, but the renunciation by the human nature of the use, or the manifest use, of the divine predicates. It is also at variance, at least as urged by Gess, with the Lutheran doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. There being no soul in Christ aside from the Logos, there is no need of a communication, except to the body, that is, of a power to transcend the limitations of space. It is noteworthy that Martensen takes exception to a communication of just this sort, as endangering the individuality of the glorified Christ, and leaning to the theory of an indefinite pantheistic Christ diffused through nature. There are others, however, among recent writers, who are in no wise inclined to renounce this item, which figured so prominently in the older dogmatics.

It is quite manifest that what may be styled a radical doctrine of the kenosis has made progress in different

quarters within the last few decades. But, taking the theological world at large, it is still, if we mistake not, the doctrine of a decided minority.

The doctrine of a pre-existent humanity of Christ, in one or more of its factors, favored by some in the preceding period, has found here and there an advocate in the present. Swedenborg's conception of God as the Infinite Man involved in itself the notion of a kind of pre-existent humanity. Isaac Watts argued for a pre-existent soul of Christ, which was the first-born of all creatures, subsisting in personal union with the Logos. In the incarnation, this soul, bereft of its exalted knowledge, power, and glory, was united with a material body, and made subject to the law of gradual development. (Works, Vol. VI.)

SECTION II.—THE REDEMPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

IN the treatment of this subject we deal, for the most part, not with new elements, but only with new combinations. All the leading aspects of Christ's redemptive work were brought out in the preceding periods.

Leaving a margin for miscellaneous views, we may include the principal types of teaching in the following classification: (1.) the judicial theory; (2.) the pure governmental; (3.) the modified governmental; (4.) the moral; (5.) the mystical.

The idea of the judicial theory is not simply satisfaction, but rather specific satisfaction. It teaches that Christ's obedience and sufferings were not merely a general condition of the exhibition of forgiving mercy, but a specific satisfaction for all the sins of the elect. Christ fulfilled the claims of the law in their behalf in such a sense that it is no longer an act of grace, but of justice, that they should be released from its penalties. Grace concerns the primary provision of the satisfaction, not its individual application.

Says one of the most eminent representatives of this theory: "It is a matter of justice that the blessings which Christ intended to secure for His people should be actually bestowed upon them. This follows for two reasons: first, they were promised to Him as the reward of His obedience and sufferings. God covenanted with Christ, that, if He fulfilled the conditions imposed, if He made satisfaction for the sins of His people, they should be saved. It follows, secondly, from the nature of the satisfaction. If the claims of justice are satisfied, they cannot be again enforced. This is the analogy between the work of Christ and the payment of a debt. The point of agreement between the two cases is not the nature of the satisfaction rendered, but one aspect of the effect produced. In both cases the persons for whom the satisfaction is made are certainly freed. Their exemption or deliverance is in both cases, and equally in both, a matter of justice." (Hodge, Pt. III. chap. 6, § 3.) From the above statement, that those are *certainly freed* for whom the satisfaction was made, it is an obvious inference that the satisfaction was made only for the elect, unless perchance some are saved who are not of the elect, a conclusion which the advocates of this theory in no wise tolerate. The virtue of Christ's death, it is conceded, is entirely adequate to cover the sins of the non-elect. And on this ground, as Hodge contends, the offer of salvation to all is justified and made consistent. (Pt. III. chap. 8, § 2.) Non-Calvinists, on the other hand, have never been able to see the consistency of urging salvation upon those for whom it was never designed. In their view the divine design and the Gospel offer should have equal breadth, if God is to be presented to the contemplation of men in any worthy light. The judicial theory, with its legal analogies, is naturally coextensive only with the stricter type of Calvinism, which carries out the conception of imputation in all its length and breadth. Professor Atwater has declared it representative of Old School

Presbyterianism. (Bib. Sac., January, 1864. Compare Wm. Cunningham, Hist. Theol., Vol. II.)

The governmental theory takes the subject of atonement from the court, or the sphere of judicial procedure, and transfers it to the sphere of sovereignty, of righteous administration. It views God pre-eminently in His character of moral ruler. In all its forms it denies the assumption of the judicial theory that Christ so fulfilled the obligations of a special class of persons as to render their acquittal, in view of His work, a matter of justice. It teaches, rather, that the work of Christ provided simply the possibility of pardon for any and every man, laid the suitable foundation for a general scheme of amnesty; that, while it is fitting that the benefits of the amnesty should be offered to all, the work of Christ gives no one a title to them in justice.

In its pure form the governmental theory makes the demand for an atonement to lie, not in the essential nature of God, but in the exigencies of moral government. It is a token rather of what good administration requires, than of what essential holiness in itself requires. It may be defined as an expedient whereby the honor and majesty of moral government are sustained in connection with the offer of pardon to the sinner. Such, on the whole, is the theory advocated by Dr. Miley in his work on "The Atonement in Christ." To be sure, he is careful to state that there is a punitive justice in God; but he states also that this is a feeling or impulse the satisfaction of which the divine nature does not necessarily demand. His point of view is well indicated by the following: "God, as a righteous Ruler, must inflict merited penalty upon sin, not, indeed, in the gratification of any mere personal resentment, nor in the satisfaction of any absolute retributive justice, but in the interest of moral government, or find some rectorally compensatory measure for the remission of the penalty. Such a measure there is in the redemptive mediation of Christ." Storr and some others of the Ger-

man supernaturalists of his era held about the same view. The governmental theory has also been advocated by the great body of those representing the New England Theology since the days of Edwards. But how far they have been committed to the theory in the form characterized in the present paragraph, it is not easy to decide. What many of them emphasize is the purely governmental demand for the atonement. This might be natural, even if they admitted a farther demand, since they wished to make prominent the point of departure from the old theory.

The modified governmental theory, as we term it, claims that the atonement is a satisfaction to the ethical nature of God, as well as an expedient for sustaining the honor and majesty of His government. It emphasizes the idea that no chasm should be interposed between the moral laws and the moral nature of God; that what one demands the other demands, and what is agreeable to the one satisfies the other. Watson, on the whole, seems to have stood upon the ground of this theory, and it may be regarded as largely current among Methodist theologians of the present, as also in other quarters, though perhaps under a different terminology from that by which it is here designated. If we mistake not, the teaching of H. B. Smith on the atonement admits of being classified here. The same may be said of many of the more orthodox Lutherans of recent times; for, in opposition to the judicial theory, they make the satisfaction of Christ to be a satisfaction of general, and not of distributive justice, and, in opposition to the Grotian or purely governmental theory, they find a ground for it in the ethical nature of God, and not merely in the demands of administration. (See the views of Dörner, Thomasius, Kahnis, and Schmucker.)

The moral (or moral influence) theory regards the work of Christ not at all as a condition, on the divine side, of man's restoration, whether the condition be located in the nature or the government of God, but simply as the chosen

means of restoration. God in Himself being already reconciled, and being moreover perfectly secure of His moral sovereignty, had no need of a tribute either to His nature or to His law. All that was needed was a restoring agency, such a manifestation of God's desire to bring the alienated race into fellowship with Himself as should influence them most powerfully and wholesomely. Sanctification of man, not satisfaction of God, was the thing demanded. In the humbled, obedient, and suffering Son of God, the restoring agency, the sanctifying influence, was provided. As enlisting the faith and drawing forth the affection of men, Christ becomes directly the power of God unto salvation. Some of the recent German theologians have espoused this theory. It underlies the representations of Töllner, Rothe, and Nitzsch, among others. In this country Horace Bushnell has been its most conspicuous advocate. Our description of the theory has already presented an outline of his view, as contained in his work on "The Vicarious Sacrifice." Love, as he teaches, is the very principle of vicarious sacrifice in God, as well as in man. The cross was in God's heart from eternity. The need of reconciliation pertained wholly to man, and not at all to God. The atoning power of Christ's sacrifice is its power to overcome man's alienation from God, its moral influence. The fulness of its moral influence is due to its wonderful manifestation, not only of God's love, but of all His moral perfections. While Bushnell teaches that there was no need on God's part that the law should be honored, he maintains that the sacrifice of Christ, as a matter of fact, conferred unmeasured honor upon the law. "Everything that we see," he says, "in the incarnate life and the suffering death, is God magnifying the honors of His law by the stress of His own stupendous sacrifice." Again he remarks, "It is obvious enough that, in such a way of obedience, Christ makes a contribution of honor to the law He obeys that will do more to enthrone it in our reverence than all the

desecrations of sin have done to pluck it down,—more than all conceivable punishments, to make it felt, and keep it in respect.” In his estimate, therefore, of the essential worth of Christ’s work, he does not differ from the advocates of the preceding theories. The prominent point of difference is, that he makes that work simply a means of man’s moral recovery, and not also a condition on God’s part of that recovery. In a later work Bushnell modified his former exposition, to the extent of admitting a real propitiation of God. This, however, he describes as a self-propitiation effectuated by making sacrifice for the offender. As we by making cost to ourselves for an enemy overcome our inward reluctance to forgive, so God by entering into sacrifice for sinners becomes in his own feeling fully at peace with Himself in extending grace to them. (Forgiveness and Law.) The moral theory was favored by Coleridge, and has also claimed the recognition of other representatives of the Broad Church in the English Establishment. The teaching of F. D. Maurice is perhaps best defined as a union of the moral and the mystical theories.

According to the mystical theory, the great aim and achievement of the redemptive work was to bring man into vital connection with God. The incarnate Logos acts as the bond of this connection. He becomes in the organism of humanity the new life-centre, whence a divine-human virtue is mediated to all the branches. As has been indicated, this view had a place in patristic thought. Among its modern exponents, Oetinger is mentioned as a prominent example. It enters as a factor into the theory of a number of theologians who do not lay upon it an exclusive stress. In the following words from Delitzsch, for example, it is clearly enough implied: “This appropriation of human nature, through the Logos, and this impropriation of the Logos into the human nature, became the inviolable ground of a new humanity, which has in the God-man the creative principle and the superabundant archetype of its growth.

. . . In Christ a new beginning is established, which bears in itself the most infallible guaranty of completion, and, on account of the superabundant intensity of its power of propagation, suggests the hope of a renewal of the whole of humanity." (Bib. Psych., V. sect. 1, 2.)

The moral theory has been characteristic of recent Unitarian theology. Ellis states as the Unitarian conclusion on the subject of the atonement: "The Scriptures do not lay the emphatic stress of Christ's redeeming work upon his death, alone or apart from His life, character, and doctrine; and His death, as an element of His redeeming work, is made effective for human salvation through its influence on the heart and life of man, not through its vicarious or substituted value with God, nor through its removal of an abstract difficulty in the divine government, which hinders the forgiveness of the penitent without further satisfaction." (A Half-Century of the Unitarian Controversy.) It may be noticed, however, that the testimony of Channing indicates that some of the earlier Unitarians were not quite satisfied to assign to Christ's death simply the place which is indicated in the above,—were inclined to regard it as securing forgiveness otherwise than by moving to repentance and reformation of life. He says, "Many of us are dissatisfied with this explanation, and think that the Scriptures ascribe the remission of sins to Christ's death, with an emphasis so peculiar, that we ought to consider this event as having a special influence in removing punishment, though the Scriptures may not reveal the way in which it contributes to this end." (Works, Vol. III. p. 89.)

The symbolical view was not included in our list of theories, as being of very indefinite range and meaning. It held, however, quite a prominent place in Germany during the transition era in the first part of the century. We quote upon this subject from Hahn: "Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and the theologians and philosophers who affili-

ated with them and were opposed to the vulgar rationalism, regarded from their different standpoints the reconciling death of Christ as a symbol of the spiritual and moral change whereby the sinner reunites himself with God. So Kant saw therein the symbolical representation of the truth that the new or reformed man must pay the penalty for the old. Similarly Tieftrunk in Halle, and Kroll in Helmstedt. Krug found therein a symbol of the truth that God does not take pleasure in man as he is, (the natural man,) but in him as he should be, (the Christ,) which idea the natural man must believingly follow, if God is to receive him into favor. According to Schleiermacher's related view, redemption and reconciliation, absolutely accomplished in the person of Christ, are accomplished in us only as fellowship and union with Him, so far as God sees us, not each by himself, but only in Him. However, we do not come immediately into this fellowship and union, but only through the medium of the community of which Christ the Saviour is the founder. De Wette considered the death of Jesus an æsthetico-religious symbol of the feeling of submission in which we bow before God. Marheinecke saw therein a symbol of the return of the world to God, in that it dies to itself in order to attain a new and true life." (*Lehrbuch der Christ. Glaubens*, § 103.) For a more specific reference to Hegel's view, see the section on Philosophy.

Among the features of Christ's redeeming work recognized by Swedenborgianism, a prominent place is given to His agency in limiting the power of evil spirits. Speaking of Christ's rebuttal of infernal spirits and their temptations, a Swedenborgian writer says: "Thus He set Himself face to face in battle with our spiritual enemies. And He overthrew them utterly. He drove them back to their own dark realm. He destroyed their predominant influence over human beings, and restored the freedom which they had so nearly subverted." (James Reed.) "That the Lord," says Swedenborg, "while He was in the world,

fought against the hells, and conquered and subjugated them, and thus reduced them under obedience to Him, is evident from many passages in the Word." (True Christian Religion, § 116.)

Nearly all theological parties agree in the verdict, that in the atonement, as accomplished by Christ, are to be included not merely His sufferings and death, but His entire life of holy obedience. But many representatives of the New England Theology have taught that the obedience of Christ, while indispensable to His vocation, was no part of the atonement. Here belong Edwards junior, Hopkins, Emmons, Pond, Fiske, etc. The last, writing as a representative of his school, says: "The old doctrine is, that the atonement consists both in the active and passive obedience. The new doctrine confines the atonement to the latter, and makes it consist wholly in Christ's sufferings." (Bib. Sac., July, 1865.) On the other hand, Dwight and Woods were opposed to attempts to separate between the active and passive obedience of Christ.

The doctrine of Christ's descent into Hades ceased before the end of the eighteenth century to be a topic of much interest among Protestant theologians. Recently the connection of the subject with eschatology has brought it to renewed attention. Much division of opinion exists on the question whether the Scriptures teach a real descent or not. Dörner implies that German exegesis answers the question in the affirmative. "It may be accepted," he says, "as a result of modern exegetical research, that, in harmony with the faith of the ancient Church, Peter really contemplates Christ after His death, probably before His resurrection, as active in the region of the dead, and therefore not in the place of torment, but in the intermediate region." (System of Christ. Doct., § 124.) Van Oosterzee argues for a real descent. (Sect. CIV.) Hodge, in agreement with a large proportion of Reformed theologians of former times, sees in the true doctrine of the descent sim-

ply the fact that Christ continued for a time under the power of death. (Pt. III. chap. 12, § 5.) Altogether wide of the modern drift is the view of Dr. Bartle, that Christ's principal sufferings by which He atoned for sin were in Hades. (The Scriptural Doctrine of Hades.)

Not a few among recent theologians have favored the conclusion that the incarnation was not dependent upon the fact of sin, or the need of redemption. Dorner contends for this conclusion, and supports it with such considerations as the following. If Christianity is the absolute religion, its central feature, the God-man, ought not to be conditioned upon the contingent fact of sin. It is contrary to the pre-eminent glory and importance of Christ's person to make the incarnation merely a means of redemption, and dependent upon the redemptive purpose. Humanity as an organism, and apart from the demand of moral recovery, can find only in the God-man an adequate centre and head. Dorner mentions, among others who have adopted this view, Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Schöberlein, Schmid, and Ebrard. (Hist. of Doct. of the Person of Christ, Div. II., Vol. III.) Among those who have advocated the reverse view are Julius Müller and Thomasius. The Roman Catholic theologian Amort, taking a medium position between the Scotist and the Thomist opinion on the subject, drew the conclusion that Christ would have adopted a form of manifestation, even if man had not sinned, but one of a more glorious order than the common human one in which he did appear. (Werner, Geschichte der katholischen Theologie.)

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

As was indicated in the corresponding section of the previous period, while there was a current of Augustinianism in the Roman Catholic Church, the opposing cur-

rent, which had long been in existence, gained an added impulse through the action of the Popes in condemning propositions of Baius and Quesnel, and of the council of Trent in teaching a synergistic mode of appropriating grace. However, the Augustinian doctrine of predestination was not formally repudiated, nor has it been to this day. Accordingly, we find such representative writers as Perrone teaching that a Roman Catholic is free to exercise his option between the doctrine of gratuitous predestination, in the sense of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and the doctrine that predestination is conditioned upon foresight of merit. (*Prælect., De Prov. ac de Prædest.*) It is difficult to determine what amount of suffrage is still rendered to the former view; but it may safely be inferred that it holds a very subordinate place as compared with the counter view, which, indeed, is the only one really in harmony with the Trent synergism. The following from Möhler may be regarded as representative of the general standpoint of modern Romanism on the mode of divine grace and the related doctrine of predestination. "According to Catholic principles, in the holy work of regeneration, when the same is really accomplished, two activities, the human and the divine, meet and intermingle; so that it is a divine-human work. God's holy power precedes arousing, awakening, and quickening, without man's being able to deserve the same, or bring it near, or long for it; but man must allow himself to be aroused, and must freely follow. God offers His help to raise from the fall, but the sinner must agree, and appropriate the same; appropriating it, he is received of the Holy Spirit, and gradually, although it may never be perfectly in this life, through faithful co-operation is raised again to that height from which he fell. God's spirit uses no absolute compulsion, though He be exceedingly urgent in His addresses; His omnipotence sets bounds to itself in human freedom, which it will not break through, because an unrestricted invasion

of the same would involve the destruction of the moral order of the world, which the eternal wisdom has founded upon freedom. With right, therefore, and entirely in harmony with her inmost essence, has the Catholic Church repudiated the Jansenist sentence of Quesnel, that human freedom must yield to the omnipotence of God,—a sentence which has for its immediate consequence the doctrine of an entirely unconditioned predestination of God, and declares concerning those who do not attain to regeneration that they have not cast themselves off, but have been simply cast off by God, since the touching of them by the Spirit of God would also have determined their freedom to faith and holy obedience.” (Symbolik, § 11. Compare Klee, Vol. III. p. 105.)

In the Lutheran Church the Augustinian doctrine of predestination has been generally repudiated. The same may be said of the Reformed Church of Germany since the early part of the present century. As Kahnis remarks, at the time the Union was agitated, it was justly urged by those favoring that project, that, with only vanishing exceptions, Reformed theologians had given up the doctrine of predestination. (Dogmatik, III. § 13.) “The Reformed divines in Germany,” says Schaff, “are not strict Calvinists, especially as regards the doctrine of predestination, but stand in close affinity with the moderate or Melancthonian school of the Lutheran Church.” (Germany, its Universities, Theology, and Religion.) Schleiermacher, it is true, as a representative of the Union Church, taught an absolute predestination. But it was not the old Reformed doctrine on that subject which he advocated. Predestination with him was not the choice of certain men to eternal life, as opposed to others, but the choice of each and every man to an earlier or later entrance into the life of the redeemed. It fixes the progressive development of the divine kingdom, the order of entrance into the same, until the final consummation is reached, when all shall have

entered. (Die Christ. Glaube, §§ 119, 120.) Still less was Rothe's the old Reformed doctrine of predestination. He held, indeed, that the fact that a man becomes here and now a partaker of grace must be referred rather to the divine choice than to human agency. However, he maintained that this, in the divine administration, is made subservient to the widest possible participation in grace. Individuals are introduced in that order most conducive to the final universality of the kingdom of redemption. He taught, moreover, that it is the unfeigned desire of God to save all men, though it is possible that human arbitrariness and obduracy may thwart this desire. So Rothe presents the predestinarian scheme of Schleiermacher without its strict determinism. (Dogmatik, II. 1, §§ 7, 8.) Contrary to the general teaching of Lutheranism, Rothe, Nitzsch, and Martensen give in their adherence to one of the concomitants of the Calvinian doctrine, holding that for the truly converted man there is no absolute falling from grace.

As respects the mode of divine grace, the monergistic theory asserted in the Formula of Concord and championed through the scholastic era may be said to be but a waning factor in the Lutheranism of the present. The Melancthonian type of doctrine comes to the front. "The spirit of Melancthon," says Kahnis, "which the Lutheran orthodoxy had put into bonds, but had not conquered, claimed its rights after the extinction of the Lutheran scholasticism. One may say that the Melancthonian standpoint is the ensign of the truth leading on the doctrinal development which has since found place in this dogma." (Dogmatik, II. § 7.) The position taken by Thomasius sides also with the synergism of Melancthon. As he teaches, only the first impact of grace lies beyond the power of man to avoid. This creates the possibility of repugnance to the old man, and strife against its impulses. On the basis of this possibility a man can ally himself with grace, and advance to repentance and faith; or, refus-

ing to make the alliance, he can extinguish the primary impress of grace. (Dogmatik, § 67^b.)

Reference has already been made to the Calvinistic leanings of the Evangelical School in the Established Church of England. This bent was quite conspicuous in Berridge and Romaine. But it is among the Presbyterians of Scotland and the United States that the peculiarities of Calvinism have been most elaborately defended and advocated in recent times. In saying this, the fact is not ignored that in both of these quarters there has been more or less of a recoil from these peculiarities. Still, representative men, like Cunningham and Hodge, champion them with a courage worthy of the heroic days of Calvinian dogmatism. Both teach, by clear implication, if not in words, that a part, at least, of the race never had any probation except in Adam, if indeed it had a real probation there. This follows, for example, as a necessary conclusion from the doctrine of reprobation which Cunningham ascribes to Calvinists, and which goes of course with his indorsement. He says: "What they hold upon this subject is this,—that God decreed, or purposed, to do from eternity what He actually does in time, in regard to those who perish as well as in regard to those who are saved, and this is, in substance, to withhold from them, or to abstain from communicating to them, those gracious and insuperable influences of His Spirit by which alone faith and regeneration can be produced,—to leave them in their natural state of sin, and then to inflict upon them the punishment which by their sin they have deserved." (Historical Theology, 1870, Vol. II. p. 428.) Evidently the withholding of that *by which alone faith and regeneration can be produced* throws them entirely out of the category of the possible. And what is a probation that is consummated without the possibility of avoiding one fixed result? Even to stocks and stones this much is accorded. The distinction which Hodge makes between common and efficacious grace im-

plies for the non-elect as little possibility of escaping damnation as does Cunningham's definition of reprobation. He says, that, while common grace is sufficient for some things, "it is not sufficient to raise the spiritually dead; to change the heart, and to produce regeneration; and it is not made to produce these effects by the co-operation of the human will." (Pt. III. chap. 14, § 4.) To be sure, the statement here is that common grace *is not* made to produce these effects by the co-operation of the human will, — in itself a less decisive statement than if it were said that common grace *cannot*. But the context shows that this *is not* is meant to be at the same time a *cannot*. For Hodge argues at length that the efficiency which accomplishes regeneration must be ascribed to nothing less than the almighty power of God working irresistibly. He defines efficacious grace as "the almighty power of God." He says, "Regeneration is not merely an act of God, but also an act of His almighty power." Now it is plain that what Hodge ascribes to almighty irresistible power he means to exclude from all possibility of being accomplished by the co-operation of the human will with something less. So we are left to the conclusion that the partakers in merely common grace, the non-elect, are debarred absolutely from the possibility of that regenerate nature the attainment of which is indispensable to eternal life. During their conscious existence they have never come within the bounds of such possibility.

It should be noticed that Hodge uses the term "regeneration" in its narrower sense, expressly distinguishing it from conversion. The former is a resurrection to spiritual life, in which God is sole agent, preparatory to the latter, in which man acts. As before indicated, Old School Presbyterianism combines with its predestinarianism and monergism the doctrine of a limited atonement. The New England Theology taught the doctrine of unconditional predestination no less distinctly than the older type of

Calvinism. But at the same time it relaxed its hold upon some of the customary adjuncts. In place of a limited atonement, it taught that Christ died for all men, interpreting the subject much as it had been by Amyraut and Richard Baxter. On the topic of regeneration it did not render a very uniform verdict, but manifested a tendency to define it in such a way as to find a place in it for the activity of the subject. This was accomplished by taking the term in its broader sense, in which it is equivalent to conversion. Extreme advocates of the exercise scheme, like Emmons, could understand by regeneration only the initiation of a new exercise, the beginning of a new series. Others, like Taylor, who laid some stress upon tendencies and dispositions behind the exercises, but still taught that exercises alone have a moral cast, made regeneration, so far as it is a *moral change*, a work in which the subject participates by a new choice, the change in the background of tendencies and dispositions not being regarded as coming under that category. Others still, like Woods, who recognized a moral character in the dispositions lying back of exercises, located the entire essence of regeneration in the transformation of those dispositions, which then become the source of holy exercises. It is, as they said, a change in the governing inclination, or propensity, or moral taste, or relish, or principle of action. Those who located the essence of regeneration in a new choice, and made man the author of his choices, could evidently speak without inconsistency of a man's regenerating himself. And this was done in very open terms by Professor Finney. "Regeneration," he says, "is synonymous, in the Bible, with a new heart. But sinners are required to make to themselves a new heart." (Lectures on Systematic Theol., 1878, p. 284.) At the same time, he found a place for divine agency, namely, in presenting motives to the will. "The Spirit takes of the things of Christ and shows them to the soul. . . . Regeneration is nothing else than the will being duly influenced

by the truth." As to the position of the New England school at large upon the agency of truth in this work, Daniel Fiske says that most would probably assent to the following statement: "In regenerating men, God in some respects acts directly and immediately on the soul, and in some respects He acts in connection with and by means of the truth. He does not regenerate them by the truth alone, and He does not regenerate them without the truth. His mediate and His immediate influences cannot be distinguished by consciousness, nor can their respective spheres be accurately determined by reason." (Bib. Sac., July, 1865.)

Methodism, true to the example of its founder, has always been a zealous herald of free grace and a general atonement. It teaches that the Gospel call, which is sent out to all men, reveals the inmost heart of God; that He sincerely desires the salvation of each and every man; that none are placed by Him under a decree either of unconditional preterition or of positive reprobation; that sufficient grace is given to every man to counteract the binding power of inherited depravity and to establish the possibility of salvation. It teaches, as respects the mode of grace, a species of synergism, — a synergism, however, in which the initiative is always assigned to God, and man's part is reduced to the rank of a subordinate though necessary factor. It maintains, that, where the result depends on copartnership, the least conceivable factor may condition the result; that, accordingly, to allow a man to condition his own salvation is equivalent neither to making him to achieve or to merit his own salvation. As well might it be said that the beggar merits the portion given to him, and it is no longer a free gift, because he is required to stretch out his hand as a condition of receiving. Regeneration it commonly understands in its broader meaning, distinguishing it from a preliminary awakening to spiritual concern, and regarding it as consummated only with the decisive turning of the heart to

God. It has little sympathy with the postulates of the exercise scheme. While it holds that God regenerates only the willing subject, only the soul that looks to Him with a measure of desire, it teaches that His agency reaches back of specific acts of will, and touches inner tendencies and dispositions. Pope says, "The Word of God is the instrument and power of regeneration." But this cannot be regarded as a representative declaration. Methodism at large, if we mistake not, would sooner subscribe to the guarded statement quoted above from Fiske.

In Methodist theology justification is regarded as, in the order of thought, antecedent to regeneration. In Calvinistic theology the reverse order is commonly adopted. Lutheranism also, at least in large part, has made regeneration antecedent to justification. After Gerhard, Lutheran theologians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries commonly adopted the following *ordo salutis*: "*Illuminatio, Regeneratio, Conversio, Justificatio*," etc. (Dorner, System of Christ. Doct., § 132 *a.*)

On the subject of justification in this period there is little need of any reference to Roman Catholic writers. The elaborate decisions and commentaries of the preceding period have left no room for further development. Authors like Möhler and Perrone afford no new material.

Among Protestants there is a very general agreement with the Reformation doctrine respecting the nature of justification. Whether it includes one or more elements, it is understood to be objective rather than subjective, something done for, rather than in, the individual. Calvinistic writers, for the most part, distinguish a plurality of elements. Justification, they say, is not simply pardon. Beyond this, as implying the imputation of Christ's righteousness, it gives a title to eternal life, to all the blessings which the divine administration connects with perfect righteousness. So, for example, Hodge, Edwards, Dwight, Helfenstein, and H. B. Smith. The same representation is

found also with Lutheran writers. (Hahn, *Lehrbuch des Christ. Glaubens*, § 111; Schmucker, *Elements of Popular Theology*, Chap. XI.) Emmons, however, refused to subscribe to this view. He criticised the practice, current, as he states, among Calvinistic divines, of dividing justification into two parts, namely, pardon and a title to eternal life, of which the former is based upon Christ's passive obedience, and the latter upon His active obedience. "Justification," he says, "in a gospel sense, signifies no more nor less than pardon or remission of sin." (*System. Theol.*, Sermon. LVI., LVII.) Very similar are the words of Wesley: "The plain Scriptural notion of justification is pardon, the forgiveness of sins." (Sermon. V.) The same definition is contained in the declaration of Watson, that the language of the New Testament indicates "that justification, the pardon and remission of sins, the non-imputation of sin, and the imputation of righteousness, are terms and phrases of the same import." (*Theol. Inst.*, Pt. II. chap. 23.)

Of Methodist theology in general it may be said that it identifies justification with pardon and prefers to reckon adoption, with consequent heirship, among concomitants rather than among the elements of justification. The sense which it attaches to the imputation of Christ's righteousness is thus stated by Wesley: "The meaning is, God justifies the believer for the sake of Christ's righteousness, and not for any righteousness of his own." (Sermon. XX.) In the same connection he explains in what sense he accepts the maxim that faith is imputed for righteousness. "Faith is imputed for righteousness to every believer; namely, faith in the righteousness of Christ; but this is exactly the same thing which has been said before; for by that expression I mean neither more nor less than that we are justified by faith, not by works; or that every believer is forgiven and accepted merely for the sake of what Christ has done and suffered." In other words, the imputation of faith for righteousness denotes, not that God accepts faith as the mer-

itorious ground of justification, but only as the condition which He has fittingly and graciously established. (Compare Watson, Pt. II. chap. 23.) All the parties referred to in this paragraph cordially agree in the maxim, Justification is by faith alone, but the faith which justifies is not alone. It cannot remain isolated, being in its very nature fruitful of holy emotions and good works. Among zealous advocates of imputation none in recent times have gone farther than the so-called Plymouth Brethren. Some of their representative statements push the idea of a borrowed righteousness to the very borders of a theoretical antinomianism.

The period has witnessed a number of exceptions to the common Protestant doctrine of justification. Among those who have departed farthest both from its spirit and its letter are the English Ritualists. These find their oracle on this subject at Rome rather than at Wittenberg, in the doctors of Trent rather than in Paul. Pusey, speaking for the party, says: "There is not one statement in the elaborate chapter on justification in the council of Trent which any of us could fail of receiving." (Eirenicon.)

A number of German writers have been disposed to give to justification a subjective aspect. Here belongs Schleiermacher. He understood by justification, says Baur, not merely the divine activity as expressed in an absolving declaration, but the entire divine activity which establishes the new life in man. (Dogmengeschichte.) Marheinecke taught that pardon presupposes incorporation into Christ, and approved the theory of Osiander that justification is through the inhabitation of Christ. (Dogmatik, pp. 475-486.) Ebrard predicated a subjective side of justification which he likewise connected with the indwelling of Christ. "Justification," he says, "as the act of the Father, is a forensic judicial act; as the act of Christ, it is identical with regeneration, i. e. with the real implantation of Christ in us and of us in Christ." (Quoted by Hodge, Pt. III. chap. 17, § 11.)

F. D. Maurice makes Christ in such a sense the head of all men that His justification was at the same time theirs. Now Christ was justified, declared to be the righteous and well-beloved Son, when God raised Him from the dead. It follows, then, that in the resurrection of Christ all men have their justification, and it is only needed that they should become conscious thereof. "St. Paul," says Maurice, "takes it for granted, that this justification of the Son of God and the Son of Man was his own justification, — his own, not because he was Saul of Tarsus, not because he was a Hebrew of the Hebrews, but because he was a man. . . . If He had justified His Son by raising Him from the dead, — if, in that act, He had justified the race for which Christ had died, — then it was lawful to tell men that they were justified before God, that they were sons of God in the only-begotten Son." (Theological Essays, IX.)

According to Horace Bushnell, to be justified is to be made righteous by entering into effective relations with God. Justification expresses the state of one who is in actual fellowship with the Father of spirits. As one by a momentary act may step into this transforming communion, so justification may be consummated at once. In this it is distinguished from sanctification. "The consciousness," he says, "of the subject in justification is raised in its order, filled with the confidence of right, set free from the bondage of all fears and scruples of legality; but there is a vast realm back of the consciousness, or below it, which remains to be changed or sanctified, and never will be except as a new habit is generated by time, and the better consciousness, descending into the secret roots below, gets a healing into them more and more perfect. In this manner one who is justified at once can be sanctified only in time; and one who is completely justified is only incipiently sanctified." (Forgiveness and Law.) The theory of Mulford, no less than that of Bushnell, includes the actual impartation of righteousness. Justifica-

tion by faith means, he says, righteousness through faith. "It is an actual implanting of righteousness through relation with Him who has taken our nature, and in whom was the fulfilment of righteousness. Faith in a righteous person, in the Christ who is the source of the life of the family and the nation, leads the individual away from himself, and in being for another he finds his real life, and enters into and partakes of a righteousness that is not a mere self-righteousness." (The Republic of God.)

In the scheme of the less thoughtful rationalism, justification denotes divine approbation won by good deeds, by works of righteousness, honesty, and charity. Respecting the futility of this method, few have spoken more incisive words than the following from a Unitarian writer: "Moral works are as valueless as ecclesiastical, when undertaken upon speculation, as means and conditions of salvation. Temperance, chastity, charity, are saving graces when they exist as genuine fruits of the Spirit; they lose that saving quality when adopted as expedients and means to an end. . . . The Mohammedans have a fable, that the soul before it can enter paradise must cross a bridge, narrow as the edge of a sword, over a gulf of fire; and that no one can be saved who does not endure this test. A good illustration this of the doctrine of salvation by works. To attempt to win heaven by this method is like the attempt to cross a gulf of fire on the edge of a sword." (F. H. Hedge, *Reason in Religion*, Bk. II. Essay VI.)

The implication which seems to be involved in some of the early Protestant definitions of justifying faith, that assurance is of its essence, has very commonly been disowned in the present period. The doctrine even of the more positive advocates of assurance is, that it is the normal rather than the necessary concomitant of genuine piety. In some circles it is presented as a high and desirable privilege, to which Christians should aspire; in others it is wellnigh taken for granted that no one living a vital Chris-

tian life will be without it, unless perchance it be in brief seasons of special temptation. The latter position has been quite generally characteristic of Methodism. Wesley laid great stress upon the doctrine of assurance. As to its mode, he affirmed a double witness, the direct witness of the Holy Spirit, and the witness of one's own spirit. Of the former he says that it might be defined in these terms: "The testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given Himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God." (Serm. X.) He argues that such an assurance, direct from God, is necessary to the development of religious life, inasmuch as it alone can make us truly conscious of God's love to us, and this consciousness must be antecedent to holy emotions. The witness of our own spirits he makes identical with a good conscience, the inward verdict that we possess the fruits of the Spirit. This second witness, as he intimates, might also be regarded as a witness of the Spirit, that is, a mediate as distinguished from an immediate. Watson occupies ground identical with that of Wesley. How far exception has been taken to these distinctions is not easily determined. Watson speaks of the Evangelical School in the English Church as in large part committed to the view that the witness of the Spirit is mediate alone. Thomas Scott is quoted as saying, "The Holy Spirit, by producing in believers the tempers and affections of children, as described in the Scriptures, most manifestly attests their adoption into God's family." With many writers of Calvinistic affinities, this is made the emphatic, if not the exclusive, point of view. Bellamy declares that the mediate witness of the Spirit is the only witness. He says: "Since grace is, in its own nature, perceptible, and specifically different from all counterfeits, there is no need of the immediate witness of the Spirit, in order to a

full assurance. If the Spirit of God does but give us a good degree of grace, and enlighten our minds to understand the Scriptures, and so to know the nature of true grace, we may then perceive that we have grace; and the more grace we have, the more perceptible will it be, and its difference from all counterfeits will be the more plain. And if a believer may know and be certain that he has grace without the immediate witness of the Spirit, then such a witness is altogether needless, and would be of no advantage; and therefore there is no such thing as the immediate witness of the Spirit in this affair." (True Religion Delineated, Discourse I. sect. 5.)

The Roman Catholic position on the subject of assurance, having become fixed long since, does not need to be defined in this connection.

As in the previous period, Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians have been in general averse to all theories of perfectionism. Among Methodists, Christian perfection has always had the place of an acknowledged doctrine, though claiming very different degrees of practical interest and advocacy from different representatives. In the present, while it is advocated by not a few after the manner of John Wesley, many in effect set it forth as rather a possible ideal to be progressively approached, than as the goal lying immediately before every well-instructed Christian, the prize of a present faith and consecration.

Christian perfection in the Wesleyan sense implies freedom from inbred sin, the complete dominance of love over the voluntary exercises, and such a service of God as is competent to powers which indeed have been given a right direction, but which fail of that ideal measure which they would have had if man had not sinned. It is not, therefore, Adamic or angelic perfection. It does not imply objective faultlessness, since it does not secure from mistakes in judgment and consequent mistakes in action. It carries with itself immunity neither from temptation nor from

apostasy. It is simply loving God with all the heart, freedom in underlying appetencies and in conscious activities from anything contrary to love.

The Oberlin theology, quite as distinctly as the Wesleyan, declares for the attainability of Christian perfection, or entire sanctification, in this life. But the difference in the general standpoint of the two involves quite a material difference in conception. The Oberlin scheme confines moral character to choice. It denies the Wesleyan and the common theory of an inbred sin still abiding in the regenerate. The choice of a man, as it represents, is either entirely sinful or entirely holy. Regeneration, as being a change of choice, is a change from the wholly sinful to the entirely holy. "It implies," says Dr. Finney, "an entire present change of moral character, that is, a change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness." All that can be added to regeneration, therefore, is fixity in the holy choice. Accordingly Dr. Finney gives this definition: "Entire sanctification, as I understand the term, is identical with entire and continued obedience to the law of God." Such obedience, he urges very emphatically, is attainable in this life. (Lectures on Systematic Theology.) In the Oberlin, as in the Wesleyan scheme, the standard is taken from the possibilities of a recovered being, and not from those of the unfallen.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

THE more liberal of the views respecting the Church which had a place among Protestants in the preceding period have advanced to a general ascendancy. Religious tolerance has become an accepted maxim. The possibility of salvation outside of the visible Church is in general unquestioned. The form of government is largely regarded as a matter of option, or at any rate as lying outside the essence of Christianity. The claim indeed of special divine right for certain forms of church government cannot be said to be obsolete. Even in recent times a voice has occasionally been raised in behalf of the theory that the New Testament authoritatively prescribes the Congregational polity, or the Presbyterian polity. However, in the main, neither Congregationalists nor Presbyterians lay much stress upon this point of view, and they are far from making it an adequate ground for challenging the proper Christian character of communions differently constituted. This procedure is left, for the most part, to the High Church party among Episcopalians. Advanced Ritualists in recent times have been very pronounced in the view that those outside the lines of apostolic succession, outside the Roman, the Greek, and the Anglican communions, must be consigned to the uncovenanted mercies of God, as being wholly destitute of Church offices. On the other hand, the Broad Church, as represented by Whately, Stanley, and

others, repudiates apostolical succession as an essential of a Christian church.

As respects the relation of Church and State, the theory which favors their mutual independence has no doubt made somewhat of an advance in Protestant countries which still have a national establishment. The American model may be credited with a measure of influence. The teaching of Thomas Arnold and Rothe, that the best order of things involves the complete identity of Church and State, is quite outside the current of practical concern, it being recognized that we have no reason to look for conditions in which such identity would not be a calamity to both civil and ecclesiastical interests.

In the Roman Catholic Church the period has witnessed the signal event of the final overthrow of Gallicanism, and the formal establishment of the Ultramontane theory. By the decisions of the Vatican Council of 1869-70 the Pope is raised to the character of an absolute and infallible monarch, without peer, rival, or associate in authority, to whom the council stands only in an advisory relation, having no power to amend his decrees, or even to convene for advisory purposes except as summoned by his mandate. A more explicit assertion of unqualified sovereignty than the following could not well be imagined: "If any shall say that the Roman pontiff has the office merely of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in things which belong to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the discipline and government of the Church spread throughout the world, or assert that he possesses merely the principal part, and not all the fulness of this supreme power, . . . let him be anathema."

The Vatican decree of papal infallibility is as follows: "Faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the

salvation of Christian people, the sacred council approving, we teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church."

The statement that infallibility covers matters of faith and morals, gives it a wellnigh universal breadth. If the Pope is pleased to regard any matter of science or history as vitally related to faith or morals, then it falls at once within the scope of his infallibility. Instead of resorting to the tedious processes of reasoning, examination, and investigation, we have only to listen to the oracular voice which comes from the chair of Peter. So obvious is this inference that it was openly proclaimed by a distinguished prelate shortly after the Vatican council had issued its decrees. Cardinal Manning maintained that infallibility extends to all that is opposed to revelation, to all that is scandalous or offensive to pious ears, to all matters which bear upon the proper custody of Catholic belief. "It extends," he said, "to certain truths of natural science, as, for example, the existence of substance; and to truths of the natural reason, such as that the soul is immaterial; that it is 'the form of the body'; and the like. It extends also to certain truths of the supernatural order, which are not revealed; as the authenticity of certain texts or versions of the Holy Scripture. There are truths of mere human history, which therefore are not revealed, without which the deposit of the faith cannot be taught or guarded in its integrity. For in-

stance, that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome ; that the council of Trent and the council of the Vatican are ecumenical, that is, legitimately celebrated and confirmed ; that Pius IX. is the successor of Peter by legitimate election. . . . That there is an ultimate judge in such matters of history as affect the truths of revelation is a dogma of faith." Speaking of the historical objection to papal infallibility, as based in particular upon the case of Honorius, he said : "The true and conclusive answer to this objection consists, not in detailed refutation of alleged difficulties, but in a principle of faith ; namely, that whensoever any doctrine is contained in the divine tradition of the Church, all difficulties from human history are excluded, as Tertullian lays down, by prescription." (The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 1871.) Truly this rivals the short-cut of the sprightly Frenchman, who, when told that the facts were against his theory, replied, So much the worse then for the facts. The only trouble is, that there are other sources of conviction than the arbitrary declarations of authority.

In arguing for the papal autocracy and infallibility, Romish apologists are wont to proceed as though convenience were the standard of truth. No argument figures more extensively than the argument from need. An infallible tribunal is needed, it is said, and therefore there is an infallible tribunal. This capital principle of Romish apologetics is thus succinctly formulated by J. H. Newman : "The absolute need of spiritual supremacy is at present the strongest of arguments in favor of the fact of its supply." (Essay on Development.)

It is noteworthy that, while Perrone calls the churches which have separated from the Roman communion synagogues of Satan, he still provides for the possible salvation of some within their limits by the statement that those bound by invincible ignorance, including all infants duly baptized, belong in soul or spirit to the Catholic fold. (Prælect. Theol., Adv. Heterodoxos.) As Perrone is in

no wise disposed to sin by excess of liberality, it may be concluded that the concession which he makes is very commonly admitted by Romanism in the present.

SECTION II. — THE SACRAMENTS.

1. GENERAL THEORY OF THE SACRAMENTS. — While the rationalistic factor in the Lutheran Church tended toward the Zwinglian conception of the sacraments, conservative Lutheranism has continued to hold substantially the theory indorsed by the leading theologians of the preceding period. Tractarianism laid the Lutheran stress upon the sacraments. It did not, however, place the Lutheran stress upon the preached word. On the contrary, it denounced, at least by the mouth of its more extreme representatives, the disposition of Protestantism to substitute a preaching ministry for a sacrificing priesthood. It represents, accordingly, a sacramentalism more closely allied with the Roman than with the Lutheran. Some representatives of the German Reformed Church, as Ebrard in Germany and Nevin in the United States, have taught a very mystical view of the sacraments, and emphasized their importance as means of imparting the theanthropic life of the Redeemer. In most other quarters of Protestantism the Reformed theory current in the latter part of the preceding period, which regards the sacraments as signs and seals of divine grace, and the occasions of special blessings rather than the instruments of their positive conveyance, is the dominant theory.

Romanism is without new developments upon the general subject of the sacraments. We notice simply that eminent writers confirm the interpretation given to the doctrine of intention in the preceding period. Thus Klee says, that in the intention to do what the Church does there is necessarily included, "not merely the act of the

Church according to its external features, but also the purpose of the Church in this act, — if not the ultimate, at any rate the proximate purpose, — for example, through baptism to make one a member of the Christian fellowship." (Dogmatik, Vol. III. p. 122.) Perrone gives the following definition: "Intentionis nomine hic venit illa animi deliberatio, qua quis intendit facere rem sacram, quam Christus instituit, aut quæ in Ecclesia fieri consuerit." (Prælect. Theol., Tract. de Sacramentis in Genere.)

2. BAPTISM. — While laying different degrees of stress upon baptism, Protestants assert at most only a relative necessity for its administration. It is their common verdict, that infant children are not lost in consequence of being deprived of the rite. Isaac Watts's suggestion, that the children of the wicked are annihilated, was based on other considerations than the indispensable need of baptism. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, deny the salvation of unbaptized infants. Klee, to be sure, thinks that infants who die without baptism may be included in the class who are saved in virtue of a desire for baptism. (Dogmatik, Vol. III. p. 150.) But this is exceptional charity. Dieringer reckons it among manifest errors. He says respecting the opinions of Roman Catholic writers: "Even the theologians who advocate the more rigorous view commonly exempt the same [the unbaptized infants] from positive punishment (*pœna sensus*), while the milder gladly refer to the hidden ways of God, and the many mansions of the Father's house, wherein, however, they manifestly err when under the mansion prepared for them they understand a place or condition of supernatural blessedness." (Dogmatik, § 104.) Perrone lays down the following proposition: "Infants departing from this life without baptism do not attain to eternal salvation." This proposition, he says, is *de fide*, — a part of the established faith. (Prælect. Theol., De Hom.)

The stress which Pietism placed upon adult conversion

naturally tended to disparage the regenerating efficacy of baptism as applied to infants. Rationalism acknowledged no positive transformation through baptism, and saw in it but a ceremony of initiation, and a symbol of spiritual good. Recent Lutheran writers customarily speak of baptism as a rite of regeneration. While some attach to this term the full sense ascribed to it by the theologians of the seventeenth century, others insert important limitations, at least in connection with infant subjects. Thus Martensen says that baptism lays the foundation of regeneration, as Christ laid the foundation of the Church : but as the Church, virtually instituted before, was actually instituted by the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost, so regeneration, posited in baptism as a germinant possibility, comes to actuality through the impartation of the Spirit. "We can say, therefore, that the baptized is not actually regenerated before he attains his Pentecost,—before the Spirit establishes the new consciousness in him, glorifies the baptismal grace in him." (Dogmatik, § 254.) To similar effect Kahnis says : "What baptism imparts is not regeneration itself, but the power of regeneration (*die Kraft der Wiedergeburt*). The working of this power is conditioned by the soil upon which baptism falls." (Dogmatik, III. § 14.) Marheinecke locates in baptism, as applied to children, rather the pledge of regeneration than its actual realization, which implies self-consciousness and personal activity. (Dogmatik, p. 529.) "With Nitzsch baptism appears in the sense of Calvin, as pledge and seal of entrance into the new life from Christ." (Kahnis.) The review indicates an unfinished attempt at construction. Dorner says : "A clear and definite form of doctrine is still to be framed, at least in respect to infant baptism." (System of Christ. Doct., § 139.) The case of adults, whose regeneration is understood to be conditioned on a faith and repentance, which may or may not be exercised, involves less difficulty for Lutheran writers.

The position of Episcopalians on the subject of baptismal regeneration is well defined by Bishop Burgess. "The Episcopal Church," he says, "thanks God that 'He has been pleased to regenerate this infant with His Holy Spirit, to receive him as His own child by adoption, and to incorporate him into His holy Church.'" As to the import of this language, he says: "By one class it is interpreted as the language of anticipation, of hypothesis, and of charity. In anticipation of the repentance and faith which in adult candidates for baptism are presupposed, and on the hypothesis that the child is indeed represented by the sponsors according to his future character and purposes, and in the charitable trust that he will be all which is promised in his behalf, he is pronounced already regenerate. As the promises, it is said, are necessarily hypothetical, so is the corresponding grace. To a second class this view of the transaction seems too dramatic and unreal, and they say, without hesitation, that every child received into the Church of Christ through this ordinance is made partaker of some measure of divine grace, which is not only pledged but given, and that this may justly and scripturally be termed regenerating grace, though not to the necessary exclusion of every other use of that term, and certainly not as if spiritual regeneration were a change not only begun, but consummated then and there. This is probably, with some shades of variation, the prevailing sentiment. But a third class, the least numerous of the three, ascribe to the sacrament, as the ordinance of Christ, and through His grace, the conveyance of regenerating grace in its fullest extent, and without qualification; so that the baptized child is indeed a new creature." (Bib. Sacra, October, 1863. Compare Mozley, Review of the Baptismal Controversy.)

Wesley admitted in general terms the regeneration of infants in baptism. The teaching of Watson may be described as allied with the second of the views specified by

Bishop Burgess. Methodism in general, however, makes account of infant baptism rather as a means of future benefits than as the instrument of the immediate communication of positive grace. The same is true of a large proportion of Protestants not associated with Lutheranism or Anglicanism. It should be noticed, however, that some of these are free to confess the possibility, or even the probability, that some infants are regenerated at the time of baptism. (Hodge, Pt. III. chap. 20, § 12.) Among the same parties an adult candidate is generally supposed to be already a regenerate person.

On the Baptist theory, baptism is rather the act in which the regenerate disciple confesses Christ, than an instrument used of God for his regeneration.

3. THE EUCHARIST. — The Lutheran view of the real bodily presence has held its place, in the face, however, of quite a large number of exceptions. Storr, Flatt, Reinhard, Knapp, Zachariä, Marheinecke, and others, as Schmucker represents, substituted for it the Calvinistic theory of a virtual presence. Schmucker himself advocates simply a spiritual presence of the Redeemer as the source of special blessings to worthy communicants, and he says that the same view is largely current among American Lutherans. Krauth, on the other hand, champions the old Lutheran theory of the presence of Christ's glorified humanity, and the recent revival of confessional Lutheranism involves of course a corresponding reinstatement of the same.

The English Ritualists are zealous advocates of a real presence. Some have termed their doctrine that of the "real objective presence," and have included under this phrase a view having affinity on one side with the Lutheran, and on the other with the Roman Catholic dogma. Speaking of Pusey and Keble, George Trevor says: "These divines distinctly advocate the coexistence theory invented by Martin Luther. . . . They interpret the body and blood of the eucharist of the glorified humanity, and so of the

whole person of Christ. They call this the 'inward part,' and the bread and wine the outward part, of the sacrament, holding the two to be inseparably united by consecration, each however retaining its proper substance and nature. This is pure Lutheranism, the difference being that Luther limited the presence to the act of communion, and held it to be absolutely inconsistent with sacrifice. The Objectivists, on the other hand, insisting on consecration and oblation, more than communion, refine away the material element into a 'vessel,' a 'garment or veil,' leaving little difference from the Romish 'accidents,' and resulting in a sacrifice almost exactly the same as the mass." (The Catholic Doctrine of the Sacrifice and Participation of the Holy Eucharist, 1876, p. 223.)

In the mystical theory of Ebrard and Nevin the eucharist is viewed chiefly as a medium for the communication by Christ of His divine-human life. E. V. Gerhart thus distinguishes between the theory of Nevin and of Calvin: "While Calvin emphasizes the *absence* of the humanity of Christ from the earth, the *elevation* of the soul to Him by the power of the Holy Ghost, and a real participation of His flesh, by which the believer is mysteriously nourished to eternal life, Dr. Nevin emphasizes the presence of the humanity of Christ in His Church on earth, — that is, of the vivific virtue of the human, hypostatically one with the divine nature, — the *self-communication* of His life in the sacramental transaction, and the participation of the believer in the *entire humanity* of Christ, the soul no less than the flesh and the blood." (Bib. Sac., January, 1863.)

In other quarters of Protestantism what was defined in the preceding period as the modified Calvinian theory is largely current, but yields to some extent to the Zwinglian conception.

The Roman Catholic theory upon this sacrament, having been so minutely defined in the preceding period, has remained unchanged. The same may be said of the remain-

ing sacraments in the Roman list. We notice simply in connection with penance, that Perrone teaches that God has not obligated Himself to accept indulgences for the dead, and that they have therefore only a conditional efficacy as applied to this class. (Prælect. Theol., Tract. de Indulg. Compare Klee, Dogmatik, III. 317.)

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. MILLENARIANISM. — The millenarian theory, or, to speak more exactly, the theory of the pre-millennial advent, has claimed the assent of more writers of learning and repute in the present than in any preceding period since the ante-Nicene age. It found representatives in the school of Bengel. More recently, it has been favored by Hofmann, Karsten, Delitzsch, Auberlen, Rothe, and Van Oosterzee. It was advocated by John Gill, and has been espoused by such recent writers of Great Britain as Bickersteth, Bonar, Frere, E. B. Elliott, and Cumming. In this country it has been taught by Seiss, Duffield, and D. T. Taylor, and has also many other patrons in various communions, as may be judged from the record of the "Prophetical Conference" of 1868. Still, the weight of theological opinion is against it.

As a specimen of the pre-millennial scheme we quote the following list of specifications from Joseph A. Seiss: "(1.) That Christ Jesus, our adorable Redeemer, is to return to this world in great power and glory, as really and literally as he ascended up from it. (2.) That this advent of the Messiah will occur before the general conversion of the world, while the man of sin still continues his abominations, while the earth is yet full of tyranny, war, infidelity, and blasphemy, and consequently before what is called the millennium. (3.) That this coming of the Lord Jesus will not be to depopulate and annihilate the earth, but to judge, subdue, renew, and bless it. (4.) That in the period of

this coming He will raise the holy from among the dead, transform the living that are waiting for Him, judge them according to their works, receive them up to Himself in the clouds, and establish them in a glorious heavenly kingdom. (5.) That Christ will then also break down and destroy all present systems of government in Church and State, burn up the great centres and powers of wickedness and usurpation, shake the whole earth with terrific visitations for its sins, and subdue it to His own personal and eternal rule. (6.) That during these great and destructive commotions the Jewish race shall be marvellously restored to the land of their fathers, brought to embrace Jesus as their Messiah and King, delivered from their enemies, placed at the head of the nations, and made the agents of unspeakable blessings to the world. (7.) That Christ will then re-establish the throne of His father David, exalt it in heavenly glory, make Mount Zion the seat of His divine empire, and, with the glorified saints associated with Him in His dominion, reign over the house of Jacob and over the world in a visible, sublime, and heavenly Christocracy for the period of 'the thousand years.' (8.) That during this millennial reign, in which mankind are brought under a new dispensation, Satan is to be bound and the world enjoy its long-expected sabbatic rest. (9.) That at the end of this millennial sabbath the last rebellion shall be quashed, the wicked dead, who shall all continue in Hades until that time, shall be raised and judged, and Satan, Death, Hades, and all antagonism to good, delivered over to eternal destruction. (10.) That, under these wonderful administrations, the earth is to be entirely recovered from the effects of the fall, the excellence of God's righteous providence vindicated, the whole curse repealed, death swallowed up, and all the inhabitants of the world thenceforward forever restored to more than the full happiness, purity, and glory which Adam forfeited in Eden." (The Last Times, 7th ed., 1878.)

As to the details of the millennial kingdom, much diversity appears among modern millenarians. "According to one view," says Hodge, "Christ and his risen and glorified saints are to dwell visibly on the earth and reign for a thousand years; according to another, the risen saints are to be in heaven, and not on earth any more than the angels now are; nevertheless, the subjects of the first resurrection, although dwelling in heaven, are to govern the earth; according to another, it is the converted Jewish nation, restored to their own land, who are to be the governors of the world; according to another, the Bible divides men into three classes: the Gentiles, the Jews, and the Church of God. The prophecies relating to the millennium are understood to refer to the relative condition of the Jews and Gentiles in this world, and not to the risen and glorified believers. Another view seems to be, that this earth, changed no more by the fires of the last day than it was by the waters of the deluge, is to be the only heaven of the redeemed. Dr. Cumming and Dr. Seiss say they wish no better heaven than this earth free from the curse and from sin. Still another view is that there are two heavens, one here and one above; two Jerusalems, both to continue forever, the one on earth and the other in heaven; the one made with hands, the other without hands; both glorious and blessed, but the earthly far inferior to the heavenly; they are like concentric circles, one within the other; both endless. Men will continue forever, on earth, living and dying; happy but not perfect, needing regeneration and sanctification; and, when they die, will be translated to the kingdom which is above." (Pt. IV. chap. 4, § 5.) Hodge adds the comment: "It seems, therefore, that the torch of the literalist is an 'ignis fatuus,' leading those who follow it, they know not whither."

2. CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION. — A tendency has been manifest in some quarters to give a more emphatic recognition to an intermediate state than

was given by the Reformation theology. Kahnis, Dorner, and Martensen represent this tendency when they teach that it is not to be imagined that death can remove at a stroke faults that are rooted in the nature, and that accordingly even those who die in the faith will be in need of more or less purification. The first of these writers considers that the Church does well not to prohibit those, whose hearts are so prompted, to offer simple prayers of good will for departed friends. (Dogmatik, III. § 16. Compare Newman Smythe, *The Orthodoxy of To-Day.*) This, it is needless to say, implies no disposition to approve the positive teaching of Rome upon the intermediate state.

The doctrine that the intermediate state is a state of slumber has found in recent times but scattered adherents. Archbishop Whately considered that the phraseology of Scripture favors the doctrine. (*A View of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State.*) Some representatives of the sect of Adventists have advocated the intermediate sleep of the dead, or, in connection with a materialistic conception of human nature, what might be called a temporary annihilation.

Several writers who believe in a general resurrection at the end of the world have felt authorized to assert that in the intermediate state the soul is not without a species of body. So Nitzsch, Martensen, Delitzsch, and Lange.

3. THE RESURRECTION.—The period has witnessed, on the whole, a wide drift from the more literal interpretation of the resurrection. The successive phases through which the teaching on this subject has passed in Germany are thus outlined by Kahnis: "The transition theologians of the eighteenth century united in the view, that between the resurrection body and that lying in the grave there is a greater difference than the orthodox proposition of the identity of the two allows. The body which we bury is only the substratum of the resurrection body. Rationalism

found, in the resurrection of the body, only a popular and figurative expression for the immortality of the soul. Meanwhile, theologians and philosophers who occupied the more positive attitude toward Christianity attained to the conviction, that without a corporeal ground the continued life of the soul is unthinkable, and so a support was rendered to the resurrection of the body. The believing and churchly theologians of the present teach a resurrection of the body, but in the freer manner of the transition era, for which scientific help is provided through a deeper understanding of the relation between body and soul." (Dogmatik, III. § 16.)

The rationalistic theory, as characterized in the preceding paragraph, is simply a denial of a bodily resurrection. It has still an occasional representative. The strict literal theory, which asserts that the entire substance, or at any rate most of the substance, of the body which goes into the grave enters into the resurrection body, has also an occasional representative. Aside from these two extremes there are three or four views of the resurrection which are especially noteworthy.

What is called the germ theory has some advocates. Van Oosterzee gives it favorable notice in these terms: "We may perhaps suppose that an invisible and indestructible germ of the future body dwells already in the present, and that precisely therein is placed the guaranty of the identity of the two,—an identity even amidst the greatest possible difference." (Dogmatics, Sect. CXLIII.)

Another theory asserts a certain material identity between the resurrection body and that of the present life, on the ground that an elementary substance from the latter enters into the composition of the former. Delitzsch, in his repudiation alike of a full material identity and a merely formal one, seems to espouse this theory. He says: "The true identity lies in the mean, between the former grossly material, and the latter merely formal identity.

Within the world once created, no single atom is ever annihilated. The elementary materials whereof the now corrupted body was composed are therefore still in existence; and the Omniscient knows where they are, and the Omnipotent can collect them together again. But in the meanwhile, together with the world of nature in which they are laid up, they have undergone the process of fire, out of which heaven and earth issue in brighter glorification. From this glorified world, He who at first formed the body of man of the earth of Eden brings together again the elementary materials of our bodies." (Bib. Psych., VII. sect. 1.) Essentially the same theory has had considerable currency in recent times, though perhaps without the reference to purification by fire.

A third theory makes no account whatever of material identity, and regards the resurrection body as identical with the present only as having the same organizing principle. This organizing principle in the era of the resurrection appropriates or is joined with material suited to the demands of a spiritual body. As some represent, this material is taken from the purified earth. Many of the recent theologians of Germany have favored this theory. So Julius Müller, Lange, Nitzsch, Kahnis, Martensen, and Dorner. As early an American writer as Dr. Dwight approved of the same theory (Serm. CLXV.), and in the last few decades it has rapidly won adherents. Hodge, Pond, and H. B. Smith have declared it at least an admissible theory. J. J. S. Perowne and Bishop R. S. Foster have given it their support. Among Protestant scholars at large, it commands probably at present as wide assent as any other theory.

The fourth theory is the Swedenborgian, the theory that the spiritual body is already in existence. As the gross body is laid in the grave, the soul clothed in its spiritual body awakes to life in another sphere. The resurrection accordingly of each individual is at death, is consummated

at least before the expiration of the third day. Essentially the same view has found here and there an advocate outside of the Swedenborgian communion, such as Joseph Priestley, George Bush, and several German writers.

4. FINAL AWARDS. — Through the major part of the eighteenth century the doctrine that death closes probation was thoroughly dominant. But at the end of the century exceptions began to multiply. In the present, they make probably a greater relative aggregate than in any preceding era in Christian history. A considerable number of writers of high reputation, who discard the theory of universal restoration, hold that for certain classes probation extends beyond death. As they maintain, all those who have not had a fair opportunity to decide definitely for or against accepting salvation through Christ, will have these alternatives presented to them in the life to come. So Dorner, Martensen, and Kahnis. Advocacy of the same view is one of the distinctive features of the recent movement among Congregationalists.

The theory of universal restoration, as opposed to the endless punishment of the wicked, has claimed some advocates outside of communions making it a specialty. Schleiermacher held that it made trouble for the Christian consciousness to exclude any from the possibility of blessedness, and quite in harmony with his determinism considered it probable that all will ultimately be restored. Schweizer seems to have been of the opinion that Schleiermacher, in his restorationism, took the proper course to escape the dualism contained in the Reformed theology. (*Die Glaubenslehre der Evangelisch-Reformirten Kirche*.) Olshausen favored restorationism. At the same time, he allowed that it is not so explicitly taught in the Scriptures but that the propriety of making it a subject of public instruction may seriously be questioned. Somewhat of a bias to restorationism has appeared in the liberal wing of the English Church. F. D. Maurice and F. W. Farrar have

indicated a belief, that, while it may be unwarranted positively to assert the recovery of all men, we are not forbidden to hope for such a consummation. In place of endless punishment, a considerable number incline to the theory of Rothe and Edward White, and teach that the incorrigible ultimately undergo annihilation. Meanwhile, a large proportion of theologians hold that there are souls fixed in sinfulness, which will live forever and be forever unblest. Their position is well represented by the following sentences from Van Oosterzee: "The conception of an everlasting gulf is difficult; but that of an absolutely universal salvation, which causes the history of the kingdom of God to end in a sort of natural process, is in itself not less dangerous, at least for him who believes in the mystery of freedom conferred by the Creator upon the creature. . . . We distrust every mode of regarding the doctrine of salvation which in its foundation and tendency fails to do justice to the seriousness of the conception of an everlasting *Too Late*, and of the holiness of grace which cannot indeed be exhausted, but can just as little be mocked." (Dogmatics, Sect. CXLIX.)

While the theory thrown out by Lessing, and embraced by some of the rationalists, that endless punishment is only a relative lack of blessedness resulting from an inferior development, is generally rejected, not a few regard future retribution as rather the self-inflicted curse of an abused nature, than a positive infliction from the hand of God. In Protestant circles the doctrine of punishment by literal fire may now be said to be obsolete, though in the former part of the period writers as eminent as John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards seem to have given it their approval. Much currency is also given to the idea that endless punishment is not so much a visitation for certain transgressions of the past, as the endless accompaniment of a sinful soul fixed in its sinfulness by its own guilty determination.

Among the Universalists, or the professional advocates of restorationism, the doctrine of future awards has passed through several phases. John Murray, who came to America from England in 1770, denied, not future punishment, but its endless duration. Hosea Ballou, who represents largely the middle era of Universalism in this country, denied all future punishment, and taught that conscious existence in the other world is from the first a blessed existence for every human being. Recent Universalists have generally returned to the earlier standpoint, and admit future punishment, only denying that it is endless. A representative of considerable eminence, however, has recently had the courage to espouse the absurd theory of Ballou.

Modern Unitarians are very largely inclined to restorationism, regarding future punishment as amendatory in its design, and future probation, with its far-reaching opportunities, as likely to ultimate, on the part of all, in the choice of goodness. Thus James Freeman Clarke defines eternal punishment as that which comes to a man from his spiritual nature, in contradistinction from temporal punishment, which comes from his temporal nature and the temporal world, and holds that there is no need to regard it as endless. "To us," he says, "it seems clear, if the parable of the prodigal son is to be taken as the feeling of God towards every sinner, that every sinner must at last be brought back by the mighty power of this redeeming love. The power of the human will to resist God is indeed indefinite; but the power of love is infinite. Sooner or later, then, in the economy of the ages, all sinners must come back, in penitence and shame, to their Father's house." (Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors, Chap. XIV.) On the other hand, F. H. Hedge sees insuperable difficulties in the theory of universal restoration. "The question," he says, "is one of the antinomies of theology, — a question of which affirmative and negative are equally debatable and equally doubtful. It is a question on which sentiment and reason

are divided. Our heart is with Universalists; but reason is shocked by the violence of the hypothesis which Universalism—theological as well as philosophical—seems to necessitate. Theological Universalism supposes a too forcible interference of Almighty Love in the normal processes of the individual soul, bringing the divine into self-collision. Philosophical Universalism assumes an inevitable triumph of self-recovery,—a fatality of goodness in man which seems to be based on no analysis of human nature, which certainly is not warranted by any mundane experience, and whose only voucher, so far as we can see, is a brave hope, which, however honorable to those that cherish it, is of no great use in the critical investigation of this subject.” (Reason in Religion, Bk. II., Essay X.) But while he allows that some souls may pass beyond amendment, Hedge is unwilling to tolerate the theory of conscious endless misery. Lost souls, as he holds, though not extinguished as entities, will be deprived of moral consciousness or life.

Romanism allows no probation proper after death. All who die in mortal sin are consigned to everlasting punishment. Likewise unbaptized infants, dying simply in original sin, attain not to eternal life. As to the nature of their punishment, unanimity is not yet fully reached. As Dieringer reports, theologians most given to mildness make their punishment purely negative, the non-possession of the heavenly estate. Many claim for them a high grade of the natural knowledge of God and His works, and great satisfaction in this knowledge. (Dogmatik, § 142.)

Swedenborg painted the future life largely in colors drawn from the present. Some not of the New Church have thought that it adds interest to the heavenly life to represent its occupations and enjoyments as allied with those of this world. Meanwhile, profound piety, true to its record in the past, looks forward to the enraptured vision of the divine as the crowning felicity of heaven, and cherishes the presentiment that a glory and a blessedness,

which this world has no adequate means to prefigure, are in waiting for the heirs of salvation. The best discretion adopts the language of reserve which Martensen quotes from the Apostle John as the conclusion of his work: "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is."



APPENDIX.

I.

ATTRITION.

THE term is found with Alexander Hales in the early part of the thirteenth century, and entered into the vocabulary of succeeding scholastics. It denotes a sorrow for sin less fundamental, and connected with a lower range of motives than that which is expressed by "contrition." Fear of punishment, with perhaps some perception of the turpitude of sin, is its source.

The notion of attrition first became of practical interest in relation to the sacrament of penance. The scholastic theory that a sacrament works *ex opere operato*, or in virtue of the sacramental performance, naturally raised an inquiry as to whether good motions in the recipient are necessary. By itself the *ex opere operato* theory seemed not to demand such motions. Still a place was found for them by some of the leading writers, inasmuch as they required that the recipient should not present an obstacle to the grace of the sacrament, and regarded him as failing to meet this condition unless he should cultivate the spiritual emotions agreeable to the solemnities of the sacramental occasion. This was the position of Peter Lombard, Alexander Hales, and Thomas Aquinas among others. The harder notion, that the mere absence of evil motions suffices, came also to expression. For example, Duns Scotus says: *Solum requiritur opus exterius cum actione interioris impedimenti. . . . Non requiritur bonus motus interior qui mereatur gratiam.* (In Sent., IV. 1. 6.) But the laxity of this doctrine was a little too undisguised to be perfectly satisfactory, and the compromise theory became

current, which, while not allowing the subject of the sacrament to be entirely neutral, requires of him only the inferior type of penitence denoted by attrition. The virtue of the sacrament itself was thought to make up for the deficit in the foregoing disposition of the penitent.

The council of Trent in its general representation implied the need of contrition as a condition of remission. (Session XIV., chap. 4.) Nevertheless, in opposition to Protestant disparagement, it took pains to assert the worth of attrition. The decree says: "Although this [attrition] cannot of itself, without the sacrament of penance, conduct the sinner to justification, yet does it dispose him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance." This is not a definite assertion that attrition, along with the sacrament, suffices. The framers of the decree might have understood that attrition is useful simply in leading the penitent forward to the deeper sorrow denoted by contrition. But, on the other hand, there is no distinct declaration of the insufficiency of attrition, and an open chance was left for its intrenchment in the Roman Catholic system.

That the Trent decisions were at least no firm bulwark against attritionism was very soon illustrated. Before the close of the sixteenth century apologies for the laxer view began to be put on record. Franciscus Victoria and Dominicus Soto taught that, when attrition is taken in good faith for contrition, it is a sufficient penitence. Melchior Canus went further and allowed a penitence to be sufficient which was known to have only the character of attrition. At the same time, while convinced of the truth of this view, he acknowledged that it was not above doubt. Lopez, Suarez, and Vasquez claimed for the like view that it was in harmony with the Trent decrees. Suarez, however, thought it inadvisable for any one in the presence of death to rest upon mere attrition, since its sufficiency is not so well guaranteed as to make it a perfectly safe reliance. (Döllinger and Reusch, *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-katholischen Kirche seit dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert*, I. 74, 75.)

In the following centuries, though the verdict was divided, a large number of theologians confidently asserted that attrition, with the sacrament, is adequate for justification. In 1644 Pinthereau declared: "The Jesuits teach unanimously that attrition alone, even when it has for motive only the fear of hell, provided it excludes the will to sin, is a sufficient disposition for the sacrament of penance, and they hold this teaching to be very Catholic, proximate to dogma, and entirely in harmony with the council of Trent." Somewhat later Viva testified with equal confidence: "In accordance with the Trent decrees, the opinion is morally certain, if not *de fide*, that attrition with the sacrament suffices for justification." (Döllinger and Reusch, I. 81, 82.)

Stanch attritionists found in the logic of their position an incentive to qualify the obligation of love to God. Negatively, the command to love God, they allowed, holds at all times—that is, continually obligates all men not to hate God; but one and another casuist contended that the positive affection of love to God is not necessary at all times, and indeed is to be counted indispensable only occasionally, or in special religious exigencies. The following from Laymann will illustrate how this wretched tenet was expounded: Hoc discrimen est inter statum legis evangelicæ, et statum ante gratiam evangelii: quòd ante legem gratiæ nemo adultus à mortali peccato liberari et justificari poterat sine vera contritione, includente charitatem Dei super omnia; propterea, quòd sacramenta veteris legis inania signa erant, quæ gratiam Dei per se non conferebant; sed excitabant fidem in Christum, quæ, si formata fuerat per actum charitatis et contritionis, vim habuit justificandi. In lege autem nova post commissum peccatum mortale non est necessaria vera contritio homini suscepturo sacramentum baptismi, vel pœnitentiæ; sed sufficit attritio, etiam cognita: quamobrem dici solet, ex attrito virtute sacramenti fieri hominem contritum. . . . Præceptum affirmativum de Deo super omnia diligendo certis tantum temporibus obligat. Ita omnes. Sed quænam sint illa obligationis tempora, difficile est definire. Valentia septem recenset ex Soto. Sanchez

vero ex iisdem et aliis auctoribus novem enumerat; sed ple-
raque rejicit, quia incerta ac dubia sint. Quatuor tamen
mihi certiora videntur, quorum duo priora continent obliga-
tionem per se; alia per accidens. (Theologia Moralis, Lib.
V. tract. VI. cap. 2; Lib. II. tract. III. cap. 2.)

The attitude of the Popes toward the doctrine may be
described as one of partial opposition, partial support, and
virtual sanction in the end. Innocent XI. may be regarded
as having reproved the doctrine, since he condemned several
of the maxims which affiliate therewith. Alexander VII.,
though it would appear that personally he was not an advo-
cate of attritionism, afforded to it a species of sanction in
allowing it to be described as the more common teaching
among scholars. A later declaration (1725), which went
forth at the instance of Benedict XIII., involved the same
kind of commendation. But the indirect support which
amounts most nearly to a papal sanction was given in the
present century, through the canonizing of Liguori by Greg-
ory XVI. and the proclaiming of him a *doctor ecclesiæ* by
Pius IX. The latter honor in particular gives a virtual con-
firmation, in the sight of the Church, to all important items
in the teachings of Liguori. Among these items is the doc-
trine of attrition, as appears from the following passages:
Quæritur, an ad rite suscipiendum sacramentum pœnitent-
tiæ requiratur contritio, vel an sufficiat attritio? Certum et
commune est apud DD. non requiri contritionem perfectam,
sed sufficere attritionem. . . . Dicimus, quod si attritio ad re-
missionem non sufficeret, et requireretur contritio, quæ ex-
tra sacramentum hominem justificat, omnes pœnitentes de-
berent justificati accedere ad hoc sacramentum. Nec valet
dicere, quod etiamsi pœnitentes semper justificati accede-
rent, semper vi clavium peccata remitterentur, cum doceat
Tridentinum, contritionem charitate perfectam non justi-
ficare sine sacramenti voto (intellige explicito, vel implicito);
nam respondetur, quod si hoc esset, nunquam verificaretur,
sacramentum pœnitentiæ actu efficere quod significat, scili-
cet absolutionem peccatorum. . . . Objiciunt contra nostram
sententiam de sufficientia attritionis: Peccator aversus a Deo

non potest ad Deum converti, nisi per charitatem formalem, et actualement. Respondetur: Hoc siquidem requiritur extra sacramentum, et ratio est, quia sicut per peccatum, quod est actualis contemptus Dei, homo avertitur a Deo, ita per amorem actualement debet se ad Deum convertere. Aliud vero dicendum de remissione peccatorum intra sacramentum, quia, cum sacramentum virtutem habeat delendi peccatum, et non nisi per infusionem gratiæ, quæ est ipsa charitas habitualis, sufficit ad gratiam obtinendam, ut peccator per attritionem sit dispositus ad sacramentum recipiendum, virtute cujus sine charitate actuali convertitur ad Deum, prout extra sacramentum per charitatem converteretur. Et sic intelligitur, quomodo peccator ex attrito fit contritus, nempe quia virtute clavium æquivalenter contritus redditur, prout dicunt fautores nostræ sententiæ communiter. (Theologia Moralis, Lib. VI. tract. iv. n. 440–442.)

Liguori, it is true, includes in attrition a certain love to God; but it is only an inferior grade which is born of the rising hope of escaping the torments of hell. Qui vero odit culpam propter pœnam, et excludendo omnino voluntatem peccandi, dolet offendisse Deum propter metum inferni, iste jam elicit actum bonum qui oritur ex charitate ordinata erga seipsum, et ideo jam se dispositum reddit ad gratiam in sacramento consequendam. (N. 442.) It is concluded by Liguori that an attrition which springs simply out of the fear of temporal punishments, at the hand of God, may suffice. Quæritur, an in confessione sufficiat attritio ex metu pœnarum temporalium prout infliguntur a Deo? Prima sententia affirmat, secunda vero sententia negat. . . . Prima sententia videtur probabilior; nam gehenna cunctas complectitur æternas pœnas, et ideo, dicente concilio, *et pœnarum*, aliquid aliud, præter pœnam æternam, intelligendum est. At cum secunda non careat sua probabilitate, saltem extrinseca, puto tutius in praxi eam servandam esse. (N. 443.) In general, it may be said that the teaching of Liguori makes an easy yoke as regards the necessity of loving God. He does better, however, than some of his fellow-casuists, since he assumes that there is an obligation to

love God several times in the course of a year. *Per accidens puto nullo modo excusari a mortali, qui existens in mortali per notabile tempus differret pœnitentiam. Quia peccaret contra præceptum charitatis erga Deum, quod saltem pluries in anno quemcumque obstringit.* (N. 437.)

II.

BÖHME AND BAADER.

Jacob Böhme (1575–1624), the shoemaker of Görlitz, ranks as the greatest of modern theosophists; and Franz Baader (1765–1841), teacher of speculative dogmatics in the University of Munich, ranks as his greatest disciple. An eminent place among the followers of Böhme is also assigned to two writers of the eighteenth century, the French mystic Saint-Martin and the German Oetinger. In the same century the English translator of Böhme's writings, William Law, rendered to him, as is well known, an almost unbounded homage.

The interpretation of theosophic speculations is in general a difficult task. In the case of Böhme, interpretation is specially arduous, since his scant education supplied him but imperfectly with means for expressing the great thoughts with which he wrestled. It is not strange, therefore, that his writings have called forth rather discordant expositions. How great has been the variety of opinion, even down to a recent date, respecting the essential trend of Böhme's thinking, is well indicated by the following from Professor Hamberger: "Some, especially Hegel and Feuerbach, rejoice to find him a pantheist; others, like Standenmaier, lament this discovery, or else, like Weisse, regard the question of Böhme's pantheism as still unsettled. Again, others esteem him a theist, but so interpret his teaching that God appears therein to be placed in a dependent relation to the world,—a result with which they are content. Here belong Dr. Wirth, Dr. Wullen, and Dr. Moriz Carrière. Professor Sengler, on the other hand, believes that it

is necessary to conclude that Böhme designed to predicate a dependence of the Divine Personality, not upon the world, but upon His own nature; and this he pronounces an essential imperfection in his teaching. Still others finally charge against him a close affiliation with Manichæism; so Professor Baur, with whom, in part at least, Dr. Haune agrees." (Baader's Werke, Band XIII., Einleit.) The true verdict seems to be, that, while Böhme had points of approach to the pantheistic and the dualistic standpoints, his real theory was essentially distinguished both from pantheism and Manichæism. Among the interpretations mentioned above, that of Professor Sengler is probably the correct one. With it Martensen substantially agrees in his very interesting and able treatise on Jacob Böhme (translated from the Danish by T. Rhys Evans, 1885).

In his conception of God, Böhme gives great prominence to the idea of life. He wishes to grasp the Divine Being as the *living* God. Now life, in his view, demands movement—realization and assertion of itself by a process. Immobility is but another name for death. But movement there cannot be without multiplicity or contrasts. The proper contrast of spirit is nature. In God, accordingly, eternally subsists, as the *other* or counterpart of spirit, a nature. This is called into manifestation by desire and imagination, which arise as God, emerging from His absolute quiescence, casts a glance upon Himself and sees as in a mirror the possibilities of His being. It consists of an infinite plenitude of powers, seven of which are ranked as fundamental. By means of this nature God passes from the dreamy self-consciousness which He has in the contemplation of an unsubstantial image of Himself, and attains to real self-consciousness. The Trinity, subsisting before potentially, now subsists actually, the diverse relations to the nature serving to call forth the latent trinitarian distinctions in the Godhead. This evolution or process of self-generation, as Böhme takes pains to inculcate, is not to be taken in a temporal sense. Though the terms *before* and *after* are used in description, it is to be understood that they denote only the logical order of the momenta

which enter into the eternal, ever-renewed process of the divine life.

As appears from the above, there is an inward and an outward aspect of the divine life, even apart from the creature world. The proper conception of the supra-mundane Deity is not exhausted by the trinitarian distinctions. A fourth element must be added : namely, the manifestation of God through the eternal nature ; His glory, the uncreated light, the heaven in which God dwells from everlasting to everlasting.

The creation is regarded as a free act, and not as a necessary factor in God's self-realization. At least, prominent interpreters so understand Böhme. "We maintain," says Martensen, "that a careful study of Böhme will establish Franz Baader's conclusion that Böhme's God is the God who is perfect in Himself, prior to creation and the world."

Still, while Böhme avoids the strict pantheistic ground, in that he assumes a positive and free initiation of creation on the part of God, he maintains that in a sense creation is *out of* God. The traditional term *ex nihilo* needs to be modified. The world pre-existed in God in idea and in potency. "In His eternal Wisdom God has the form for the created world ; in his eternal nature He has its matter ; not as though there were matter in God Himself, but rather an energetic potency, which is the *fons originis* of matter. We may also say that the world is created, according to Böhme's view, out of the seven Natural Properties or Forms which compose the Glory of God, and which themselves contain the mediation of Idea and Nature." (Martensen.)

Like many other theosophists, Böhme interprets the Mosaic account of creation as the history of the renovation of a ruined and chaotic world, rather than the story of its original formation. Prior to the events there recounted, as he conceived, a great catastrophe had taken place. On account of the close relation subsisting between the upper and the lower realm, the fall of Lucifer and his angels had brought into the latter province utter confusion and desolation.

The origin of evil lay in the free act of the creature. So

Böhme emphatically asserts. Still his language is not always as conformable to this fundamental thesis as could be desired. The strong emphasis which he placed upon contrasts as conditioning all real life was a standing temptation towards the radical position which appears in this expression of Schelling: "Real concord is vanquished discord. Heaven would be lifeless without Hell." Even in God Himself he posited, not indeed the actual contrast of good and evil, but diverse grounds having an analogy with the one and the other, a light centre and a dark centre. The preponderance of the former over the latter is the safeguard of a most holy and blessed harmony in God, while the reverse relation in the fallen creature opens the flood-gates of evil.

The fall of Adam was regarded by Böhme as taking place by successive stages. The descent from the original plane began before the eating of the forbidden fruit. Prior to that crowning trespass Adam had turned away from his inner bride, the heavenly Sophia, and began to covet an outward mate, after the order which prevailed in the animal creation. The result was a severance in his being. Originally he was androgynous, representing the higher unity of man and woman, and destined, apart from all sexual relations, to produce beings in his own likeness. (Compare Gregory of Nyssa and Erigena.)

On the subjects of christology, soteriology, and eschatology Böhme did not depart widely from the ordinary Lutheran representations. We notice only the emphasis which he placed upon the idea of an essential relation between justifying faith and sanctification, and his belief that the soul in the intermediate state has a species of body.

Baader's system is in outline so much like that of Böhme that very little needs to be added to the foregoing. No less than the Protestant theosophist the Roman Catholic emphasizes the necessity of assuming a process in God (upon which His self-consciousness is conditioned), since no life can be without a process. He also insists upon a nature in God, which, in the process of the divine life, is ever glorified into

a body perfectly corresponding to God as Spirit. This view he regards as fundamental to a theistic philosophy. By placing a nature in God an adequate means of His self-revelation is posited; He appears complete in Himself and has no need of the creature in order to become revealed to Himself. Thus the naturalism of Schelling and Hegel is forestalled.

The intimate relation between spirit and nature (in the created world) is a conception upon which Baader lays very great emphasis. The laws of the one correspond to the laws of the other. The two are linked together in destiny. As man is eclipsed by sin, nature passes under shadow. As man is redeemed and glorified, nature is lifted up towards the plane of its lord and is also glorified. All in the region of sense is a parable and symbol of spiritual realities. As the history of theosophy shows, this conception, however much of truth it may contain, carries with itself a certain temptation. The close reciprocal relation between spirit and nature may suggest a species of magic, or the appropriation of the spiritual through the manipulation of the material. And it can hardly be said that Baader has kept wholly clear of this element. Some of his statements, for example, respecting the Levitical sacrifices seem to predicate a magical agency. (Werke, Band VII.)

On the connection of the primitive chaos with a foregoing fall of spirits, and on the androgynous state of the unfallen Adam, Baader is in full accord with Böhme. The primitive condition of Adam he describes as identical with that of Christ between His resurrection and His ascension, the exception being understood that Christ was no longer temptable, whereas Adam was exposed to the assaults of evil and in peril therefrom. (VIII. 192.)

Towards the doctrinal system and polity of his own Church Baader occupied a very free position. He gave his preference to the Greek Church as respects the principal points in which it differs from the Roman Church. He declared the papal headship entirely foreign to the primitive constitution of the Church, and maintained that it had no

place for many centuries except as a tendency patronized by a part of Christendom. He repudiated the notion of unconditional dependence upon any human agent. As each apostle, he says, received his spiritual equipment directly from the Lord, and needed not the mediation of Peter, so is it with each and every man to the end of time. The utter irrelevancy of the Scriptures which are commonly quoted for the primacy is exhibited by him in a way decidedly satisfactory to any one but an infallibilist, and the counter representations in the Gospels are commented on to good effect. Referring to Matt. xx. 25-28, he says: "This passage agrees ill with the representation of a prince of apostles, even when regarded as only *primus inter pares*, and just as ill with a compulsory church regiment, or with the idea of subjection, whether of one priest to another, or of a layman to a priest." (Werke, Band X.) This surely is at a great remove from average Romanism, and is not far from the Protestant standpoint. Perhaps we may discern here in the person of Baader an illustration of one of his own declarations, namely, that the study of the Philosophus Teutonicus, as he calls Böhme, is well adapted to serve as a means of reconciliation between the different confessions.

III.

POSITION OF THE GREEK CHURCH ON THE OLD TESTAMENT CANON.

The present position of the Greek Church upon the proper limits of the Old Testament is indicated by the statement of Adolf Harnack. He says, notwithstanding the impulse given by the union attempts of the Middle Ages and the abortive project of Cyril Lucar toward adoption of the Roman view, "the question is still undecided, and there are eminent Russian theologians who regard the writings of the Hebrew canon as alone properly canonical. The number of such, however, is continually diminishing." (Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II., Cap. III.)

IV.

BECK'S TRICHOTOMY.

In the view of J. T. Beck, as presented in his *Outlines of Biblical Psychology*, spirit is the energizing or life principle in man's triple being. Connected with the soul by a vital bond, spirit imparts to it the power which is operative in its various functions. The subject or *ego* in man is the soul—the intermediate factor which connects spirit and body into a living individuality—though the life of this ego is from the spirit. Man *has* spirit; he *is* soul. Upon the body the spirit acts through the medium of the soul. In the normal or ideal state the spirit gives the type to the whole man—spiritualizes his entire being.

The substance of the above specifications will be found in the following sentences of Beck: "The entire province of life, both in its lowest forms or stages and in its highest, is the province of spirit." "Spirit is the principle and power by which life persists; soul is the seat, guide, and holder of it, while body is its vessel and organ. The three are specifically different; but they exist only in connection with one another." "While man only *has* and *is not* a spirit, he not only has, but is, a soul. Nevertheless he *became* a living soul only by the entrance of spirit; for, a quickening energy or power to give life is inherent in the very nature of spirit, whereas the life which soul has is not its own, but derived from spirit. It follows that spirit is the necessary condition of the life of the human ego; and when a man's life is as it ought to be, spirit is the pregnant power to give life and motive to the soul." "But although the spirit of man is only an endowment (*δωρεά*) of the soul, imparted from and by the Spirit of God, it is not, therefore, a mere attribute of the soul. It is to be conceived as an *independent spirit*, and therefore as a *substance sui generis*—a substance woven into the texture of the soul from within and above, even as the body from without and beneath. Moreover, the

spirit, like the body, is given to the soul only in an individual form; and therefore, if its growth is to go on and extend, it will need constant supplies of life from the spiritual world." "By means of soul spirit obtains entrance to body in such a way as to make body its own peculiar instrument, and to make itself the inward principle of life in body. Soul is therefore the means of bringing body and spirit together." "The soul, in its life of feeling and motion, possesses the power of holding conscious and voluntary intercourse either with the sensible world or with a supernatural world indifferently; and if anything from the higher or from the lower world is to become the *property* of man's *life* it must be apprehended by the soul. But because of the twofold nature of the soul, it is neither natural nor possible that spirit and sense should remain isolated. On the contrary, the one passes into the other, so that *the spiritual element is interwoven with the sensible life, and the sensible element with the spiritual life.*"

V.

KEIM'S GESCHICHTE JESU.

A Life of Christ by Theodor Keim (presented in both a longer and a shorter form) has added, in the present generation, another to the noted efforts to recast the gospel history. Keim's work, however, is not of great significance in the field to which our attention is limited. It embraces no unique conceptions either as respects the authority of the New Testament writings or the person of Christ.

Keim assigns a large place in the Gospels to legendary matter; at the same time he allows in them a much larger basis of genuine history than Strauss was willing to concede. He regards Paul as the earliest witness who gives important information on the life of Christ, and the Gospel by Matthew as the most original and trustworthy among the writings of the Evangelists. He rules out the fourth Gospel as being destitute of a historical character, though

admiring it for the spiritual depth, literary tact, and religious genius which it exhibits.

For miracles proper Keim shows no favor. While he allows that extraordinary works of healing were wrought by Christ, he explains them on the principle of mind cure—the action of spirit upon spirit—an action carried above the common range by the powerful faith both of the healer and the healed. He repudiates the notion of a literal resurrection of Christ, but accepts the fact of veritable appearances of the crucified Master to His disciples.

It is granted that Paul ascribed divinity to Christ; but Keim's own view is purely humanitarian. He pictures Jesus as man, and man only. As man he shows of necessity certain limitations. Nevertheless he stands very near the ideal. It is scarcely a misuse of terms to call Him sinless. "The small defects which have been detected are no sins; they are sometimes an extravagance of idealism and energy, and sometimes a remnant of human force in the crushing conflict of the elements, and vanish like a drop in the ocean of brilliant superhuman achievement." He attained to a unique relation with God, in virtue of which He rightfully possesses lordship over all men. His position was more than prophetic. He was so united to God and so lifted above the sin of the world that "He forgave sins in the name of God, held up His life as a pattern for all men, devoted His blood, as pure, to the atonement of the impure, and felt Himself equal to the Messianic office of Judge of the righteous and unrighteous."

Keim does not wish to figure as an abettor of reckless iconoclasm. He denounces the radical brawlers and enthusiasts as among *the most obnoxious public scourges of the present time*. His reverence towards the person of Christ is a feature that cannot fail to elicit the sympathy of a Christian mind. Still the total result is not acceptable to such a mind. After dwelling for a brief space in the moonlight of this reconstructed history, one is glad to get back into the warm glow and sunshine of the gospel narratives.

VI.

IRVING'S CHRISTOLOGY AND SOTERIOLOGY.

The peculiarity of Edward Irving's conception of Christ's person is expressed in the declaration that the Son of God, in the incarnation, assumed *fallen* human nature. By this he did not mean to deny that Christ was a holy person. The corruption or sinfulness of a nature becomes the sinfulness of a person only when it leads him astray. Now Christ never yielded in the slightest degree to the wayward impulses of His human nature. On the contrary, through His righteous will and the power of the Holy Ghost dwelling in Him, he subdued that nature, secured its complete regeneration, immolated it upon the altar of His cross, and brought it by His resurrection to a perfect and incorruptible life.

In this transformation lay the essence of His redemptive work. He raised fallen human nature, appropriated by Himself, to complete acceptability unto God; in other words, reconciled it to God. What was thus accomplished in Him was virtually accomplished in the whole body with which He so perfectly identified Himself. In His lordship over that body He possesses the right to communicate to all of its members what He has acquired for Himself, and His purified soul becomes the appropriate channel through which the Holy Ghost descends upon His brethren, to work in them the mind that was in Him.

As confirming the foregoing exposition, a few sentences may be added from Irving's treatise on the Incarnation (vol. v. in his collected works). "That Christ took our fallen nature is most manifest, because there was no other in existence to take." "I wish it to be clearly understood that I believe it to be necessary to salvation that a man should believe that Christ's soul was so held in possession by the Holy Ghost, and so supported by the divine nature, as that it never assented unto an evil suggestion: while, upon the

other hand, His flesh was of that mortal and corruptible kind which is liable to all forms of evil suggestion and temptation, through its participation in a fallen nature and a fallen world ; and that thus, though at all points assailable through his flesh, He was in all respects holy, seeing wickedness consisteth not in being tempted, but in yielding to the temptation." "If the human substance which He hath taken be of a piece with mine and with yours, as we are all of a piece with Adam, and can, through the union with the Godhead, be preserved pure and blameless, and carried through death incorrupt, and brought into the presence of God perfectly holy, then it is made manifest that a fallen creature can be reconciled unto God, for it hath been done, it was done in the person of Christ ; and the only question which will remain is, How is it to be done in other persons?" "Seeing that Christ's human nature was the same of which all the brethren are partakers, it follows that what is accomplished in one portion is virtually accomplished in the whole ; that reconciliation being made between God and one part of the fallen thing, reconciliation is made between God and the whole fallen substance." "This is truly the work of God which was wrought in and upon the human nature of Jesus Christ, to bring a clean thing out of an unclean, and to bring the work of regeneration into the fallen world. And from this time forth beginneth the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, through the man-soul of Jesus Christ, so that now we receive the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of Christ."

Representations substantially identical with the above were made by a contemporary of Irving, Gottfried Menken of Bremen. The view of both respecting the redemptive work of Christ is not inaptly described as the theory of *redemption by sample*. (Compare A. B. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*.)

VII.

CAMPBELL'S THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT.

A theory of the atonement commanding considerable attention in Calvinistic circles was set forth a few decades since by John McLeod Campbell, a minister of the Established Church of Scotland, whose opinions were challenged by the General Assembly in 1831. The main points in his exposition of the atonement are the following: (1) The redemptive purpose must be regarded as universal. Christ died for all men. To limit the atonement is to make it expressive rather of the arbitrariness of God than of His essential love. "Nothing can be clearer to me," he says, "than that an arbitrary act cannot reveal character." This of course involves a rejection of the judicial theory as commonly held by Old School Calvinism. (2) The strict governmental theory is decidedly unsatisfactory. It does not square with the facts of conscience, and predicates too loose a connection between divine law and divine nature. "Of this I feel quite certain," writes Campbell, "that no really awakened sinner ever thinks of rectoral, but of absolute, justice, and of absolute justice only." "Rectoral justice so presupposes absolute justice and so throws the mind back on that absolute justice, that the idea of an atonement that will satisfy the one, though it might not the other, must be a delusion." "Doubtless what meets the requirements of absolute righteousness must secure the interests of rectoral justice." Here, it will be observed, our author agrees with what has been characterized as the *modified governmental theory* (p. 356), and there is little objection to describing his own view by these terms, except the fact that he does not specially accentuate the governmental aspect. (3) A real satisfaction for sin was required. (4) The satisfaction, as rendered by Christ, did not consist in *penal* sufferings. (5) Christ made satisfaction by His perfect response to the divine condemnation of sin. As one in mind with the

Father, He gave in the presence of men a clear manifestation of what our sins are to the Father, and at the same time presented to the Father that perfect sense and acknowledgment of their deep demerit which the race ought, but is incompetent of itself, to present. He rendered "a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man." This answer to the divine sentence or estimate had all the virtue of a perfect confession and a perfect repentance, and so absorbed the divine wrath. To use Campbell's words: "That response has all the elements of a perfect repentance in humanity for all the sin of man, a perfect sorrow, a perfect contrition; all the elements of such a repentance, and that in absolute perfection—all, excepting the personal consciousness of sin; and by that perfect response in Amen to the mind of God in relation to sin is the wrath of God rightly met." (6) The intercession of Christ supplements his "expiatory confession," and enters as a perfecting element into the atonement. "As that intercession is a natural form of love in Him that intercedes, the response to that intercession is a natural form for the love addressed to take." (7) The legal adequacy of Christ's work follows from its spiritual adequacy. Not as a basis for an imputed righteousness, but as a veritable power to purge the conscience, it is the antecedent and ground of justification.

VIII.

ALBRECHT RITSCHL'S THEOLOGICAL VIEWS.

The prominence of the school of Ritschl upon the theatre of German theology in the present naturally evokes a special interest in the views of its founder. We therefore give place to a brief outline which may serve to indicate the more essential features of his system. Our representations—given in substantially the same terms as in our Church History—are drawn mainly from his elaborate work, *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*.

The general standpoint of Ritschl involves a good degree

of deference to Biblical authority. A religion like Christianity, whose aim is to unite men in one great spiritual communion, must, he maintains, have its content expressed in the person and work of the founder. Only thus are the requisite unity and historical continuity provided for. The person and work of Christ give the standard for our conceptions of Christianity. The oracles which supply trustworthy information respecting the person and work of Christ are the writings of the foundation-epoch, the books of the New Testament. Anything which did not find record here may be left out of the account as unimportant or unauthentic. The New Testament writings constitute a pretty sharply defined group. They are separated from all other writings of that and the following era, in that they are harmoniously related to the preceding dispensation and reflect an authentic understanding of the Old Testament religion, whereas other writings, whether proceeding from Jewish or Gentile Christians, are clearly wanting in this respect. There is abundant reason, therefore, to base Christian theology solely upon the books of the New Testament, reference to the Old Testament being important mainly as supplying a means for understanding the New. It may be allowed, indeed, that the New Testament, here and there, on subordinate points, has been tinged through the influence of apocryphal sources. But instances of this kind may be detected, and are so far exceptional as not to impair the authority of the New Testament.

In treating of the person of Christ Ritschl assumes to keep within the Biblical point of view. He discards the dogmatic construction which the Church has wrought out upon the subject. The way in which Christ became what He was, he says, is not a theme for theological investigation. That is a problem which is above our reach. We must take Christ as He is presented. Responding to the charge that he taught that Christ was a mere man, he says: "That I speak of Christ in general only so far as His personal character as bearer of God's revelation comes into consideration, no one who has read my writings will deny." His official position and the work which He accomplished are thus made

the basis for estimating His person. The result seems to be that, while there is no distinct specification respecting His essence, the practical value of divinity is assigned to Him. He reflects the divine attributes and asserts over the race an unlimited moral lordship. "An authority which excludes all other standards or subordinates them to itself, which at the same time fundamentally directs all human trust in God, has the worth of divinity."

Ritschl adopts also a negative attitude towards the conclusions of the old theology on the attributes of God, and assumes to give a more Biblical exposition of the subject. He objects to placing an attribute back of the will of God and regarding the latter as determined by the former. "A necessity for God," he says, "which is not conceived as issuing from His will, but is derived from a resting natural attribute, makes God a finite and incomplete personality" (endliche und werdende Persönlichkeit). In accordance with this view he repudiates the notion that righteousness in God involves a demand for retribution which must be met. That idea, he maintains, is no Biblical idea, but a foreign growth which has unwisely been imported into theology. "The maxim that God will visit every man according to his works with reward or punishment, which is the foundation-stone of the old dogmatic system, and from which has issued the juristic treatment of the Christian idea of atonement, is a principle of the Pharisaic as also of the Hellenic world-view. Paul gave expression to it in order to argue *ex concessis* over against his readers who had been educated in Judaism and Hellenism, and in order to show that there was no real validity in the principle."

God's attitude towards the race is not described in the Bible as one of wrath, nor is redemption represented as a deliverance from wrath. In the New Testament the wrath of God is associated altogether with the closing up of the dispensation, and denotes the divine retribution which will then befall those who have arrayed themselves against God's kingdom.

In conformity with the above the conclusion is drawn

that God's relation to the redemptive work is not to be described under judicial or governmental terms. In the scheme of reconciliation He does not stand forth as judge or ruler. The dominant conception of God in the New Testament is that He is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the relation in which He stands to Christ shapes the conception of His relation to men. As Christ Himself taught with sufficient distinctness, God approaches men in the character of father, and forgives their sins in that character. "The ground of justification or the forgiveness of sins is the benevolent, gracious, compassionate determination of the will of God to grant to sinners access to Himself." His act of forgiveness imports not that He forgets the sins of the person who enjoys His pardon, but only that He decrees that they shall not be a bar to fellowship.

The work of Christ was to reveal and make effective the benevolent intent of God. It was not a means for determining the will of God to gracious designs, but showed what God in his love had willed to accomplish. No vicarious satisfaction was required on the part of God. Christ did not and could not bear the penalty which properly attaches to sinners, since the essential characteristic of that penalty is the feeling of guilt and of consequent separation from divine communion. His sufferings had worth as exhibiting the worth of His person; they gave occasion to patient endurance and were a test of fidelity. His death expresses the culmination of His righteous obedience. Accordingly, in New Testament language the death of Christ is a compendious expression for His faithful fulfilment of the entire charge committed to His hands.

An advantageous word for representing the redemptive agency of Christ is the word *calling* or *vocation* (Beruf). He wrought out salvation by the fulfilment of His calling, and that calling was the founding of a spiritual kingdom, a universal religious communion (Gemeinde) in which the law of love has the supremacy. "In the view of Christ the assuring to mankind universal forgiveness of sins and the founding of a communion whose members recognize

in God as His Father also their Father, are ideas of like meaning."

The more immediate relation of Christ is with the communion, and it is within the communion that the individual is made a recipient of justification. By justification may be understood the fundamental relation towards God in which the communion, originated through the accomplished work of Christ, is placed. The love of God towards the obedient head of the communion is fittingly extended to the members. "The justifying sentence or the forgiveness of sins is not to be construed to mean that the adherence of the communion to Christ is imputed to it, but rather that to the communion adhering to Christ the place of Christ in God's love, which He maintained through His obedience, is imputed."

The stress which Ritschl places upon the communion leads him to adverse comments upon such systems of religious thought as lay the main emphasis upon the direct relation of the believer to Christ and make much account of his subjective states. His attitude towards Pietism is one of conspicuous hostility. It should be noticed, however, that Ritschl in emphasizing the importance of the communion intends to pay no tribute to sacerdotal or hierarchical notions. He denotes by this term a fellowship in which the chief bond of union is a common pursuit of the great ends of the divine kingdom.

Among those who have written dogmatic treatises from the general standpoint of Ritschl are Herrmann and Kaftan. Somewhat of the Ritschlian premises underlies also the historical works of Harnack.

INDEX OF SUBJECT MATTER.

[The numbers at the left refer to the periods; those at the right, to volume and page.]

I.

INTRODUCTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.

I. The ground for an inevitable development of doctrine. — Benefit of acquaintance with the history of doctrine. — Place belonging to the branch. — Rules for the choice of subject matter. — Cautions against misinterpretation. — Five periods, and the leading characteristic of each 1-8

Incentive to doctrinal development supplied by heathen criticism and by heresies. — Orthodox zeal against heresy; its warrant and its danger. — Question whether Montanism is to be included among the heresies. — Jewish heresy, especially Ebionism. — Evidence that Ebionism did not command large suffrage in the early Church. — Gnosticism; causes and date of its origin; sources of its materials; points in which most of its systems agreed; points of difference. — Manichæism. — Two types of Monarchianism 23-31

II. Circumstances naturally fostering polemic zeal in the second period. — Compensations for the bigotry and violence exhibited. 159-161

Rise and spread of monasticism. — Its influence in the sphere of doctrine 171-173

Nature of the relation between Church and State which was consummated under the early Christian Emperors. — Doctrinal bearing of this relation 173, 174

III. The relation of the Greek Church to doctrinal development after the beginning of the third period. — Her most eminent dogmatic writer. — Causes and date of the separation between the Greek and the Latin Church. — Relative extent of heresy in the middle ages. — Principal cases of heresy or dissent 293-299

IV. Importance of the Reformation in the history of Christianity. — The starting-point of the Reformation, as demanded by the preceding developments and as evolved from the personal experience of Luther. — Inferences drawn as to the mediatorial office of the priest, the authority of Scripture, and the right of private interpretation ii. 3-9

Relation of the Reformation to the doctrinal standpoint of the early Church ii. 9, 10

Logical outcome of Reformation principles. — Excess of individualism in the Protestantism of the past centuries, and the superficial poemism to which it has given occasion. — Reasonable hope of a growing unity within the bounds of Protestantism ii. 10-12

V. Task of fundamental criticism undertaken in the present era. — Probable result ii. 221, 222

II.

PHILOSOPHY AS RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE.

I. Reason why early Christianity could entertain but moderate interest in the pre-Socratic philosophies. — Features in Epicureanism and Stoicism hindering their appropriation by Christian writers. — Ground of preferring Plato to Aristotle. — Characteristics of Platonism commending it to Christian use. — Testimony of the early fathers to the superiority of Platonism. — Different opinions as to the worth of heathen philosophy in general. — Actual contributions of heathen philosophy to early Christian theology 11-23

II. General attitude of theologians toward heathen philosophy in the second period. — Relative estimate of Plato and Aristotle. — The founder and the chief representatives of Neo-Platonism. — Its place in the development of Greek philosophy. — Its cardinal ideas as set forth by Plotinus. — Its divergence from the older Platonism. — Degree of favor which it received from the earlier and from the later writers of the period. — The works of the pseudo Dionysius. — Date of their origin. — Their reception by the Church. — Peculiarities in their teaching. — Their kinship with Neo-Platonism 163-171

III. Different estimates of philosophy in the scholastic era. — Peculiar philosophical demand of the age, and its relation to an increased appreciation for Aristotle. — Points of contrast between Platonism and Aristotelianism. — Relative affinity of the two philosophies for mysti-

cism. — Testimony of writers indicating the place assigned to Aristotle. — Introduction of Aristotle's writings into the West, and decrees respecting their use. — Revived interest in Platonism near the close of the period. — Mohammedan and Jewish philosophers. — Influence of the writings of the pseudo Dionysius. — The point at issue between the nominalists and realists; decisions by earlier thinkers; position taken by different scholastics; theological import of the subject. — Scholastic distinction between matter and form . . . 301-311

IV. The transition to modern philosophy. — Double origin of modern philosophy in Bacon and Descartes, and the divergent tendencies resulting. — Range which Bacon gave to philosophy, and the relation which he predicated between it and revealed religion. — Extent to which Hobbes pushed his sensationalism. — Formal attitude of Hobbes toward revealed religion. — Real bearing of his philosophy upon the same. — The Cambridge school, and the offset which they presented to the theories of Hobbes. — Affinity of Locke's philosophy with sensationalism, not to say materialism. — Basis incidentally provided for idealism. — Contrast between Locke and Bacon in their views of the relations between reason and faith . . . ii. 13-21

Place which Descartes assigned to theological data in gaining a certain basis of knowledge. — Prominence of the divine causality in Descartes's system, and his emphasis upon the contrast between mind and matter. — His attitude toward revealed religion. — Conclusion which Geulincx drew from Cartesian premises. — Conclusions drawn by Malebranche. — Spinoza's pantheism. — His definition of substance. — His definition of minds and bodies. — His comments on the idea of freedom and of final cause. — His conception of Christ, of the Christian Scriptures, and of miracles . . . ii. 21-25

Degree of influence exerted by modern philosophy upon early Protestant theology. — Estimate of the worth of philosophy by different theologians . . . ii. 25-29

V. Relative fruitfulness of the last two centuries in philosophic thinking. — Dissatisfaction of Leibnitz with preceding philosophies. — His method of offsetting the sensationalism of Locke. — Antidote to Spinozism which he supplied in his doctrine of monads. — His doctrine of the pre-established harmony, and its bearing upon freedom and optimism. — His general attitude toward revealed religion. — Modification of the philosophy of Leibnitz by Wolff . . . ii. 223-227

Berkeley's combination of idealism with empiricism. — Manner in which he deduced his idealistic theory and the conception of nature which it involved . . . ii. 227, 228

Four points embraced in the scepticism of Hume. — Question whether Hume's attitude toward religion was purely destructive.

ii. 228-230

The Scottish school, and the offset which it presented to the scepticism of Hume. — Its doctrinal affinities ii. 230, 231

Representatives of extreme sensationalism in England and France. — French opponents of sensationalism. — Eclecticism of Cousin.

ii. 231

Stimulus which Kant received from Hume's scepticism. — Task which Kant proposed to himself in his Critique of Pure Reason. — Limitations which he placed both upon empiricism and dogmatism. — Province which he assigned to the speculative and to the practical reason respectively. — Points of likeness and of contrast between his views of religion and the Scriptural system ii. 231-236

Fichte's attempt to amend the philosophy of Kant. — His starting-point. — His way of explaining our impression of an external world. — Respect in which his later philosophy differs from his earlier. — Distinction between his philosophy and that of Kant as to doctrinal affinities. — Extent to which he conserves the great truths of Christianity ii. 236-239

Different stages in the philosophical development of Schelling. — The point of his departure from Fichte. — His theory of the Absolute, and of the means of attaining to the knowledge thereof. — His later views as distinguished from his earlier. — Poetic affinities of his philosophy. — Points in antagonism with Catholic thought. — His attitude toward the vulgar rationalism ii. 239-242

Hegel's conception of the proper object of philosophy, and of the way to reach and to explicate that object. — The three branches into which he divides philosophy. — Starting-point and successive stages which he predicates for the evolution of thought. — Formal attitude of his philosophy toward Christian theology. — Its real bearing as judged by its principles and its professed disciples ii. 242-248

Distinctive features in the philosophies of Jacobi and Schleiermacher. — Respects in which Schleiermacher supplemented Jacobi.

ii. 248, 249

Schopenhauer and Hartmann as representatives of philosophical pessimism ii. 249, 250

Herbart's relation to preceding philosophies. — His conception of the true method of philosophy. — Lotze's criticism both of dogmatic idealism and of materialism. — Element of idealism which he recognizes. — Prominence of the theistic phase in his philosophy.

ii. 250-252

The fundamental thesis of Comte's Positivism. — The six branches which in his view cover the whole field of knowledge. — His scheme for a new religion ii. 252, 253

Recent English advocates of sensationalism. — Points in which they agree. — Evolutionism of Herbert Spencer. — Statements of Mill and Spencer bearing upon religious truths ii. 253-257

The general outcome of the philosophy of the period in its relations to Christian theology. — Specific affiliations of different theologians and theological parties with the various philosophies. — More common estimate as to the worth of philosophy ii. 257-260

III.

AUTHORS, COMMUNIONS, AND CREEDS.

I. Classification of the authors of the first three centuries. — Question as to the genuineness of writings attributed to Clement of Rome, to Ignatius, and to Justin Martyr. — Consideration of the identity of Barnabas and of Hermas. — Propriety of quoting Tertullian, Novatian, and Hippolytus as exponents of Catholic teaching. — Strictures upon the dogmatic authority of Arnobius and Lactantius. — Distinguishing characteristics of the principal groups of authors 32-36

II. Greek authors of the Arian era. — Greek authors of the christological era. — Latin authors of the period. — Theologians whose orthodoxy was called in question. — Most prominent of those distinctly ranked as heretics. — Most representative authors of the Greek and the Latin Church respectively 175-178

III. Meaning of the term Scholasticism. — Four subdivisions of the period, with the characteristics and leading writers of each. — Schools and universities. — Estimate of scholasticism. — Estimate of mysticism 311-323

IV. The conditions of Protestant unity. — Cause of the first division. — Distinguishing characteristics of the Lutheran and the Reformed Church respectively. — Propriety of reckoning the Church of England as a branch of the Reformed Church. — Features distinguishing the Church of England from the Reformed Church at large, and giving occasion to controversy and dissenting parties ii. 29-32

Scattered representatives of Unitarianism. — Organized Unitarianism under Faustus Socinus. — Leading representative of Unitarianism in England in this era ii. 32-34

Occasion of the rise of the Arminians, or Remonstrants, in Holland. — Outward fortunes of the Arminians. — Distinction between Arminius and those who succeeded him, as to doctrinal position.

ii. 34, 35

Origin of the Mennonites, and peculiarities in their belief and practice ii. 35

The founding and the early fortunes of the Baptist Church in England. — Roger Williams and the first Baptist society in America. — Theological standpoint of the first Baptists, and of the branches subsequently organized ii. 35, 36

Rise of the society of Friends, or Quakers, and their most noted representatives ii. 36, 37

List of creeds and other representative statements of doctrine. — Comments on the Augsburg Confession, the Smalcald Articles, the Formula of Concord, the Heidelberg Catechism, the Second Helvetic Confession, the Canons of the Synod of Dort, the Thirty-Nine Articles, the Westminster Confession, the Racovian Catechism, and the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent with other Roman Catholic documents of the period. — Confessions of the Greek Church in the seventeenth century ii. 37-43

Table of the authors of the period ii. 43-50

Double source of Lutheran theology in Luther and Melancthon. — Other Lutheran writers of the sixteenth century. — Lutheran writers of the seventeenth century ii. 50, 51

Double source of the Reformed theology in Zwingli and Calvin. — Distinguished theologians who followed in Switzerland. — Representative writers in Holland. — The principal Arminian writers. — Reformed theologians in France. — Leading writers of different parties in Great Britain ii. 51-54

Most celebrated authors in the Roman Catholic Church ii. 54

Outline of controversies in the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth century. — Two important controversies in the eighteenth century. — Mystics in the Lutheran Church ii. 54-58

Agitation caused in the Reformed Church by the teachings of Amyraut and Placcæus. — Mystics in the Reformed Church ii. 58, 59.

The origin and the nature of the controversy between the Jesuits and the Jansenists. — Comments on the apparent lack of homogeneity in the Romish Church. — Roman Catholic mystics ii. 59-61

V. The rise and the doctrinal peculiarities of the Moravians.

ii. 261

Early connection of Methodism with Moravianism. — Relation of Methodism to the Established Church. — Sense in which its theology may be termed Arminian. — Its doctrinal standards and representative writers ii. 261-264

The New Jerusalem Church. — Its founder and the position accorded to him ii. 264, 265

Unitarianism in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. — Genesis of New England Unitarianism. — Different stages in its growth, and leading writers pertaining to each. — Sects affiliating more or less with Unitarian belief ii. 265-269

- Reason for excluding a specific account of Mormonism.** ii. 269.
- Recent developments in the Lutheran Church.** — Rise and progress of rationalism. — Counteractives to rationalism. — List of Lutheran theologians who may be classed as relatively orthodox. — Union project — Doctrinal status of Lutherans in the United States . . ii. 269-273
- Theological vicissitudes of the Reformed Church on the Continent.** — Most distinguished representatives of evangelical tendencies. — Affiliated branches in the United States . . . ii. 273, 274
- The deistic controversy in England.** — Rise of the Evangelical school. — Tractarianism. — Broad Church movement . ii. 274, 275
- Founding of the Episcopal Church in the United States.** — Tendency which was dominant in it at first. — Effect upon it of the later movements in England ii. 275, 276
- Presbyterianism in Scotland.** — Origin of the schisms within its bounds. — Recent authors. — Presbyterianism in the United States. — Distinction between the Old and the New School. — Writings of special significance ii. 276, 277
- English Congregationalism.** — Importance of the movement in New England Congregationalism which started from Jonathan Edwards. — Points in which Edwards and his successors claimed to have made improvements on the older theology. — Characteristics of the so-called New Departure. — Creed of 1884 ii. 277-279
- Developments among the Baptists in the eighteenth century.** — Relative prosperity in the present century. — Representative Confessions and authors ii. 279, 280
- Small scope given to liberalism in the Roman Catholic Church in the present period.** — Triumph of Ultramontaniam in the Vatican Council. — The Old Catholic movement. — Additions to the list of confessional documents. — Eminent writers ii. 280, 281
- Conservative temper of the modern Greek Church.** — Most important of recent Confessions ii. 281

IV.

SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

- I. Meaning of Scripture as the term was used by those immediately succeeding the apostles.** — Uncertain limits of the Old Testament canon among the early Christians. — Efforts to ascertain the true limits. — Decision finally rendered upon the subject by the Greek and the Latin Church respectively 37-39

Incentives which urged to the fixing of the New Testament canon. — Evidence that the great body of New Testament books early commanded a general acceptance. — Books respecting which there was a measure of doubt. — Date when the present list of books was substantially unchallenged. — Books not retained in the canon, and to which a local and limited acceptance was accorded 39-42

Theory of inspiration bequeathed from Judaism. — Theory which appears in the earliest references of Christian writers. — The Montanist theory. — Position taken by Christian writers after the rise of Montanism 42-45

Hermeneutical maxims. — Prominent fault of early Christian exegesis. — Evidence that an unrestricted privilege to read the Scriptures was accorded to the laity 46, 47

Prominence held by tradition and its most important embodiments before the collection of the New Testament books. — Theory entertained of the relation of Scripture and tradition after the collection was effected. — Exceptional instance of a reference to a secret tradition 47-52

II. Evidences of a very emphatic theory of inspiration. — Instances of a recognition of a human element. — Attitude toward the Montanist theory 178-180

Advance in exegetical methods. — Relative place still assigned to allegorical interpretation. — Privilege and practice of the laity as respects reading the Bible 180-182

More common theory as to the relation of Scripture and tradition. — Partial exception on the part of Basil and Gregory Nazianzen. — Causes favoring recourse to extra-Biblical and traditionary authority. — References to a secret tradition 182-186

III. Mediæval theories of inspiration and interpretation as compared with those of the preceding period. — Argument of Aquinas for the necessity of revelation 323

Distinction between the position accorded to the Scriptures in the theory of the scholastics and that which was practically awarded to them. — Relative position assigned to Scripture by Wycliffe and other Reformers. — Tendency to insinuate the authority of the Church in place of tradition proper. — Different views as to the location of the infallible authority of the Church 324-327

Extent to which the Bible was prohibited to the laity . . . 327

IV. Points of contrast between Protestantism and Romanism on the subject of the section ii. 61, 62

Discussions and decisions at the council of Trent on the canon and the authoritative edition of Scripture. — Trent decree on tradition. — Bellarmin's specifications on tradition. — Test of tradition as implied

in the statements of Bellarmin and Bossuet respectively. — Prescription of Pedro de Soto on the same point. — Trent decree respecting the interpretation of Scripture. — Relative position assigned by Romanism to Scripture and church authority ii. 62-67

Specifications in the Greek Church respecting the canon and the authority of tradition ii. 67.

Position of Protestants on the canon, the authoritative version, the function of tradition, the interpretation of Scripture, and the relation of church authority to Scripture. — Test of the divine origin of Biblical books which was most emphasized. — Other tests urged by Protestants. — Way in which the Quakers qualified the supremacy of Scripture ii. 67-75

Views of inspiration entertained by various parties in the Roman Catholic Church ii. 75, 76

Luther's view of inspiration. — View which became dominant among the Lutherans ii. 76-78

Zwingli, Calvin, and the general body of Reformed theologians, on the subject of inspiration. — Position taken by the Buxtorfs and the Helvetic Consensus Formula on the vowel-points of the Hebrew Scriptures ii. 78, 79

Statements on inspiration by prominent Arminian writers, by the Socinians, and by Richard Baxter ii. 79, 80

Comment on the dogmatic way in which the Scriptures were treated in the seventeenth century ii. 80, 81

Beginnings of radical criticism as represented by English deism, Spinoza, and Richard Simon ii. 81-83

V. Way in which some Protestants and some Romanists in recent times apparently have approximated in their views of the relation of Scripture and tradition. — Newman's doctrine of dogmatic development. — Genuine approach to the Romish theory of tradition in the Tractarian or Ritualistic school 281-284

Four theories of Biblical inspiration, and advocates of each. — Distinctions made between revelation and inspiration. — Summary of recent tendencies toward a modified view of the Bible among those who acknowledge in general its authority ii. 284-293

Radical criticism as it appears in English deism in the eighteenth century, beginnings of German rationalism, German rationalism developed into naturalism, school of æsthetic rationalism, mythical hypothesis of Strauss, development theory of Baur, and treatment of the Old Testament by Kuenen and Wellhausen ii. 293-298

Inference as to the final outcome of the radical criticism.

ii. 298, 299

V.

EXISTENCE OF GOD.

I. Degree of stress laid by the early fathers upon the self-evidencing power of truth. — Specific arguments most relied upon as proof of God's existence 53-56

II. New class of arguments added to those of the foregoing period.
— The argument of Diodorus, of Augustine, and of Boëthius.
187-189

III. The ontological argument by Anselm. — Criticism of Anselm's argument by Gaunilo. — Consideration of the worth of his argument. — Attitude of the majority of the scholastics toward it. — Arguments of Thomas Aquinas. — Argument of Raymond of Sabunde. — Point of special emphasis with the mystics 328-331

IV. Arguments used in the fourth period before the rise of the Cartesian philosophy. — Descartes's arguments. — Measure of assent given to them. — Locke's arguments. — Argument which Samuel Clarke founded on the consideration of space . . . ii. 84-88

V. Extent to which the ontological argument of Anselm and Descartes has been recognized in more recent times. — Criticism of the same by Kant and Lotze. — Attitude of most theologians toward it. — Kant's criticism of the cosmological and teleological arguments. — Place still held by these arguments. — Moral argument of Kant. — Impression made by a review of the whole development on this topic.
ii. 300-303

VI.

ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

I. Opposing interests which modified the consideration of the divine essence. — Manifestations of a tendency strongly to emphasize the transcendence of God. — Indications that it was not meant to deny all proper knowledge of God. — Representations which failed to do justice to the spirituality of the divine nature. — Motive of Origen in predicating a limit to divine power and knowledge. — The superi-

ority of God to the category of time and change. — Relation of God's omnipotence to the power to sin 56-63

II. Representatives of anthropomorphism. — View of Eunomius as to the possibility of knowing the essence of God. — Opposing views of Catholic writers. — Lack of consistent adherence to extreme statements on the divine transcendence. — Conception of the simplicity of the divine nature. — God's relation to time and space. — Reason for denying to God the power to sin. — Relative lack of attention to God's moral attributes in the Greek Church 189-194

III. Specifications of different writers of the Middle Ages respecting the possibility of knowing God as to His essence. — Scholastic theory of the simplicity of the divine nature. — Question whether God can do more and better than He does. — Conception of the divine omnipresence, and the peculiar symbol by which it was represented. — Mode of the divine knowledge, and the different forms of that knowledge. — Impassibility of God. — Question whether the will of God is ultimate or conditioned 331-336

IV. Relative degree of affiliation with agnostic representations in the Reformation era. — Extent of agreement with Augustine and the scholastics on the general subject of God's essence and attributes. — Conception of God's eternity entertained by Socinians and by some Arminians. — Socinian theory respecting divine foreknowledge of the contingent. — Relation of foreknowledge to predestination as taught by Calvinistic writers. — View of the Arminians and others on this subject. — Question whether there is a *scientia media*. — Question whether the will of God is the absolute standard of right. — Prominence given in Reformation theology to the attribute of justice.

ii. 88-95

V. Starting-point for agnosticism in Kant's philosophy. — Opposite extreme in the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel. — Agnostic theories of Hamilton and Mansel, and the practical conclusions which they drew from them. — Criticism of their theories. — More common position in the present on man's competency to know God. — Modified view of the simplicity of the divine nature. — Specifications on God's eternity. — Question as to the possibility of foreknowledge of the free acts of men. — Relation of foreknowledge to foreordination. — The *scientia media*. — Relation of the will of God to the moral standard.

ii. 304-311

V.

EXISTENCE OF GOD.

I. Degree of stress laid by the early fathers upon the self-evidencing power of truth. — Specific arguments most relied upon as proof of God's existence 53-56

II. New class of arguments added to those of the foregoing period.
— The argument of Diodorus, of Augustine, and of Boëthius.
187-189

III. The ontological argument by Anselm. — Criticism of Anselm's argument by Gaunilo. — Consideration of the worth of his argument. — Attitude of the majority of the scholastics toward it. — Arguments of Thomas Aquinas. — Argument of Raymond of Sabunde. — Point of special emphasis with the mystics 328-331

IV. Arguments used in the fourth period before the rise of the Cartesian philosophy. — Descartes's arguments. — Measure of assent given to them. — Locke's arguments. — Argument which Samuel Clarke founded on the consideration of space . . . ii. 84-88

V. Extent to which the ontological argument of Anselm and Descartes has been recognized in more recent times. — Criticism of the same by Kant and Lotze. — Attitude of most theologians toward it. — Kant's criticism of the cosmological and teleological arguments. — Place still held by these arguments. — Moral argument of Kant. — Impression made by a review of the whole development on this topic.
ii. 300-303

VI.

ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

I. Opposing interests which modified the consideration of the divine essence. — Manifestations of a tendency strongly to emphasize the transcendence of God. — Indications that it was not meant to deny all proper knowledge of God. — Representations which failed to do justice to the spirituality of the divine nature. — Motive of Origen in predicating a limit to divine power and knowledge. — The superi-

ority of God to the category of time and change. — Relation of God's omnipotence to the power to sin 56-63

II. Representatives of anthropomorphism. — View of Eunomius as to the possibility of knowing the essence of God. — Opposing views of Catholic writers. — Lack of consistent adherence to extreme statements on the divine transcendence. — Conception of the simplicity of the divine nature. — God's relation to time and space. — Reason for denying to God the power to sin. — Relative lack of attention to God's moral attributes in the Greek Church 189-194

III. Specifications of different writers of the Middle Ages respecting the possibility of knowing God as to His essence. — Scholastic theory of the simplicity of the divine nature. — Question whether God can do more and better than He does. — Conception of the divine omnipresence, and the peculiar symbol by which it was represented. — Mode of the divine knowledge, and the different forms of that knowledge. — Impassibility of God. — Question whether the will of God is ultimate or conditioned 331-336

IV. Relative degree of affiliation with agnostic representations in the Reformation era. — Extent of agreement with Augustine and the scholastics on the general subject of God's essence and attributes. — Conception of God's eternity entertained by Socinians and by some Arminians. — Socinian theory respecting divine foreknowledge of the contingent. — Relation of foreknowledge to predestination as taught by Calvinistic writers. — View of the Arminians and others on this subject. — Question whether there is a *scientia media*. — Question whether the will of God is the absolute standard of right. — Prominence given in Reformation theology to the attribute of justice.

ii. 88-95

V. Starting-point for agnosticism in Kant's philosophy. — Opposite extreme in the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel. — Agnostic theories of Hamilton and Mansel, and the practical conclusions which they drew from them. — Criticism of their theories. — More common position in the present on man's competency to know God. — Modified view of the simplicity of the divine nature. — Specifications on God's eternity. — Question as to the possibility of foreknowledge of the free acts of men. — Relation of foreknowledge to foreordination. — The *scientia media*. — Relation of the will of God to the moral standard.

ii. 304-311

VII.

THE TRINITY.

I. Demand in religious thought for a theory of mediation between God and the world, and the shape which it would naturally assume with speculative minds 63, 64

Fitness of the Platonic theory of Ideas to serve as an antecedent of the Christian doctrine of the Logos. — Distinct evidence that some writers saw in the Ideas of Plato an image of the Logos. — Other suggestions in Plato of a plurality of Persons in the Godhead.

64-66

Anticipations in the Old Testament and other Jewish writings of the Logos doctrine. — Sources from which Philo drew. — Various aspects under which he portrays the Logos. — Question whether he regarded the Logos as personal. — Dorner's analysis of Philo's Logos. — Relation of Philo's doctrine of the Logos to the idea of incarnation, and to the coming of a Messiah 66-70

The most important antecedent of the Catholic doctrine of the Logos 70, 71

Proper expectation respecting the first attempts to construct the doctrine of the Logos, and the rule for judging these attempts. 71

Evidences of great unanimity of belief on the part of the early Church in the personal pre-existence of the Logos. — Special question on the interpretation of Athenagoras 72-74

Evidences of a marked tendency in the early Church to regard the Son as truly consubstantial with the Father. — Testimony of heathen criticism, Christian hymns, and the rule of faith. — Suggestions in the writings of the apostolic fathers. — Special characteristics of the representations of Justin Martyr and his co-apologists. — Distinctive phase in the teaching of Clement of Alexandria and Irenæus. — Particular interest which colored the representations of Tertullian and the writers who succeeded him. — Tributes of Origen to the proper divinity of the Son. — Dorner's comment on Origen's conception of the mode of the divine existence. — Statements of Dionysius of Alexandria, and of Lactantius 74-84

Points in which some of the early fathers admitted a subordination of the Son which was not allowed by the Nicene standard. — Subordination in the system of Origen. — Question whether Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria admitted an undue subordination of the Son.

84-89

Character of the earliest references to the Holy Spirit. — Recognition of the Holy Spirit in Christian life and worship. — Evidences of

belief in the personality of the Spirit. — Rank accorded to the Spirit by Origen 89-92

II. Antecedents of the Arian controversy. — Relative strength of the parties in the controversy apart from the effects of political pressure 194-197

Creed of the semi-Arians and their relative divergence from the other two parties 197

The Arian conception of the Son. — Arguments which the Arians drew from reason and from Scripture 198-200

The Catholic doctrine of the Son as stated in the Nicene creed. — Advance made by the Nicene fathers on the teaching of some of the preceding fathers. — Their representations respecting the nature of the Son's generation. — Evidence that they meant to teach that the Son is fully consubstantial with the Father. — Only subordination which they designed to allow. — Answers of Athanasius and others to the metaphysical objections of the Arians. — Answers to Arian inferences from Scripture 200-208

The Arian doctrine of the Holy Spirit. — Doctrine of the Macedonians. — Extent to which the personality of the Spirit was denied. 208, 209

The Catholic doctrine of the Holy Spirit as expressed in the creeds and the writings of the fathers. — Chief points urged in behalf of the divinity of the Spirit. — Question respecting the procession of the Spirit 209-211

Way in which the Nicene fathers reconciled the threefold personality with the unity of God. — Terminology of Catholic trinitarianism 211, 212

Respects in which the Augustinian representation of the Trinity differed from the Athanasian or Nicene. — Illustrations most used by Augustine. — Idea to which Augustine appeals in reconciling the tri-personality with the unity of God. — The creed representative of the Augustinian school 212-215

III. Heterodox theories of the Trinity taught by Roscelin and Gilbert. — Illustrations of Abelard. — Eckhart's view of the Divine Persons 337, 338

Illustration most used by the scholastics. — Necessity for a plurality of Divine Persons as urged by Richard of St. Victor 338, 339

Views in the East and the West respectively on the procession of the Spirit. — Considerations urged by Anselm and Aquinas respectively in behalf of the Western theory 339

IV. Attitude of Lutheran and Reformed theologians toward the Augustinian type of trinitarianism. — Statements of Calvin and oth-

ers in reference to the self-existence of the Son. — Gerhard on the reconciliation of the tri-personality and the unity of God. — Practical importance of the doctrine of the Trinity in the view of Lutheran dogmatists of the seventeenth century ii. 96, 97

Subordination of the Son and the Spirit as taught by the Arminians and by some Anglican divines ii. 97-99

Samuel Clarke's "Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity," and the strictures passed upon it ii. 99, 100

Attitude of the Quakers toward the Catholic definitions of the Trinity ii. 100

Theory of Servetus respecting the Son ii. 100

Opposition of the Socinians to trinitarianism. — Their conception of the nature of Christ, of the position occupied by Him since His ascension, and of the honors due to Him. — Socinian conception of the Holy Spirit ii. 100-102

John Biddle's view of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

ii. 102, 103

Views of Milton respecting the Son and the Spirit. — Question whether Locke and Sir Isaac Newton, were ill affected toward the trinitarian theory ii. 103

V. Place occupied by the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological thinking of the present. — Specifications on the philosophical demands for the doctrine. — Instances of dissent from the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son ii. 311-314

Trinitarians representing a somewhat emphatic subordinationism.

ii. 314

Schleiermacher's exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. — The Swedenborgian theory ii. 314, 315

Developments within the sphere of German rationalism. ii. 315

Different phases of belief among English and American Unitarians respecting the nature of Christ. — Unitarian definitions of the Holy Spirit ii. 315-318

VIII.

CREATION OF THE WORLD.

I. General position of the early Church as to creation *ex nihilo*. — Tertullian's reproach against Hermogenes. — God's motive in creating. — Theory of the Church generally as to the Mosaic days of creation. — Views of the Alexandrian fathers on this point. — Origen's reasons for extending God's creative agency back into eternity . . . 93-95

II. Position as to creation *ex nihilo*. — Augustine's answers to the reasons of Origen for carrying creation back into eternity. — Distinction made between creating the essence of things and shaping them into their distinct forms. — Association on the part of Augustine of the ideas of creation and preservation. — Views generally held respecting the days of the creative week. — Explanation of evils having their ground in the works of the Creator 216-218

III. Common verdict of the Scholastics as respects creation *ex nihilo*. — Ground of that verdict according to Aquinas and Duns Scotus. — Difference of conception involved by the different standpoints of the realists and nominalists. — Exceptional theories of Erigena and Eckhart. — Time employed in creation 340, 341

IV. Exceptional view of John Milton respecting creation. — Relation of creation to conservation. — Time employed in creation. — Appearance of the pre-Adamite theory ii. 104, 105

V. Instances of a disposition to modify the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. — Question respecting God's freedom in creation. — Breadth of the distinction between creation and preservation. — Various conceptions of the Mosaic account of creation ii. 319-323

IX.

ANGELS AND DEMONS.

I. Views respecting the nature of unfallen angels. — Evidence of a tendency to ascribe corporeity to angels 95, 96

Cause of Satan's fall as represented by several fathers on the one hand, and by Lactantius on the other. — Cause of the fall of the other evil angels. — Origin of demons 96

Agency of good angels in different spheres. — Agency of evil angels. — Cyprian's explanation of natural evils. — Care of the fathers to predicate suitable limits for angelic agency 96-98

Question whether the early Church conceded ought to the practice of worshipping angels 98

II. Statements of different writers relative to the corporeity of angels. — Classes and orders of angels according to the pseudo Dionysius 218-220

Augustine's theory of the gift of perseverance as applied to unfallen angels 220

- New interpretation of Gen. vi. 2-4, and its application to the fall of the angels 220, 221
 Views respecting the agency of good and of evil angels. 221, 222
 Extent to which the practice of angel-worship was countenanced. 222

III. The common verdict of mediæval writers on the question whether angels have bodies. — Discussion of curious questions of angelology. — The standard classification of angels . . 342, 343

IV. Decision of the majority of early Protestant theologians respecting a corporeal factor in angels. — Common position of Roman Catholic theologians on this point. — Views of Satanic agency on the part of Luther and Calvin. ii. 105, 106

V. Present state of the question concerning an angelic corporeity within the bounds of Romanism and Protestantism respectively. — Swedenborg's conception of the antecedents of all angels. — Attitude of German rationalism, in its culminating era, toward the doctrine of evil angels. — The counter current on this subject . . ii. 323, 324

X.

MAN.

I. Relative eminence ascribed to Adam. — Comments on the divine image and likeness in man. — The abode of unfallen man. — Choice between dichotomy and trichotomy. — Question whether the soul is purely incorporeal and naturally immortal. — Choice between creationism and traducianism. — Theory of pre-existence . . . 98-104

Interpretation of the narrative of the fall. — Negative statements regarding the connection of the race with Adam's trespass and regarding the inherited effects of that trespass. — Positive statements respecting the consequences of the fall. — General position of the early Church on this subject illustrated by comparison. — More common view of the death penalty denounced against the first sin . . . 104-108

Specifications of different writers on the nature of sin . 108-110

II. More common understanding of the divine image and likeness in man. — Twofold sense ascribed to the account of Paradise. — Tendency as respects choice between dichotomy and trichotomy. — Common

position relative to the doctrine of the soul's natural immortality. — Drift of opinion on the question whether the soul is purely incorporeal. — Choice between creationism and traducianism. — Theory of pre-existence 222-226

Catholic view of the essence of the fall. — Special fruitfulness of the period in theories respecting the results of the fall 226

General position of the Greek anthropology on the results of the fall 226-228

Chief distinction between the Greek and the early Latin anthropology. — Evidence that before the Pelagian controversy Latin writers did not stand upon an Augustinian platform. — Position of Augustine himself at this stage 228, 229

External history of the Pelagian controversy. — Religious experience of Pelagius as a factor in shaping his views. — Theoretical standpoint from which he proceeded. — The only results which he allowed to have descended from Adam's sin. — The only way, as he conceived, in which sin can be transmitted. — His idea of the essence of free will and of the genesis of moral character. — His inferences as to man's natural ability, and the scope to be assigned to grace. — Considerations which he adduced to justify his view of man's natural state . . . 229-234

Relation of Augustine's experience to his distinctive doctrines. — Innovating character of Augustinianism. — General contrast between Augustinianism and Pelagianism as to starting-point, spirit, and goal. — Augustine's conception of Adam's original estate. — His view of the essence of freedom. — Interpretation which he put upon the power of contrary choice in Adam. — His account of the sin of Adam. — The results of Adam's trespass upon himself and upon his posterity. — Explanation of corruption in the children of the regenerate. — Scriptural warrant adduced by Augustine for his doctrine of original sin. 234-239

Rise and leading representatives of semi-Pelagianism. — Points in which it was distinguished both from Pelagianism and Augustinianism. 239, 240

Moderate Augustinianism as represented by the council of Orange. — Points in which it differed from semi-Pelagianism and strict Augustinianism. — Degree to which it engaged the sympathies of the Church in after times 240, 241

Extent to which the negative conception of sin prevailed. — View of the relation of the body to evil. — Aspects of sin specially emphasized by Augustine 241-243

III. Specifications of the scholastics respecting the divine image and likeness in man. — Conception of original righteousness and the time of its bestowment. — Location of Paradise. — Length of Adam's sojourn there according to Abelard. — Common verdict as to the

divisions of human nature, the incorporeal essence of the soul, and its natural immortality. — Choice between creationism and traducianism 343-346

Erigena's exceptional interpretation of the story of the fall. — Results of the fall as taught by the Greek Church. — General cast of the development on this subject in the Latin Church . . . 346-348

Specifications of the scholastics on the nature of original sin and the way in which it is transmitted 348-352

Degree of recognition accorded by the scholastics to formal and real freedom respectively 352, 353

Instances of a close approximation to Augustine's view of the effects of the fall upon the free will. — Evidence of a wide-spread tendency to diverge from Augustine on this point . . 353-355

Scholastic definitions of moral evil. — Statements on the relation of evil to the perfection of the universe 355, 356

IV. Different views of the relative eminence of the unfallen Adam. — Roman Catholic theory of original righteousness, and of the divine image and likeness in man. — Contrasted theory of Lutheran and Reformed theologians. — Interpretation of the divine image by Socinian and Arminian writers. — Relative prevalence of dichotomy. — Instances of dissent from the doctrine of the purely incorporeal nature of the soul. — Force of the Socinian denial of man's natural immortality. — Choice between creationism and traducianism. — Theory of pre-existence ii. 106-110

Roman Catholic view of the relation of divine decrees to the fall. — Criticism of the Dominican theory of grace predominant. — More common definition of freedom among Romanists, as appears from the statements of Petavius, Bellarmin, and Suarez. — Roman Catholic theory as respects the elements entering into original sin. — Bellarmin's views on the proper definition of original sin, its imputation, and the mode of its propagation. — Suggestion of Nicole on the last point. — More prevalent theory in the Romish Church on the moral ability of the fallen man, as indicated by the Trent decrees, and the statements of Bellarmin, Bossuet, and Thomassin. — Theories of Baius, the Jansenists, the Jesuits who followed the lead of Molina, and the papacy as represented by the Bull *Unigenitus*. — Summary of the developments in the Romish Church as respects man's natural ability ii. 110-117

Tendency in the earlier stage of Lutheranism to more ultra views than claimed permanent acceptance. — Statements of Luther and Melancthon logically involving an irresistible decree of God for the fall. — Melancthon's later teaching, and the proper Lutheran theory on the subject. — Idea of freedom entertained by Luther, and by later theologians among the Lutherans. — Elements included in original

sin. — Question whether imputation is immediate or mediate, or both. — Employment of the traducian theory to explain the transmission of original sin. — Obnoxious theory ascribed to Matthias Flacius. — Degree of emphasis placed by the Lutheran theology on the moral inability of the fallen man ii. 117-121

Teaching of Zwingli on the relation of the divine decrees and agency to the fall. — Teaching of Calvin, Beza, Gomar, and others, on the same subject. — Statements of the Westminster Confession, and their interpretation by William Cunningham. — Conception of human freedom involved in representative statements of the Reformed theology, and question whether that theology relieves God from responsibility for the introduction of sin. — Exceptional teaching of Zwingli as respects original sin. — Similar view of Jeremy Taylor. — Elements included in original sin by Reformed theologians generally. — Question whether the earlier Reformed theory was in favor of immediate imputation. — Later decisions on this point. — Grounds urged in explanation of the guilt of original sin. — Explanation of the transmission of corruption. — Standard teaching of the Reformed Church on the moral inability of the fallen man. — Tendency in England to a modified type of Reformed theology ii. 121-129

Arminian teaching on the relation of the divine decrees to the fall. — Idea of contingency insisted upon by Arminius and others in their account of the fall. — Arminian definition of freedom. — Theory of original sin held by the followers of Arminius. — Distinction between the position of Arminius and that of his successors on the moral inability of the fallen man. — Quaker theory of original sin.

ii. 129-132

Socinian theories respecting the contingency of the fall, the nature of freedom, and the results of the fall upon Adam and his posterity.

ii. 132

Definitions of sin in Roman Catholic and in Protestant circles.

ii. 132, 133

V. Tone of more recent representations respecting the primal estate of Adam. — Attitude toward the Romish theory of original righteousness. — Interpretation of the Scriptural account of Paradise. — Proportion of recent theologians who advocate dichotomy. — Exposition of trichotomy. — Instances of a denial of the incorporeal nature of the soul. — Arguments for personal immortality. — Choice between creationism and traducianism. — Instances of a combination of the two theories. — Advocates of the soul's pre-existence . . ii. 324-329

General verdict of non-Calvinists on the relation of the divine will to the fall ii. 329

Extent of preference among recent Calvinists for the infra-lapsarian theory. — Import of a "permissive decree" in Calvinistic terminology.

— Representations of the Hopkinsian wing of the Edwardean school respecting the divine agency in the fall. — Criticism of the Hopkinsian view by the New Haven school, and the standpoint which it adopted. — Van Oosterzee on the same subject . . ii. 329-332

General position of non-Calvinists on the necessary conditions of freedom and responsibility. — Specifications of Müller and Whedon. — Conception of freedom taught by Reid, Dugald Stewart, Sir William Hamilton, and Kant ii. 332-336

Definition of freedom on the part of Calvinists. — Edwards's theory as proved by his statements. — His famous *reductio ad absurdum*, and comments on the same. — Statements savoring of necessitarianism on the part of the younger Edwards, Hopkins, Emmons, Griffin, and Woods. — Verdict of East Windsor and Princeton as represented by Lawrence and Atwater. — Approval of the Edwardean maxim on responsibility by the above writers. — Declarations of Hodge concerning responsibility ii. 336-339

Modification of the Edwardean theory of freedom and responsibility by more recent New England theologians. — Views of Finney of Oberlin ii. 339, 340

Instance of departure, within the bounds of Romanism, from the standard doctrine of original sin ii. 340

Question among Lutherans, Reformed, and Methodists as to whether original sin includes the element of guilt. — Unitarian view of original sin ii. 340-342

Different theories offered in explanation of the guilt of original sin. — Different explanations of the transmission of corruption. — Novel theory of Emmons ii. 342, 343

Modification of the old Lutheran view of the moral inability of the natural man. — Position of Old School Calvinism on this subject. — Distinctions emphasized by the New England school. — Force of the declaration, in Methodist theology, of man's natural inability . . ii. 344

Recent theories respecting the nature and origin of sin. — Different views of the relation of sin to the aggregate good of the universe.

ii. 344-347

XI.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

I. Portraiture of Christ which appears in general in early Christian literature. — Occasion for emphasis upon Christ's possession of a real body. — Peculiarities attributed to Christ's body by Clement of Alexandria and Origen. — Question whether any of the early fathers denied

the presence of a rational human soul in Christ. — Common view as to the permanence of the incarnation 111-115

II. Theory of Apollinaris. — Its relation to the Arian Christology. — Arguments urged in its behalf. — Criticisms passed upon it and the time of its formal condemnation 244, 245

Degree of prominence given to the human aspect of Christ by the orthodox contemporaries of Apollinaris. — Noteworthy ideas of Hilary 245, 246

The diverse standpoints of the Alexandrian and the Antiochian schools viewed as antecedents of the Nestorian controversy. — Immediate occasion of the attack upon Nestorius. — Proximate result as seen in the council of Ephesus and in the creed which supplemented its action 246-248

The theory of Eutyches, and the events to which it gave occasion. 248

Statement of Christology by the council of Chalcedon. — Comments on the creed of Chalcedon by different parties 248, 249

Closing stages of the christological controversies. — Schismatic bodies which continued as memorials of the strife 249, 250

Sense in which the doctrine of the kenosis was admitted 251

III. Interpretation of the creed of Chalcedon in the Greek Church as represented by John of Damascus 357, 358

The Western type of Christology as preparing the soil for Adoptionism. — Chief exponents of Adoptionism, and the circumstances of its overthrow. — Its peculiarity. — Arguments for and against. — Bias characteristic of Western Christology after the controversy with Adoptionism 358-360

Nihilian theory, and the connection of Peter Lombard therewith. 360

Extent to which a *communicatio idiomatum* was acknowledged. 360, 361

IV. Primal occasion of the Lutheran doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. — Melancthon's attitude toward this doctrine. — Dispute which the Formula of Concord was designed to settle. — Points which the Tübingen and Giessen theologians held in common, and points upon which they differed ii. 134-136

Attitude of the Reformed Church toward the special features of the Lutheran Christology. — Views of Roman Catholic theologians. — List of peculiar views held by different parties ii. 136, 137

V. Recent christological ideas outside the current of Catholic belief. — Relative interest of the present age in the theme of Christ's person ii. 348, 349

The doctrine of the kenosis as developed by Thomasius, Gess, Ebrard, and others. — Dorner's substitute for the kenotic theories. — Theory of H. M. Goodwin. — Bearing of the kenotic theory upon the old Lutheran Christology ii. 349-353
Theories of a pre-existent humanity of Christ ii. 353

XII.

THE REDEMPITIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

I. General character of the exposition of Christ's work in the early Church. — Propositions embodying the various points of belief commonly advocated by the early fathers 115-121

Question whether Irenæus entertained the theory that the redemptive price was paid to Satan. — Origen's concessions to this theory. — Evidence that Origen gave equal emphasis to other aspects of the redemptive work 121-124

References to Christ's descent into Hades, and to the work which He was supposed to have accomplished there. — Time when the doctrine of the descent first obtained a place in the symbols of the Church. 124, 125

II. Most conspicuous example in the Greek Church of the acknowledgment of Satan's claims, and of the payment of the redemptive price to him. — Extent of acceptance gained by this theory in the Greek Church. — The one element of the theory that claimed recognition in the Latin Church. — Statements of Augustine, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great. — The way in which, as they taught, the claim of Satan was cancelled 251-254

Various aspects of Christ's redemptive work as recognized by Greek and by Latin writers. — Factors in the moral influence of Christ upon which Augustine dwelt in particular 254-257

Doctrine of Christ's descent into Hades. — Question whether any other way of saving men than the one adopted was possible. 257, 258

III. The endeavor of Anselm in his *Cur Deus Homo*. — His treatment of Satan's right. — The conception of obligation to God, from which his theory of the atonement proceeds. — Position taken as to the need of the atonement, the ground of its adequacy, and the manner in which it was accomplished 361-364

Abelard's theory. — Points emphasized by other scholastics, and

respects in which they diverged from Anselm. — The maximum of this divergence as seen in Duns Scotus 364-369

Conclusions rendered on the question whether Christ would have become incarnate if man had not sinned 369, 370

IV. Choice between different mediæval theories in the Roman Catholic Church ii. 138

Respect in which Lutheran and Reformed theories were in affinity with that of Anselm. — Points in which they differed from the Anselmic theory. — Deviating views of Piscator, Tillotson, and Baxter. ii. 138-142

Conception of law advocated by Hugo Grotius, and his application of it to the doctrine of the atonement. — Respect in which leading Arminians agreed with Grotius, and the point in which they modified his theory ii. 142-145

Socinian conception of divine justice. — Aspects of Christ's work recognized by the Socinians. — Sense in which they admitted that the death of Christ was an expiatory sacrifice. — Their objections to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction. — Comments on the objections. ii. 145-151

Specifications on Christ's descent into Hades by Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed theologians ii. 152

V. Different theories of the atonement in recent times, and the patrons of each. — Decisions on the question whether the active obedience of Christ was a factor in his atoning work . . . ii. 353-361

Direction of attention recently to Christ's descent into Hades, in connection with questions of eschatology. — Interpretation of Scripture bearing on the subject ii. 361, 362

Verdict of different theologians on the question whether the incarnation was dependent on the fact of sin ii. 362

XIII.

APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

I. View in the early Church respecting the spiritual opportunities of all men. — Sense in which the divine predestination was understood. — Specifications of Origen on this subject . . . 125-127

Element of time in the work of moral renovation 127

Instances of emphasis upon faith as the pre-eminent means in appropriating salvation. — Sense in which the term "justification" was used. — Views of the nature of faith, and of its relation to knowledge.

— Some initial tendencies toward a legal *régime* as opposed to the sole office of faith in the appropriation of grace 127-132

II. Common view of the Church, apart from Augustine and those influenced by his teaching, on the subject of free agency and electing grace. — Augustine's doctrine as respects God's sovereign choice, the reason for His choice of one and rejection of another, the gift which must be added to regeneration to insure a place among the elect, the relative number of the elect, the relation of the divine will to the non-elect, and the Scriptural proof of his view of election. — Augustine's view as to the essential relations of foreknowledge and predestination 258-262

Meaning attributed to the terms "regeneration" and "justification" 262, 263

Statements of Augustine on the nature of faith and on its relation to knowledge 263, 264

Tendencies to displace faith in Christ from a complete pre-eminence in the appropriation of salvation 264-267

III. Views of the Greek Church as represented by John of Damascus 370

The controversy over the twofold predestination taught by Gottschalk and the index which it supplies of the feeling of the Latin Church toward the strict Augustinian theory of predestination. — Statements bearing on the subject from theologians between Gottschalk and Alexander Hales. — Thomas Aquinas on predestination. — Indications of a drift adverse to strict predestinarianism. — Views of Bradwardine and Wycliffe 370-375

Scholastic definitions of regeneration and justification. — Scholastic doctrine of assurance as stated by Thomas Aquinas. — Specifications on the nature of faith 376, 377

Scholastic doctrine of merit and of the virtue of indulgences.

377-380

Theory of saint-worship. — Dogmatic opinions respecting the Virgin which were generally received. — Position of leading theologians on the subject of the Virgin's immaculate conception. — Honors rendered to Mary. — Wycliffe on saint-worship 380-383

IV. Interests moving the early Protestants to revert to the Augustinian standpoint ii. 153

Different opinions on the subject of predestination which claimed adherents in the Roman Catholic Church. — Bearing of papal bulls and the Trent decrees on the subject. — Different theories suggested as to the way in which the predestinating decrees are fulfilled.

ii. 153-158

Manner in which Luther in his later years qualified his predestinarian theory. — Position taken in Lutheran creeds and by Lutheran writers generally. — Propositions of Quenstedt giving a summary of Lutheran teaching on predestination. — Lack of congruity between the Lutheran doctrine on this subject and the declarations of the Formula of Concord. — Definitions of conversion and regeneration as given by Hollaz ii. 159-162.

Relative prominence of the doctrine of predestination in the Reformed Church. — Main differences on this subject between Zwingli and Calvin. — Respects in which Calvin's theory of predestination went beyond Augustine's. — Propositions advocated by Calvin. — Statements of Beza and other Calvinists. — Creeds which are most explicit in their statement of the predestinarian dogma. — Inference drawn as to the extent of the atonement. — Theory of Amyraut and some others on the extent of the atonement, and estimate of the practical worth of the theory. — Two different theories as to the order of the predestinating decrees. — Calvinistic theory of conversion . . ii. 162-168

Points emphasized by the Arminians in opposition to the dogma of unconditional predestination. — Strictures which they passed upon that dogma. — Spread of the Arminian views in the Church of England. — Position of the Quakers on the universality of grace.

ii. 168-170

Data which must be taken into the account in judging of the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification. — Principal points in the decisions of the Council of Trent upon this subject. — Comments upon the decisions. — Bellarmin's exposition of the doctrine of justification. — Relative place which he assigns to the sacraments in the justifying process. — His teaching as to the nature of justifying faith. — Office which he assigns to good works ii. 170-174

Significance of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone. — His understanding of justification. — Meaning which he attached to the faith that justifies. — Evidence that Luther knew how to value good works when they are relegated to their proper sphere.

ii. 174-176

Points embraced in the theory of justification that gained the ascendancy among the Protestants. — Special views of Osiander, some of the Arminians, Bishop Bull, Jeremy Taylor, and the Quakers.

ii. 176-178

Teaching respecting assurance, on the part of Roman Catholics, the Reformers, and the later Protestant writers of the period.

ii. 178-180

Dominant theory of Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the possibility of complete freedom from sin in this life. — Exception to this theory as taken by Arminians and Quakers. — Conclusion involved in Roman Catholic tenets ii. 180, 181

V. Amount of acceptance commanded in the Romish Church by Augustine's doctrine of predestination. — Statements of Möhler bearing on the subject ii. 362-364

Attitude of the Lutheran and the German Reformed Church in recent times toward the strict doctrine of predestination. — Teaching of Schleiermacher and of Rothe on the subject. — Rothe, Nitzsch, and Martensen on the doctrine of perseverance. — Prominence of the Melancthonian synergism in recent Lutheran dogmatics ii. 364-366

Instances of a staunch advocacy of the peculiarities of Calvinism among Scotch and American Presbyterians ii. 366, 367

The New England school upon predestination, extent of atonement, regeneration, and the agency of truth in regeneration ii. 367-369

Methodism on predestination, extent of the atonement, and universal grace. — Guarded character of the synergism which it inculcates. — Sense which it commonly imputes to regeneration. — Position on the agency of truth in regeneration ii. 369, 370

The *ordo salutis* as recognized in different communions. ii. 370

More common verdict of Calvinistic writers on the question whether justification includes a plurality of elements. — Position of Emmons on this subject. — Position of Wesley and Methodist theologians. — Wesley's interpretation of the "imputation of righteousness" and of the "imputation of faith for righteousness" ii. 370-372

Exceptions to the common Protestant doctrine of justification on the part of English Ritualists, Schleiermacher and some other German writers, F. D. Maurice, Horace Bushnell, and Elisha Mulford. — Comment of F. H. Hedge on the theory of justification urged by superficial rationalism ii. 372-374

Common position in the present on the question whether assurance is of the essence of justifying faith. — Wesleyan doctrine of assurance. — Extent to which exception has been taken thereto. ii. 374-376

Different ways among Methodists of presenting the doctrine of Christian perfection. — The Wesleyan definition of Christian perfection. — Respect in which the Oberlin doctrine differs from the Wesleyan ii. 376, 377

XIV.

THE CHURCH.

I. Rise of the idea and name of the "Catholic Church." — Extent to which the early fathers emphasized union with the Church as a condition of salvation. — Degree to which the distinction between the

visible and invisible Church was apprehended. — Place assigned to the bishops in general and to the Bishop of Rome in particular.

133-136

II. Tendencies to ecclesiasticism. — Definitions of the Church by Augustine and the Donatists. — Augustine and others on the question of the possibility of salvation outside the visible Church. — Rank and dogmatic authority of the Roman bishop as evinced in particular by the record of the ecumenical councils 268-270

III. Era of the culmination of the papal theocracy. — Dominant ideas respecting the Church at this time in Latin Christendom. — Definition by the Popes of their prerogatives. — Statements of some of the earlier theologians of the period bearing on the papal dignity. — Statements of those who belonged to the crowning era of scholasticism. — Claims made at the council of Constance respecting the relative authority of an ecumenical council. — Wycliffe on the hierarchy. — Relation of the ecclesiastical theory of the leading scholastics to spiritual despotism. — Decree of the Fourth Lateran Council.

384-388

IV. Bellarmin's definition of the Church. — His specifications on the relation of the Church to the infliction of corporal punishments. — His position on granting liberty of belief. — Immunities and prerogatives which he assigns to the Pope. — Most noteworthy instance of the assertion of the Gallican theory ii. 182-185

Standard definitions of the Church among Protestants. — Distinction drawn between the visible and the invisible Church. — Disparity between the logical outcome of Protestant principles in respect of tolerance, and the theory and practice of some Protestants. — Progress of tolerance in the seventeenth century. — Conception of Christian priesthood and of church government commonly entertained by Protestants. — Tone of the Protestant polemic against Romanism.

ii. 185-191

V. General current of Protestant thought, in recent times, as respects the nature of the Church. — Contrasted theories of the High Church and the Broad Church party. — Views of the proper relation of Church and State ii. 378, 379

Decrees of the Vatican council of 1869 and 1870 on the administrative authority and the doctrinal infallibility of the Pope. — Scope of papal infallibility. — Prominent argument urged in its defence.

ii. 379-381

Noteworthy statement of Perrone respecting the possible salvation of some not formally inducted into the [Roman] Catholic Church.

ii. 381, 382

XV.

THE SACRAMENTS.

VARIOUS ITEMS RESPECTING THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.

I. Sense in which the term "sacrament" was employed in the first centuries 136

II. Augustine's definition of a sacrament. — Range still given to the term. — List of sacraments presented by the pseudo Areopagite 270, 271

III. Scholastic definitions of a sacrament. — Different views as to the relation of the grace of the sacrament to the visible sign. — Statements as to the human conditions of the gracious working of a sacrament. — Progress toward fixing the number of the sacraments.
388-391

IV. Specifications of the council of Trent on the number of the sacraments, their necessity, the mode of their working, and the dependence of their efficacy upon the intention of the administrator. — Bellarmin's exposition of the technical phrase describing the working of a sacrament. — Bellarmin and others respecting the intention of the priest ii. 191-194

The earlier and the later position of Protestantism as to the number of the sacraments. — Different degrees of stress upon the necessity of the sacraments. — More common definition of a sacrament. — Different points emphasized by Zwingli and Calvin respectively. — The Lutheran conception of the sacraments, and comparison of the same with the Roman Catholic theory. — Common attitude of Protestants toward the doctrine of intention ii. 194-196

V. View of the sacraments favored by rationalists in the Lutheran Church. — View finding advocates among English Ritualists. — Mystical view advocated by representatives of the German Reformed Church ii. 382

Recent interpretations of the Romish doctrine of intention.

ii. 382, 383

BAPTISM.

I. Importance attached to baptism in the early Church. — Sense in which it was made the rite of regeneration. — Practice and teaching

respecting infant baptism. — Discussion and settlement of the question of rebaptizing. — Position of the Church as to the mode.

136-139

II. Conditions of the efficacy of baptism as specified by Augustine and others. — Spiritual results associated with baptism. — Position of leading writers on the question whether the unbaptized can be saved. — Future state of unbaptized infants 271-274

III. Position of the scholastics on the conditions of valid and efficacious baptism. — References to the mode. — Effects commonly attributed to the rite. — Exceptions allowed to the necessity of baptism 391-393

IV. Specifications of Romish standards on the effects of baptism. — Teaching of Bellarmine, Nicole, Bossuet, and the Trent Catechism respecting the fate of unbaptized infants ii. 196, 197

The Lutheran theory of baptism as compared with the Roman Catholic. — Position on the baptism of infants . . ii. 197, 198

The Reformed view of the necessity of baptism as compared with the Lutheran. — Statements of Reformed standards on the effects of baptism. — Respects in which the Reformed theory of infant baptism differed from the Lutheran. — Eccentric view of Henry Dodwell. — Continued force of baptism as affirmed by Lutheran and Reformed theologians ii. 198-202

Socinian view of baptism. — The Quaker theory. — Statement of the Baptist Confession of 1688. — Position of the Mennonites on immersion ii. 202

V. Protestant and Roman Catholic views respecting the necessity of baptism and the fate of unbaptized infants. — Developments in the Lutheran Church on the subject of baptismal regeneration. — Different interpretations in the Episcopal Church of the regeneration of infants in baptism. — Wesley, Watson, later Methodists, and others, on the efficacy of the baptism of infants. — The function of baptism as commonly explained by Baptists ii. 383-386

THE EUCHARIST.

I. Canon for interpreting references to the eucharist. — Evidence that the doctrine of transubstantiation had no advocates in the early Church. — Sense in which the eucharist was regarded as a sacrifice 139-144

II. Causes tending to magnify the import of the eucharist. — Proof that transubstantiation was not an acknowledged doctrine of the

Church. — Consideration of the question whether it was held by individual writers. — Gieseler's statement of the positive theory which was current. — Emphasis upon the sacrificial aspect. . . 274-281

III. John of Damascus and the Greek Church on the doctrine of transubstantiation. — First specific elaboration and defence of this doctrine in the Latin Church. — Way in which it was received at first. — Date of its authoritative sanction. — Subsequent examples of dissent. — Specifications ill agreeing with the asserted reality of the body and blood. — Stress upon the sacrificial aspect. — Practical consequences of the scholastic doctrine of the real presence. 393-399

IV. Prominence of the eucharistic question in the Reformation era. — Points in the Romish doctrine of the eucharist asserted by the council of Trent. — Bellarmin's attempt to construe the doctrine speculatively ii. 203-205

The Lutheran doctrine of the eucharist, and the points in which it differed from the Roman Catholic. — Conception of the ascension of Christ connected with the Lutheran theory. — Specifications on the mode of the real presence ii. 205, 206

Zwingli's interpretation of the words of institution and general view of the sacrament. — Calvin's theory, and the extent of its currency. — The theory intermediate between the Zwinglian and the Calvinian, and its relation to the drift of the Reformed Church.

ii. 206-209

V. Recent developments in the Lutheran Church. — Views of Ritualists in the English Church. — Theory of Ebrard and Nevin. — Theories most patronized in other quarters of Protestantism.

ii. 386, 387

OTHER SACRAMENTS.

I.-III. The formula for the sacrament of confirmation. — Rule of the Greek and the Latin Church respectively as to the qualified agent 393

General position of the Church in the earlier periods as respects confession and absolution. — Development of the scholastic doctrine of the sacrament of penance. — The function assigned to indulgences 399-402

Scholastic exposition of extreme unction, holy orders, and marriage 402-403

Estimate of the scholastic doctrine of the sacraments . . . 404

IV. Decrees of the council of Trent respecting the sacrament of penance. — Luther and the Lutherans on confession and abso-

lution. — Position of Reformed Confessions and writers on these subjects ii. 209-211

Trent decisions respecting marriage, and the opposing decisions by Protestants ii. 211, 212

V. Statement of Perrone respecting the efficacy of indulgences for the dead ii. 388

XVI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

CHILIASM.

I. Indications that the theory of a personal reign of Christ upon earth, prior to the general judgment, was very prevalent in the early Church. — Causes initiating a decline of chiliasm . . . 145-147

II. Instances of the advocacy of chiliasm. — General position of the Church. — Augustine's interpretation of the thousand years mentioned in the Apocalypse 282

III. Extent to which chiliasm found recognition in mediæval thought 405

IV. Attitude of the larger Protestant communions toward the chiliastic or millenarian theory. — Views of various persons and parties in England and on the Continent ii. 213

V. Recent advocates of the millennial or pre-millennial theory. — Points included in the theory as presented by Seiss. — Lack of agreement among millenarians as respects details ii. 389-391

CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.

I. Evidence that the early fathers believed in an intermediate state. — Their conception of this state. — Opinions as to the possibility of escaping from Hades before the resurrection. — Phrases or ideas having affinity with the doctrine of Purgatory . . 147-150

II. General representation of the intermediate state at the opening of the period. — Development of the theory of Purgatory, and its reaction upon the conception of the intermediate state . . 282-285

III. Scholastic specifications as regards the immediate fortunes of different classes in the other world, the geography of Purgatory, the nature of its fire, the degree of pain which it inflicts, and the length of the purgatorial process. — Authoritative promulgation of the doctrine of Purgatory 405, 406

IV. Attitude of the early Protestants toward the doctrine of Purgatory. — Extent to which they recognized an intermediate state. — Instances of the advocacy of the sleep of the dead . . ii. 213, 214

Difference between the Greek and the Latin Church as respects the doctrine of Purgatory. — Scriptures which Bellarmin adduces as a warrant for the doctrine ii. 214, 215

V. Tendencies within Protestant circles to a more emphatic recognition of an intermediate state. — Recent advocates of the sleep of the dead ii. 391, 392

THE RESURRECTION.

I. More common theory of the Resurrection in the early Church. — Views of Origen. — Arguments used to establish the credibility of the resurrection 150-152

II. Indications that the literal view was predominant. — Distinguishing features of the glorified body as enumerated by Augustine. 285, 286

III. Common theory of the scholastics as to the identity of the future with the present body. — Views of Erigena and Durandus. — Suggestions of Aquinas as to the peculiarities of the resurrected body 407

IV. Absence of new developments in the Reformation era. — Cudworth and More on the body of the intermediate state . . ii. 215

V. Account by Kahnis of the developments in the Lutheran Church in the last two centuries. — Different theories now having place in the theological world ii. 392-395

FINAL AWARDS.

I. Position of the early Church on the subject of future probation. — Evidence of a common belief that the general judgment is to seal the permanent fortunes of souls. — Sense in which Origen taught restorationism, and the motives at the basis of his teaching. — Representations on the nature of future awards 152-155

II. Instances of the advocacy of restorationism. — Indications that the Church in general discountenanced restorationism. — Nature of future punishment. — The Augustinian view of future rewards.

286-290

III. Sense in which Erigena taught restorationism. — Specifications of the scholastics respecting the nature and the gradations of future punishment. — Conception of future reward most dwelt upon by the mystics. — Question whether Erigena and Eckhart taught the doctrine of absorption into Deity 407-411

IV. Fewness of the exceptions to the doctrine of endless punishment. — Advocates of annihilation. — Views of Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians on the nature of future punishment. — William Sherlock's justification of endless punishment . . . ii. 215-217

V. Common attitude in the eighteenth century toward the notion of future probation. — Writers of the present century, belonging to evangelical communions, who have shown a leaning to restorationism. — Noteworthy advocates of the annihilation of the incorrigible. — Statements of Van Oosterzee as representative of a large body of theologians. — Views of the nature of future punishment. ii. 395, 396

Phases of restorationism which have been taught among Universalists. — Extent to which restorationism is advocated by Unitarians. — Position of F. H. Hedge ii. 397, 398

Recent declarations of Roman Catholic writers on the condition of unbaptized infants ii. 398

Swedenborgian and other representations of the heavenly life.

ii. 398, 399

INDEX OF MAIN THEMES.

- ABSOLUTION**, 400 *f.*, ii. 209 *ff.*
Adoptionists, 295 *f.*, 358 *f.*
Agnosticism, 57 *f.*, 189 *ff.*, 331 *f.*, ii. 88 *f.*, 233 *f.*, 256 *f.*, 304 *ff.*
Albigenses, 297.
Angels, 95 *ff.*, 218 *ff.*, 342 *f.*, ii. 105 *f.*, 323 *f.*
Annihilation, 153, ii. 215 *f.*, 396, 398.
Anthropology, 98 *ff.*, 222 *ff.*, 343 *ff.*, ii. 106 *ff.*, 324 *ff.*
Anthropomorphism, 59 *f.*, 189.
Arianism, 194 *ff.*, 297, ii. 33, 103, 265, 279, 315.
Aristotelianism, 164 *f.*, 302 *ff.*, ii. 13, 25.
Arminians, ii. 34 *f.*, 46, 79 *f.*, 130 *f.*, 168 *f.*
Assurance, 376, ii. 178 *ff.*, 374 *ff.*
Atonement. See "Redemptive Work."
Attributes of God, 57 *ff.*, 192 *ff.*, 334 *ff.*, ii. 89 *ff.*, 307 *ff.*
Attrition, ii. 401.
Authors, 32 *ff.*, 175 *ff.*, 311 *ff.*, ii. 43 *ff.*, 261 *ff.*

BAPTISM, 136 *ff.*, 271 *ff.*, 391 *ff.*, ii. 196 *ff.*, 383 *ff.*
Baptists, ii. 35 *f.*, 279 *f.*
Bible. See "Scriptures."
Bogomiles, 296.
Broad Church, ii. 275.

CANON, 37 *ff.*, ii. 62 *f.*, 67 *f.*
Cathari, 297.
Chiliasm. See "Millenarianism."
Christology, 111 *ff.*, 244 *ff.*, 357 *ff.*, ii. 184 *ff.*, 348 *ff.*
Church, the, 133 *ff.*, 268 *ff.*, 384 *ff.*, ii. 182 *ff.*, 378 *ff.*
Church and State, 173 *f.*, 385 *f.*, ii. 183 *f.*, 379.

Church government, Protestant views of, ii. 190, 378 *f.*
Church of England, ii. 31 *f.*, 40 *f.*, 46 *ff.*, 53, 98 *ff.*, 169, 190, 201, 274 *f.*
Communicatio idiomatum, 360 *f.*, ii. 134 *ff.*, 352.
Confession, 399 *ff.*, ii. 209 *ff.*
Confirmation, 393.
Congregationalists, ii. 32, 277 *ff.*, 336 *ff.*
Creation, 93 *ff.*, 216 *ff.*, 340 *f.*, ii. 104 *f.*, 319 *ff.*
Creationism, 104, 225, 346, ii. 109, 328 *f.*
Creeds, 201, 209, 248 *f.*, 339, 415, ii. 37 *ff.*, 280 *f.*, 379 *ff.*
Criticism, Biblical, ii. 81 *ff.*, 293 *ff.*

DEISM, 6 *f.*, ii. 81, 274, 293 *f.*
Demons, 96, 119, 221 *f.*
Descent of Christ to Hades, 124 *f.*, 257, 369, ii. 152, 361 *f.*
Devil, 96, 98, 121 *ff.*, 220, 343, ii. 106, 323 *f.*
Dichotomy, 101 *f.*, 224, 346, ii. 108, 325.

EBIONISM, 24 *ff.*
Edwardean theology, ii. 277 *f.*, 336 *ff.*, 356, 361, 367 *f.*
Episcopal Church, Protestant, ii. 275 *f.*
Eternity of God, 58, 62, 193 *f.*, 335 *f.*, ii. 89 *f.*, 308 *f.*
Eucharist, 139 *ff.*, 274 *ff.*, 393 *ff.*, ii. 203 *ff.*, 386 *f.*
Existence of God, 53 *ff.*, 187 *ff.*, 328 *ff.*, ii. 84 *ff.*, 300 *ff.*
Extreme unction, 402 *f.*

FAITH, 127 *ff.*, 263 *f.*, 376 *f.*, ii. 173, 175 *ff.*

- Foreknowledge, 126, 258, 261 *f.*, 336, ii. 90 *ff.*, 309 *f.*
 Fraticelli, 298.
 Freedom, moral, 106, 108, 231 *f.*, 235 *ff.*, 352 *ff.*, ii. 111 *f.*, 118 *f.*, 124 *f.*, 129 *f.*, 132, 332 *ff.*
- GALLICANISM, ii. 185.
 Gnosticism, 28 *f.*
 Greek Church, 293 *ff.*, ii. 43, 67, 214 *f.*
- IMAGE of God in man, 99 *f.*, 222 *f.*, 343 *f.*, ii. 107 *f.*, 324 *f.*
 Immortality, 102 *ff.*, 153, 224, 346, ii. 109, 327 *f.*
 Independents. See "Congregationalists."
 Indulgences, 379, 402, ii. 172, 388.
 Infallibility, papal, 270, 326 *f.*, 386 *f.*, ii. 185, 379 *ff.*
 Infra-lapsarian theory, ii. 167, 330.
 Inspiration, 42 *ff.*, 178 *ff.*, 323, ii. 75 *ff.*, 284 *ff.*
 Intention, doctrine of, 390, ii. 191 *ff.*, 382 *f.*
 Intermediate state, 147 *ff.*, 282 *ff.*, 405 *f.*, ii. 213 *ff.*, 391 *f.*
- JANSENISTS, ii. 59 *f.*, 75, 115, 153 *f.*
 Jesuits, ii. 59 *f.*, 75, 115 *f.*, 156.
 Justification, 128, 262 *f.*, 376, ii. 170 *ff.*, 370 *ff.*
- KENOSIS, 251, ii. 135 *f.*, 349 *ff.*
- Logos, 63 *ff.*
 Lutherans, ii. 30, 37 *ff.*, 43 *f.*, 50 *f.*, 76 *ff.*, 117 *ff.*, 134 *ff.*, 138 *f.*, 159 *ff.*, 174 *ff.*, 179, 194 *ff.*, 205 *f.*, 269 *ff.*, 364 *f.*, 386.
- MACEDONIANS, 208 *f.*
 Manichæism, 30.
 Marriage, 403, ii. 211 *f.*
 Merit, 377 *ff.*, ii. 171 *ff.*
 Methodists, ii. 261 *ff.*, 369 *ff.*, 375 *ff.*
 Millenarianism, or Chiliasm, 145 *ff.*, 282, 405, ii. 213, 389 *ff.*
 Monarchianism, 30 *ff.*
 Monasticism, 171 *ff.*
 Monophysites, 250.
- Monothelites, 250.
 Montanism, 24, 43 *f.*
 Moravians, ii. 261.
 Mysticism, 317 *f.*, 320, 322 *f.*, ii. 57 *f.*, 61.
- NEO-PLATONISM, 165 *ff.*, 307 *f.*, 315, ii. 13, 19.
 Nestorianism, 247 *f.*
 Nominalism, 308 *ff.*, 337.
- OLD CATHOLICS, ii. 280.
 Omnipotence, 61, 63, 194.
 Omnipresence, 58, 60, 193, 335, ii. 89 *f.*
 Omniscience, 335 *f.* See "Foreknowledge."
 Orders, holy, sacrament of, 403.
 Original righteousness, 344 *f.*, ii. 107 *f.*, 324 *f.*
 Original sin, 105 *ff.*, 226 *ff.*, 347 *ff.*, ii. 112 *f.*, 119 *f.*, 125 *ff.*, 130 *f.*, 132, 340 *ff.*
- PAPACY, 135 *f.*, 270, 326 *f.*, 384 *ff.*, ii. 184 *f.*, 379 *ff.*
 Paradise, 100 *f.*, 223, 345 *f.*, ii. 325.
 Paulicians, 296.
 Pelagianism, 229 *ff.*
 Penance, sacrament of, 399 *ff.*, ii. 209 *ff.*
 Perfection, Christian, ii. 180 *f.*, 376 *f.*
 Pessimism, ii. 249 *f.*
 Philosophy, 11 *ff.*, 163 *ff.*, 301 *ff.*, ii. 13 *ff.*, 223 *ff.*
 Pietism, ii. 57, 269 *f.*
 Platonism, 14 *ff.*, 164 *f.*, 302 *ff.*, ii. 13, 19.
 Positivism, ii. 252 *f.*
 Pre-Adamite theory, ii. 105.
 Predestination, 125 *ff.*, 229, 239, 258 *ff.*, 370 *ff.*, ii. 110, 117 *f.*, 121 *ff.*, 129, 153 *ff.*, 329 *ff.*, 362 *ff.*
 Pre-existence of souls, 104, ii. 110, 329.
 Presbyterians, ii. 31, 276 *f.*
 Preservation, 217, ii. 104, 321.
 Priesthood, Protestant view of, ii. 189 *f.*
 Punishment, future, 152 *ff.*, 287 *ff.*, 408 *ff.*, ii. 215 *ff.*, 395 *ff.*
 Purgatory, 149 *f.*, 283 *ff.*, 405 *f.*, ii. 214 *f.*
- QUAKERS, ii. 36 *f.*, 74 *f.*, 189, 202.

- RATIONALISM**, German, ii. 270 *f.* 294 *ff.*
Realism, 308 *ff.*, 337, 340.
Redemptive work of Christ, 115 *ff.*,
 251 *ff.*, 361 *ff.*, ii. 188 *ff.*, 353 *ff.*
Reformation, the, ii. 3 *ff.*
Reformed, the, ii. 30 *f.*, 37 *ff.*, 44 *ff.*,
 51 *ff.*, 78 *ff.*, 121 *ff.*, 136, 139 *ff.*,
 162 *ff.*, 176 *f.*, 179 *f.*, 194 *ff.*, 206 *ff.*,
 273 *f.*
Regeneration, 128, 137 *f.*, 262, 376,
 ii. 162, 198, 200 *f.*, 367 *f.*, 377,
 384 *ff.*
Remonstrants, ii. 34. See "Armini-
 ans."
Restorationism, 153 *ff.*, 286 *ff.*, 407 *f.*,
 ii. 215, 395 *ff.*
Resurrection, 150 *ff.*, 285 *f.*, 407, ii.
 215, 392 *ff.*
Rewards, future, 155, 289 *f.*, 410, ii.
 398 *f.*
Ritualism, or **Tractarianism**, ii. 275 *f.*,
 283 *f.*, 382, 386 *f.*

SACRAMENTS, 136 *ff.*, 270 *ff.*, 388 *ff.*, ii.
 191 *ff.*, 382 *ff.*
Saint-worship, 132, 266, 380 *ff.*, ii.
 172.
Scholasticism, 314 *ff.*
Scientia media, ii. 92, 310.
Scriptures, 37 *ff.*, 178 *ff.*, 323 *ff.*, ii. 7 *f.*,
 61 *ff.*, 281 *ff.*
Semi-Pelagianism, 239 *f.*
Sensationalism, ii. 17, 20, 231, 253 *ff.*
Sin, its nature and origin, 108 *ff.*,
 241 *ff.*, 355 *f.*, ii. 132 *f.*, 344 *ff.*

Socinians, ii. 33 *f.*, 42, 46, 100 *ff.*, 132,
 146 *ff.*
Son of God. See "Trinity" and "Chris-
 tology."
Spirit, the Holy, 89 *ff.*, 208 *ff.*, 339,
 ii. 102 *f.*, 314 *f.*, 318.
Supererogation, works of, 130, 378 *f.*
Supra-lapsarian theory, ii. 166 *f.*, 330.
Swedenborgians, ii. 264 *f.*, 285 *f.*, 360 *f.*,
 398 *f.*

TRACTARIANISM. See "Ritualism."
Tradition, 47 *ff.*, 182 *ff.*, 324 *ff.*, ii. 63 *ff.*,
 68 *f.*, 282 *f.*
Traducianism, 104, 225, 346, ii. 109 *f.*,
 328 *f.*
Transcendentalism, New England, ii.
 267 *f.*
Transubstantiation. See "Eucharist."
Trichotomy, 101 *f.*, 224, 346, ii. 108,
 325 *ff.*
Trinity, 63 *ff.*, 194 *ff.*, 337 *f.*, ii. 96 *ff.*,
 311 *ff.*

ULTRAMONTANISM, ii. 184, 280, 379 *ff.*
Unitarians, ii. 32 *ff.*, 265 *ff.*, 315 *ff.*
Universalists, ii. 268 *f.*, 397.

VATICAN Council, ii. 280, 379 *ff.*
Virgin Mary, 132, 266 *f.*, 381 *f.*, ii. 281.

WALDENSES, 298, 419.

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

- ABELARD, 301, 305, 309, 312, 317, 335, 337 *f.*, 344 *f.*, 348, 355, 364 *f.*, 367, 373, 385 *f.*, 397, 401, 403.
 Abubacer, 307.
 Ackermann, 19 *f.*, 167, 303 *f.*
 Adam, Jean, ii. 75.
 Adrian IV., Pope, ii. 154.
 Aëtius, 177, 189.
 Agricola, ii. 55.
 Agrippa of Nettesheim, ii. 13.
 Alanus, 312.
 Albertus Magnus, 301, 313, 318, 330, 333, 346, 351, 399.
 Alcott, A. B., ii. 268.
 Alcuin, 311, 320, 358 *f.*, 394.
 Alexander, Natalis, ii. 50.
 Alfarabi, 307.
 Alford, Dean, ii. 287.
 Algazel, 307.
 Alkendi, 307.
 Allen, J. H., ii. 268.
 Alsted, J. A., ii. 45.
 Alting, James, ii. 45.
 Alting, J. H., ii. 45.
 Alzog, Johannes, ii. 75.
 Amalaricus of Metz, 396.
 Amalrich of Bena, 297, 415.
 Ambrose, 164, 171, 176, 178, 180 *f.*, 202 *ff.*, 210, 220 *f.*, 222, 223, 228 *f.*, 255, 266, 272 *f.*, 279, 283, 287.
 Ammon, C. F. von, ii. 259, 271.
 Ammonius Saccas, 166.
 Amort, Eusebius, ii. 281, 362.
 Amyraut, ii. 45, 53, 58, 166, 368.
 Anaxagoras, 12.
 Andreä, Jacob, ii. 44, 51.
 Andreä, J. V., ii. 44.
 Andrewes, ii. 47.
 Anselm, 305, 309, 312, 314, 316, 328 *f.*, 333 *ff.*, 338 *f.*, 341, 347 *ff.*, 361 *ff.*, 372 *f.*, ii. 84, 138.
 Apollinaris, Claudius, 32.
 Apollinaris of Laodicea, 177, 224, 244 *f.*, ii. 352.
 Aquinas, 297, 301, 305, 307, 313, 318, 323 *f.*, 326, 329 *ff.*, 339 *ff.*, 347 *ff.*, 351 *ff.*, 360 *f.*, 365, 367 *ff.*, 373 *f.*, 376 *ff.*, 384, 386 *ff.*, 389 *ff.*, 397 *ff.*, 405, 407 *ff.*, ii. 84, 113, 138.
 Aretius, ii. 45.
 Aristo, 32.
 Aristotle, 11, 13, 164 *f.*, 194, 294, 302 *ff.*, ii. 14.
 Arius, 177, 194 *ff.*
 Arminius, ii. 34, 46, 89, 94, 97, 129 *ff.*, 180, 263.
 Armsdorf, ii. 44, 55.
 Arnould, ii. 50, 59.
 Arndt, ii. 44.
 Arnobius, 18, 33, 36, 55, 57, 99, 103, 106, 153.
 Arnold, J. G., ii. 44.
 Arnold, Matthew, ii. 275, 297.
 Arnold, Thomas, ii. 275, 287, 379.
 Arrowsmith, ii. 48.
 Artemon, 30, 165.
 Athanasius, 41, 175, 177, 180, 183, 187, 189, 202 *ff.*, 209 *ff.*, 223 *ff.*, 227, 241, 255, 257 *f.*, 274 *f.*, 288.
 Athenagoras, 19, 32, 43, 60, 73 *f.*, 77, 86, 93, 96 *f.*, 106, 145, 150.
 Atwater, L. H., ii. 285, 339, 343, 354.
 Atwell, W. E., ii. 290.
 Auberlen, ii. 272, 389.
 Augustine, 39, 163 *f.*, 169, 171, 176, 178 *ff.*, 183, 187 *f.*, 191 *ff.*, 210, 212 *ff.*, 216 *ff.*, 219 *f.*, 221, 223 *ff.*, 229, 234 *ff.*, 242 *f.*, 251, 253 *ff.*, 258 *ff.*, 268 *f.*, 271 *ff.*, 276, 280, 282 *ff.*, 295, 323, 334, 338, 345, 347, 376, 405, ii. 89, 96 *f.*, 104, 156, 213.
 Avempace, 307.
 Averroës, 307.
 Avicbron, 307.
 Avicenna, 307, 310.
 BAADER, ii. 409 *f.*
 Bacon, Francis, ii. 14 *ff.*
 Bacon, Roger, 313, 318, 324.
 Bahrdt, ii. 270.
 Baier, ii. 44.
 Baillie, Robert, ii. 48.

- Baius, ii. 59, 115, 157.
 Ballou, Hosea, ii. 268, 397.
 Bancroft, Bishop, ii. 190.
 Barclay, ii. 37, 49, 75, 131, 137, 170, 178, 181.
 Barnabas, 32, 34, 38, 42, 72, 76.
 Barnes, Robert, ii. 125.
 Barrow, Isaac, ii. 47, 152, 169.
 Bartle, George, ii. 362.
 Basil, 175, 177, 180 *f.*, 186, 190, 202 *f.*, 208, 210, 219, 224, 228, 241, 255, 266, 272, 288, 294, 324.
 Basilides, 40.
 Bauer, Bruno, ii. 248.
 Baumgarten, ii. 259, 272, 284.
 Baur, F. C., 79, 81, 86, 103, 141, 199, 254, 396, ii. 76, 119, 271, 298, 372.
 Baxter, Richard, ii. 48, 53, 80, 94 *f.*, 142, 166, 178, 368.
 Becanus, ii. 50.
 Beck, J. T., ii. 272, 412.
 Becker, ii. 46.
 Becon, Thomas, ii. 47.
 Beecher, Edward, ii. 329.
 Beecher, Lyman, ii. 340.
 Beet, J. A., ii. 264.
 Beda, 311, 314, 320, 386.
 Bellamy, ii. 278, 375 *f.*
 Bellarmin, 277, ii. 49, 54, 59, 63 *f.*, 66, 76, 107, 111 *f.*, 113 *f.*, 132, 137, 138, 154 *f.*, 158, 172 *f.*, 179, 182 *f.*, 188, 192 *f.*, 196, 204, 215 *f.*
 Bellows, H. W., ii. 268, 289.
 Belsham, ii. 265.
 Benedict of Nursia, 171.
 Bengel, ii. 272, 389.
 Bennett, Thomas, ii. 137.
 Bentley, Richard, ii. 274.
 Berengar of Tours, 296, 312, 316, 396.
 Berkeley, Bishop, ii. 227 *f.*
 Bernard of Clairvaux, 312, 317, 323, 342, 344, 353 *f.*, 365 *f.*, 373, 377, 381, 392.
 Berridge, John, ii. 366.
 Beryllus, 30.
 Bethune, G. W., ii. 274.
 Beveridge, William, ii. 48, 128.
 Beza, ii. 45, 52, 91, 94, 122, 124, 164, 167, 200, 212.
 Bickersteth, Edward, ii. 389.
 Biddle, John, ii. 34, 102 *f.*, 173.
 Biel, 313, 354, 390, 393, 396.
 Bingham, Joseph, ii. 48.
 Blandrata, ii. 33.
 Blondel, David, ii. 45.
 Blount, ii. 81.
 Boehme, ii. 57 *f.*, 240, 406.
 Boëthius, 165, 189.
 Bolingbroke, 7, ii. 274, 294.
 Bona, John, ii. 50, 61.
 Bonar, A. A. and H., ii. 389.
 Bonaventura, 313, 318, 323, 324, 326, 331, 333 *f.*, 342, 345 *f.*, 349, 351, 355 *f.*, 361, 365, 370, 374, 381 *f.*, 387, 388, 390 *f.*, 402 *f.*, 406, 408.
 Boniface VIII., Pope, 335 *f.*
 Bonnet, ii. 231.
 Borromeo, ii. 49, 61.
 Bossuet, ii. 11, 50, 54, 61, 64 *f.*, 96, 105, 114, 158, 185, 196, 283.
 Bourignon, Madame, ii. 58.
 Bowen, Francis, ii. 250.
 Bowne, B. P., ii. 252, 321.
 Bradbury, ii. 277.
 Bradwardine, 313, 375.
 Bramhall, ii. 47.
 Brenz, ii. 44, 51, 135.
 Bretschneider, ii. 259, 271.
 Brine, John, ii. 279.
 Broadus, J. A., ii. 280.
 Bromley, Thomas, ii. 58.
 Brown, Robert, ii. 32.
 Bruce, A. B., 251, ii. 136, 276.
 Bruno, ii. 14, 105.
 Bucan, W., ii. 125, 165.
 Bucer, Martin, ii. 31, 45.
 Buckland, William, ii. 322.
 Buddeus, ii. 272.
 Bull, Bishop, 71, ii. 48, 53, 98 *f.*, 105, 169, 178, 180.
 Bullinger, ii. 27, 40, 45, 52, 123, 210.
 Bunyan, ii. 49, 141, 216.
 Burgess, Bishop, ii. 385.
 Burnet, Gilbert, ii. 48, 53, 80.
 Burnet, Thomas, ii. 137.
 Burmann, ii. 45.
 Burwash, N., ii. 264.
 Bush, George, ii. 395.
 Bushnell, Horace, ii. 352, 357 *f.*
 Butler, Bishop, ii. 274.
 Buxtorf, ii. 79.
 CABANIS, ii. 231.
 Caird, John, ii. 311.
 Cajetan, 393, ii. 49, 62, 104.
 Calamy, Edmund, ii. 48.
 Calderwood, Henry, ii. 276, 302, 307.
 Calixtus, ii. 44, 51, 57, 76, 119.
 Callistus, Roman Bishop, 35.
 Calov, ii. 44, 51, 73, 78, 89, 104 *f.*, 110, 213.
 Calvin, ii. 45, 51 *f.*, 72, 78, 84 *f.*, 91, 93, 96, 104, 106, 122, 126 *f.*, 141, 163 *f.*, 167, 176 *f.*, 179, 186, 188, 190 *f.*, 195, 199 *f.*, 207 *f.*, 210, 216.
 Cameron, John, ii. 45, 53.
 Campanella, ii. 14.
 Campanus, ii. 32.
 Campbell, J. McL., ii. 417.
 Canisius, ii. 49.
 Canus, ii. 49, 402.
 Capen, E. H., ii. 268.
 Cappel, ii. 45, 79.
 Cardanus, ii. 13.
 Carlyle, Thomas, ii. 239, 260.
 Carpov, ii. 259, 272.
 Carpozov, ii. 272.
 Cartwright, Thomas, ii. 48, 53, 190.
 Cassianus, 171, 176 *f.*, 219 *f.*, 239 *f.*, 265, 272.

Catharinus, ii. 112, 155.
 Cave, William, ii. 48.
 Celsus, 23, 74.
 Cerinthus, 25, 145.
 Chalmers, ii. 276, 322, 343.
 Chandler, Edward, ii. 274.
 Chandler, Samuel, ii. 274.
 Channing, ii. 267, 288, 315*f.*, 318, 359.
 Chapman, John, ii. 274.
 Charron, ii. 13.
 Chemnitz, ii. 44, 51, 65, 118, 135, 194, 201, 212.
 Chillingworth, ii. 47, 53, 69, 71, 169.
 Chrysostom, 175, 179*f.*, 220, 227*f.*, 243, 266, 278, 288, 372, ii. 76.
 Chubb, Thomas, 7, ii. 274, 294.
 Clarke, Adam, ii. 309, 313.
 Clarke, J. F., ii. 268, 317*f.*, 397.
 Clarke, Samuel, ii. 48, 53, 88, 92, 95, 99.
 Claudius of Savoy, ii. 32.
 Clement of Alexandria, 18*f.*, 32, 38, 42, 44*f.*, 51, 53*f.*, 57*f.*, 60, 77*f.*, 88*f.*, 90, 94, 96*f.*, 99*f.*, 104*f.*, 110, 113*f.*, 117, 121, 125, 127*f.*, 135, 137, 141, 144, 153*f.*, 163, 246.
 Clement of Rome, 32*f.*, 42, 72, 75, 116, 118, 127.
 Coccejus, ii. 45, 52, 87, 91, 104*f.*, 125, 127, 140, 214.
 Cochlaeus, ii. 49.
 Cocker, B. F., 13, 303*f.*
 Coelestius, 177, 229.
 Coleridge, ii. 19, 259, 275, 287, 358.
 Collins, J. A., 6, ii. 81, 274, 294.
 Comenius, ii. 108.
 Comte, ii. 252*f.*
 Conant, T. J., ii. 280.
 Condillac, ii. 231.
 Conybeare, John, ii. 274.
 Coster, ii. 49.
 Cotton, John, ii. 49.
 Cousin, ii. 231.
 Cramp, J. M., ii. 36.
 Cranmer, ii. 47, 53, 169, 190, 208.
 Crell, Johannes, ii. 46, 89*f.*, 147, 214.
 Crell, Nicolas, ii. 55*f.*
 Crisp, Tobias, ii. 141.
 Cudworth, ii. 19, 47, 87, 92, 94, 98, 169, 215.
 Culverwell, ii. 19.
 Cumming, John, ii. 389, 391.
 Cunningham, John, ii. 37.
 Cunningham, William, ii. 123, 125, 179, 276, 309, 355, 366.
 Curcellæus, ii. 46, 52, 74, 90*f.*, 93, 97*f.*, 104, 107*f.*, 129, 131, 144*f.*, 168, 181.
 Curtis, O. A., ii. 264.
 Cyprian, 33, 36, 45, 50, 96*f.*, 131, 133*f.*, 136, 137*f.*, 142*f.*, 148.
 Cyril of Alexandria, 175, 177, 219, 228, 247, 251, 257, 278.
 Cyril of Jerusalem, 175, 179, 183, 202*f.*, 209, 224, 227, 254*f.*, 271*f.*, 277*f.*, 280, 288.
 Cyril Lucar, ii. 43.

Dagg, J. L., ii. 280.
 Daillé, Jean, ii. 45.
 D'Ailly, Peter, 327.
 Daunhauer, ii. 44, 73.
 Dante, 313, 319, 405*f.*, 408*f.*
 Darwin, Doctor, ii. 231.
 Davenant, ii. 47, 166.
 Davenport, John, ii. 49.
 David of Dinanto, 297, 415.
 David, Francis, ii. 33, 102.
 Dawson, ii. 322.
 Day, Jeremiah, ii. 338.
 De Chandieu, ii. 45.
 Delitzsch, ii. 272, 323, 325*f.*, 351, 358, 389, 392*f.*
 Denck, John, ii. 32.
 Descartes, ii. 14*f.*, 21*f.*, 85*f.*
 De Wette, ii. 296*f.*, 360.
 Dewey, Orville, ii. 288.
 D'Holbach, ii. 231.
 Diderot, ii. 231.
 Didymus, 175, 210, 224, 286*f.*
 Dieringer, ii. 281, 307, 323, 328, 383, 398.
 Diodorus of Tarsus, 175, 177, 180, 187*f.*, 287.
 Dionysius of Alexandria, 32, 41, 56, 83, 146.
 Dionysius the Areopagite, 169*f.*, 186, 190, 219, 243, 271, 294, 307*f.*, 315, 334, 343.
 Dioscurus, 248.
 Doddridge, Philip, ii. 277, 286.
 Dodwell, Henry, ii. 201.
 Doederlein, ii. 272.
 Döllinger, ii. 280*f.*, 402.
 Dorchester, Daniel, ii. 318.
 Dorner, 27, 31, 70, 73, 83, 87, 114, 122, 199, 211, 246, 249, 251, 361, ii. 26, 51, 78, 100, 120, 137, 159, 179, 198, 272, 307*f.*, 312, 324, 328*f.*, 345, 351, 356, 361*f.*, 370, 384, 392, 394*f.*
 Drey, ii. 260, 281.
 Drusus, ii. 45.
 Druthmar, 396.
 Duffield, George, ii. 389.
 Du Moulin, ii. 45, 53.
 Duncker, 122.
 Duns Scotus, 302, 305, 313, 314, 318*f.*, 325*f.*, 330, 333*f.*, 336, 339*f.*, 345*f.*, 348*f.*, 352, 361, 365, 369*f.*, 375, 381*f.*, 387, 389*f.*, 393.
 Durandus, 313, 334, 345, 352, 354, 369, 378, 388*f.*, 403, 407, 409.
 Dwight, Timothy, ii. 278, 331, 361, 370, 394.
 EBRARD, ii. 273, 323, 349, 351, 362, 372, 382, 387.
 Eck, Joh., ii. 49.
 Eckermann, ii. 270.
 Eckhart, 313, 320, 323, 332, 338, 341, 410*f.*, 416.

- Edelmann, ii. 270.
 Edwards, Jonathan, ii. 277 *f.*, 309, 328, 330, 336 *f.*, 342, 370, 396.
 Edwards, Jr., ii. 273, 333, 361.
 Eichhorn, ii. 271, 321.
 Elipandus of Toledo, 358.
 Ellis, George E., ii. 359.
 Elliott, E. B., ii. 389.
 Elwert, ii. 290.
 Emerson, R. W., ii. 268.
 Emmons, ii. 278, 284, 309, 313, 323, 328, 331, 338, 343, 345, 361, 368, 371.
 Ephraem, the Syrian, 219.
 Epiphanius, 165, 175, 180, 210, 221, 252, 282, 288, 345.
 Episcopus, ii. 35, 46, 52, 73 *f.*, 79 *f.*, 90, 97 *f.*, 104, 130 *f.*, 144, 181.
 Erasmus, ii. 49.
 Erdmann, 169, 306, 309.
 Erigena, 301, 305, 308 *f.*, 312, 315 *f.*, 324, 332, 340 *f.*, 345 *ff.*, 355, 371, 395, 407 *f.*, 410 *f.*, ii. 134.
 Ernesti, J. A., ii. 270.
 Eugenius IV., Pope, 391.
 Eunomius, 177, 189, 200, 208.
 Eusebius of Cæsarea, 25 *f.*, 38, 41 *f.*, 66, 75, 164, 175, 177 *f.*, 206, 208, 211, 220, 222, 255, 272, 274.
 Eutyches, 177, 248.
 Eutychius, 285.
 Evagrius, 175.
- FARRAR, F. W., ii. 395.
 Faustus of Rhegium, 176 *f.*, 219, 225, 239 *f.*, 259.
 Felix of Urgellis, 358 *f.*
 Fénelon, ii. 50, 61.
 Feuerbach, ii. 248.
 Fichte, ii. 236 *ff.*, 251, 259 *f.*, 271, 348.
 Ficinus, 306, 346.
 Fisher, George P., ii. 340 *f.*
 Fiske, Daniel, ii. 361, 369.
 Finney, C. G., ii. 340, 345, 368, 377.
 Flacius, Matthias, ii. 44, 57, 85, 120.
 Flatt, K. C., ii. 386.
 Fleming, Robert, ii. 137.
 Fletcher, John, ii. 264.
 Florus Magister, 396.
 Forbes, John, ii. 47.
 Foster, James, ii. 274.
 Foster, R. S., ii. 323, 394.
 Fowler, Edward, ii. 19, 48, 137.
 Fox, George, ii. 37, 49.
 Francke, ii. 44.
 Frank, Sebastian, ii. 57.
 Frere, J. H., ii. 389.
 Fries, ii. 297.
 Frothingham, O. B., ii. 260.
 Froude, H., ii. 275.
 Fulgentius, 176, 219, 251, 262, 272.
 Fuller, Andrew, ii. 280.
- GABLER, ii. 321.
 Gannett, E. S., ii. 267, 288, 316.
 Gannett, William C., ii. 267.
 Gastrell, Francis, ii. 137.
 Gaunilo, 328 *f.*
 Gaussen, L., ii. 285.
 Gelasius, Roman Bishop, 276 *f.*
 Gennadius, 176 *f.*, 219, 224, 239, 272, 288.
 Gentilis, J. Val., ii. 32.
 Gerbert, Martin, ii. 281.
 Gerhard, John, 39, ii. 26, 44, 51, 62, 67, 73, 76 *f.*, 89, 91 *f.*, 97, 104 *f.*, 108 *ff.*, 118 *ff.*, 132, 136, 139, 160 *f.*, 177, 194 *f.*, 197 *f.*, 202, 212.
 Gerhart, E. V., ii. 387.
 Gernler, Lucas, ii. 45.
 Gerson, 313, 320, 325, 393.
 Gess, W. F., ii. 349 *f.*
 Geulincx, ii. 23.
 Gieseler, 5, 37, 71, 122, 124, 144, 266, 280, 325, 386, 396, 399, ii. 115 *f.*, 156.
 Gilbert Porretanus, 312, 337.
 Gill, John, ii. 279, 284, 389.
 Glanville, ii. 19.
 Gobarus, 26.
 Goethe, ii. 240, 260.
 Gomar, ii. 45, 52, 93, 105, 122, 140, 165, 167.
 Goodwin, H. M., ii. 325 *f.*, 351 *f.*
 Goodwin, John, ii. 28, 43, 54.
 Goodwin, Thomas, ii. 48.
 Gottschalk, 296, 312, 353, 370 *f.*
 Gould, Edwin, ii. 285.
 Gregory Nazianzen, 175, 177, 182 *ff.*, 187, 190, 194, 203 *f.*, 209 *ff.*, 219, 224, 227 *f.*, 252 *f.*, 257, 266, 272 *f.*, 275, 283, 287, 294, 315.
 Gregory of Nyssa, 165, 175, 177, 204, 210 *f.*, 217, 225, 227 *f.*, 242, 246, 251 *f.*, 256, 272 *f.*, 278, 283, 286, 294, 315, 347, 407, ii. 134.
 Gregory Thaumaturgus, 32, 121.
 Gregory of Valencia, ii. 49.
 Gregory I., Pope, 39, 170, 176, 178 *f.*, 185, 191, 193, 217, 219 *f.*, 222, 224 *f.*, 241, 253 *f.*, 258, 264 *f.*, 269, 271 *ff.*, 280, 284 *f.*, 288, 290.
 Gregory VII., Pope, 384 *f.*
 Gregory XIII., Pope, ii. 107.
 Gribaldi, ii. 32.
 Griffin, E. D., ii. 278, 339.
 Grotius, Hugo, ii. 46, 53, 80, 142 *ff.*
 Gryneus, ii. 45.
 Günther, ii. 260.
 Guericke, ii. 272.
 Guibert of Nogent, 312, 403.
 Guion, Madame, ii. 61.
 Guizot, ii. 273.
- HACKETT, H. B., ii. 280.
 Hävernack, ii. 272.

- Haffenreffer, ii. 44.
 Hagenbach, ii. 241, 273.
 Hahn, ii. 272, 323, 359, 371.
 Haimo of Halberstadt, 396.
 Hales, Alexander, 301, 306, 313, 314, 318, 333, 335, 345, 347, 349, 354, 365, 369, 374, 379, 398.
 Hales, John, ii. 47, 53.
 Hall, Joseph, ii. 47, 53, 180, 199, 211.
 Hall, Robert, ii. 279.
 Halyburton, ii. 48.
 Hamel, J. B. du, ii. 50, 59, 75, 156.
 Hamilton, Sir William, ii. 230, 304, 306, 319, 335.
 Hammond, Henry, ii. 47, 201.
 Harnack, A., 414, ii. 272, 411.
 Harris, Samuel, ii. 320.
 Hartley, ii. 231.
 Hartmann, ii. 249 *f.*
 Hedge, F. H., ii. 260, 268, 301, 307, 316 *ff.*, 319 *f.*, 329, 345 *f.*, 374, 397 *f.*
 Heerbrand, ii. 44.
 Hefe, 33, 195, 270, ii. 281.
 Hegel, ii. 242 *ff.*, 259 *f.*, 271, 346, 348, 360.
 Hegesippus, 25 *f.*
 Heidanus, ii. 45.
 Heidegger, ii. 46, 52.
 Helffenstein, Samuel, ii. 370.
 Henderson, Alexander, ii. 48.
 Henderson, E., ii. 286.
 Hengstenberg, ii. 272.
 Henke, ii. 270, 321.
 Henry of Ghent, 313.
 Henry, Matthew, ii. 49.
 Herbart, ii. 250.
 Herbert, Lord, 6, ii. 25, 81.
 Herder, ii. 61, 321.
 Hermas, 32, 34, 42, 72 *f.*, 76, 97 *f.*, 114, 125, 130, 153.
 Hermes, G., ii. 260, 340.
 Hermes Trismegistus, 335.
 Hermogenes, 93.
 Herrmann, J. G. W., ii. 272.
 Heshusius, ii. 44.
 Hetzer, ii. 32.
 Hilary of Poitiers, 38, 176, 191, 193, 202, 207, 210, 219, 223, 225, 228 *f.*, 246, 251, 255, 258, 271, 278, 288.
 Hill, Richard, ii. 263.
 Hill, Rowland, ii. 263.
 Hincmar, 312, 371 *f.*, 395, 396.
 Hippolytus, 24, 33, 35, 39, 50, 80, 90 *f.*, 120, 125, 147.
 Hobbes, ii. 16 *ff.*, 81, 214, 216.
 Hochstetter, ii. 44.
 Hodge, Charles, 390, ii. 277, 285, 307, 309 *f.*, 323, 325, 328, 330, 339, 343, 345, 354, 361, 366 *f.*, 370, 386, 391, 394.
 Hoffmann, Daniel, ii. 26.
 Hofmann, J. C. K. von, ii. 272, 287, 323 *f.*, 389.
 Hofmann, Melchior, ii. 32.
 Hollaz, ii. 26, 44, 73, 78, 89, 105, 110, 118, 136, 139, 162, 198, 216.
 Honorius I., Pope, 270.
 Hooker, Richard, ii. 47, 53, 190, 208, 211.
 Hooker, Thomas, ii. 49.
 Hooper, John, ii. 46.
 Hoornbeck, ii. 45.
 Hopkins, Samuel, ii. 278, 309, 313, 328, 330, 338, 361.
 Howe, John, ii. 49, 54, 89.
 Hovey, Alvah, ii. 280, 343.
 Hülsemann, ii. 44, 73.
 Hugo of St. Victor, 312, 316 *f.*, 330, 332, 334, 337, 341 *ff.*, 345, 347, 349, 351, 353, 355 *f.*, 360, 365 *ff.*, 372, 377, 380, 386, 388, 391 *ff.*, 398, 400, 408.
 Hume, David, ii. 228 *ff.*
 Hundeshagen, ii. 273.
 Hunnius, ii. 44, 51.
 Hunt, John, ii. 35, 201.
 Huss, John, 298, 313, 324, 387, 421, ii. 6, 188.
 Hussey, J., ii. 137.
 Hutter, ii. 44.
 Huxley, ii. 253.
 Hyperius, ii. 45.
 IBAS, 250.
 Ignatius, 32, 34, 72, 76, 116, 120, 128, 133, 145, 153.
 Innocent III., Pope, 312, 385, 396 *f.*, 402, 408 *f.*
 Irenæus, 20, 24, 27, 33, 39 *f.*, 44 *f.*, 54, 72, 75, 77 *ff.*, 88, 90, 93 *f.*, 96, 99, 101 *ff.*, 108, 113, 117 *ff.*, 128, 133 *f.*, 137, 139 *ff.*, 145 *f.*, 147, 150, 155.
 Irving, E., ii. 415.
 Isidore, the pseudo, 34.
 Isidore of Seville, 176.
 JACKSON, Thomas, ii. 47.
 Jacobi, ii. 248, 259 *f.*
 Jamblicus, 166.
 Jansenius, ii. 60, 115, 157.
 Jerome, 39, 91, 171, 176, 178 *ff.*, 221, 225, 282, 285, 288.
 Jewell, John, ii. 47, 53, 208.
 Joachim, 298.
 John of Damascus, 6, 253, 293 *f.*, 307, 311, 324, 332, 334, 342, 343, 355, 357 *f.*, 370, 393.
 John of Paris, 396.
 John of Salisbury, 305, 312
 John XXII., Pope, 405.
 Jonas, Justus, ii. 44.
 Joris, David, ii. 32.
 Jouffroy, ii. 231.
 Jowett, B., 14, ii. 275.
 Julian the Apostate, 168.
 Julian of Eclanum, 177, 230, 233.
 Junius, F., ii. 45.
 Jurieu, ii. 213.
 Justinian, 61, 185.

- Justin Martyr, 18 *f.*, 24, 32, 35, 36, 40, 43, 47, 53, 57, 73, 76 *f.*, 85, 90, 93, 101 *f.*, 103, 114, 117, 119 *f.*, 135, 137, 139 *f.*, 145, 150, 152 *f.*, 163.
- KAFTAN**, J., ii. 272.
- Kahnis, 91, 101, 122, 125, 227, 253, 356, 396, ii. 117, 121 *f.*, 162, 272, 292, 307, 309, 314, 323 *f.*, 329, 344, 356, 364 *f.*, 384, 392 *f.*
- Kant, ii. 231 *f.*, 238, 259 *f.*, 271, 300 *f.*, 335, 348, 360.
- Karsten, ii. 339.
- Keble, ii. 386.
- Keil, ii. 272.
- Keim, T., ii. 413.
- Kempis, Thomas à, 313, 320.
- Kendrick, A. C., ii. 280.
- Kingsley, Charles, ii. 275.
- Klee, 393, ii. 260, 281, 286, 301, 313, 323, 328, 364, 382 *f.*, 388.
- Knapp, G. C., ii. 272, 322, 386.
- Knox, John, ii. 48.
- König, ii. 44, 73.
- Köstlin, ii. 8, 76, 159, 188.
- Koonheert, ii. 34.
- Krauth, C. P., ii. 273, 386.
- Kroll, ii. 360.
- Krug, ii. 360.
- Kuenen, ii. 273, 298.
- Kurtz, ii. 322 *f.*
- LABADIE**, ii. 58.
- Lactantius, 6, 18, 22, 33, 36, 56 *f.*, 84, 91, 93, 96, 103 *f.*, 109 *f.*, 146 *f.*, 153, 155.
- Ladd, G. T., ii. 291.
- La Mettrie, ii. 231.
- Lanfranc, 312, 316.
- Lange, J. P., ii. 273, 287, 324, 362, 392, 394.
- La Place, ii. 45, 53, 58, 127.
- Lardner, ii. 274.
- La Saussaye, ii. 274.
- Lasson, 338.
- Latimer, Hugh, ii. 46, 169, 210.
- Laud, William, ii. 47.
- Law, William, ii. 274.
- Lawrence, E. A., ii. 339.
- Leade, Jane, ii. 58.
- Le Clerc, ii. 46, 80, 98.
- Leibnitz, ii. 25, 223 *f.*, 300, 320, 345.
- Leighton, Robert, ii. 47.
- Leland, John, ii. 274.
- Leo I., Roman Bishop, 176, 178, 248, 253 *f.*, 257, 264 *f.*, 267, 269, 271 *f.*
- Leo IX., Pope, 326.
- Leo X., Pope, 346.
- Less, ii. 59, 75, 156.
- Lessing, ii. 295, 396.
- Lewis, Tayler, ii. 274, 322.
- Leydecker, ii. 46.
- Lidgett, J. S., ii. 264.
- Liebner, ii. 272, 313, 362.
- Lightfoot, John, ii. 47.
- Liguori, A., ii. 402 *f.*
- Limborch, ii. 46, 53, 74, 79, 89, 91, 93, 97, 104 *f.*, 107 *f.*, 130 *f.*, 133, 144 *f.*, 177, 181, 212, 214, 216.
- Lindsey, Theophilus, ii. 102, 265.
- Locke, ii. 18 *f.*, 71, 87 *f.*, 103, 259.
- Lombard, 294, 312, 316 *f.*, 338, 341 *f.*, 351, 360, 365 *f.*, 376, 379, 388, 390 *f.*, 397 *f.*, 400 *f.*, 403, 406, 409.
- Lotze, ii. 250 *f.*, 300 *f.*
- Lowth, William, ii. 287.
- Lucian, 23.
- Lücke, F., ii. 272.
- Lullus, 307, 313, 369.
- Luthardt, ii. 272, 324.
- Luther, ii. 5 *f.*, 30, 43, 50, 54, 67 *f.*, 71 *f.*, 76, 93, 106, 108, 117 *f.*, 120 *f.*, 134 *f.*, 138, 159, 174 *f.*, 179, 186, 188, 190, 194, 205 *f.*, 209 *f.*, 212, 213, 386.
- MCCABE**, F. D., ii. 309.
- Maccovius, ii. 45, 125, 152, 216.
- Macedonius, 208 *f.*
- Maimonides, 307.
- Maitland, S. R., 420.
- Major, George, ii. 55.
- Maldonat, ii. 49.
- Malebranche, ii. 23.
- Mamertus Claudianus, 176, 219, 225.
- Manning, Cardinal, ii. 380 *f.*
- Mansel, H. L., ii. 304 *f.*
- Marcellus, 197.
- Marcion, 39, 46, 62.
- Maresius, ii. 45, 104.
- Marheinecke, ii. 259, 290, 311, 360, 372, 384, 386.
- Martensen, ii. 272, 287, 307 *f.*, 312, 320, 323 *f.*, 329, 351 *f.*, 362, 365, 384, 392, 394 *f.*, 399, 407 *f.*
- Martin of Tours, 171.
- Martineau, James, ii. 265, 318.
- Mather, Cotton, ii. 49.
- Mather, Richard, ii. 49.
- Maurice, F. D., ii. 275, 358, 373, 395.
- Maximus, 170, 175, 190, 315.
- Mead, C. M., ii. 325.
- Mede, Joseph, ii. 213.
- Melanchthon, ii. 43, 50, 54, 56, 70, 117 *f.*, 135, 159, 161, 187, 194, 365.
- Melito, 32, 38, 60.
- Melville, Andrew, ii. 48.
- Menno Simons, ii. 35, 137.
- Methodius, 32, 90, 96, 150.
- Meyer, ii. 272.
- Michael Cerularius, 295.
- Michaelis, ii. 270.
- Miley, John, ii. 355.
- Mill, James, ii. 254.
- Mill, John, ii. 48.
- Mill, John Stuart, ii. 253 *f.*, 256, 307.
- Millard, David, ii. 269.
- Milton, John, ii. 48, 103 *f.*, 213.
- Minucius, Felix, 18, 33, 56 *f.*, 98.
- Möhler, ii. 43, 107, 281 *f.*, 363 *f.*, 370.
- Molina, ii. 49, 59, 93, 115, 156.

- Molinos, ii. 61.
 Montaigne, ii. 13.
 More, Henry, ii. 19, 47, 109 *f.*, 137, 215.
 Morell, J. D., ii. 290 *f.*
 Morgan, Thomas, 7, ii. 274, 294.
 Morus, ii. 272.
 Mosheim, ii. 272.
 Mozley, J. B., ii. 283, 385.
 Müller, J., ii. 272, 310, 313, 324, 329,
 333 *f.*, 345 *f.*, 362, 394.
 Mulford, E., ii. 373 *f.*
 Murray, John, ii. 269, 397.
 Musæus, ii. 44, 51, 76.
 Musculus, ii. 45, 139.
 Mussus, Cornelius, ii. 66.

 NEANDER, 26, 182, 298, 354, ii. 272.
 Nemesius, 163, 294.
 Nestorius, 177, 247.
 Nevin, John W., ii. 274, 382, 387.
 Newnan, J. H., ii. 67, 275, 282 *f.*, 381.
 Newton, Sir Isaac, ii. 103.
 Nicetas Choniates, 294.
 Nicolai, M., ii. 44.
 Nicolas of Cusa, ii. 14.
 Nicolas de Clemangis, 324.
 Nicolaus of Methone, 294, 346.
 Nicole, ii. 50, 59, 105, 113, 155, 193,
 196.
 Niemeyer, ii. 271.
 Nitzsch, 62, ii. 272, 290, 324, 357, 362,
 365, 384, 392, 394.
 Noetus, 30.
 Norris, John, ii. 19, 48, 87, 132.
 Norton, Andrews, ii. 267.
 Novalis, ii. 260.
 Novatian, 33, 35, 57, 81, 85 *f.*, 90, 98,
 147, 150.
 Numenius, 66.
 Nye, Philip, ii. 48.

 OCCAM, 302, 310, 313, 319, 325, 327, 332,
 354.
 Odo of Cambray, 312, 346, 350, 397.
 Ocolampadius, ii. 206.
 Oehler, ii. 272.
 Oetinger, ii. 272, 358.
 Oisclinger, ii. 281.
 Olevianus, ii. 40.
 Olivers, Thomas, ii. 263.
 Olshausen, ii. 272, 395.
 Origen, 19 *f.*, 24, 32, 36, 38 *ff.*, 58 *ff.*, 65,
 72, 75, 81 *ff.*, 86 *ff.*, 89 *ff.*, 94 *f.*, 96 *ff.*,
 111 *ff.*, 116 *f.*, 120 *f.*, 123 *ff.*, 126 *ff.*,
 135, 137 *f.*, 142 *ff.*, 146 *f.*, 149 *ff.*, 154 *f.*,
 163, 197, 216, 234, 241, 286, 315, 345,
 347.
 Osiander, ii. 44, 56, 137, 177, 372.
 Outram, William, ii. 47.
 Owen, John, ii. 49, 54, 125, 141 *f.*, 176.

 PAPIAS, 32, 145.
 Paracelsus, ii. 13, 108.
 Park, E. A., ii. 278, 341.
 Parker, Matthew, ii. 47.
 Parker, Theodore, ii. 268.
 Pascal, ii. 29, 50, 59.
 Patrick, Simon, ii. 47.
 Patritius, ii. 14.
 Paul of Samosata, 30 *f.*
 Paulus, ii. 270, 295 *f.*, 321.
 Pearce, Zachary, ii. 274.
 Pearson, John, ii. 47, 99.
 Pelagius, 177, 229 *ff.*
 Pendleton, J. H., ii. 280.
 Penn, William, ii. 37, 49, 100.
 Perkins, William, ii. 47, 105, 125, 128,
 140 *f.*, 166, 188.
 Perowne, J. J. S., ii. 394.
 Perrone, ii. 281, 286, 310, 323, 363, 370,
 381, 383, 388.
 Petavius, 66, 71, 277, 393, ii. 29, 50, 54,
 59, 96, 104 *f.*, 111 *f.*, 132, 137, 152,
 156, 216.
 Peter Martyr, ii. 31, 45.
 Peter of Poitiers, 312.
 Petersen, William, ii. 213, 215.
 Peyrère, Isaac, ii. 105.
 Pfaff, C. M., ii. 272.
 Philaret, ii. 281.
 Philippi, F. A., ii. 272, 324.
 Philo, 37, 42 *f.*, 65, 67 *ff.*, 100, 126, 166,
 195.
 Philoponus, 285.
 Philostorgius, 195.
 Photinus, 198.
 Photius, 188, 195.
 Pighius, ii. 49, 66, 112.
 Piscator, ii. 45, 123, 140, 165.
 Pistorius, Adam, ii. 32.
 Pius V., Pope, ii. 107.
 Pius IX., Pope, ii. 281.
 Planck, G. J., ii. 272.
 Plato, 14 *ff.*, 64 *ff.*, 164 *f.*, 168, 302 *ff.*, ii. 14.
 Platon, ii. 281.
 Pliny, 74.
 Plotinus, 66, 166 *ff.*
 Poirer, Pierre, ii. 58, 137.
 Polycarp, 32, 76, 145.
 Pond, Enoch, ii. 278, 285, 309, 322 *f.*,
 330, 361, 394.
 Pope, W. B., ii. 264, 310, 325, 328, 341,
 345, 370.
 Pordage, John, ii. 58.
 Porphyry, 23, 166.
 Praxeas, 30, 79.
 Preger, W., 416 *f.*
 Pressensé, ii. 273.
 Prideaux, John, ii. 47.
 Priestley, Joseph, ii. 231, 265, 327, 395.
 Proclus, 166, 170, 294.
 Prosper, 176, 262.
 Pullus, 312, 316, 331, 346, 355, 384, 392,
 398, 400, 408.
 Pusey, E. B., ii. 275, 283 *f.*, 372, 386.

- QUADRATUS**, 32.
Quenstedt, ii. 26, 44, 51, 73, 77, 93, 97,
 104*f.*, 108, 110, 121, 136, 139, 161,
 187, 197*f.*
Quesnel, ii. 50, 59, 115, 153*f.*, 157.
- RABANUS MAURUS**, 311, 320, 396.
Radbertus, Paschasius, 312, 381, 386,
 394*f.*, 397.
Ramus, Peter, ii. 13.
Randall, Benjamin, ii. 264.
Rathmann, ii. 78.
Ratramnus, 312, 371, 395.
Raymond, M., ii. 264, 309, 328.
Raymond of Sabunde, 313, 331, 346.
Redepenning, 87, 117, 149.
Reed, James, ii. 265, 360.
Reid, Thomas, ii. 230, 334.
Reinbeck, ii. 272.
Reinhard, ii. 272, 386.
Reinkens, ii. 280.
Reischle, M., ii. 272.
Remigius, 371.
Renan, ii. 348.
Reuchlin, ii. 13.
Reusch, ii. 259.
Richard of St. Victor, 312, 337, 339, 353,
 367, 381, 400*f.*
Richter, ii. 260.
Ridley, Nicholas, ii. 46, 169.
Rigg, J. H., ii. 341.
Ripley, George, ii. 268.
Ritschl, 364, 378, ii. 139, 259, 418*ff.*
Ritter, 14, 303.
Rivet, ii. 45, 125.
Robertson, William, ii. 276.
Robinson, John, ii. 32, 43.
Röhr, ii. 270, 295.
Romaine, William, ii. 366.
Romang, ii. 324.
Roscelin, 296, 309, 312, 337.
Rothe, ii. 272, 290, 301, 307, 320, 324,
 328*f.*, 346, 351, 357, 362, 365, 379,
 389, 396.
Royer-Collard, ii. 231.
Rufinus, 38, 176.
Rupert of Dentz, 312, 369, 396.
Rust, George, ii. 19.
Rutherford, Samuel, ii. 48, 95, 139.
Ruysbroek, 313, 320.
- SABELLIUS**, 30*f.*, 79.
Sack, K. H., ii. 273.
Sailer, Michael, ii. 281.
Sales, Francis de, ii. 49, 61.
Salmeron, ii. 49.
Salvianus, 176.
Sanchez, ii. 13.
Sarpi, Paul, ii. 62, 155, 194.
Sartorius, ii. 272, 313.
Savonarola, 313, 423, ii. 6.
- Schaff**, 185, 241, ii. 177, 272, 274,
 364.
Schelling, ii. 239*ff.*, 259*f.*, 271, 348.
Schenkel, ii. 349.
Schindler, M. J., ii. 213.
Schleiermacher, ii. 248*f.*, 259*f.*, 271,
 289, 307, 310, 314, 346, 360, 364, 372,
 395.
Schlichtingius, ii. 46, 214.
Schmalz, ii. 46.
Schmid, C. F., ii. 272.
Schmid, J. W., ii. 259.
Schmucker, ii. 273, 356, 371, 386.
Schneckenburger, ii. 273.
Schöberlein, ii. 327, 351, 362.
Schomann, ii. 46.
Schopenhauer, ii. 249.
Schubert, ii. 259.
Schulthess, ii. 271.
Schweizer, ii. 104, 273, 395.
Schwenkfeld, ii. 57, 108, 137.
Scott, Thomas, ii. 375.
Seiler, G. F., ii. 272.
Seiss, J. A., ii. 389*ff.*
Sellon, Walter, ii. 263.
Selnecker, ii. 44.
Semler, ii. 270, 294*f.*
Serry, ii. 104.
Servetus, ii. 32, 100.
Shaftesbury, 6, ii. 81.
Shedd, W. G. T., ii. 131, 301, 342.
Sherlock, Thomas, ii. 274.
Sherlock, William, ii. 48, 53, 139, 169,
 217.
Simon, Richard, ii. 50, 65, 82*f.*
Simson, ii. 276.
Smalbrooke, ii. 274.
Smalley, ii. 278.
Smith, H. B., ii. 277, 307, 309, 325, 329,
 343, 356, 370, 394.
Smith, John, ii. 47.
Smyth, John, ii. 35.
Smythe, Newman, ii. 322, 392.
Socinus, Faustus, ii. 28, 33, 46, 80, 85,
 89, 102, 132, 145*ff.*, 202.
Socinus, Lælius, ii. 33, 46.
Socrates, the historian, 175, 189.
Soto, Pedro de, ii. 65.
South, Robert, ii. 48, 53.
Sozomen, 175, 197.
Spangenberg, ii. 261.
Spanheim, F., ii. 45.
Spencer, Herbert, ii. 254*ff.*, 304, 306.
Spener, ii. 44, 57.
Spinoza, ii. 24*f.*, 81*f.*, 245.
Spring, Samuel, ii. 278.
Stäudlin, ii. 259.
Stanley, A. P., ii. 275, 378.
Stapfer, ii. 343.
Staudenmaier, ii. 260, 281*f.*, 301, 307,
 312, 323.
Stephen, Roman Bishop, 51, 188.
Stewart, Dugald, ii. 280, 335.
Stillingfleet, ii. 47, 53, 87, 190.

- Stöckl, 341.
 Storr, G. C., ii. 272, 355, 386.
 Strabo, Walafrid, 311, 396.
 Strauss, David, ii. 248, 271, 297, 348.
 Strigel, Victorin, ii. 44, 55.
 Stuart, Moses, ii. 313 *f.*
 Suarez, 352, ii. 49, 54, 93, 111, 158, 402.
 Suso, 313, 320, 417.
 Swedenborg, ii. 264, 315, 353, 360 *f.*, 398.
 Synesius, 169.

 TANNER, Adam, ii. 50.
 Tatian, 21, 32, 35, 73, 77, 85, 101 *ff.*, 145, 150.
 Tauler, 313, 320, 417.
 Taurellus, ii. 13.
 Taylor, D. T., ii. 389.
 Taylor, Jeremy, ii. 47, 53, 107, 126, 169, 178.
 Taylor, N. W., ii. 278, 332, 339, 368.
 Telesius, ii. 14.
 Terry, M., ii. 264.
 Tertullian, 21, 33, 35, 38, 43 *f.*, 54, 59 *f.*, 62 *f.*, 72, 75, 79 *f.*, 85 *f.*, 90, 93 *f.*, 96 *f.*, 99, 101 *f.*, 104 *ff.*, 112 *f.*, 117, 131 *f.*, 136 *ff.*, 141 *f.*, 145 *ff.*, 150 *f.*, 153, 155, 189.
 Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, 320.
 Theodore of Mopsuestia, 175, 177 *f.*, 228, 247, 250, 287.
 Theodoret, 66, 164 *f.*, 175, 180, 208, 218, 220 *ff.*, 224 *f.*, 227, 243, 250, 258, 265, 272, 275.
 Theodorus, 170.
 Theodotus, 30, 165.
 Theophilus, 18, 32, 55, 57, 60, 73, 77, 85, 90, 94, 99 *f.*, 103, 108, 145, 153.
 Theophylact, 311.
 Tholuck, A., ii. 272, 287, 324.
 Thomassin, ii. 50, 110, 114, 154 *f.*, 158.
 Thomasius, Christian, ii. 44.
 Thomasius, G., 251, ii. 272, 324, 329, 340 *f.*, 343, 349 *f.*, 356, 362, 365.
 Tieftunk, ii. 259, 360.
 Tigert, J. J., ii. 264.
 Tillett, W. F., ii. 264.
 Tillotson, John, ii. 47, 71, 139, 142, 169, 201.
 Tindal, Matthew, 6, ii. 274, 294.
 Töllner, ii. 294, 357.
 Toland, 6, ii. 81.
 Toplady, ii. 263.
 Townsend, L. T., ii. 322.
 Trevor, George, ii. 386.
 Tulloch, John, ii. 28, 276.
 Turretin, ii. 27, 45, 52, 78, 91, 94 *f.*, 104 *f.*, 109, 125, 132 *f.*, 140, 152, 165 *f.*, 167, 176 *f.*, 179, 188, 201 *f.*, 216.
 Twisten, ii. 272, 290, 301, 307, 313, 324.
 Twisse, William, ii. 48, 53, 95, 123, 125, 139, 167.
 Tyler, Bennet, ii. 343.

 UEBERWEG, 319, ii. 249.
 Ullmann, 275, 422, ii. 272.
 Ulrici, ii. 303.
 Ursinus, ii. 40, 45.
 Usher, James, ii. 42, 47, 53, 105, 128, 142, 152, 166, 190, 201.
 Uytenbogaert, ii. 46.

 VALLA, L., 414.
 Vanema, Hermann, ii. 343.
 Van Oosterzee, ii. 274, 287, 302, 308, 310, 321, 323, 325, 332, 341, 361, 389, 393, 396.
 Vasquez, ii. 49.
 Vincentius, 176 *f.*, 183, 185, 239, ii. 157.
 Vitringa, ii. 46, 52.
 Voëtius, ii. 27, 45, 52, 79, 128.
 Voltaire, 7, ii. 294.
 Vorstius, ii. 46, 89 *f.*
 Vossius, ii. 45, 52, 139, 200.

 WALCH, J. G., ii. 272.
 Walden, Thomas, 327.
 Waldo, Peter, 298, 419.
 Walter of St. Victor, 312, 317.
 Walton, Bryan, ii. 47.
 Warburton, ii. 274, 287.
 Ware, Henry, father and son, ii. 267.
 Waterland, ii. 48, 99 *f.*
 Watson, John, ii. 240.
 Watson, Richard, ii. 178, 264, 308, 328, 341, 356, 371, 375, 385.
 Watts, Isaac, ii. 277, 353, 383.
 Wegscheider, ii. 271, 295 *f.*, 315.
 Weigel, ii. 57, 103, 137.
 Weiss, Bernhard, ii. 272.
 Weisse, ii. 328.
 Wellhausen, ii. 298.
 Werner, 342, 354, ii. 340, 362.
 Wesley, John, ii. 262, 308, 328, 341, 371, 375 *f.*, 385, 396.
 Wessel, John, 313, 320, 324, 369, 421 *f.*
 West, Stephen, ii. 278.
 Westcott, 40.
 Westphal, ii. 44.
 Whately, ii. 378, 392.
 Whedon, ii. 264, 310, 334, 337.
 Whichcote, ii. 19, 28, 47, 94, 139, 217.
 Whitaker, William, ii. 47.
 Whitby, Daniel, ii. 48, 213.
 White, Edward, ii. 328, 396.
 White, William, ii. 275.
 Whitefield, George, ii. 262.
 Whitgift, John, ii. 41, 47, 190.
 William of Champeaux, 309, 312, 317.
 William of Paris, 393.
 Williams, Roger, ii. 86, 49, 189.
 Wilson, D., ii. 286.
 Winchell, Alexander, ii. 322.
 Winchester, Elhanan, ii. 269.
 Wiseman, ii. 283.
 Wissowatius, ii. 46, 215.
 Witsius, ii. 46, 140, 166 *f.*, 201.

- | | |
|---|--|
| Wolff, ii. 226, 259. | ZACHARIA, ii. 386. |
| Wolleb, ii. 45, 152. | Zanchi, ii. 45, 94, 96, 125, 132, 140, 165. |
| Wolzogen, ii. 46, 85, 108, 147. | Zeller, E., 15, 166. |
| Woods, Leonard, ii. 278, 285, 309, 330, 339, 343, 361, 368. | Zephyrinus, Roman Bishop, 35. |
| Woolston, Thomas, 6, ii. 274. | Zigabenus, Euthymius, 294. |
| Worcester, Samuel, ii. 267. | Zinzendorf, 6, ii. 261. |
| Worthington, ii. 19. | Zwingli, ii. 9, 27, 30, 44, 51 <i>f.</i> , 78, 121 <i>f.</i> , 124 <i>f.</i> , 130, 139, 152, 162, 183, 195, 206 <i>f.</i> |
| Wycliffe, 298, 313, 324 <i>f.</i> , 355, 375, 383, 387, 398, 402, 406, 420. | |

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